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The main objective of this thesis is to investigate corporate governance practices in 
South Africa listed companies. Specifically, the thesis strives to achieve the following 
objectives. First, it investigates the extent of compliance with the best corporate governance 
practices as recommended by the King Committee on Corporate Governance prior to and 
post 2002 in order to understand whether there is improvement in corporate practices.  
Second the thesis investigates whether compliance with the best corporate governance 
practices are related to ethnicity of board structures (in particular Board Chairman, Board 
Dominance and Chief Executive Officer/Managing Director) and other factors such as 
company characteristics, market and performance related variables. Third it investigates the 
views/opinions of key stakeholders [e.g. regulators, King Code Commissioners, companies 
and institutional investors] regarding the state of corporate governance in SA and its 
influence in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region. 
The findings from regression results indicate that compliance with the King Code 
increased substantially between 2002 and 2008. The results also indicate that compliance is 
high for accounting and auditing and boards and directors issues and lowest for integrated 
sustainability reporting issues. The findings also indicate that ethnicity influences corporate 
compliance with best practice governance principles such as the King Code, as per 
prediction. Compliance was also found to be high for large firms, firms with multiple listings 
in other stock exchanges and firms audited by Big 4 audit firms. 
Finally, the findings from the views of key stakeholders indicate that the Code has 
indeed improved corporate governance standards in South Africa, is suitable for the country 
because of its consideration of local circumstances and influences corporate practice in the 
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Definition of Key Terms and Abbreviations 
a. Ubuntu – African humanism or the foundation of sound human relations in 
African societies. It means “humanness” or being “being human” and includes 
supportiveness, co-operation and solidarity (King Report, 2002, p. 94). The King 
Code advocates for recognition of the culture within which governance is 
practiced. In this case the Ubuntu culture. 
b. Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu – “I am because we are and therefore I am” 
(Karsten and Illa, 2005). This concept defines culture in the African context. 
c. King Code/Report – A report on corporate governance reform in South Africa. 
d. Compliance - the state of being in accordance with established guidelines, 
specifications, or legislation or the process of becoming so and communicating 
this state through established mediums of disseminating information to the 
relevant publics. 
e. “Whites” and “Blacks” – two main ethnic groups in South Africa as defined 
during the apartheid era. 
f.  “Therisanyo” /consultation – this concept is emphasized in the African culture of 
Ubuntu.  
g. TCI – Total Compliance Index 
h. VCI – Voluntary Compliance Index 
i. MCI – Mandatory Compliance Index 
j. THEME1 – Boards and Directors Issues 
k. THEME2 – Risk Management 
l. THEME3 - Accounting and Auditing 




1 Chapter One: Introduction 
 
1.0 Introduction 
The main objective of this thesis is to investigate corporate governance practices in 
South African JSE Securities Exchange (the JSE) listed companies. Specifically, the thesis 
strives to investigate the extent of compliance with best corporate governance practices as 
recommended by the King Committee on Corporate Governance prior to and post 2002 in 
order to understand whether there is improvement in corporate practices.  Corporate 
governance (CG) can be defined in terms of narrow definitions oriented around corporate 
accountability to shareholders (West, 2006, p. 434) or broader definitions that stress 
accountability to or meeting the interests of diverse societal stakeholder groups (Letza et al., 
2004, p. 243). Under the narrow definitions, CG may be defined as: “…the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled” (Cadbury, 1992, sec 2.5 p. 14) or “…the ways in 
which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their 
investment” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p. 737). Claessens (2006, p. 94) defines CG as “…a 
set of mechanisms designed to reduce agency costs associated with the separation of 
ownership and decision control”. The narrow definitions of CG tend to reflect the Berle and 
Means (1932), Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama and Jensen (1983) agency theory 
approach which posits that the interests of the owners of the corporation will differ from 
those of management and suggests monitoring mechanisms are put in place to safeguard 
these interests. The narrow definitions of CG also tend to “emphasize the primacy of 
ownership and property rights, and focus the corporate objectives on returning a profit to 
shareholders over the long term (contractarian view)” (Smith et al., 2005, p. 3). The 
contractarian view of CG is observed in the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom 
i.e. the Anglo-American Model. Under this view, employees, suppliers and other creditors 
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have contractual claims on the corporation. As owners with property rights, shareholders 
have a claim to whatever is left after all contractual claimants have been paid. 
In contrast to the narrow definitions, the broad definitions assume a corporation to be 
a social entity that has accountability and responsibility to a variety of stakeholders, 
encompassing shareowners, creditors, suppliers, customers, employees, management, 
government and the local community (Freeman and Reed, 1983; West, 2006). For instance,  
under the broad definitions  CG may be defined as “... a set of relationships between a 
company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders” (OECD, 2004b, 
p.11) or being  “...concerned with ensuring that firms are run in such a way that society’s 
resources are used efficiently” (Allen, 2005, p. 165).  
These various groups (stakeholders) have various contractual and non-contractual 
relationships with corporations and hence, affect and are affected by corporations in various 
ways (Freeman and Reed, 1983). The broad definitions tend to focus on the need to satisfy 
societal expectations, in particular the interests of employees and other stakeholders such as 
suppliers, creditors, tax authorities, and communities in which the corporation operates. This, 
commonly referred to the communitarian perspective (Smith et al., 2005, p. 3) is found in 
many continental European countries such as Denmark, Norway, Germany, France and the 
Netherlands.  
Corporate governance is important for economic development. As markets become 
more open and global, and business become more complex, societies around the world tend 
to place greater reliance on the private sector as the engine for economic growth (Claessens, 
2006). In both developed and developing nations, a growing proportion of economic activity 
takes place in corporations. Corporations mobilise and combine capital, raw materials, 
labour, managerial expertise and intellectual property to produce goods and services which 
benefit society  (Gregory and Simms, 1999). In a way, corporations purchase goods and 
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services, create jobs and generate income, distribute profits through dividends, pay taxes, and 
contribute to foreign exchange in an economy. Corporations contribute to economic growth 
and development, which in turn lead to improved standards of living and poverty alleviation, 
which ideally should create a stable political system. The importance of corporate governance 
in an economic system cannot be overemphasized because, the quality of corporate 
governance impacts; the efficiency with which a corporation employs assets, the ability of a 
corporate entity to attract low cost capital, its ability to meet societal expectations and its 
overall performance (Gregory and Simms, 1999). The rest of the chapter is organised as in 
Figure 1.1. 
 




1.1 Statement of the Problem 
The need for good CG has been heightened in the last two decades, following among 
others, high profile corporate scandals in the developed and developing world (Claessens, 
2006; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). Examples of such corporate scandals in the developed 
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countries include among others Polly Peck, BCCI and Maxwell group in the UK, WorldCom 
and Enron in the US and Parmalat in Italy. Such scandals led to the proliferation of CG codes 
in the developed countries such as, the Cadbury Committee (1992) in the UK, the Blue 
Ribbon Committee (1999) and the Tradeway Commission (1987) in the US, the Hilmer 
Report (1993) in Australia, the Dey Report (1994) in Canada and the Viernot Report (1995) 
in France. Generally, these codes were developed to address deficiencies in the CG system by 
recommending a comprehensive set of norms on the role and composition of the board of 
directors, relationships with shareholders and top management, auditing and information 
disclosure, and the selection, remuneration, and dismissal of directors and top managers 
(Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). Internationally, the Organization for Economic 
Development (OECD) also came up with the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
(2004a) which are intended to assist both OECD and non-OECD member countries in the 
process of developing good CG. 
Similarly, the Asian economic crises of 1997-1998 prompted the regional 
governments to seriously consider ways of improving governance structures resulting in the 
establishment of the countries’ own CG codes e.g. in Malaysia the Malaysian Code of 
Corporate Governance (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006), in Singapore the Corporate Governance 
Committee and Disclosure and Accounting Standards Committee (Eng and Mak, 2003), in 
Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Code of Corporate Governance of 2004.  
South Africa became the first emerging country to develop a code of corporate 
governance via the King Report of 1994 (the King Code or the Code) (Mallin, 2004). Whilst 
codes in other countries were developed as a response to corporate scandals and failures, the 
case is different in South Africa (SA). The establishment of the first King Report (1994) can 
be traced to the need for South Africa to compete effectively in the global economy following 
the end of apartheid (Armstrong et al., 2005). Prior to 1994, SA was isolated through 
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economic and trade sanctions during the apartheid years. This encouraged complacency 
among its corporations and regulators because financial sanctions kept international 
institutions out of the domestic market and domestic firms out of the international capital 
markets (Malherbe and Segal, 2001). As such, SA firms and regulatory institutions were 
unable to benchmark corporate practices and national laws against international norms, 
resulting in weakly governed companies (Vaughn and Ryan, 2006, p. 505).  The abolition of 
apartheid in 1994 resulted in SA being accepted back into the community of nations 
(Malherbe and Segal, 2001). Politically, the country could have diplomatic ties with other 
nations and economically domestic institutions and foreign financial institutions were for the 
first time allowed to do business together. The end of apartheid and the integration of SA into 
the world economy coincided with the period during which there was heightened debate 
about CG around the world, hence SA saw the need to embrace best CG practices in order to 
compete for investment capital (Dunn and Derrick, 2003). 
The report, which was published by the King Committee on Corporate Governance, 
(formed under the auspices of the Institute of Directors of South Africa in 1992) and 
extensively drawing upon the Cadbury Committee of 1992, was revised via the King Report 
II in 2002
1
. The review was undertaken following a number of important events: first, there 
had been significant developments locally in terms of legislation on corporate labour 
practices such as Employment Equity Act – No. 55 of 1998, which seeks to address the 
legacy of apartheid. Internationally, the first Combined Code was issued in the UK in 1998 
after combining the Cadbury Report (1992) and the Hampel Report (1998) (Pass, 2006). 
Therefore, a need arose in South Africa to review the King Report (1994), so as to remain 
competitive by keeping up with international developments (Dunn and Derrick, 2003). In 
addition, pressure from international investors for improved standards of CG and the need for 
                                                          
1
 Recently revised via King III of 2009. 
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private sector to compete internationally for foreign direct investment forced SA to embark 
on a path of reform (Armstrong et al., 2005; Deutsche Bank, 2002, p. 26; Vaughn and Ryan, 
2006) “to promote the highest standards of CG in South Africa” (King Report, 2002, p. 7). 
Second, South Africa experienced a number of corporate failures and financial 
irregularities, such as Fidentia, JCI-Randgold Exploration, Masterbond, Leisurenet, MacMed 
and Regal Treasury Bank, all of which were blamed on weaknesses in CG structures (Sarra, 
2004; World Bank, 2003). These scandals were characterised by a pattern of weak boards that 
failed to engage in effective oversight of the business affairs of the company and failed to 
ensure that senior officers did not engage in self-dealing (Sarra, 2004, p. 10). For example, 
the collapse of Regal Treasury was blamed on the failure by the board to disclose of material 
information as well as failure to contain questionable dealings by the chairman (Myburgh, 
2002). Third, there were concerns that listed companies were not complying with the spirit of 
the King Report (1994) (Deutsche Bank, 2002; Dunn and Derrick, 2003). For instance, while 
Regal Bank had a board that included non-executive directors, these were friends and 
relatives of the chairman and therefore were not independent (Myburgh, 2002) as per the 
recommendations of the King Code. 
A conspicuous feature of the King Report (1994, 2002, p. 8) is its adoption of the 
‘inclusive approach’ to CG. Whilst the Cadbury Report (1992), and indeed codes in other 
countries, focus on shareholder wealth protection, the King Report (1994; 2002) expands the 
scope of CG further by advocating an integrated approach to CG in the interests of a wide 
range of stakeholders and embracing the social, environmental and economic aspects of a 
company’s activities. Thus, the inclusive approach goes beyond the financial and regulatory 
aspects of CG adopted in most countries. The report considers good governance as involving 
discipline, transparency, independence, accountability, responsibility, fairness, and social 
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responsibility. In this context, SA adopted a broad approach (rather than a narrow approach) 
to corporate governance with a focus on stakeholders than just shareholders. 
In adopting the inclusive approach, the King Report emphasises the need to create a 
governance system that recognizes the central feature of the African value system, ubuntu. 
Ubuntu emphasizes the collective good over individual realisation. It recognises principles of 
mutual interdependence and the inclination towards consensus rather than dissention. The 
values of ubuntu are spiritual collectiveness, consensus, humility and helpfulness and 
coexistence with others (King Code, 2002). The King Report (2002, p. 19) noted that this is 
the value system that has an inherent trust and belief in the fairness of human beings based on 
a system of broad consultation and consideration of the interests at all levels “as practiced by 
the chiefs since time immemorial”. The King Code recognizes the importance of this value 
system in modern labour relations and people management. Two main reasons have been 
proffered in the literature to explain why the inclusive approach was adopted in South Africa.  
First, SA was ruled under the policy of apartheid for over three decades, which led to 
her exclusion from the community of nations because of sanctions. This policy also promoted 
white supremacy and excluded the black
2
 majority from participation in the economy of the 
country (Malherbe and Segal, 2001; Sethi and Williams, 2000). As such, the inclusive 
approach can be seen as an attempt by the King Committee to companies in SA to address the 
legacy of apartheid. The King Code seems to acknowledge this in the statement, 
“…companies in South Africa must recognise that they co-exist in an environment where 
many of the country’s citizens disturbingly remain on the fringes of society’s economic 
benefits” (King Report, 2002, p.18). In addition, when the King Report of 1994 was 
published, it was anticipated then that the African National Congress (ANC) would win and 
form the next government. Given the apartheid legacy of remarkable inequality between the 
                                                          
2
 “Black people” is a generic term which means Africans, Coloureds and Indians (BBBEE Act, 2003,  p. 4) 
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minority “whites” and the “black” majority population, there was political and economic 
uncertainty in SA as to how the ANC government would address issues relating to inequality 
in the economy (West, 2006), given its long standing ideological commitment to socialism 
(Malherbe and Segal, 2001, p. 20). Accordingly, the adoption of the inclusive approach by 
the King Committee on corporate governance was justified in SA given the remarkable 
inequality resulting from the apartheid policy (Mangena and Chamisa, 2008) and therefore, 
the adoption of the inclusive approach was driven by the desire to anticipate policy changes 
by the ANC government.  
Second, as per the King Code, (2002, p. 94), the notion of sustainability and triple 
bottom line in the corporate world is evolving to a level which recognises the importance of 
interdependent relationships between an enterprise and the community in which it exists. 
Consequently, the Code was an attempt by the King Committee to strike a balance between 
“…freedom to manage, accountability and the interests of the different stakeholders” (King 
Report, 2002, p. 8; Rossouw et al., 2002, p. 299).  
Similar to the UK, compliance with the King Code is generally inspirational (self-
regulatory), although the JSE Listing Requirements (2005) oblige listed companies to 
disclose in their annual reports the extent of compliance with the King Code and reasons for 
non-compliance. In the view of the King Report, agency-related costs and market 
mechanisms would ensure compliance with the code (Dunn and Derrick, 2003). In this 
respect, the King Report (King Report, 1994, 2002) encourages greater activism by 
shareholders, the business and financial press to enforce compliance.  
Despite pioneering the inclusive approach to CG over 15 years ago, there is very 
limited research on whether or not companies comply with CG recommendations from the 
Code. Only few studies (e.g., Deutsche Bank, 2002; KPMG, 2003, 2004, 2006; Ntim, 2009) 
have investigated compliance with the King Code in general. The results of these studies 
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generally suggest that companies are attempting to embrace the good governance principles 
from the King Code. However, the studies have a number of limitations. The Deutsche Bank 
(2002) study suffers from sample selection bias. The companies investigated are large and 
some have dual listings (e.g., Anglo American Plc, SAB Plc) in other stock exchanges such 
as the London Stock Exchange (LSE). As a result, these companies comply because they are 
subjected to intense pressures to follow best practice corporate governance, particularly from 
institutional investors in the foreign stock exchange they are listed, for example LSE (Ntim, 
2009).  In addition, the sample includes companies followed by Deutsche Bank only and is 
not representative of all JSE listed companies. Further, the study does not examine factors 
which influence compliance with the Code. The KPMG (2003; 2004; 2006) only focuses on 
one aspect of the King Code i.e. integrated sustainability reporting and therefore only provide 
partial evidence of compliance. The most extensive and relevant study is that by Ntim (2009). 
Ntim (2009) examines compliance with CG using data for a five-year period from 2002 to 
2006. He finds that in general compliance increased from 48% in 2002 to 68% in 2006. The 
study also investigated whether compliance was related to firm performance.  Although this 
study provides better insights into corporate compliance with the King Code, there is need for 
additional research to fully understand compliance issues in SA. For example, Ntim’s (2009) 
study focuses on compliance with King II only, and therefore the extent of compliance with 
King I (prior to the revision of code) is not clear. Although one of the reasons for revising the 
code was because companies were not complying with the Code, there is no comprehensive 
research on this issue. In addition, Ntim (2009) examines overall compliance with provisions 
of the Code. Compliance with the four key issues from the King Code (i.e., boards and 
directors, risk management, accounting and auditing and integrated sustainability reporting) 
is still a priori research issue. Examining compliance with the key aspects of the King Code is 
important to enhance our understanding of the extent to which the Code has been accepted by 
pg. 26 
 
JSE listed firms in SA. In addition, an examination of compliance with the Code is 
particularly important given that the adoption of the inclusive approach was linked to 
addressing issues relating to inequalities between blacks and whites. For example, how has 
corporate governance influenced changes to board diversity and social responsibility? 
Further, although Ntim (2009) investigate some factors affecting compliance, he does not 
examine the effect of ethnicity on compliance with the Code.  This aspect is important 
because it will help us to understand how corporate SA behaves in terms of compliance when 
their structures are occupied by people from the two main ethnic groups (e.g. blacks and 
whites). This issue is particularly interesting to examine because the literature in the context 
of South Africa suggests differences in culture between blacks and whites. For example, prior 
South African studies (e.g., Mbigi, 2000; Booysen, 2000; Louw, 2002; Luthans et al., 2003; 
Visser, 2005) find that blacks are more collectivist, whilst whites are individualistic. Finally, 
Ntim (2009) draws all the data from annual reports only. Whilst this provides useful insights, 
better insights can be obtained by interviewing key stakeholders in SA.  
Elsewhere, studies on compliance with corporate governance codes have been 
conducted in the UK (see Arcot et al., 2010; MacNeil and Li, 2006; Weir and Laing, 2000), 
Germany (see Talaulicar and v. Werder, 2008; Werder et al., 2005), Portugal (see Alves and 
Mendes, 2004), Spain (see Fernández-Rodríguez et al., 2004), Australia by Henry (2010), 
Cyprus by Krambia-Kapardis and Psaros, (2006) and Malaysia Wahab et al. (2007). Despite 
examining compliance with corporate governance codes in the respective countries, with the 
exception of Wahab et al. (2007), these studies do not examine the effect of ethnicity on 
compliance with corporate governance codes. Although Wahab et al. (2007) examine the 
effect of ethnicity on compliance with the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 
(MCCG); the cultures of Malaysia and South Africa are different. For instance, the cultures 
of the two main ethnic groups (‘blacks’ and ‘whites’) in South Africa are different from the 
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cultures of the main ethnic groups in Malaysia e.g. Bumiputera and Chinese. The Ubuntu 
culture of blacks places emphasis on significance of survival through group solidarity, 
brotherhood and group care (Mbigi, 1997, Poovan, 2005). In contrast, the white’s culture 
tends to place emphasis on individual self reliance (Mbigi, 1997). According to Haniffa and 
Cooke (2005), all Malays are Muslims which implies different cultural values to the blacks 
and whites in South Africa who are mostly Christians (SA Info, 2007). As per Haniffa and 
Cooke (2005, p. 392), the mindset of a Malaysian manger is influenced by ethnicity, 
education and type of organisation they work for. The SA culture of ubuntu on the other hand 
recognises the oneness of humanity through interconnectedness and independence of all 
creation  (Poovan, 2005, p. 16). The culture is also inclusivistically oriented. This is in 
contrast to the Eurocentric white culture which emphasises independence from other 
members of society, priority of individual goals and emphasis on non-communal 
relationships (Poovan, 2005). The cultures of SA ethnic groups contrast those of ethnic 
groups in Malaysia. As such, it is important to examine whether ethnicity influences 
compliance with best practice corporate governance principles in the context of South Africa. 
 
1.2 Research Objectives and Questions 
Given the dearth of empirical studies on corporate governance in South Africa and the 
literature gap on corporate compliance and ethnicity, this thesis seeks to address three main 
research objectives. First, the thesis investigates the extent of compliance with King Code’s 
best practice corporate governance recommendations by JSE listed companies. Specifically, it 
analyses the extent of compliance with King I (pre-review) and King II (post review) and 
examines whether there are significant differences in terms of compliance between the pre-
review and post-review periods. Second, the thesis examines whether compliance with the 
code is influenced by ethnicity and other corporate characteristics. Third, the thesis examines 
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whether compliance is related to company characteristics and market and performance related 
variables. Fourth, the thesis explores the views/opinions of key stakeholders [e.g. regulators, 
King Code Commissioners, companies and institutional investors] regarding corporate 
governance in SA in general and corporate compliance with the King Code in particular. In 
order to investigate these issues, the following research questions are developed. 
 
1. To what extent do JSE listed companies comply with the key aspects (boards, 
accounting and auditing, etc) of the inclusive approach to corporate governance as 
recommended by the King Code? 
2. Does ethnicity of management and board members influence extent of compliance 
with the King Code in South Africa? 
3. Is compliance related to company characteristics, market and performance related 
variables? 
4. What are the views/opinions of key stakeholders regarding the state of corporate 
governance in SA, including corporate compliance? 
    
1.3 Rationale and Importance of the Study 
This study is motivated by the following reasons. First, ethnicity and corporate 
governance offer an interesting research subject in the context of South Africa because of the 
historical political background of the country. As such, the study will shed light on whether 
corporate behaviour (extent of compliance in this case) under black and white executive 
leadership is different or similar for JSE listed firms. The study will also provide data on the 
extent to which blacks have made inroads into corporate SA, following the new dispensation 
which resulted in blacks being given equal opportunities with their white counterparts. 
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Second, given the ethnic divide in SA, this study explores the possible impact of 
differences between ‘blacks’ and ‘whites’ values on corporate governance compliance by 
employing the Hofstede-Gray
3
 culture theory. Third, the King Report (1994; 2002; 2009) is a 
unique code because it takes an inclusive approach to CG (which encapsulates the African 
culture of ubuntu, unlike other codes. The African culture of consultation/therisanyo and the 
concept of ubuntu or African humanism play an important role in SA, but not in other 
countries. It is therefore important to examine whether this cultural aspect influences 
corporate compliance. 
Fourth, as mentioned earlier, the King Code borrows heavily from the Cadbury Code. 
It is therefore important to investigate whether recommendations from the developed world 
(Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006),  are suitable for implementation in a developing country. This is 
particularly important given the differences in politico-economic and social environments 
between developed and developing countries (Gregory, 1999). For instance, African 
countries are characterised by unstable business environments which creates an investor 
unfriendly atmosphere, trade restrictions which inhibit free economic activity, high state 
regulation of economic activity, a culture of corruption, political interference and the weak 
nature of institutions (Okeahalam, 2004; Okeahalam and Akinboade, 2003). These factors 
may inhibit the best practice corporate governance and this would offer valuable insights in 
the context of countries sharing similar characteristics with South Africa. 
Fifth, research on compliance with the King Code is also important because South 
Africa, like other countries in the developed and developing world, has had its share of 
corporate scandals (Armstrong et al., 2005) pre- and post-revision of the King Code, which 
                                                          
3
 Hofstede-Gray theory is difficult to test and in relation to corporate reporting, their measures lack precision, 
are somewhat indirect and based on a dated survey of IBM employees (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). However, 
some researchers have used the four bipolar dimensions in comparative studies of accounting practice in 
Lebanon and France (Baydoun and Wilett, 1995). Also, Salter and Niswander (1995) find that while Grays’ 
(1988) model has statistically significant explanatory power, it is best at explaining actual financial reporting 
practices and is relatively weak in explaining extant professional and regulatory structures from a cultural base.  
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anecdotal evidence attributes to weak corporate structures, disclosure issues and weak boards 
(Sarra, 2004). This begs the question of whether JSE listed companies are complying with the 
King Code and whether the Code has lived up to its objective of promoting the highest 
standards of CG in South Africa (King Report, 2002). 
Sixth, Africa is traditionally perceived as a high-risk continent by international 
investors due to weaknesses in corporate governance and investor protection laws (King 
Report, 1994; Klapper and Love, 2004; Okeahalam, 2004; Mangena and Tauringana, 2007; 
Mangena and Chamisa, 2008). A comprehensive study on compliance with best CG 
principles in South Africa (King Code) may help contribute towards a positive change in 
perceptions of investors with regard to whether South Africa (and possibly the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) region given that King Code is recommended in 
the region) is a suitable destination for foreign investment capital.
4
 Corporate governance 
affects growth and development through increased access to external financing which leads to 
investment, growth and greater employment creation (Claessens, 2006). Compliance with 
best practice CG principles has the potential to increase investor confidence, both among 
foreign and domestic investors (Reed, 2002). The study will also contribute to the thin 
literature on CG in Africa (Barako et al., 2006; Mangena and Tauringana, 2007; Okeahalam, 
2004; Tsamenyi et al., 2007). 
 
1.4 Scope of the Research 
This study covers two periods, 2001 and 2008. The former represents the pre-review 
period of the King Code I while the latter represents post-review period of the Code and the 
                                                          
4
 Arthur Levitt as quoted by the King Report (2002) “If a country does not have a reputation for strong 
corporate governance practices, capital will flow elsewhere. If investors are not confident with the level of 
disclosure, capital will flow elsewhere. If a country opts for lax accounting and reporting standards, capital will 
flow elsewhere…”  (King Code, 2002, p.10) 
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most recent reporting period. In this study, analysis of the extent of compliance with the King 
Code is limited to disclosure compliance in corporate annual reports only. Corporate 
disclosures may be done through other mediums, but in this study corporate annual reports 
are considered as the important mechanisms for dissemination of information to a wider 
group of users (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005). The study focuses on companies listed on the JSE 
main board only. Unlisted companies and companies listed in the ALTx (smaller) board are 
not considered because the former are not required to comply with the King Code
5
 while the 
latter have different regulatory requirements. The King Code recommendations are directed 
to main board companies, although ALTx and indeed private companies can actually 
implement the recommendations if they want to. 
The research will also use qualitative data from interviews with King Code 
Commissioners, institutional investors, companies, regulators (key stakeholders) to get their 
perceptions on compliance with the King Code and on CG in South Africa in general. 
Specifically, their views on whether the Code is suitable for SA and whether it has achieved 
its intended objectives will be examined. The views of King Code commissioners and 
regulators are important because they were involved in the development of the Code and 
ensuring compliance with good governance practices in the country respectively, while 
company stakeholders are directly affected by the Code. 
 
1.5 Research Methodology 
This section provides a summary of the research methodology used in this thesis. A 
detailed specification of the research methodology is provided in Chapter 5. 
 
                                                          
5
 The new King Code III  (2009) applies to all companies in South Africa. 
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1.5.1 Research Process 
Figure 1.2 shows the procedural flow chart of the various steps in the research 
process. The steps in the research process involved a literature search to provide a framework 
for the study, to identify relevant theories and to select the appropriate methodology and 
research procedures to answer the research questions. The literature search also helped to 
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Following on from the literature search, a compliance checklist was developed based 
on recommendations from the King Code and the JSE Listing Rules (2004). The checklist 
was sent to supervisors to validate its applicability and appropriateness for measuring 
compliance with the Code. A pilot test was conducted on ten annual reports by the researcher 
and the supervisors to test the reliability of the checklist. If the checklist is reliable, then, it 
should provide similar scores from different administrators (Saunders et al., 2003, p. 101; 
Thanerou et al., 2007, p. 153). On the basis of separate scoring results, the compliance 
checklist was modified to produce a final list of 53 compliance items grouped in terms of 
voluntary, mandatory and according to key aspects (e.g. THEME1 – Boards and Directors, 
THEME2 – Risk Management, THEME3 – Accounting and Auditing and THEME4 – 
Integrated Sustainability Reporting). The modifications entailed removing a few compliance 
items which were considered to measure the same thing.  
 
1.5.2 Research Sample 
The criteria for inclusion of firms in the sample were that they had to have been listed 
in the JSE prior to 2001 and also in 2008. Secondly, corporate annual reports of the firms 
must be available for both 2001 and 2008. The prior year is important for analysing 
compliance with the Code pre-review, while the latter year represents the post-review and 
most up-to-date reflection of corporate compliance with the King Code in South Africa. 
 A sample population of 136 JSE listed firms for the years 2001 and 2008 was arrived 
at based on the residual number of firms obtained after removing firms not listed in both 
years, firms in the financial industry and firms whose annual reports were not available for 
either year from the total number of firms listed in the JSE in both years. The entire sample 
population of 136 listed firms was considered appropriate to base the analysis on, so as to 




Compliance index scores were obtained as follows: 
i. A method of scoring CG disclosures in annual reports (e.g. Alves and Mendes, 2004; 
Black et al., 2006; Gompers et al., 2003; Henry, 2010; Ntim, 2009; Wahab et al., 
2007)  was used to score annual reports of firms. This method involves awarding 
value of “1” if a particular internal CG provision is disclosed in the annual report or 
“0” otherwise.  Since the Code operates on a ‘comply or explain’ regime, companies 
were considered to have complied with the Code if they offered narrative explanations 
pertaining to compliance items. For instance, some companies did not appoint various 
board committees because the functions of such committees were done by the entire 
board. Such companies were deemed to have complied with the Code. 
ii. The un-weighted total scores for each company under various themes were calculated. 
iii. The compliance index for each company was then calculated by dividing the actual 
scores obtained by the scores obtained in step (ii) by the total maximum score 
possible for each company under each theme. The index is percentage based and was 
used to analyse the extent of compliance with the King Code and to evaluate the 
impact of selected explanatory variables on the extent of compliance with the Code. 
iv. The compliance indices were categorised as total compliance index (TCI) for all the 
indices in the checklist, voluntary compliance index (VCI) for items recommended by 
the Code but not required by the JSE Listing Rules, mandatory (MCI) for all the items 
which have been adopted by the JSE Listing Rules, THEME1 (Boards and Directors), 
THEME2 (Risk Management), THEME3 (Accounting and Auditing) and THEME4 





The explanatory variables were categorised as follows: 
i. Company specific characteristics 
ii. Corporate governance variables 
iii. Ethnicity – ethnicity of chairperson, board of directors’ dominant ethnic group and 
ethnicity of the chief executive officer or managing directors (CEO/MD). 
 
1.5.4 Data Analysis Procedures 
Data analysis procedures entailed the following: 
i. Descriptive analysis of items in the compliance checklist was conducted to 
find out the most and least frequent items complied with by companies in the sample. 
This was conducted by analysing total compliance, voluntary and mandatory 
compliance. Descriptive analysis was also conducted to analyse compliance with 
themes.  
ii. Pearson and Spearman’s correlation coefficients were used to test for the 
association between the dependent and independent variables. 
iii. Multiple regression method was used to test the hypotheses. Tests of 
normality, multicollinearity, homoscedasticity and linearity assumptions were 
conducted on the dependent and independent variables to ensure that the OLS 
assumptions were not violated. Following these tests, data transformation using van 
der Waerden was undertaken on those dependent and independent variables that were 
not normal. 
iv. Template analysis method (King, 2004) was used to analyse results of 
interviews with key stakeholders. The process involved classifying data into 
meaningful categories or codes.  The codes were based on the purpose of the research 
as expressed by the research questions.  
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1.6 Summary of Results 
Results from this study indicate that the extent of compliance (total compliance index) 
with the King Code was 40.6% in 2001 (pre-review) and 74.2% in 2008 (post-review). This 
indicates that sample JSE firms are complying more with the King Code following the 
review. The increase in the extent of compliance between the two periods was 82.8%. The 
results also indicate that as per expectation, the extent of compliance was high for mandatory 
compliance (MCI) provisions compared to voluntary compliance (VCI) provisions. For 
instance, the extent of compliance for VCI in 2001 was 36.1% while for MCI in the same 
period it was 60.2%. In 2008, the extent of compliance for VCI was 71.7% while that of MCI 
was 86.3%. In terms of the four themes, the extent of compliance was highest for THEME3 
(Accounting and Auditing) in 2001(78.2%) and 2008 (99.0%) and lowest for THEME4 
(Integrated Sustainability Reporting) in 2001 (31.5%) and 2008 (67.9%). The possible reason 
for the high extent of compliance with THEME3 is possibly because THEME3 consists of 
items which relate to normal accounting disclosure practices which companies regularly 
disclose in annual reports as per generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). THEME4 
on the other hand consists of social and environmental reporting provisions. Compliance was 
also found to be high for large firms, firms with multiple listing status and firms audited by 
Big 4 audit firms. 
As will be discussed in chapter six, the number of blacks occupying positions of 
board chairman and chief executive officer/managing director was insufficient to enable OLS 
tests to be conducted on all ethnicity variables e.g. black CEO and Black Board Chairman. As 
such, only one ethnicity variable was tested to determine whether ethnicity influences 
compliance with the King Code. Results from this test indicate that the proportion of whites 
on boards of directors (PROPWHITES) has a negative relationship with extent of compliance 
with the King Code. The negative significant relationship was registered in 2008 across most 
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of the models in 2001, (except MCI 2001 (insignificant) and THEME2 2008 significant at 
5% level). However, in 2008, PROPWHITES was negative and significant for TCI at 1% 
level, VCI at 1% level, THEME1 at 1% level, and THEME4 at 1% level) as per prediction 
and negative but insignificant for MCI and THEME2. Generally, regression results indicate 
that when the proportion of whites on boards is high, the extent of compliance with the King 
Code is low, in support of the theoretical proposition that when people from a particular 
ethnic group (whites) dominate corporate structures of JSE sample firms there will be less 
compliance.  
As discussed in chapter seven, the results indicate that board characteristics such as 
proportion of non-executive directors had a positive relationship with the extent of 
compliance in line with the popular view that the inclusion of non-executive directors on 
boards of directors may enhance their independence and promote good governance practices. 
NEDs may influence compliance with best practice corporate governance principles because 
of their independent judgement (Cadbury Report, 1992), the need to protect their reputation 
as directors and also to enhance their employability in competitive and efficient managerial 
labour markets. Board size also had a positive relationship with the extent of compliance, in 
line with the view that larger boards are associated with diversity in skills, business contacts, 
and experience that smaller boards may not have, which offers greater opportunity to secure 
critical resources. As such a large board may have a greater range of expertise to monitor the 
actions of management effectively (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005) resulting in compliance 
with best practice corporate governance principles. 
Director shareholding on the other hand had an insignificant positive relationship with 
extent of compliance in 2001 and a negative significant relationship in 2008.  In the context 
of South Africa directors (owners) may influence compliance with the King Code as a legitimation 
strategy to seek active support or merely passive acquiescence (Suchman, 1995, p. 575), for corporate 
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sustainability from traditionally disadvantaged blacks, more especially in the case of companies 
owned by white directors. 
As for company characteristics, firm size had a positive significant relationship with 
extent of compliance in 2001 and 2008 in accordance with expectation and political cost 
theories. Institutional shareholding had contrasting results in 2001 and 2008. The 2001 results 
reflected a positive but insignificant relationship with the extent of compliance while the 
2008 results were negative and mostly insignificant.  
Long term debt to total equity had an insignificant positive association with extent of 
compliance in 2001 and a mostly insignificant negative association in 2008. Auditor type had 
an insignificant positive association with extent of compliance in 2001 and a significant 
association in 2008. Listing status had a positive and mostly significant association with 
extent of compliance in both 2001 and 2008. Industry type variables on the other hand 
generally had an insignificant association with extent of compliance. The results for return on 
assets (ROA) are contrasting. In 2001, ROA has a positive insignificant association with 
extent of compliance while in 2008; it has a negative insignificant association with extent of 
compliance. The findings are generally consistent with contrasting results from prior 
literature. 
In addition to statistical tests on compliance, this study conducted interviews to gain 
insight into the views of key stakeholders on the importance of the King Code to SA, 
compliance with the Code and the impact of the Code in the SADC region. Generally the 
views of key stakeholders indicate that the Code is indeed important for SA because it takes 
the local circumstances into consideration. It has also helped to raise awareness with regard 
to the importance of CG in the country. Key stakeholders are also of the view that SA listed 
companies are not complying adequately with social and environmental reporting and that 
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more needs to be done to ensure that SA corporations integrate social and environmental 
reporting into their activities. Finally, key stakeholders are of the view that the Code has 
positively impacted CG standards in the SADC region as evidenced by its adaption by some 
exchanges in the region.  
 
1.7 Thesis Contribution 
This study provides the first empirical evidence on the association between 
compliance with corporate governance codes and ethnicity in the context of South Africa. 
The thesis shows a negative association between the extent of compliance with the King 
Code and the proportion of whites on boards of directors. As such the study has provided 
insights on whether corporate behaviour (extent of compliance in this case) under white and 
black directorship is different or similar for JSE listed firms. The study has also explored the 
possible impact of differences between ‘blacks’ and ‘whites’ values on corporate governance 
compliance by employing the Hofstede-Gray culture theory. The study has found that 
corporate compliance with the King Code in SA may be low for companies whose structures 
are dominated by whites possibly because the King Code emphasises the ubuntu collectivist 
culture which contrasts the white individualistic culture 
Secondly, the thesis contributes to the thin literature on compliance with corporate 
governance codes by investigating the extent to which JSE listed firms comply with the King 
Code. Concerns have been raised in the past on the dearth of literature on the assessment of 
the extent of compliance with CG principles in SA in recent times (IIF, 2007; Malherbe and 
Segal, 2001). As such, this study seeks to fill this gap by examining the extent of compliance 
with the King Code in 2001 and 2008. The thesis not only addresses the aspect of aggregate 
compliance, but also examines the extent of compliance with the various key issues as 
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recommended under the King Code.  For instance the study offers empirical evidence on the 
extent of compliance with boards and directors issues, risk management, accounting and 
auditing and integrated sustainability reporting issues as recommended by the King Code. 
The study offers evidence that SA corporations comply less with social and environmental 
reporting (integrated sustainability reporting) in comparison to other key issues. While the 
study generally indicates that SA corporate compliance with the King Code has increased 
following the review of the King Code I, it also shows that there is generally ample room for 
improvement on compliance with various provisions from the Code. 
This study also provides empirical evidence with regard to the extent to which black 
South Africans have made inroads into corporate SA. For instance, the thesis provides 
empirical evidence on the number of blacks who occupy structures of listed firms in SA.  
While the SA black majority government has come up with intervention strategies (e.g. 
BBBEE Act of 2003) to try to encourage meaningful participation of blacks in the economy 
of SA, evidence from this thesis suggests that these strategies may not be meeting the 
intended objectives. As such, evidence from this study has important implications for 
government policy.  
Further, unlike prior literature, this study extends literature on CG by examining the 
views of key stakeholders with regard to CG in SA. In particular the study offers evidence on 
the views of the key stakeholders with regard to the importance of the King Code to SA, 
compliance with the Code and whether the Code has a positive impact in the SADC region. 
 
1.8 Limitations of the Study 
No study is perfect and there are several limitations in this study. First, the analysis of 
compliance is based on disclosure compliance from corporate annual reports only. 
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Companies do make disclosures through other mediums such as interim reports, 
prospectuses, the financial press, company web pages, in-house newsletters, etc (Hassan and 
Marston, 2008, p. 5; Botosan and Plumlee, 2002, p. 30). Also, companies may comply but 
may not disclose their compliance in any medium and this is difficult to capture except by 
asking companies to complete questionnaires. Due to the generally poor response rate for 
questionnaire survey, this method was not undertaken. Furthermore, even if companies 
responded to the questionnaire survey, it is difficult to check the validity of their responses. 
Second, this study uses Hculture theory in determining differences in societal values 
between two groups in South African society i.e. the ‘blacks’ and the ‘whites’.  This theory 
has been heavily critiqued for being obsolete and irrelevant (Ng et al., 2007), and using 
unsuitable measuring instrument and insufficient cultural dimensions (e.g. McSweeney 2002; 
Baskerville-Morley, 2005). Furthermore, the cultural values assumed in this study based on 
Hofstede’s dimensions may not necessarily be applicable to the blacks and whites in SA 
because as culture evolves over time, the cultural values of society may change. Also, the 
study could not test some ethnicity variables
6
 owing to the small number of blacks in the 
structures of corporate SA. 
Third, this study uses cross-sectional data to investigate the association between 
culture and compliance only for two selected years (pre- and post-King Code II). A 
longitudinal study may perhaps capture the trend for each year.  
Fourth, there may be validity and reliability problems with regard to the constructed 
composite compliance index (e.g. TCI, VCI, MCI and the THEME) is based on binary rather 
than ordinal coding which has been criticised for being less informative (Barako et al., 2006). 
It is also an un-weighted index which considers all CG provisions to be of equal importance. 
Theory and practice indicates that this may not necessarily be the case.  
                                                          
6
 Black board chairman (BBCHAIR) and black chief executive officer/managing director  (BLACKCEO/MD). 
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Fifth, the researcher could not gain access to the required number of interviewees. As 
such, conclusions from interview data are limited to specific group(s) of interviewees. 
However, the data is helpful in providing insights into important groups. 
 
1.9 Outline of Thesis Chapters 
The rest of the thesis is divided into eight chapters and organised as follows. 
 
Chapter 2: Development of Corporate Governance in South Africa (Country Context) 
In this chapter, the SA environment is discussed focussing on legal, economic, 
political and regulatory issues. The discussion focuses on how the environment of SA may 
affect compliance with the King Code. The discussion also examines how the culture and 
business environment/professional organisations in SA affect CG. The chapter further 
examines the colonial history of SA and the development of CG in SA. 
 
Chapter 3: Literature Review 
This chapter discusses literature on CG. In this regard CG literature on various themes 
is discussed. Attention is paid to CG literature on disclosure and compliance and the gap in 
the literature on culture and compliance with CG principles is identified. 
 
Chapter 4: Theoretical Framework and Development of Hypothesis 
This chapter develops hypotheses based on various theories, to examine factors which 
influence compliance with the King Code. The hypotheses are divided into ethnicity 





Chapter 5: Research Design and Method 
This chapter focuses on the research design and method employed to answer the 
research questions. Both quantitative and qualitative methods are used to answer the research 
questions. In this regard, the population and sample, variables and measures used, data 
collection methods employed, and the data analysis methods used are discussed. An attempt 
is made to discuss the strengths and limitations of the procedures adopted in this study. In 
addition, the chapter discusses the method used to answer the question pertaining to views of 
key stakeholders on CG in SA. 
 
Chapter 6: Descriptive Analysis of Sample 
Chapter six describes the sample. In this regard, the profile of JSE listed firms in 
terms of corporate ownership and type of audit firms is discussed. The chapter also dwells on 
the state of CG in SA by examining CG characteristics of SA listed firms. The discussion 
also focuses on an important aspect of this study by analysing corporate structures of JSE 
sample firms in terms of ethnicity of boards, chairman and CEO/MD.  
 
Chapter 7: Empirical Results  
This chapter presents the empirical results of the study. First, the chapter presents 
descriptive results of both dependent and independent variables.  Second, the chapter presents 
results of regression analysis. In this way, regression results from thirteen models are 
presented. Further, sensitivity tests are conducted on selected variables. 
 
Chapter 8:  Conclusions: Summary of Findings, Implications, Limitations and Avenues 
for Future Research 
Chapter eight summarises the findings from the research with regards to the extent of 
compliance, factors which influence compliance and views of key stakeholders. The chapter 
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also discusses the policy implications and recommendations of the research findings. In 





2 Chapter Two: Development of Corporate Governance in South 
Africa (Country Context)  
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter makes an attempt to discuss the development of corporate governance in 
South Africa (SA) and various environmental factors which may affect corporate governance 
and firm compliance with best practice governance principles. Firms do not operate in a 
vacuum, but under legal, political, economic and social constraints which affect their 
performance, disclosure, compliance and other firm outcomes. In fact, the broader definition 
of corporate governance acknowledges the importance of various players within the corporate 
governance framework (Gillian, 2006, p. 383), as discussed in Chapter One. It is therefore 
important to examine how these various players/factors may affect corporate governance in a 
country. Figure 2.1 outlines the chapter overview. 




Section 2.0  
Introduction 
Section 2.1 Factors Affecting Corporate 
Governance in SA 
•2.1.1 Political Environment 
•2.1.2 Legal Environment 
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•2.1.5 Financial Regulation in SA 
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2.1 Factors Affecting Corporate Governance in South Africa 
2.1.1 Political Environment 
In this subsection, the political environment of SA is briefly discussed to try to show 
how political governance operates in the country. The discussion seeks to demonstrate that 
SA, unlike some African countries, maintains a stable democratic system of political 
governance, where free and fair elections are conducted regularly and where the free market 
economy operates unhindered. As such the discussion will attempt to show how a stable 
political climate and supporting institutions will attract investment and allow good 
governance to flourish especially in the context of a developing country such as SA with a 
previous history of political instability. However, although still having challenges to address 
regarding the economic and social imbalances brought about by apartheid (Andreasson, 
2007), SA now presents a different picture from most African countries on the political front. 
Since coming to power in 1994, the post-apartheid government in SA has maintained 
a multi-party parliamentary democracy in which constitutional power is shared between the 
President and the parliament. The SA parliament consists of two houses, the National 
Assembly and the National Council of Provinces, which are responsible for drafting the laws 
of the Republic. The National Assembly, which is elected on a “list proportional 
representation”, currently consists of 400 members (US Department of State, 2007). Since 
1994, SA has held four successive free and fair elections. The National Council of Provinces 
fulfils the function of representing provincial interests in the national sphere of government.  
The President, elected by the National Assembly from among its members, is the 
executive Head of State and leads the Cabinet. The President may not serve more than two 
five-year terms in office. The cabinet consists of the President, the deputy President and 25 
ministers (the executive arm of government) (SA Info, 2007). The President appoints the 
deputy President and cabinet ministers. The President’s constitutional responsibilities include 
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assigning cabinet portfolios, signing bills into law, and serving as commander-in-chief of the 
military.  
The Public Protector; the Human Rights Commission; the Commission for the 
Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities; 
the Commission for Gender Equality; the Auditor-General and the Independent Electoral 
Commission are governmental organisations which have been created to support 
constitutional democracy (SA Info, 2007). 
The third arm of the central government is an independent judiciary. The 
Constitutional Court is the highest court for interpreting and deciding constitutional issues, 
while the Supreme Court of Appeal is the highest court for non-constitutional matters. Most 
cases are heard in the extensive system of High Courts and Magistrates Courts. The 
constitution’s bill of rights provides for due process including the right to a fair, public trial 
within a reasonable time of being charged and the right to appeal to a higher court. The bill of 
rights also guarantees fundamental political and social rights of SA’s citizens (SA Info, 
2007).  
SA maintains a transparent democratic process or system through which a 
government is selected, held accountable, monitored and replaced. In short, the three arms of 
government (e.g. the executive, legislative and the judiciary) work together in SA in the 
running of the country to create a stable political environment conducive for economic 
activity. Developing countries require a corporate governance system that will attract 
international investment and enhance economic growth through the provision of stability and 
confidence (West, 2009, p. 10). Political stability is one of the essential elements necessary to 
create an enabling environment for enterprises to thrive in developing countries. In this 




2.1.2 Legal Environment 
This subsection briefly discusses various pieces of legislation that are relevant to 
businesses and therefore which have an impact on CG in SA.  The key relevant legislations 
are discussed in the following subsections.  
 
2.1.2.1 The Companies Act (1973) 
The South African Companies Act no. 61 of 1973 (the Companies Act/the Act) is the 
primary statute which governs corporate law in SA.  The Companies Act is administered and 
supervised by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) through the Registrar of 
Companies.  The Companies Act sets out several regulatory requirements which govern the 
relationship between the firm, directors, shareholders and other stakeholders. As per section 
19 of the Companies Act, two types of companies may be formed in South Africa, a private 
and a public company.  According to section 32 of the Companies Act, public companies 
must have a minimum of seven members (shareholders) and corporate entities can be 
members. For private companies, membership is limited to between 1-50 members under 
section 20.  The governance structure under the Companies Act resembles the statute’s 
British origins (Rossouw et al., 2002). Under the Act, the board is responsible for the 
oversight of the company. The articles of association spell out the structure and powers of the 
board.   
Section 228 of the Act seeks to protect shareholders against actions from directors and 
management by requiring that disposal of the whole undertaking or assets of the undertaking 
be disposed of only after authorisation by members by means of an ordinary majority 
members’ resolution at the general meeting. Directors are also required to declare their direct 
or indirect interest in a contract of the company, to prevent harmful conflict of interests. In 
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addition, such contracts also have to be authorised or confirmed by the members of a 
company in a general meeting. 
According to section 268A-268I, public companies are supposed to appoint a 
company secretary (optional for private companies). The company secretary is appointed by 
the board of directors. The company secretary is the principal administrative officer of the 
company. He/she is responsible for ensuring that board procedures are regularly reviewed 
and followed in practice and that all legal and regulatory requirements are complied with. 
The board of directors has the responsibility to approve the Annual Financial Statements and 
must present them to the Annual General Meeting for the members’ receipt within 21 days 
notice as per section 302. Members elect the directors and formally appoint the auditors.  
Under sections 252-268 of the Companies Act, members have remedies which 
include: relief from oppression (section 252); the ability to seek an appointment of inspectors 
to investigate financial interest in and control of the company (section 254); the power to 
impose some restrictions on shares or debentures (section 256); and some power to 
investigate the company’s affairs (section 257). For instance, the oppression remedy under 
section 252 specifies that a member may complain that an act or omission of the company is 
unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable, or that the affairs of the company are being 
conducted in a manner that is unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable.  The court has broad 
powers to remedy the oppression including making orders for regulating the future conduct of 
the company. According to section 210 of the Companies Act, directors may be appointed to 
the board through a resolution at the general meeting of the company. Section 220 of the 
Companies Act, addresses the procedure through which a director may be relieved of his 
duties before the expiration of his period of office. Removal of directors may be done through 
a company resolution. As per the South African Companies Act 1973, all pubic companies 
must have a minimum of two directors, while the JSE’s Listings Rules mandate listed firms 
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to have a minimum of four directors. The King Code on the other hand sets out a general 
principle that every board must consider whether its size makes it effective. None of these 
corporate governance principles and or regulatory instruments sets a maximum board size.  
Subsections 3.59-3.84 and the whole of sections 7 and 10 deal with the duties, 
responsibilities, powers, and rights of directors, shareholders, the company secretary, and 
auditors as discussed in the Companies Act. With regard to director remuneration, schedule 2 
of the Act offers directors a right to adequate remuneration for services offered. The King 
Code requires directors’ remuneration to be determined by a remuneration committee that 
consists only of independent non-executive directors. The Companies Act also regulates the 
appointment, removal and duties of the auditors under section (269-283). In line with the 
need for auditor rotation, section 271 requires public companies to appoint auditors at every 
Annual General Meeting to hold office from the conclusion of that meeting until the 
conclusion of the next Annual General Meeting of the company. 
 
2.1.2.2 Insider Trading Act (1998) 
People in a fiduciary position are tasked with managing the company on behalf of the 
owners of the company or shareholders. By trading whilst in the possession of information 
that they have received in the performance of their duties such individuals benefit at the 
expense of shareholders. Therefore, the Insider Trading Act seeks to prohibit individuals who 
have inside information relating to securities or financial instruments from dealing in such 
securities or financial instruments. This Act is important because it prohibits expropriation of 
outsiders by insiders because of their privileged position. For instance, section 2 and 5 of the 
Act imposes penalties on any insider who is convicted of a direct or indirect insider trading, 
of a criminal fine not exceeding R2 million or imprisonment for a period not exceeding 10 
years or both. Section 11 of the Act grants wide ranging statutory powers to the Financial 
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Services Board (FSB) including the power to investigate any matter relating to insider 
trading, summon, interrogate, search any entity deemed to be an offender under the 
provisions of this Act. The Act also establishes a directorate (Insider Trading Directorate) 
under the FSB to institute any civil proceedings against those who transgress the provisions 
of this Act. 
This Act is relevant when discussing CG in SA because it is one of the essential 
regulatory frameworks which may help in enhancing good governance practices in a country. 
In short, the Act prevents trading of a corporation’s stock or 
other securities (e.g. bonds or stock options) by individuals with potential access to non-
public information about the company (insiders). Other Acts which influence CG in SA are 

















Table 2.1 SA Acts which Impacts Corporate Governance  
Year Acts 
1997 Basic Conditions of Employment Act 
Gives effect to the right to fair labour practices referred to in the Constitution by establishing and 
making provision for the regulation of basic conditions of employment; and thereby requires 
employers to comply with the obligations of the Republic as a member state of the International 
Labour Organisation. 
1998 Employment Equity Act 
Promotes the constitutional right of equality and the exercise of true democracy; eliminates unfair 
discrimination in employment; ensures the implementation of employment equity to redress the 
effects of discrimination; requires the workforce to be broadly representative of the SA population; 
promotes economic development and efficiency in the workforce. Applies to companies of a specific 
size (mostly large). 
1996 
&1998 
Environmental Issues: Constitution of the Republic of SA (1996) &  National Environmental Act 
(1998) 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, as well as environmental legislation, defines 
environmental rights of South Africans. Section 24 of the Constitution specifies that everyone has the 
right to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being; and to have the environment 
protected for the benefit of present and future generations, through reasonable legislative measures 
that prevent pollution and ecological degradation; promotion of conservation and ecologically 
sustainable development and use of natural resources while promoting justifiable economic and social 
development. 
2000 Promotion of Access to Information Act 
This Act gives effect to the constitutional right of access to any information held by any public or 
private body that is required for the exercise or protection of any rights. According to the Act, where a 
request is made in terms of the Act, the body to which the request is made is obliged to release the 
information, except where the Act expressly provides that the information may or must not be 
released (e.g. limited protection of privacy, commercial confidentiality, safety of individuals etc). In 
short, this Act seeks to promote transparency and good governance by doing away with the secretive 
and unresponsive culture in public and private bodies which often leads to an abuse of power and 
human rights violations.  
2003 Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 
This Act seeks to address the historical socio-economic imbalances created by apartheid. The Act 
seeks to accelerate the pace of black economic advancement, by generating a greater level of 
ownership of businesses by black people. According to BEE guidelines and legislation, companies 
must promote black ownership and representation at all levels of operation, from entry level 
employees to the highest levels of executives and boards.   





2.1.3 Economic Environment 
  
SA is the economic powerhouse of the African continent, with a gross domestic 
product (GDP) four times that of its Southern African neighbours, and comprising an 
estimated 25% of the entire GDP of Africa (SA Info. 2009). The country leads the continent 
in industrial output (an estimated 40% of Africa’s total output) and mineral production (an 
estimated 45% of total mineral production) and generates most of Africa’s electricity (over 
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60%) (SA Info., 2009). It is blessed with an abundance of natural resources, such as gold, 
diamonds, platinum, coal etc. In comparison to most African countries, SA has well-
developed financial, legal, communications, energy, and transport sectors . Its stock 
exchange, the JSE, is ranked among the top 20 in the world. The country also boasts  a 
modern infrastructure supporting efficient distribution of goods throughout the Southern 
African region (South Africa Info, 2009). Corporate law and corporate practice in SA have 
largely been adopted from the UK (West, 2006).  
The SA financial services sector is well developed, has a sound regulatory and legal 
framework and boasts dozens of domestic and foreign institutions which provide a full range 
of services such as commercial, retail and merchant banking, mortgage lending, insurance 
and investment (Armstrong et al., 2005, p. 13). The SA banking sector consists of many local 
and foreign banks and offers modern facilities such as electronic and internet banking 
facilities. 
The SA economy experienced the longest period of economic expansion since 
September 1999, registering an average annual economic growth of over 4% up to the fourth 
quarter of 2007 (South Africa Info, 2009) compared to an average of less than 1% a year in 
the decade prior to 1994. Growth was robust from 2004 to 2008 as SA reaped the 
benefits of macroeconomic stability and a global commodities boom, but began 
to slow down in the second half of 2008 due to the global financial crisis’ impact 
on commodity prices and demand. Figure 2.2 shows the (Gross Domestic Product) GDP 







Figure 2.2 GDP Growth in South Africa - 1999 to 2008 
 
Data source: (South Africa Info, 2009) and (US Department of State, 2009) 
 
 
However, as a result of the global economic crisis, GDP contracted in the third and 
fourth quarters of 2008, officially plunging the economy into recession. This contraction 
continued into the first, second and third quarters of 2009, with GDP growth at -6.4%, -3% 
and -3.2% respectively. Economic growth is expected to recover gradually to 4% by 2011 
(Stats SA, 2009). Table 2.2 shows the sector contribution to GDP for 2005 to 2008. 
 
Table 2.2 Sector Contribution to GDP 
Sector 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 2.7% 2.5% 2.6% 2.9% 
Mining and quarrying 7.6% 7.5% 7.5% 7.1% 
Manufacturing 18.5% 19.7% 20.7% 21.2% 
Electricity, gas and water 2.4% 2.4% 2.5% 2.5% 
Construction 2.8% 3.0% 3.5% 3.8% 
Wholesale and retail trade; hotels and 
restaurants 
13.9% 14.7% 15.5% 15.7% 
Transport, storage and communication 10.0% 10.5% 11.1% 11.6% 
Finance, real estate and business services 21.1% 23.1% 24.9% 26.9% 
General Govt services 14.9% 15.3% 16.0% 16.6% 
Personal services 6.3% 6.6% 7.0% 7.3% 


























As can be seen from Table 2.2, the financial sector contributes more than other sectors 
to the GDP between 2005 and 2008. The manufacturing sector is the second largest 
contributor to GDP while wholesale and retail claims the third spot. Growth in the financial 
sector has implications for compliance with financial regulatory and other legal frameworks. 
The SA banking and financial sector conforms to first world market principles, which gives 
confidence to local and international investors (Coetzer, 2009). This positions SA as a 
suitable country to do business in because of the existence of enabling factors such as a world 
class banking and financial sector. 
 
2.1.3.1 Regional and International Trade Relations 
 
SA participates in a number of trade relationships, both regional and bilateral. SA is a 
member of SADC whose main objective is to achieve regional economic integration 
(USAID, 2008). SA’s participation in the SADC, comprising 14 sub-Saharan African 
countries, allows access to a market of approximately 140 million people, which is expected 
to grow at an annual rate of around 3% (South Africa Info, 2008). SA has negotiated free 
trade agreements with the SADC, and the European Union (EU) (the SA-EU Trade 
Development Co-operation Agreement). It was a founding member of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (1947), and is an active member of the World Trade Organisation. Its 
commitment to free trade is evidenced by reduction of tariffs and the phasing out of non-tariff 
barriers. SA is party to various international agreements and conventions relating to the 
protection of intellectual property including patents, trademarks, designs and copyright. 
Being a party to the World Trade Organisation agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), SA is obliged to comply with the minimum standards 
set by that Agreement for the protection of intellectual property. Such membership has 
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implications on the culture of compliance with regulatory requirements in the country. This 
has an effect of influencing compliance with best practice recommendations among business 
organisations, in line with the tone set at a country level. As such South Africa has put in 
place laws which govern compliance with international norms. As will be discussed in 
section 2.1.6, the DTI is responsible for compliance with corporate laws. 
SA has placed greater importance on forming strong economic trading blocs to gain 
access to key markets given the fierce competition for foreign direct investment among 
developing nations. SA has a trade imbalance with other African countries as indicated by the 
2003 figures, which indicate that 16% of South African exports went to Africa compared 
with 4% of imports during the same year (South Africa Info, 2008). Table 2.3 shows the 2003 
trade figures between SA and some other African countries.  
 
Table 2.3 Trade Figures between SA and major African Trading Partners 
Trade Partner Exports Imports 
Angola R3.0b R3.0b 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
R1.2b R28m 
Ghana R1.1b R52m 
Kenya R2.2b R2.1b 
Malawi R1.7b R381m 
Mauritius R2.0b R124m 
Mozambique R5.6b R28m 
Nigeria  R2.5b R2.7b 
Tanzania  R1.8b R136m 
Zambia R5.6b R3.4b 
Zimbabwe R6.5b R2.6b 
Source: SA Info. (2010) – SA Trade with Africa 
 
 
SA has a trade surplus with most of her major African trading partners except with 
Nigeria which had a surplus of R200.0m for the year under consideration. South Africa 
influences corporate governance in the SADC region to some extent. For instance countries 
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like Zimbabwe, Botswana, Zambia, etc have corporate governance that recommends either 
King Code or Cadbury Code. SADC countries have similar listing rules (SA Info, 2007).   
 
2.1.3.2 Other Trading Partners 
 
Europe accounts for half of SA’s total foreign trade. Seven out SA’s ten major trade 
partners are located in Western Europe, led by the UK and Germany. SA’s trade relations and 
development co-operation with the EU are governed by the Trade, Development and Co-
operation Agreement (TDCA), which was signed in 1999. The main objective of the TDCA 
is to create a free-trade area between SA and the EU over a 12-year period. The EU and SA 
will, in terms of the agreement, open their markets to each other (South Africa Info, 2008). 
In terms of foreign direct investment, the UK is the largest foreign investor in SA, 
with assets worth an estimated R132-billion and the third largest trading partner with a two-
way trade worth R66.0-billion annually (South Africa Info, 2008). This is not surprising 
given the historical ties of the two countries. Other major European trading partners include 
Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland. SA has also forged trade 
links with Asian countries such as Japan which is the fifth largest investor in SA with assets 
estimated at around R2-billion. These investments are concentrated in minerals processing 
and the motor assembly and related sectors, especially tyres. Japan is also a substantial aid 
donor to SA. Bilateral ties between SA and Japan are strengthened through The Partnership 
Forum (South Africa Info, 2008). Trade with Japan was R32.0 billion in 2001. SA also trades 
with other Asian countries such as China, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia. As a 
trading partner with other countries, SA may be compelled to comply with trade related 
protocols e.g. SADC protocol on free trade in the region, WTO’s Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), international protocols on labour related issues i.e. 
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human trafficking. This may ultimately impact compliance with best CG practice in the 
country as SA cultivates business friendly environment which complies with international 
norms. For instance, SA’s European and other trading partners may influence compliance 
with best practice governance principles in SA. This was the case when investors demanded 
reform in both corporate structures and corporate governance practices in exchange for their 
infusion of capital when SA was readmitted into the community of nations in 1994 
(Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabadse, 2002). As such the demands by international investors 
that corporations practise accountability, transparency and fairness to all stakeholders may 
create an investor friendly environment and ultimately make SA competitive. 
 
2.1.4 Culture 
Researchers have defined culture in several ways. For instance, Kroeber and 
Kluckhohn, as cited in Miller-Loessi and Parker (2003, p. 530) define culture as consisting:  
 
“of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behaviour, acquired and 
transmitted by symbols constituting the distinctive achievement of human groups, 
including their embodiment in artefacts; the essential core of culture consists of 
traditional (i.e. historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached 
values; culture systems may, on the one hand, be considered as products of action, on 
the other hand as conditioning elements of the future action”. 
 
More recently Myers (1999, p. 11) defines culture as, “the enduring behaviours, ideas, 
attitudes and traditions, shared by a large group of people and transmitted from one 
generation to the next”. Using the analogy of the way computers are programmed Hofstede 
and Hofstede (2005, p. 3) define culture as “software of the mind” which partially 
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predetermine a person’s behaviour. According to Hofstede & Hofstede (2005, p. 3) culture is 
leaned through socialisation and education. Hofstede & Hofstede (2005, p. 3)  contend that 
socialisation begins with the family, continues with the neighbourhood, then at school, in 
youth groups, at the workplace and ends in the living community. 
 
Culture is not genetically inherited; but rather leaned from our social environment. 
Each person is guided by the beliefs, customs, norms and values of their culture. As such,  
this explains why people have different approaches to life (Poovan, 2005, p. 4). Culture 
influences our human abilities such as perception, thinking, acting and feeling; hence our 
pattern of behaviour becomes consistent with our cultural reality. As human beings, we 
reflect our culture because of the way we act, think, perceive things e.g. “we become the 
mirrors of our culture – our culture is mirrored in us” (Poovan, 2005, p. 4). 
 
Culture regulates human behaviour because (1) it has the power to stipulate 
acceptable and unacceptable behaviours, (2) it defines how we behave and (3) it provides 
people with an identity (Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005). As a result, of these regulatory 
powers that cultures possess, people from the same culture have the tendency to exhibit 
behaviours which are common. For instance, the Eurocentric culture is characterised by 
individualism, competition and materialism. The motto of the survival of the strongest 
individual or most competitive business organisation is the foundation and the driving force 
in this culture – society is shaped, built and developed around the interest of the individual 
and the needs of the best performing business. This is in contrast to the African culture of 
Ubuntu which promotes the ideologies of communality, collectivism, human unity and 
pluralism (Karsten and Illa, 2005). As such differences in cultures may influence individuals 
to behave in different ways when dealing with corporate matters such as disclosure, 
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compliance, transparency etc because of their cultural orientation. This leads to an 
examination of the Ubuntu and the Eurocentric culture. 
 
2.1.4.1 Cultural Values of Blacks and Whites 
 
The predominant cultures of blacks and whites in SA are the Ubuntu culture and the 
Eurocentric culture (Booysen, 2000), respectively. Ubuntu is a traditional indigenous African 
family system which developed spontaneously through the sharing of cattle, commodities and 
pieces of land for the purpose of survival. The development of the culture was spontaneous in 
the sense that the principles of Ubuntu were not discussed and agreed at any forum by the 
tribesmen/women and King. The culture just developed among community members over 
centuries. The Ubuntu culture is the way of life that black Africans believe in, trust and 
practice in their daily interaction with others. 
The origins of Ubuntu could be traced to the need for survival by African 
communities e.g. when communities had to work together to complete tasks which would 
ensure survival. Traditionally, African communities lived together and shared basic needs 
such as shelter, water and food. Ubuntu expresses the interconnectedness among human 
beings as described by the Sotho/Tswana proverb “Motho ke motho ka batho ba bangwe” or 
Xhosa “Umuntu ngumuntu ngabanye abantu” which means “I am because we are” or “a 
person is a person because of other people” (Mbigi, 1997, p. 2). This proverb demonstrates 
the interconnectedness of an African to the community and members of his community. This 
culture is classified by researchers as collectivist in nature (see Gykeye, 2003; Mbiti, 1989; 
Menkiti, 1979; Wiredu, 2003). The African culture of Ubuntu is viewed as a source of 
guidance for communities in times of peace, uncertainty, birth, life and death (Malunga, 
2006a, p. 2).  “At its best it has been the basis for identity, respect and self confidence” 
(Malunga, 2006a, p. 2). The Ubuntu culture enables the African people to live in harmony 
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with the physical, social and spiritual environment. It also provides a foundation for 
leadership, problem solving, decision making and hope for the future (Malunga, 2006a, p. 2).  
According to (Prinsloo, 2000, p. 277) “Ubuntu embodies a tradition of consultation of 
and decision making by the ordinary members of society”. Karsten and Illa (2005, p. 607) see 
Ubuntu as “a pervasive spirit of caring and community, harmony and hospitality, respect and 
responsiveness that individuals and groups display for one another.” Mbigi (1997), as quoted 
in Karsten and Illa (2005, p. 607), lists the following principles of Ubuntu: “unconditional 
African collective contribution, solidarity, acceptance, dignity, stewardship, compassion and 
care hospitality and legitimacy”. Malunga (2006, p. 2) observes five principles of Ubuntu. 
These are “sharing and collective ownership of opportunities, responsibilities and challenges; 
the importance of people and relationships over things; participatory decision making and 
leadership; patriotism; and reconciliation as a goal of conflict management”. The Ubuntu 
culture emphasizes the importance of coexistence within the society.  
In contrast, the whites’ culture is considered to be individualistic, masculine, low 
uncertainty avoidance and has a long term orientation (Booysen, 2000; McFarlin et al., 
1999). The culture is characterised by the desire to be independent from other members of 
society by individual members, lack of concern for interpersonal bonds and a high level of 
competition. The cultures of the two main groups have implications on compliance with CG 
principles, considering that culture may partially account for the actions of individuals 
(Hofstede, 1988). For instance, as discussed in section 4.2.1 of chapter 4, a board dominated 
by people from the Ubuntu culture may influence compliance of a company with some 
aspects of the King Code which are collectivist in nature e.g. board diversity, social 
investment, employment equity, human capital development among others because 
compliance with these recommendations may have a positive impact on the community. 
Culture, proxy ethnicity is therefore important to consider when discussing CG in SA.  
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2.1.4.2 Societal Goals 
 
The South African societal goals are largely influenced by the legacy of apartheid. 
The South African government has always pursued democratisation and social and economic 
change, as well as reconciliation and the building of consensus founded on the commitment 
to improve the lives of all South Africans, especially the previously disadvantaged and the 
poor (South African Government, 2007). At the dawn of the new democracy, the South 
African government placed emphasis on meeting basic needs through programmes for 
socioeconomic development such as the provision of housing, piped water, electricity 
education and healthcare and social grants for those in need (South African Government, 
2007). The South African government also has to address the issue of security and policing. 
During the apartheid era the South African security agents were trained to protect the one 
ethnic group (“white”) (South African Government, 2007). To this end, the government has 
to transform the police into a service working with the community and overcoming the grave 
problem of criminality and a culture of violence posed by the social dislocations inherited 
from the past. 
The government has also embarked on the major objectives of creating jobs, poverty 
eradication, reduction of inequality and overall economic growth. Government efforts have 
seen an improvement in the achievement of macroeconomic stability and the initiation of 
microeconomic reform, although unemployment is still a major problem. One way to tackle 
the issue of diversity in employment has been through the South African Employment Equity 
which seeks to enable black people to gain access to jobs.   
SA, like many African countries, is grappling with the scourge of HIV/AIDS which 
has the potential to negatively impact the workforce (Sarra, 2004). In the spirit of good CG, 
organisations must recognise that they operate within the context of economic as well as 
social challenges and to that extent that its staff, business associates, and customers are 
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affected by adverse circumstances (such as HIV/AIDS) which may ultimately affect the 
organisation (SAICA, 2004). The HIV/AIDS pandemic poses one of the gravest risks (e.g. 
operational risks, absenteeism, cost of employment, credit, target market, legal, health) that 
many organisations have to face and corporate boards have to consider ways in which 
HIV/AIDS risks are managed in their organisations (SAICA, 2004). In this regard, it makes 
business sense for organisations to embark on HIV/AIDS risk management not only because 
it is recommended by the King Report, but because the pandemic poses risk to the very 
existence of the business. The South African government, non-governmental organisations 
and the society in general have devoted ample resources to addressing this pandemic. It forms 
one of the major goals which South African society seeks to address. As will be discussed in 
section 2.1.8.3.2, these aspects are recommended in the Code under integrated sustainability 
reporting. As such, societal goals in SA affect corporate compliance with the Code. 
 
2.1.5 Financial Regulation in SA 
 
2.1.5.1 DTI & FSB 
 
The SA financial regulatory system consists of regulation of financial instruments, 
regulation of the markets for these instruments and regulation for the market participants 




















The Minister of Finance has the final authority in financial regulation over the 
Financial Services Board (FSB) in the non-banking financial sector and the South African 
Reserve Bank in the banking sector. The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) is the 
government department responsible for commercial and industrial policy. The DTI and its 
subsidiary agencies are involved in promoting economic development, Black Economic 
Empowerment, implementing commercial law (including companies’ law and intellectual 
property law), promoting and regulating international trade, and consumer protection. The 
DTI impacts corporate governance through its function of creating a predictable, competitive, 
equitable and socially responsible environment for investment, enterprise and trade (DTI, 
2008). Basically, the DTI has the responsibility to position SA as a suitable destination of 
capital. This is conducted through a number of divisions within the DTI. Among others, the 
Companies and Intellectual Property Registration Office (CIPRO) registers companies and 
intellectual property rights, maintains related registries and develops information for 
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disclosure to stakeholders. The DTI also has a Competition Commission (CC) division whose 
main responsibility is to investigate anti-competitive conduct. It also assesses the impact of 
mergers and acquisitions on competition and takes appropriate action. The CC also monitors 
competition levels and market transparency in the economy; identifies impediments to 
competition, and, plays an advocacy role in addressing these impediments (DTI, 2008). This 
creates a level playing field for businesses in SA. Through the Competition Tribunal, the DTI 
may authorise or prohibit large mergers and adjudicate cases of anti-competitive behaviour 
(DTI, 2008). The CC may also impose penalties on enterprises for engaging in restrictive 
practice or abuse of their dominance. 
Another function of the DTI includes creation of an enabling environment for fair 
trade through customs tariff investigations, trade remedies and import and export control. 
This is conducted through the International Trade Administration Commission of SA (ITAC) 
which manages and monitors all investigations with regards to alleged dumping
7
 and 
subsidized export. This unit basically serves to ensure that cheap subsidised produce is not 
dumped in SA. In a way, ITAC promotes fair competition, at the same time protecting local 
industries. 
 The FSB is an independent institution (not a government institution) established by 
the Financial Services Board Act, 97 of 1990 to among others supervise compliance with 
laws regulating financial institutions and the provision of financial services; and advise the 
minister on matters concerning financial institutions and financial services (FSB, 2009). The 
supervision function of non-banking financial services is bestowed upon the FSB in terms of 
16 Parliamentary Acts (Rossouw et al., 2002, 294; FSB, 2009). The FSB functions are also 
delegated to the Insider Trading Directorate (ITD) as well as an advisory board on financial 
                                                          
7
 Article 2 of the World Trade Organisation Anti-Dumping Agreement defines a dumped product as: a 
product introduced into the commerce of another country at less than its normal value, if the export price of the 
product exported from one country to another is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, 
for the like product when destined for consumption in the exporting country (WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement, 
1994) found at: http://www.antidumpingpublishing.com 
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markets, and advisory committees on long- and short-term insurance pension funds and unit 
trusts respectively (FSB, 2009). The financial markets board is responsible for supervision 
and issuing licenses for the operation of the securities markets such as the stock, bond and 
financial futures markets. The financial markets board supervises the JSE, the Bond 
Exchange of SA (BESA) and the South African Futures Exchange (SAFEX). The JSE which 
is the focus of this study is discussed in the following subsection together with BESA and 
SAFEX. 
 
2.1.5.1.1 The JSE 
 
The JSE provides the following services to investors under one roof: an equities 
market, including stocks from the Main Board and the small to mid-cap Alternative 
Exchange, an interest rate market, an active financial derivatives market and an agricultural 
products market. The JSE is privately owned, funded, and governed by a Board of Directors. 
Its activities are licensed and regulated by two Acts of Parliament, namely the Stock 
Exchanges Control Act, 1 of 1985 (“SECA”), which governs the equities markets, and the 
Financial Markets Control Act, 55 of 1989 (“FMCA”), which governs the derivatives markets 
(JSE, 2010). The JSE is governed by the JSE Listing Rules (2007) which have since adopted 
some of the recommendations from the King Code and made them mandatory for listed firms 
to comply with (or explain non-compliance) with these recommendations.  
The JSE Securities Exchange was established as a stock exchange in 1887 and it 
became a member of the World Federation of Exchanges in 1963 (JSE, 2010). As of 2001, 
there were 616 companies listed in the JSE Securities Exchange whilst in 2008 there were 
334 companies listed in the Main Board and 77 companies listed in the ALTx board. The 





September 2006), making it the largest exchange in Africa and the 16th largest stock 
exchange worldwide (JSE, 2010). The exchange trades shares for a wide variety of industries, 
with the largest portion of market capitalization coming from the mining industry. There are 
three categories of listing in the JSE, namely the Main Board, the Development Capital 
Market (DCM) and the Venture Capital Market (VCM). The listing requirements of each of 
these are designed to enable companies at different stages of development to obtain a listing 
which best suits their respective circumstances (JSE, 2010).  
 
The JSE Listing Requirements (2007) spell out conditions which must be met by 
firms requiring a listing on the JSE Securities Exchange Main Board. In order for companies 
to be listed on the JSE Securities Exchange Main Board, a company must have a subscribed 
capital of at least R25.0 million and not less than 25,000,000 equity shares in issue. It must 
also have a satisfactory audited profit history for the preceding three financial years, the last 
of which reported an audited profit of at least R8,000,000 before taxation (JSE Listing 





 listing requirements are less stringent than those of the Main 
Board 
In addition to the Main Board, DCM and VCM listings, the JSE also offers an 
alternative exchange known as the ALTx. The ALTx board was established in 2003. It is a 
market for small to medium companies that are in a growth phase. The ALTx plays a vital 
                                                          
8
 The DCM listing requirements include: subscribed capital of at least R1 million with at least one million 
equity shares in issue; a satisfactory profit history for the preceding two years, the last of which should reflect an 
audited profit before taxation of not less than R500,000; a minimum of 10% of each class of equity shares to be 
held by the public; and a minimum of 75 public shareholders for equity shares, 25 for preference shares and 10 
for debentures (JSE, 2010). 
9
 The VCM requirements on the other hand include: a memorandum summarising the nature of the business of 
the company, its modus operandi, its business plans and prospects. Subscribed capital of at least R500,000.00 in 
the form of not less than one million equity shares in issue; no profit history is required, but the applicant should 
in its analysis of future earnings, indicate credible returns on capital that, on a time-weighted basis, are above 
average; a minimum of 10% of each class of shares must be held by the public; and there must be at least 75 




role within the JSE, by providing smaller companies not yet able to list on the JSE Main 
Board with a clear growth path and access to capital. Listing on the ALTx Board requires a 
subscribed capital of R 2.0 million, no profit history and pre-tax profit requirements and 100 
shareholders. Companies which are not able to list on the Main board may list on the ALTx 
board (JSE Listing Rules, 2007, Sc 4.).  
 
2.1.5.1.1.1 The JSE Listing Rules 
 
JSE listed corporations are required to comply with the JSE Listing Rules (2007); as 
such the Listing Rules are an integral part of internal corporate governance mechanisms in 
SA. The Listing Rules append some sections of the Companies Act, the Insider Trading Act 
and the King Code. The JSE Listing Rules (2007) consist of 22 sections and 27 schedules 
which cover a range of topics from authority of the JSE (Section 1), conditions for listing, 
CG, and pyramid companies among others. The business of the JSE is to provide facilities for 
the listing of securities, to provide the JSE’s users with an orderly marketplace for trading in 
such securities and to regulate the market accordingly. The Listing Rules, therefore, ensure 
that the business of the JSE is carried out in the best interests of the public (JSE Listing 
Rules, 2010). 
Sections 3.84 (a) to (h) and section 8.63 (a) contains specific requirements concerning 
corporate governance. Under section 3.84 listed companies or companies seeking to be listed 
in the JSE must have a policy detailing the procedures for appointments to the board, a 
balanced board, no role duality, remuneration and audit committee and a brief CV of each 
director. The companies must also categorise each director accordingly and have a policy 
with regard to non-audit services among others. These provisions also form part of the King 
Code.  According to section 3.15 of the Listing Rules, interim company reports shall be 
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published and distributed to shareholders after the expiration of the first six month period of a 
financial year, by no later than three months after that date. Section 3.19 of the Listing Rules 
requires listed companies to distribute annual financial statements to all shareholders within 
six months after the end of each financial year and at least twenty-one clear days before the 
date of the annual general meeting. These reports form important communication tools 
between the principals and the agents. Section 3.83 of the Listing Rules requires directors to 
maintain a register of the disclosures made in terms of section 140A of the Act. The register 
should the issuer is to publish the beneficial interests of directors and major shareholders in 
its annual financial statements as required by paragraphs 8.63(d) and (f) of the Listing Rules. 
 
2.1.5.1.2 SAFEX (South African Futures Exchange) 
 
SAFEX became part of the JSE in 2001. It is the principal market in SA for trade in 
derivative financial products e.g. financial and commodity futures and options. In order to 
trade in the SAFEX market, a trader must be: a registered financial institution in terms of the 
Securities Services Act, with own funds of R 200 million; provide a surety-ship to the 
SAFEX clearing house and to enter into a clearing house agreement with SAFEX. Similar to 
other futures markets, the SAFEX market offers assurance of future prices and availability of 
goods, and hence provides stability in an unstable business environment by offering the 
facility to hedge against an unstable financial environment. In terms of CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE, SAFEX provides a market through which firms may hedge against 





2.1.5.1.3 BESA (Bond Exchange of South Africa) 
 
BESA operates as an independent, licensed exchange and is constituted as a public 
company. It operates and regulates debt securities and associated derivative instruments 
issued by central and local government, public sector corporations’ enterprises and major 
companies. BESA primarily includes government-issued securities and corporate debt 
securities. In terms of CG, BESA provides a stable platform though which business can 
obtain finance for investment and growth.  
 
2.1.5.1.4 Challenges Facing the SA Financial Regulatory Environment 
 
A critical challenge facing the DTI is the recruitment and retention of high calibre 
people in key managerial and technical positions across all the core programmes of the 
department. This is exacerbated by intense competition for skilled personnel within both 
Government and the private sector, and between them. 
The FSB is financed by the financial services industry through levies and fees, with 
no contribution from the government (FSB, 2001; Bamber et al., 2001; Rossouw et al., 
2002). As such, this has the potential to affect the FSB’s enforcement independence as a 
regulatory institution. It raises the question of whether the FSB can ‘bite the hand that feeds 
it’ e.g. whether it can be truly independent of, and properly regulate, market participants who 
fund it. According to the Institute of International Finance (IIF) (2007), SA’s self regulation 
environment (SRO) creates a weak enforcement environment. This is not helped by the fact 
that the South African enforcement function is fragmented between the FSB and the DTI, 
which tends to weaken authority. The FSB supervises compliance with laws regulating non-
banking financial institutions and services while the DTI supervises compliance with 
company law. The DTI is perceived by market participants to have a weaker enforcement 
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function partly due to lack of trained personnel (IIF, 2007). The IIF suggests that 
restructuring of the DTI will increase focus and strengthen the enforcement environment. 
 
2.1.6 Colonial History 
 
2.1.6.1 Colonial History and Corporate Governance in South Africa 
 
The colonial history of SA has had a lasting legacy on the corporate landscape of the 
country. First, the pyramid structures which were prevalent in the JSE in the 1990s owe their 




 century to exploit the 
Johannesburg gold deposits. The ownership structure of these firms brought about 
unacceptable business and governance controls characterised by elaborate control structures 
and conflicts of interest (Vaughn and Ryan, 2006). The presence of pyramid structures in the 
JSE can be traced to the historical background of the country. Second, because of the policy 
of apartheid, SA experienced virtual isolation from the global economy for over three 
decades. As such, South African corporate practices fell behind international norms, as did 
laws and regulations (Malherbe and Segal, 2001), although the country has since brought its 
CG standards at par with international norms. 
Third, the South African corporate structure has been found to be similar to the 
Anglo-Saxon shareholder system of CG which focuses on shareholder wealth maximization 
with single tier board (Rossouw et al., 2002; West, 2006). The corporate landscape reflects 
centuries of colonialism and apartheid and has been adopted mainly from the UK (West, 
2006, p. 435). However, the South African King Code espouses an inclusive approach to CG  
(Institute of Directors, 1994, 2002).  
Fourth, economic marginalisation during the apartheid era ensured that whites 
controlled the economy by denying blacks access to positions of leadership and managerial 
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decision making. This situation still prevail in modern SA whereby the economy is 
predominantly in the hands of white English-speaking conglomerates, with an 
overwhelmingly black labour force (Southall, 2006; Thomas and Bendixen, 2000; West, 
2006). Because of the colonial history of SA, the post-apartheid government has enacted a 
series of statutory requirements such as the Employment Equity Act, Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act and the Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment. These pieces of 
legislation influence corporate governance, in particular corporate compliance with 
sustainability reporting.  
 
2.1.7 Professional Bodies 
 
Professional bodies play an important role in corporate governance issues in SA. 
Some of the important professional bodies in SA are discussed in the following subsections. 
 
2.1.7.1 South Africa Chamber of Commerce (SACOB) 
 
SACOB is one of the many organisations
10
 in SA which represents the interests of 
various firms from different interest groups. However, SACOB is the largest in the country 
with a membership of close to 20,000 businesses, including 80 of the largest corporations in 
SA, and nearly 20 sector-specific business associations. SACOB seeks to address economic, 
social and political issues affecting the business community in SA. SACOB also publishes 
the monthly Business Confidence Index (SA Info., 2010). SACOB and other umbrella 
organisations impact corporate governance in SA because member organisations are expected 
                                                          
10
 Others include: The National African Federated Chamber of Commerce (Nafcoc), an independent business 
support organisation that primarily, but not exclusively, serves the interests of black economic empowerment 
companies and small businesses; The Foundation for African Business and Consumer Services (Fabcos), 
established in 1988, aims to bring black business into the mainstream economy; The Minara Chamber of 
Commerce which represents and assists South African Muslim businesses and entrepreneurs among others. 
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to adhere to a strict code of conduct, which is consistent with corporate governance practice 
in the country. As such, members are expected to abide by rules and regulations in force in 
SA and also to practice good corporate governance by complying with recommended best 
practice in SA. As discussed in section 2.1.9.3.1, SACOB supported the initiative to make 
recommendations on the first King Code (Rossouw et al., 2002) in 1992. As such, it 
subscribes to good governance principles under the King Code. Members of SACOB may 
therefore be expected to comply with principles from the Code.  
 
2.1.7.2 South African Institute of Chartered Accountants (SAICA) 
 
SAICA is one of the main accounting bodies
11
 in SA which offers training in the area 
of management and accounting. The institute came into existence in January 1980 (SAICA, 
2010). Some of the aims of SAICA are to enhance the quality and information used in the 
private and public sectors for measuring and enhancing organisational performance; to fulfil a 
leadership role regarding relevant business-related issues and providing reliable and respected 
public commentary. SAICA boasts a membership of over 30,000 Chartered Accountants 
[CAs(SA)] who hold positions as board directors, chief executive officers (CEOs), chief 
financial officers (CFOs), managing directors, business owners /entrepreneurs, auditors and 
leaders in their spheres of business operation (SAICA, 2010). Most of these members operate 
in commerce and industry, and play a significant role in the nation’s highly dynamic business 
sector and economic development. SAICA members enjoy the privilege of using the highly 
regarded and prestigious CA (SA) designation. In its 2009 survey of the directors of the JSE’s 
Top 200 companies ranked by market capitalization, SAICA found that 25% are CAs (SA). 
                                                          
11
 Other bodies with almost similar objectives include the following: Public Accountants and Auditors Board 
(PAAB); Southern African Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators (ICSA); Association of 
Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA); Chartered Institute of Management Accountants (CIMA); South 
African Institute of Professional Accountants (SAIPA); Institute of Certified Bookkeepers (ICB) and Institute of 
Administration and Commerce (IACSA). 
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In addition, the survey showed that more than 90% of the Top 200’s Chief Financial Officers 
hold the coveted designation while 22% of the CEOs also hold the designation (SAICA, 
2010). 
SAICA and other professional accountancy bodies contribute significantly to 
corporate governance in SA by providing training to members in the field of accounting. In 
this way, this helps towards ensuring compliance with the King Code (2002) 
recommendation that the majority of the members of the audit committee should be 
financially literate. Also, most of its members hold key positions in listed companies and are 
responsible for corporate governance issues such as compliance with rules, regulations and 
self regulatory principles.  
Professional accounting organisations such as SAICA, CIMA, ACCA etc normally 
have a professional code of conduct which members are expected to abide by at all times in 
the execution of their duties. Ethical principles expected of members include integrity; 
objectivity; professional competence and due care; confidentiality; and professional 
behaviour (SAICA, 2010). As such, it may be expected that firms with directors who hold 
qualifications from such organisations may have better corporate governance practices
12
 
including compliance with good governance principles.  
In addition, SAICA is the guardian of what constitutes Generally Accepted 
Accounting Practice in SA (GAAP). Since 2005, JSE listed companies are required under the 




                                                          
12
 However, this may not necessarily be the case if prior experience with corporate collapses in SA is anything 
to go by. In 2000, LeisureNet collapsed despite having many governance mechanisms in place, including six 
chartered accountants on the audit committee (Sarra, 2004, p. 7). 
pg. 76 
 
2.1.7.3 Institute of Directors of South Africa (IoDSA) 
 
IoDSA originated in London in 1903, and almost sixty years later, in 1960, the 
Southern African chapter of the Institute was established in Johannesburg (IoDSA, 2010). 
Recently, in 2009, the IoDSA became autonomous from the IoD in the United Kingdom 
although it still maintains close links and enjoys a mutual working relationship with it. 
According to information from the IoDSA website, the institute is a custodian of corporate 
governance in SA. It also seeks to be a role model for good governance, leadership and 
integrity and to develop and enhance professional directorship in SA and the SADC region.  
The IoDSA is currently the only organisation that represents directors, professionals, 
business owners and leaders in their individual capacities in South Africa. In pursuit of 
safeguarding corporate governance standards, the Institute is committed to the development 
of business owners and directors through education and improvement of governance 
structures. As part of improving corporate governance standards, in 1992 the King 
Committee on corporate governance was formed under the auspicious of the IoDSA, to make 
recommendations on a Code of Practice in terms of the financial aspects of corporate 
governance in SA (Rossouw et al., 2002, p. 296). This process marks the start of 
development of corporate governance in SA, which is examined in the next section. 
 
 
2.1.7.3.1 Development of Corporate Governance in SA 
 
The first King Report was released in November 1994 under the auspices of the 
Institute of Directors of SA (IoDSA). The initiative also had the backing of various 
organisations in SA such as SACOB, the Institute of Chartered Secretaries and 
Administrators (ICSA), SAICA and the JSE (Rossouw et al., 2002). The King Committee’s 
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(named after its chair Judge Mervyn King) terms of reference included both financial and 
ethical dimensions of corporate governance. The King Code (1994) adopted many of the 
corporate governance standards and principles that had already been advocated in other 
national and international codes (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Armstrong et al., 2005; 
Rossouw et al., 2002). In particular, the King Code borrowed heavily from the Cadbury 
Report (1992). The primary objective of the King Report was to promote the highest 
standards of corporate governance in SA by advocating an integrated approach to governance 
in the interests of a range of stakeholders (King Report, 1994). A distinguishing feature of the 
King Report (compared with the Cadbury Report) was its integrated approach to good 
corporate governance with regard to social, ethical, and environmental practice, to serve the 
interests of a wide range of stakeholders  (Armstrong et al., 2005).  
The following subsections discuss the broad outlines of the key recommendations of 
the King Code I, II and III. 
 
2.1.7.3.2 The King Code I 
 
The recommendations from King I consist of six key areas: board and directors, risk 
management, internal audit control, accounting and auditing, integrated sustainability 
reporting, and compliance and enforcement. 
 
i. Boards and directors 
Similar to other Codes, such as the Cadbury Report (1992), the first King Report 
(1994) drew attention to the importance of a proper functioning board of directors as a key 
ingredient of good corporate governance. The King Code (1994) identified the board as the 
focal point of the corporate governance system because it is ultimately accountable for the 
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performance affairs of the company. The board must retain full and effective control over the 
company, monitor the executive management and ensure that decisions on material matters 
are in the hands of the board. It has a role to ensure that the company complies with all 
relevant laws, regulations and codes of business practices, and that it communicates with 
shareholders and other stakeholders in a timely and transparent manner (King Code 1994). In 
this context, the King Report makes a number of recommendations to make the board of 
directors effective. It recommended that the selection and appointment of directors should be 
matters for the board as a whole. As such, the King Code I did not recommend the 
appointment of nomination committees, unlike the Cadbury Code. 
Similar to the Cadbury Code, it recognised the important role played by non-
executive directors in setting and maintaining high standards of corporate governance (King 
Code, 1994). The Code noted the importance of independence and experience brought by 
non-executive directors to issues of strategy, performance, resources, major appointments and 
standards of conduct (King Report, 1994). The 1994 King Code recommended that boards of 
directors should have at least two non-executive directors of adequate calibre and 
independence. In contrast, the Cadbury Report (1992) recommended three non-executive 
directors. The issue of independent non-executive directors was not addressed under the King 
Code I. For instance, the Code did not specify the number of independent directors on the 
board and did not specify that the board chair should be an independent director, similar to 
the Cadbury Report (1992).   
The King Code I stipulated that all boards should have at least an audit committee and 
remuneration committee in order to be efficient and effective, in line with the 
recommendations from the Cadbury Report (1992). In addition, it recommended that the two 
committees must consist of at least two non-executive directors, with the majority of its 
members, including the chairman of the committees, being non-executive directors. 
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As part of securing good corporate governance, the King Code I also recommended 
that board chairpersons should ensure that non-performing directors are not re-elected and 
should have their services terminated (King Report, 1994, para. 4.3). It is worth noting that 
the King Code does not specifically recommend a specific board size, but leaves that to the 
discretion of company boards. The King Code (1994) also recommended that the length of 
executive directors’ contracts is restricted to a maximum term of three years and that any 
extension should be subject to shareholder confirmation. 
 
ii. Risk Management, Internal Audit & Control  
Section 10 of the King Code I recommended that companies must have well 
resourced internal audit and control units in line with the recommendation from Cadbury. As 
per the King Code I, the function of internal auditors is complementary to, but different from, 
that of outside auditors. To this end, the King Code I recommended that companies must set 
up internal audit functions to undertake regular monitoring of key controls and procedures. 
Section 10.2 of the King Code I recommended that internal audit units carry out 
investigations on behalf of the audit committee and to follow up any suspicion of fraud. In an 
attempt to maintain independence, the King Code I recommended that the heads of internal 
audit committees should have unfettered access to the chairman of the audit committees. 
Similar to Cadbury, King Code I recommended that company directors should keep a 
system of internal control over financial management of the company, such as procedures for 
reducing fraud. This aspect is also in accordance with the provisions of the South African 
Companies Act. The Code also recommended that directors should report on the 
effectiveness of their system of internal control and that external auditors should express their 
opinion on the directors’ statement in the annual reports. However, King Code I did not 




iii. Accounting and Auditing 
In terms of accounting and auditing, King I made the following recommendations 
under section 11 of the Code: that South African companies should prepare their accounts in 
line with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) as per the recommendations of 
the JSE Listing Rules and the South African Accounting Standards Board. As such, it 
recommended that directors must prepare financial statements for every financial year which 
give a true and fair view of the state of affairs of the company or group. In line with the South 
African Companies Act, it was also recommended that directors must maintain adequate 
accounting records and confirm that suitable accounting policies and standards have been 
consistently applied in preparing the financial reports. King I also recommended that 
accounts should be prepared based on the principles of ‘substance over form’. Further, it was 
also recommended that financial statements must be comprehensible, transparent and that 
directors must maintain the integrity of the financial reports. 
King I also recommended that directors must express their opinions on the status of 
the business as a ‘going concern’ i.e. whether it will be able to continue into the foreseeable 
future. This requires that directors fully state the assumptions used in their assessment of the 
‘going concern’ status of the business for the ensuing financial year. By expressing their 
opinions on the status of the business as a ‘going concern’ directors in a way are making a 
declaration that material fraud which may incapacitate the business has not been committed, 
hence the business will be in existence in years to come. 
King I also recognised the important role played by the audit committee. It 
recommended that the audit committee should play a critical role in ensuring the integrity of 
the financial reports. The Code recommended that the audit committee must be composed in 
such a way that it enables non-executive directors to contribute independent judgement and 
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that the committee must review financial statements. The Code also recommended that the 
finance director and the head of internal audit must attend the audit committee meetings to 
provide answers to questions on any issues of concern raised at these meetings. The Code 
also recommended that the external auditor should be given access at all times to the board 
chairman, management, the audit committee and the chairman of the audit committee. 
 
iv. Integrated Sustainability Reporting/Non-Financial Information 
The distinguishing feature of King Code I from the Cadbury Report (1992) is the 
recommendation for firms to engage in stakeholder reporting. Section 12 and 13 of the King 
Code I made several recommendations which address affirmative action and stakeholder 
rights. This was in apparent recognition of the socio-economic and political situation 
prevailing in the country at the time the Code was developed. The stakeholder issues covered 
contribution to the community, health and safety, environment and fair employment practices 
(King Report, 1994). Some stakeholders are of the opinion that King Code I was more of a 
‘wish list’13 with regard to recommendations under integrated sustainability reporting.  
With regard to black economic empowerment (BEE), King Code I did not make BEE 
because this aspect was brought about by the new government after 1994. It also did not 
make recommendations on HIV/Aids and employment equity issues. Similar to Cadbury, it 
made recommendations on organisational ethics. 
In trying to maintain the principle of recognising that companies no longer act 
independently from the societies and environment in which they operate, King I 
recommended that firms should invest in their local communities. First firms should assess 
the particular needs of the communities in which they operate and integrate these needs into 
the policies and goals of their companies. King I tried to suggest examples of various 
                                                          
13
 In an interview with a company secretary of a mining firm in SA, she expressed her views that “King1 was a 
wish list, King 2 became a requirement, King 3 is practical” in terms of realising the goals set out in the Code. 
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contributions to the communities in which companies operate such as: improving access to 
portable water, to construct or renovate local schools or health centres in consultation with 
local communities’ leaders or make donations to local Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs) that offer essential services like affordable housing. On fair employment practices, 
King I recommended that firms should try to address the massive legacy of apartheid by 
contributing to employee skills development, upholding labour and employee rights and 
avoiding discrimination and harassment along ethnic, religious and gender lines. 
With regard to health and safety, King I recommended that every company must keep 
a safe and healthy working environment by providing training, tools and protective 
equipment to help reduce workplace accidents and fatalities. On environmental issues, King I 
recommended that sustainable development requires a constant awareness and respect for the 
conservation of the environment. As such, the Code recommended that companies should 
conduct a regular environmental assessment impact to identify and adequately address any 
negative consequences of their operations. In an apparent warning to companies on 
environmental issues, King I suggested that if companies do not take the initiative to address 
recommendations on integrated sustainability reporting, government could legislate on these 
issues, which would be legally binding on firms. 
The King Code I also recommended that every firm should prepare a code of ethics 
which acts as a guide on the dealings of directors, management, and all employees.  
 
v. Compliance and Enforcement 
Similar to the Cadbury Report (1992), compliance with recommendations under the 
King Code I is inspirational e.g. self regulatory. The King Code I viewed compliance as a 
matter of direct responsibility of boards of directors and indirectly a responsibility of auditors 
and shareholders. In line with the ‘comply or explain’ regime of the Code, the board of 
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directors have the responsibility to explain why it was not appropriate for it to adopt a 
Corporate Governance measure as recommended by the Code. On the other hand, external 
auditors should offer their opinion on the extent of compliance to the provisions and or 
recommendations of the Code. King Code I also recommended that both local and 
international shareholders to play an active role on issues of compliance with the Code by 
positively influencing compliance. As such, the Code encouraged companies to enter into 
sustainable dialogue, based on constructive engagement and mutual understanding of 
objectives with institutional investors. Shareholders were encouraged to exercise their rights 
by attending, voting and asking pertinent questions at Annual General Meetings as stipulated 
in the Companies Act.   
 
 
2.1.7.3.3 Achievements, Weaknesses and Criticisms of King Code I 
 
One of the achievements of the King Code I is that it was instrumental in raising the 
level of awareness of what constitutes good governance, both in the private and public sector 
in SA (Armstrong et al., 2005, p. 14; Malherbe and Segal, 2001). Armstrong et al., (2005) 
also argue that the Code offered for the first time a coherent, disciplined and practical 
governance framework relevant to the local context. King I adopted the inclusive approach to 
corporate governance, which requires that corporations should recognise that they no longer 
exist in isolation from the communities in which they do business (King Code I, 1994, West, 
2002). In this regard, the King Code raised awareness with regard to the importance of 
corporate sustainability through triple bottom line reporting i.e. the notion that organisations 
with issues related to sustainable development needed to work away from a single (i.e. 
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financial) bottom line to a recognition that organisations also need to monitor both social and 
environmental performance, therefore have social and environmental ‘bottom lines’.  
The King Code I also made several recommendations which have since been 
incorporated into the South African Companies Act, such as compelling disclosure of the 
identity of beneficial owners of shares held by nominees. The King Code also highlighted 
corporate responsibility issues in terms of the Labour Relations Act (1995), the Employment 
Equity Act (1997) and the National Environmental Management Act (1998). It also 
encouraged the JSE to introduce more rigorous listing rules which are comparable with 
international standards (Armstrong et al., 2005). The King Code has helped to improve 
corporate governance standards in SA. For instance, Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) 
reported that SA ranked fifth, emerging with good corporate governance structures in a 
survey of 495 firms in 25 emerging markets (King Report, 2002; para. 15; CLSA, 2000, p. 
69). 
However, the King Code I was not without shortcomings. According to Malherbe and 
Segal (2001), the King Code 1994 followed the Cadbury Report (1992) such that it neglected 
the control situations that predominate in SA, and the governance concerns that arise from 
them. For instance, SA, like most emerging economies, has control bloc situations whereby 
these influential groups of shareholders may abuse their positions to the detriment of minority 
shareholders. The King Code (1994) was silent on such control situations and on conflict of 
interest. The King Code 1994 has also been heavily criticised for failing to recommend the 
appointment of independent non-executive directors. For instance, in a departure from the 
Cadbury Report, the King Code 1994 did not recommend that non-executive directors be 
independent of management (Malherbe and Segal, 2001). The Code also did not make 
recommendations on the establishment of nomination committees or the process which 
should be followed in nominating new directors to the board. This brings into question issues 
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of board independence from management (Malherbe and Segal, 2001). Another criticism of 
the King Code I is that although it recommended the establishment of remuneration 
committees, it did not specify rules which should be used to guide firms in setting 
remuneration levels of their directors. As such, this did not address the concerns of 
shareholders and the general public about self-enrichment and consumption of too many 
perquisites by directors. 
The King Code has also been criticised for failing to position its integrated approach 
to corporate governance in terms of whether it is a communitarian or contractarian system of 
corporate governance (Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabadse, 2002; Spisto, 2005). Further, the 
King Code I was also criticised for having extensive non-governance content which consisted 
of a series of wide-ranging but somewhat vague stipulations on communication to 
stakeholders, worker participation, affirmative action, and code of ethics. This aspect was 
also associated with the slow adoption of the Code by listed companies (Malherbe and Segal, 
2001). 
 
2.1.7.3.4 King Code II 
 
The King Code I was reviewed in 2002 following domestic and international events. 
As discussed in section 1.1 the review was undertaken to: 1. assess the currency of King 
Code against developments, locally and internationally, since its publication on 29 November 
1994; 2.  review and clarify the earlier proposal in the King Report 1994 for an “inclusive 
approach” for the sustainable success of companies; 3. recognise the increasing importance 
placed on non-financial issues worldwide, and to consider and recommend reporting on 
issues associated with social and ethical accounting, auditing, and reporting and health safety 
and environment; 4. recommend how compliance with a new Code of Corporate Governance 
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for SA can be measured and based on outcomes, that is how the success of companies can be 
measured through the “balanced score card” approach of reporting (King Report, 2002, p. 
16).   
Among domestic events, the Code was reviewed following corporate governance 
scandals involving Masterbond Group, Regal Treasury Bank among others. The Masterbond 
Group collapsed because of serious deficiencies in the South African Supervisory system and 
those sections of the Companies Act which were designed to protect investors (Nel, 2001). 
The investigation into the collapse of the Masterbond Group revealed astonishing degree of 
dishonesty, inefficiency, lack of professional integrity and lack of independence on the part 
of some auditors involved with these companies (Nel, 2001). Regal Treasury Bank collapsed 
in 2001 because the CEO, Levenstein was not a fit and proper person to be a director and 
CEO of a bank or its holding company, and carried on the business of the bank and Holdings 
in a reckless manner (Myburgh, 2002). The boards of directors of the bank and its holding 
company acted in breach of the Banks and Companies Act and the standards of corporate 
governance. Myburgh (2002) also attributed the collapse of Regal Treasury Bank to actions 
by the external auditors, Ernest & Young. According to Myburgh Ernst and Young acted in 
breach of the Public Accountants and Auditors Act and the Banks Act during the 2000 audit 
by giving consent to the release of the 2001 preliminary financial results of Holdings when 
they had not completed the 2001 audit properly in two material respects. The reserve Bank of 
South Africa was also accused of failing to act swiftly and decisively in October or 
November 2000 by not taking appropriate action for the removal of Levenstein as CEO 
(Myburgh, 2002). These corporate failures brought about pressure for the need to examine 
corporate governance practices in South Africa, hence the review of King Code I. 
Table 2.4 presents a summary of recommendations from the Cadbury, and King 
Codes I, II and III. The differences between King I and King II include the following: the 
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King Code II defines good corporate governance principles as constituting discipline, 
transparency, independence, accountability, responsibility, fairness and social responsibility 
while King I defined it in terms of accountability, fairness responsibility and transparency. A 
conspicuous feature of the King Code (2002) is its adoption of the “inclusive approach” to 
corporate governance, unlike the King Code I which took an “integrated” approach. The King 
Code emphasizes the need to create a governance system that recognizes the African value 
system.  
Unlike the King Code I, the King Code II offers clear guidance on how the inclusive 
approach to corporate governance should be operationalised (King Code, 2002 para, 6). 
Third, the stakeholders relevant to the company’s business should also be identified. These 





Table 2.4 Comparison of Provisions from the Cadbury, King I, II and King III Codes 
 Cadbury Report 1992 King I – 1994 King II – 2002 King III – 2009 










Director/insider share dealings 
 
Unitary board 
At least three 
At least two 









At least three 










Majority of NEDs > 50% 
Majority of I NEDs > 50% 
Separate Roles 
Preferably an INED 
At least once every quarter 
 
Audit, remuneration & 
nomination 
Prohibits insider trading 
 
Unitary board 
Majority of NEDs > 50% 
Majority of I NEDs > 50% 
Separate Roles 
Must be an INED 
At least once every quarter 
 
Audit, risk, remuneration & 
nomination. (Audit min 3 
members) 
Prohibits insider trading 
Shareholder Approval of 
Remuneration Policy 
Business Rescue Proceedings 
Minimum of 2 Exec. Directors 
to be appointed to Board (CEO 
& FD). 
Staggered Rotation of NEDs 
NEDs should not receive share 
options 
All audit committee members 
to be INEDs 
 








Establish internal audit function 




Establish internal audit function 




Establish internal audit function 




Establish internal audit 
function 
Establish internal control 
system 
Alternative Dispute Resolution 




Accounting standards (GAAP) 
Audit committee/auditors 
Accounting standards (GAAP) 


































Code of ethics 
Environment 







Code of ethics 
Environment 












auditors, the courts, financial 




Not covered Not covered Not covered Develop & Implement IT 
Governance Framework 
Measure & Report IT 
Performance to Board 
Compliance regime Comply or explain Comply or explain Comply or explain Apply or explain 
Code principles Openness, integrity and 
Accountability 
Accountability, fairness, 




responsibility & transparency 
Inclusivity, Innovation, 
fairness, and collaboration & 
Social transformation 
Governance principle Financial aspects of governance Integrated/Inclusive approach to 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Integrated/Inclusive approach to 
corporate governance  
Integrated performance 
reporting to CG (Governance, 




Recently, the King Coe II was reviewed following the release of the New Companies 
Act no. 71 of 2008. Similar to King 1 and II, the review was also influenced by corporate 
governance changes around the world. Some of the new aspects of King III (2009) are: it 
applies to all entities regardless of the manner and form of incorporation or establishment; it 
is based on the “apply or explain” regime while King I and II were based on “comply or 
explain” regime or the comply or else framework (one size fits all); and it is based on the 
concept of sustainability reporting e.g. it advocates sustainability to be made an integral part 
of all company processes. Unlike King I and II, King III deals with IT (information 
technology) governance. According to King III, IT governance is a “framework that supports 
the effective and efficient management of information resources (for example people, funding 
and information) to facilitate the achievement of corporate objectives. The Code therefore 
recommends that IT governance should be an integral part of the overall governance 
structures within a company that ensure that the company’s IT sustains and extends the 
strategy and objectives. Table 2.4 provides comparisons between the three King Codes and 
the Cadbury Code. 
 
2.1.7.3.5 Criticism of King Code II 
 
The King Code has received endorsements from leading academics and policy makers 
as an example of a good corporate governance model in the world (Armstrong et al., 2005; 
Malherbe and Segal 2001; Andreasson 2006b; Rossouw et al., 2002).  
The major criticism levelled against King II is that it adopted a shareholder unitary 
board mirroring the Anglo-American model but equally tasking boards with meeting 
demanding stakeholder requirements (Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabadse 2002). For instance, 
stakeholder requirements such as HIV sensitivity and the promotion of black empowerment 
are more easily accommodated by the continental European stakeholder model of corporate 
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governance, whereas business and organisational issues are the remit of the executive board 
and the broader economic stakeholder and societal concerns fall under the umbrella of the 
supervisory board (Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabadse 2002). The King Code II has also been 
criticised for inconsistencies with regard to the issue of accountability of corporate directors 
(Sarra 2004). There is also the criticism of conflict between the African value system under 
the Ubuntu and the Anglo-American governance system. According to West (2006), there is 
an incompatibility between aspects of African culture and the Anglo-American corporate 
governance system. West (2006) outlines the following conflicts between the Ubuntu culture 
and the Anglo-American corporate governance system: for instance, he contends that the 
emphasis on communal rights under the Ubuntu culture conflicts with the individual right to 
private property that is fundamental in Anglo-American models; the insistence on consensus 
in decision making conflicts with corporate structures where directors are appointed by only 
one party (shareholders), and whose interests are typically elevated above those of other 
stakeholders; and the urgent need for social justice and redress of inequalities conflicts with 
an economic system in which development needs are a hoped-for long-term consequence of 
the immediate pursuit of profit and efficiency” (West, 2006, p. 441). 
Overall, the King Code II has received international acclaim as a good corporate 
governance model in the world and has also heightened the importance of good corporate 
governance practices in SA (Armstrong et al., 2005; Malherbe and Segal 2001).  
 
2.2 Chapter Summary 
 
SA is considered as one of the leading countries in terms of economic growth and 
development. It is also called the hub of Africa given the numerous financial and business 
transactions flowing through the country in comparison with other African countries. This 
chapter sought to examine the SA country context. In this regard, the chapter attempted to 
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discuss how the political, legal, economic and cultural aspects affect corporate governance in 
SA. An attempt was also made to discuss the financial regulatory environment under which 
the JSE is administered. The FSB is the main body which supervises compliance with laws 
regulating financial institutions and the provision of financial services. SA does not have a 
single regulatory body equivalent to the provincial securities commission in Canada or the 
United States Securities and Exchange Commission that reviews prospectuses for public 
offerings. As discussed in the chapter, this function is carried out by various combinations of 
the JSE, CIPRO and other entities discussed in the chapter. 
The chapter also sought to discuss how the colonial history of SA affects corporate 
governance in the country. Further, an attempt was made to examine how various 
professional bodies affect corporate governance and corporate compliance in the country 
such as SACOB, SAICA and IoDSA, which leads to a discussion on the development of 
corporate governance in SA. 
In the next chapter, literature on corporate governance is reviewed to try to identify a 




3 Chapter Three: Literature Review 
3.0 Introduction 
In Chapter 1, the objectives and research questions for this study were discussed 
together with the rationale and importance of the study. Chapter 2 discussed the country 
context of South Africa. This chapter seeks to achieve the following objectives: first, 
compliance is defined in the context of this study; second, relevant extant theories that 
attempt to link corporate governance mechanisms and various firm outcomes will be 
discussed. Third, the chapter also reviews relevant literature on corporate governance and 
compliance so as to identify gaps in the literature. In this regard, the chapter briefly discusses 
some of the areas and issues in corporate governance such as performance, compensation and 
corporate governance disclosure. In particular, a review of the literature on corporate 
governance and corporate compliance is presented in sub-section 3.2.2 and a gap in the 
literature is identified in section 3.3. Section 3.4 summarises the chapter. Figure 3.1 presents 
an overview of the chapter. 
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3.1 Compliance Defined 
This section attempts to define corporate compliance with best corporate governance 
principles in the context of this study. Burgstaller (2007, p. 45), suggests that compliance can 
be said to occur when the actual behaviour of a given subject conforms to prescribed 
behaviour, and non-compliance or violation occurs when actual behaviour significantly 
differs from prescribed behaviour. As per this definition, compliance signifies conduct which 
is in accordance with prescribed practice. It includes refraining from acts not in accordance 
with prescribed practice. Compliance may require positive action to live up to the prescribed 
requirements of, say, corporate governance principles. Compliance is therefore linked to the 
concept of implementation because it requires practical steps to put in place in accordance 
with prescribed practice i.e. governance principle recommendations. According to Burgstaller 
(2007), there are three reasons why a given actor may comply with a rule or a requirement. 
First, the actor may comply because they fear the punishment of rule or requirement 
enforcers; second, because the actor sees the rule as in its own interest; and third, because the 
actor feels the rule is legitimate and ought to be obeyed or complied with.  
In the context of the proposed study, it is assumed that firms comply with corporate 
governance codes because of the legitimate expectations of the relevant publics and that 
compliance with governance principles generated by legitimate institutions such as IoDSA is 
deemed by firms as the right thing to do. Further, compliance is also assumed to require 
practical steps to implement prescribed practice. This definition implies that measurement of 
compliance may entail verification of practical steps to implement prescribed practice. 
However, the process of verification would be limited to statements from companies on 
compliance i.e. declarations in various media (annual reports, internet, company websites 
etc). As such, compliance is defined in terms of the extent of compliance disclosures in the 
annual reports of listed companies or other mass communication media such as newspapers, 
the internet and in-house magazines (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005) used by companies for 
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disclosure purposes. However, this study relies on annual reports to measure compliance with 
the King Code. 
Consequently, compliance measured in this manner implies considerable reliance on 
assertions from corporate executives (in annual reports) with regard to the “state of being 
compliant” with governance codes. Compliance has two aspects: “the act of compliance in 
the practical sense” and “the communication aspect” by way of compliance disclosure in the 
medium of communication chosen by companies. Two major problems arise with regard to 
investigation of compliance with corporate governance principles in this way. First, 
companies may claim to be compliant with corporate governance codes by making 
compliance disclosures in annual reports or other such corporate communication media, 
whilst in the practical sense this is not the case. Secondly, an attempt to address this problem 
by interviewing company officials to elicit information on corporate compliance practices 
may also not help because interviewees could claim to comply with corporate governance 
codes if asked about compliance with specific issues whilst this is not the case in practice. 
The best approach to address these problems is for the researcher to observe and record 
corporate compliance with governance principles over time, to be able to draw accurate 
conclusions. This brings us to the definition of what compliance is. 
Compliance may therefore be defined as a state of being in accordance with 
established guidelines, specifications, or legislation or the process of becoming so and 
communicating this state through established mediums of disseminating information to the 
relevant publics. Disclosure may be defined as making something known or revealing 
something (Sykes, 1982). Corporate disclosure compliance, on the other hand, may be 
defined as a means to influence perceptions regarding the future financial prospects of the 
firm in the minds of external, and primarily financial, stakeholders such as stock analysts, 
capital markets and investors and others (Brammer and Pavelin, 2006a).   
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For the purposes of this study, compliance is defined as the implementation of 
recommendations from the King Code II over and above the mandatory requirements by 
South African company laws, the JSE Listing Requirements and other regulatory 
requirements. 
 
3.1.1 Mandatory and Voluntary/Best Practice Compliance 
Corporate governance codes around the world (e.g. Cadbury Report, GCGC, MCGC, 
King Code etc) adopt a “comply or explain” (MacNeil and Li, 2006, p. 486) or self regulatory 
regime. However, others adopt a mandatory approach such as The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 
2002 which was adopted following public outrage in the wake of the Enron, WorldCom and 
other high profile corporate scandals. The mandatory approach was adopted as an effort to 
forestall a potential crisis in public investor confidence (Dunn and Derrick, 2003). The 
essence of comply or explain is that compliance with the codes is not mandatory whilst 
disclosure relating to compliance is. The comply or explain regime is also premised on 
flexibility, because it is not possible to adopt a “one size fits all” approach to corporate 
governance codes because corporations differ in terms of size, structure, and culture 
(MacNeil and Li, 2006, p. 486).  
Self regulation includes voluntary measures as well as other kinds of initiatives, such 
as self monitoring, reporting and certification, or the establishment of an industry-based 
regulatory body with the responsibility for monitoring its members. Generally, self regulation 
is intended to influence and shape the actions of the self regulated industry without having to 
rely on the traditional regulatory approach of command and control inspection and 
enforcement, with its subsequent greater government involvement. There is an ongoing 
debate in corporate governance matters on the need for regulation (a legal framework) versus 
self-regulation (e.g. non-binding corporate governance codes) (Wymeersch, 2006). 
Proponents of mandatory regulation argue that a legal framework offers clarity and 
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uniformity across companies and industries and enhances the enforceability of good 
corporate governance practices. They also contend that obligatory reporting is a powerful tool 
to achieve compliance predictably because of the enforcement aspect (Cleyn, 2008). On the 
other hand, obligatory/mandatory compliance is not enough to guarantee genuine compliance 
with corporate governance codes and the philosophy behind them. This is evidenced by 
reports of corporations complying with the letter and not the spirit of the code (Deutsche 
Bank, 2002). Obligatory compliance also requires a lot of resources (Burgstaller, 2007) as 
already mentioned above and breeds box-ticking. 
Prior literature has identified peer pressure as a motivation for compliance and an 
argument for self regulation (Wymreesch, 2006), as company boards comply with codes to 
protect their reputation (Cleyn, 2008) and the reputation of their companies (Levis, 2006). 
Wymeersch (2006, p. 2) states that the “moral value” aspect of corporate governance codes 
reduces the need for legal regulation. Several studies have found that in general companies do 
comply with corporate governance codes under the comply or explain regime (see Arcot et 
al., 2010; MacNeil and Li, 2006; Ntim, 2009; Weir, 1997). However, some researchers have 
found problems with the monitoring and explanations offered for non-compliance. MacNeil 
and Li (2006) find that investors’ tolerance of non-compliance is linked to some extent with 
superior financial performance (in terms of share price) i.e. investors do not value reasoned 
arguments for non-compliance and prefer to use financial performance as a proxy to 
determine when non-compliance can be excused.  
 The comply or explain regime is also based on the assumption that the market will 
monitor compliance with a code and penalise non-compliance through lowering share prices 
(Wymreesch, 2006) or accepting the justification for non-compliance given the circumstances 
(Anand, 2005). As such, there is no consensus as to which approach (self regulation or 
mandatory) is preferable with regard to compliance with corporate governance codes. Both 
approaches have their benefits (perceived) and flaws which may result in failure/success to 
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achieve the desired results. The checks and balances under self regulation may not be 
operational in the case of superior financial performance (MacNeil and Li, 2006). On the 
other hand, mandatory regulation may lead to box ticking, whereby firms comply with the 
letter and not the spirit of the code. The proposed study will focus attention on voluntary 
compliance and some aspects of mandatory compliance because it investigates compliance 
with a self regulatory code of corporate governance. 
 
3.2 Theoretical Review  
This section discusses the relevant extant theories that attempt to link corporate 
governance mechanisms and various firm outcomes e.g. disclosure, performance, compliance 
etc. These theories are drawn from various disciplines such as accounting, economics, 
finance, and law, amongst others (e.g., Rwegasira, 2000; Mallin, 2007; Solomon, 2007; 
Durisin and Puzone, 2009). As a result, past studies have adopted several theoretical 
perspectives. Common among them include agency, resource dependence, managerial 
signalling, legitimacy, organisational political costs, stakeholder and stewardship theories. 
Clarke (2004) offers a detailed overview of most of these corporate governance theories. 
The following subsection discusses agency theory in detail. Specifically, the general 
principal-agent construct will be first presented in subsection 3.2.1.1.  Subsection 3.2.1.2 will 
describe its direct application to the shareholder-manager relationship in modern 
corporations. Finally, the supporting theories of information asymmetry and managerial 
signalling, stewardship, and resource dependence will be briefly described in subsections 
2.2.2 to 2.2.6. 
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3.2.1 Agency Theory 
3.2.1.1 The Principal Agent Relationship 
Agency theory is derived from the works of Berle and Means (1932), Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) and Fama and Jensen (1983). Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 308) define an 
agency relationship “as a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) 
engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf, which involves 
delegating some decision making authority to the agent.” Two problems arise in an agency 
relationship, when: (a) the desires or a goal of the principal and agent conflict, and (b) it is 
difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what the agent is actually doing (information 
asymmetry). The former agency problem arises because of the assumptions that: first, the 
principal and agent have different risk appetite (e.g. different attitudes towards risk) 
(Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 58). Differences in risk appetite may result in different actions, second, 
the principal and agent have different goals and interests (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 58).  The third 
assumption is that, if both parties to the relationship are utility maximisers there is good 
reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 308).   
Agency theory is therefore concerned with resolving problems which can arise when 
the interests of the principal/agent are in conflict and when it is difficult or expensive for the 
principal to verify what the agent is doing presumably on his behalf. Agency theory suggests 
that the principal can limit divergences from his interests by establishing appropriate 
incentives for the agent and by incurring monitoring costs designed to limit the 
aberrant/deviant activities of the agent (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 308). These may 
include efforts on the part of the principal to control the behaviour of the agent through 




 The principal may also require the agent to expend resources (bonding costs) to 
guarantee that he/she will not take certain actions which would harm the principal or to 
ensure that the principal will be compensated if he/she takes such actions. Agency theory 
recognises that it is generally impossible for the principal or the agent at zero cost to ensure 
that the agent will make optimal decisions from the principal’s viewpoint. As such, there will 
always be divergence between the agent’s actions and those actions which will maximise the 
welfare of the principal, defined as residual loss. In short agency cost is defined as the sum of 
the costs of designing, implementing and maintaining appropriate incentive and control 
systems and the  residual loss of not solving the problems completely (Burton, 2000, p. 196; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 308). 
 
3.2.1.2 Application of Agency Theory in a Modern Corporation 
In a modern corporation, several control mechanisms are employed to try and bring 
the interests of managers (agents) into alignment with those of shareholders (principals). 
Agency theorists see corporate managers as “inherently untrustworthy” (Burton, 2000, p. 
196; Donaldson, 1995, p. 166). Managers of contemporary publicly held organisations are not 
the owners. As such,  managers of these organisation will always maximise their own utility 
as per the classical economics view of man (Burton, 2000). The managers will not act as 
profit maximisers for the owners, but will pursue their own interests to the full extent they are 
able. This may not simply involve maximising their remuneration and perks, but may lead to 
self aggrandising activities such as pursuing acquisitions which do not enhance shareholder 
wealth (Burton, 2000, p. 196). The difference in risk appetite between the principal and agent 
can also give rise to agency costs in a modern corporation through missed opportunities by a 
risk averse management, or at worst, through management recklessness (Burton, 2000, p. 
196). Internal organisationally based mechanisms of corporate control and external, market 
based control mechanisms can be employed to help align the interests of managers and 
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shareholders (Walsh and Seward, 1990). According to Burton (2000), corporate governance 
mechanisms represent such an agency cost.  
Internally, shareholders can use outcome based contracts to co-align the preferences 
of agents with those of principals because the rewards for both depend on the same actions, 
and therefore, the conflict of self interest between principal and agent are reduced. Secondly, 
the principal may use information systems to curb agent opportunism (Fama, 1980; Fama and 
Jensen, 1983) because when the principal has information to verify agent behaviour, the 
agent is more likely to behave in the interests of the principal (Eisenhardt, 1989). For 
instance, the principal may invest in information systems such as budgeting systems, 
reporting procedures, boards of directors, and additional layers of management (Eisenhardt, 
1989). 
Externally, agency theory relies on managerial labour markets to govern or discipline 
internal managerial behaviour (Fama, 1980). The theory of the market for corporate control 
may help co-align the interests of principals with agents. According to this theory, as top 
managers engage in self-interested behaviour, their company's performance is likely to 
increasingly diverge from its maximum potential (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
Underperformance in this case will be reflected in the value of the company's stock (Walsh 
and Seward, 1990, p. 435). Under such circumstances, other management teams are likely to 
offer themselves to the shareholders as alternatives to the incumbent management. According 
to Wash and Seward (1990, p. 435), the "market for corporate control," then, is the 
competition among these management teams for the rights to manage corporate resources. As 
such, management teams of underperforming stocks risk being rooted out and replaced by 
efficient management teams who may put the assets of the firm to better use in alignment 
with the interests of principals. Thus, the market for corporate control provides an external 
control mechanism whereby the shareholders' interests can be served in the event of the 
breakdown of the internal control mechanism (Walsh and Seward, 1990). As per the theory of 
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market for corporate control, poorly performing firms risk being acquired by their better 
governed and performing counterparts.  
In short agency theory is based on the hypothesis that a net reduction in agency costs 
such as compliance with internal corporate governance mechanisms should maximise 
shareholder wealth and reduce conditions for corporate malfeasance, increase efficiency and 
maximise firm value. Compliance with recommendations on corporate governance control 
mechanisms to some degree aligns the interests of principals (shareholders) and agents. 
Agency theory in this regard is suitable to explain compliance with corporate governance 
codes for the purpose of serving the interests of this stakeholder group. The principal agent 
relationship under agency theory limits the explanatory power of this theory to one group of 
stakeholders i.e. shareholders.  
However, firms have many relevant publics (stakeholders) apart from shareholders. 
Therefore, agency theory may not necessarily serve to explain why firms comply with 
corporate governance recommendations, more especially that firms seek to address the 
interests of other stakeholders such as environmental pressure groups, government agencies, 
customers, employees etc (triple bottom line reporting espoused by the King Code) in the 
pursuit of corporate objectives. This is so because principals do not have a responsibility to 
account to these stakeholders [at least in the context of agency theory]. Agency theory is 
therefore inadequate in terms of explaining corporate compliance with corporate governance 
principles, when other stakeholders are factored in, because it is limited to one stakeholder 
group [shareholders]. Other theories such as stakeholder theory, legitimacy, culture theory etc 
may better explain why firms may comply with corporate governance codes.  
 
3.2.2 Signalling Theory 
Signalling theory may also be used to explain the link between corporate governance 
mechanisms and various firm outcomes. Signalling theory (Spence, 1973) was originally 
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suggested in order to explain information asymmetry in the labour markets. The theory has 
since been developed in a number of other areas including disclosure of voluntary 
information (see for example Ross, 1977). Signalling theory suggests that in corporate 
reporting, (because of asymmetry in the market for the information) companies that believe 
they are “better” than other companies signal this to investors in order to attract investment 
and a more favourable reputation. “The idea that the possessor of superior information or 
insight will signal what he knows either directly or through his actions to achieve some 
economic benefit has been studied in a variety of institutional settings” (Verrecchia, 1983, p. 
20). Companies may do this by voluntary disclosing accounting information in excess of 
what is required by law and other regulation. Similarly, not disclosing something can be a 
signal in itself. However, because of what is known as “adverse selection,” companies will 
always wish to signal that they are better than average.” Thus they will (according to 
signalling theory) tend to choose disclosure over non-disclosure. Thus in the limit, 
theoretically, the equilibrium position will be full disclosure as all companies will have an 
incentive to disclose all positive distinguishing attributes in order to maximize their own self-
interest.  
In the same vein, companies may comply with best practice corporate governance 
principles to signal to shareholders and other stakeholders that they are better managed and 
thus worth investing in. Also, by appointing independent non-executive directors to the 
board, a firm signals to potential investors of its intentions of treating them fairly, by 
protecting their investment. By disclosing compliance to best corporate governance principles 
(signalling), a firm reduces information asymmetry. Prior studies have used signalling theory 
to explain the lick between principals and agents in modern corporations (see Shabbir and 
Padget, 2005; Black et al., 2006).  
As such signalling theory may also be used to explain compliance with the King Code 




3.2.3 Stakeholder Theory 
Freeman and Reed (1983) define stakeholders as any group or individual who can 
affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives. Stakeholder theory 
conceptualize the organization as part of a broader social system wherein the organisation 
impacts, and is impacted by, other groups within society (Freeman and Reed, 1983). The 
theory accepts that because different stakeholder groups will have different views about how 
an organisation should conduct its operations, there will be various social contracts 
‘negotiated’ with different stakeholder groups.  
Stakeholder theory is used to help understand the groups and individuals that can 
affect and are affected by the achievement of an organization’s purpose. The stakeholder 
effects are categorised as technological, social, political, economic, regulatory and 
managerial. There are two branches of stakeholder theory, thus managerial stakeholder theory 
and the ethical (moral) stakeholder theory (Deegan and Unerman, 2006).  
The managerial branch of stakeholder theory explicitly refers to issues of stakeholder 
power, and how a stakeholder’s relative power impacts their ability to ‘coerce’ the 
organization into complying with the stakeholder’s expectations. The moral (and normative) 
perspective of stakeholder theory argues that all stakeholders have the right to be treated 
fairly by an organisation, and that issues of stakeholder power are not directly relevant 
(Deegan and Unerman, 2006). Within the ethical branch of stakeholder theory, there is a view 
that stakeholders have intrinsic rights (for example, to safe working conditions, fair pay, etc), 
and these rights should not be violated. That is, each group of stakeholders merits 
consideration for its own sake and not merely because of its ability to further the interests of 
some other group, such as the shareholders (Donaldson and Preston, 1995, p. 66).  
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Stakeholder theory has been critiqued for  transforming all and sundry into a 
stakeholder” (multiple accountability), for being incompatible with substantive business 
objectives and with corporate governance (Key, 1999; Sternberg, 1999, p. 13)
 14
.  
Stakeholder theory may also be used to explain why corporations may comply with 
good governance principles. Unlike agency theory, stakeholder theory encompasses various 
stakeholders. Compliance with social issues as recommended under the King Code e.g. 
HIV/AIDS, community outreach programmes, employment equity etc may be an attempt by 
corporations to indicate to other stakeholder groups of their good corporate citizenship. 
Hence stakeholder theory may be used to explain compliance with best practice CG 
principles in this regard. 
 
3.2.4 Legitimacy Theory 
Suchman (1995, p. 574) defines legitimacy as:  
 
 “a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of any entity are desirable, 
proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs and definitions.”  
 
Through legitimacy, the organisation seeks congruency between organisational 
actions and the values of its general and relevant publics (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; 
Lindblom, 1994) or its stakeholders (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005). A disparity (actual or 
perceived) between organisational and social values may jeopardise organisational legitimacy 
                                                          
14
 Key (1999) critiques Freeman’s (1984) work for presenting an incomplete linkage between actors, and 
between internalities and externalities. According to Key (1999), while Freeman’s model identifies both external 
and internal stakeholder groups, he incompletely maps out the limitless linkages between these groups and 
individual actors. Key (1999) argues that an individual actor within a stakeholder group can be a member of a 
variety of groups i.e. an employee can be a member of the internal stakeholder groups or stockholder and 
employee, and of external groups such as professional organization, consumer, environmental activist, parent 
group, or other community stakeholder group. Key (1999) argues that Freeman’s contention that stakeholder can 
be identified as separable entities misses the complexities of the real linkages. She suggests that instead of 
identifying stakeholder groups, both internal and external interests that groups represent must be identified.   
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and yield legitimacy gap. Legitimacy theory asserts that organisations continually seek to 
ensure that they are perceived as operating within the bounds and norms of their respective 
societies, that is, they attempt to ensure that their activities are perceived by outside parties as 
legitimate (Grey et al., 1995; Dowling and Pfeiffer, 1975). These bounds and norms are not 
considered to be fixed, but change over time, thereby requiring organisations to be responsive 
to the ethical (or moral) environment in which they operate (Deegan and Unerman, 2006). 
Suchman (1995) argues that legitimacy is a perception or assumption in that it represents a 
reaction of observers to the organisation as they see it. It reflects congruence between the 
behaviours of the legitimated entity and the shared beliefs of some social group and 
dependent on a collective audience. Legitimacy could result in a number of benefits for an 
organisation e.g. legitimacy could enhance stability and comprehensibility of an 
organisation’s activities; it could lead to persistence because audiences are most likely to 
supply resources to organisations that appear desirable, proper or appropriate. A legitimate 
organisation may not have to spend substantially to legitimate its activities.  
 
3.2.4.1 Types of Organisational Legitimacy 
Suchman (1995) outlines three broad types of legitimacy e.g. pragmatic legitimacy, 
moral legitimacy and cognitive legitimacy. Pragmatic legitimacy rests on audiences’ self-
interest, whereas moral and cognitive legitimacy do not. According to Suchman (1995), 
organisations often can purchase pragmatic legitimacy by directing tangible rewards to 
specific constituencies. On the other hand, moral and cognitive legitimation implicate larger 
cultural rules, and side payments in contravention of the cultural rules may diminish the 
organisation’s stature and coherence, often even in the eyes of the favoured constituency. 
Both pragmatic and moral legitimacy rest on discursive evaluation, whereas cognitive 
legitimacy does not (Suchman, 1995). Organisations can win pragmatic and moral legitimacy 
by participating vigorously in explicit public discussion. However cognitive legitimacy is not 
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based on unspoken orienting assumptions, and any attempts by the organisation to try and 
engage in heated defences of organisational endeavours may result in negative outcomes. 
Legitimacy therefore falls within continuum – from pragmatic, to the moral to the cognitive. 
As one moves to the left end of the continuum, legitimacy becomes more elusive to obtain 
and more difficult to manipulate, but becomes more subtle, more profound, and more self 
sustaining, once established (Suchman, 1995). 
 
3.2.4.1.1 Pragmatic Legitimacy 
Suchman (1995) argues that this type of legitimacy is assumed to rest on self 
interested calculations of an organisation’s most immediate audiences, which involves direct 
exchanges not only between the organisation and audience but also can involve broader 
political, economic, or social interdependencies. There are two types of this kind of 
legitimacy, influence legitimacy and dispositional legitimacy. 
Under influence legitimacy, constituents support the organisation not necessarily 
because they believe that it provides specific favourable exchanges, but rather because they 
see it as responsive to their larger interests. This type of legitimacy arises when the 
organisation incorporates constituents into its policy making structures or adopts 
constituents’ standards of performance as its own. Influence legitimacy is clearly based on 
what an organisation’s immediate audiences perceive it to be. For instance, a firm may 
influence the perceptions of its relevant publics by appointing previously disadvantaged 
people in its structures but without necessarily giving them any decision making authority. 
This may create an illusion that the firm embraces diversity, whilst in practice this is not the 
case. The explanatory power of this theory on compliance with corporate governance 
principles is important even though compliance in this case may be described as superficial 
e.g. compliance with the letter and not the spirit of the underlying principle(s).  
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Dispositional legitimacy, on the other hand is accorded by constituents to 
corporations that "have our best interests at heart," that "share our values," or that are 
"honest," "trustworthy," "decent," and "wise" (Suchman, 1995, p. 578). Dispositional 
legitimacy could prove to be some form of goodwill for the organisation in times of 
adversity, when perceptions about the organisations’ good character may dampen the 
deligitimating effects of isolated failures, miscues and reversals. 
 
3.2.4.1.2 Moral Legitimacy 
Moral legitimacy could be consequential (evaluation of outputs and consequences), 
procedural (evaluations of techniques and procedures), structural (evaluation of categories 
and structures) and personal (evaluation of leaders and representatives) (Suchman, 1995, p. 
579). Moral legitimacy reflects a positive normative evaluation of the organization and its 
activities. It is not based on judgements about whether a given activity benefits the evaluator 
but rather on judgements about whether a given activity is the right thing to do.  These 
judgements according to Suchman (1995) usually reflect beliefs about whether the activity 
effectively promotes societal welfare, as defined by the audiences’ socially constructed value 
system. Moral legitimacy differs from pragmatic legitimacy which is considered to reflect 
narrow self interest. 
Consequential moral legitimacy is based on organisational accomplishments, whereby 
the level of rewards to organisations, are determined by judgements on the quality and value 
of their production outcomes. Procedural moral legitimacy is amassed by organisations which 
produce socially valued consequences by embracing socially accepted techniques and 
procedures. 
Organisations acquire structural moral legitimacy if their structural characteristics 
locate them within a morally favoured classification as deemed by their constituents. The 
structure in this case is deemed as the organisations’ capacity to perform specific types of 
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work. Suchman (1995) argues that structural legitimation focuses on the general 
organisational features that arise when entire systems of activity recur consistently over time. 
Personal moral legitimacy is based on the charisma of individual organisational leaders. 
Personal moral legitimacy is based on the ability of organisational leaders to dodge 
potentially stigmatising events through strategies such as blaming a scapegoat or replacing an 
executive. 
Moral legitimacy theory seems to extend the ethical branch of stakeholder theory by 
bringing into the fore the importance of the conduct of the firm in accordance with moral 
values of its constituents. A firm’s constituents may not necessarily have uniform moral 
values because the constituents may not be a homogeneous group. As such, an expectation on 
the firm to fulfil moral practices of its constituents is a non-starter. Therefore the explanatory 
power of this theory on compliance matters is limited. 
 
3.2.4.1.3 Cognitive Legitimacy 
This form of legitimacy may involve affirmative backing for an organisation or mere 
acceptance of an organisation as necessary or inevitable based on some taken for granted 
cultural account. Cognitive legitimacy is based on cognition rather than on interest or 
evaluation. Organisations exist within a wider social system which affects and is affected by 
it (Freeman and Reed, 1983). Hence, organisations have to employ strategies to try and make 
themselves relevant [or at least appear to be] in the eyes of the respective publics. Various 
strategies are at the disposal of organisations for legitimacy purposes, some genuine some 
deceptive to some degree (Suchman, 1995).  
A corporation has to maintain its legitimacy for its survival. Legitimation process 
requires an organisation to recognise its relevant publics (stakeholders), and take the interests 
of these stakeholders into consideration. This creates a link between agency theory, 
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legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory, because rationally a firm would seek legitimacy 
from stakeholders who are relevant for its survival.  
In terms of compliance with best practice corporate governance principles, societies 
may expect well managed corporations which protect the interests of stakeholders to adhere 
to these principles. Failure to comply with these principles may constitute a deviation from 
legitimate expectations of society and lack of congruency between organisational actions and 
the values of its general and relevant publics. As such legitimacy theory may be used to 
explain why corporations may comply with best practice corporate governance principles. 
 
3.2.5 Institutional Theory 
Institutional theory is the brainchild of DiMaggio and Powell (1983), who proposed 
three different isomorphic processes (coercive isomorphism, mimetic isomorphism and 
normative isomorphism) which bring about homogenization of organisations. Quoting 
Hawley (1968), they defined isomorphism as , “a constraining process  that forces one unit in 
a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions” 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p. 149).  
Coercive isomorphism, the first of these, “results from formal and informal pressures 
exerted on organisations by other organisations upon which they are dependent and by 
cultural expectations in the society within which organisations function.  Such pressures may 
be felt as a force, as persuasion, or as invitations to join in collusion” (p. 149). They provide 
a series of examples whereby the homogenization  process may come about, for instance, a 
response to government mandate such as the adoption of new pollution control technologies 
to conform to environmental regulations; hiring accountants by non-profit organisations to 
meet tax law requirements and employment of representatives of pressure groups to fend off 
allegations of say discrimination, sexism etc. Deegan and Unerman (2006) contend that this 
form of isomorphism is related to the managerial branch of stakeholder theory whereby firms 
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will use voluntary corporate reporting disclosures to address the economic, social, 
environmental and ethical values and concerns of those stakeholders who wield more power 
over the organisation, possibly at the expense of other stakeholders. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983)’s second isomorphic process is mimetic isomorphism, 
which is linked to uncertainty which may result in organisations mimicking others or 
modelling themselves, to deal with ambiguous problems or unclear solutions. Mimetic 
isomorphism, they argue is a response to uncertainty. This process takes place without the 
permission and knowledge of the mimicked organisation and may come about through a 
number of avenues. For instance, it may be done unintentionally, indirectly through employee 
transfer or turnover, or through consulting organisations or industry trade associations. 
Deegan and Unerman (2006) associate this form of isomorphism with legitimacy theory, 
when organisations emulate or improve upon institutional practices of other leading 
organisations in their sector. They argue that this process is undertaken to maintain or 
enhance external stakeholders’ perception of the legitimacy of organisations, because failure 
to follow innovative practices and procedures adopted by other organisations in the same 
sector would risk losing legitimacy with respect to the rest of the sector. 
The third and final isomorphic organizational change is normative and stems from 
professionalism
15
. This form of isomorphism relates to the pressure arising from group norms 
to adopt particular institutional practices. Deegan and Unerman (2006) opine that, in the case 
of corporate reporting, accountants will comply with accounting standards as a form of 
normative isomorphism for the organisations they work for to produce accounting reports 
which are shaped by accounting standards. Normative isomorphism is also thought to affect 
voluntary reporting practice through less formal group influences from a range of formal and 
                                                          
15
 Professionalism in this case is defined as, “the collective struggle of members of an occupation to define the 
conditions and methods of their work, to control, “the production of producers” (Larson, 1977:49-52) and to 




informal groups to which managers belong, such as the culture and work practices developed 
within their work practices.  
Basically, this theory proposes that institutions will endeavour to copy or emulate 
other institutions because they belong to the same social system and hence should be similar 
or identical in their practices. Institutional theory may be used to explain why corporations 
deem it necessary to comply with corporate governance codes e.g. through regulatory 
requirements (when codes form part of listing requirements) or through peer pressure or 
pressure from institutional investors or other groups; when they mimic other corporations 
within the same sector as a legitimation process; and to the demands of the professions of 
their staff members or other informal or formal groupings to which their managers belong.  
Institutional theory is not without limitations; first this theory assumes that institutions 
are copy cats and would always be following on others to standardize their practices. What if 
an institution does not want to emulate others but seeks to be a leader? This aspect is not 
addressed by this theory. It is common practice in management circles that organisations are 
constantly trying to come up with new and better ways of doing things to be leaders in their 
industries. This desire for organisations to be at the top is not addressed by this theory. The 
copy cat assumption is not always the norm in social systems as per the assumption of this 
theory. 
Second, although institutional theory speaks of the desire for institutions to be 
identical through the three isomorphic processes, it does not address (like stakeholder theory) 
a complete linkage between institutions and their internalities and externalities and how these 
combine to attain uniformity. Even though it addresses both external and internal isomorphic 
pressure, the theory does not clearly state how this would come to bear on the concerned 
institutions (institutions seeking uniformity). This leaves the reader to assume that logically, 
the organisation would feel pressure to be uniform or identical with other institutions because 
failure to do so it may be deemed irrelevant within its industry or society as argued by the 
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theory. The theory also falls short of addressing the various external and internal environment 
of the institution which may influence it against uniformity. It also fails to account for the 
ever changing organisational environment and how this may affect the desire to be uniform 
with other institutions. 
 
3.2.6 Reputation Theory 
Reputation is defined as the opinion or social evaluation of the public toward a 
person, a group of people or an organization (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990). Reputation is a 
fundamental instrument of social order based upon distributed, spontaneous social control. It  
is 'the result of what you do, what you say, and what other people say about you' (Fombrun 
and Shanley, 1990). Reputation reflects the culture and identity of companies. It is the 
outcome of the efforts of managers to prove their success and excellence. According to 
Fombrum (1996:57) as cited in Carmeli and Tishler (2005, p. 16) a favourable corporate 
reputation, is a strategic resource as it reflects the firm’s competitive position relative to its 
competitors. “Having a favourable organisational reputation means that the firm’s 
constituencies perceive the firm as more attractive than other firms” (Carmeli and Tishler, 
2005, p. 16).  
Reputation is a vital resource, the protection of which is of fundamental importance 
(Chajet, 1997). The reputation of a company increasingly will influence its appeal as an 
investment choice (Chajet, 1997, p. 20). A corporation's reputation for more than just 
maximizing shareholder value will play an ever larger role in the battle for world market 
share (Chajet, 1997, p. 21). According to Fombrun and Shanley (1990), a good reputation 
enhances profitability because it attracts customers to products, investors to securities and 
employees to its jobs because the company will be regarded as a reliable, credible, 
trustworthy and responsible for employees, customers, shareholders and financial markets. 
pg. 114 
 
As per Fombrum and Shanley (1990), reputation results from firms actively signalling 
`key characteristics to constituents to maximize social status.' Hall (1992) contends that the 
information stored in a reputation may influence evaluations by publics, allow the firm to 
attain privileged positions with its customers and supply chain, and, potentially, influence 
evaluations of investors (Srivastava et al., 1997). Once a reputation has been established, it 
may help to frame the way that publics detect and interpret events which affect the firm 
(Srivastava et al., 1997). Srivastara et al., (1997) also argue that a strong reputation may 
indirectly affect equity markets' evaluation through its impact on operational performance. 
Reputational theory basically explains how the perceptions of the publics’ within the 
firm’s social system perceive it because of its past interactions with them or because of its 
communication(s) with them. This theory posits that good reputation will be rewarded and 
bad reputation will be punished. In the context of compliance with corporate governance 
principles, a firm will be considered to have a good reputation if it complies with what the 
social system perceives as recommended best practice corporate governance principles or 
standards and may be rewarded by being perceived as safe to invest in by potential investors. 
For instance a firm which complies with the recommendations from the King Code may be 
perceived to have best corporate practice and attractive to investors and other stakeholders. 
Reputation is also important to corporate managers’ especially non-executive directors. This 
theory is therefore important in explaining the behaviour of corporate entities or people 
involved in corporate management with regard to compliance with good corporate 
governance principles. If best practice corporate governance principles are considered by the 
firm’s publics as a measure of good corporate governance, it may be expected that firms 
would comply more to earn good reputation from the respective publics. 
In the following section 2.3, literature on corporate governance will be discussed and 
a gap in the literature identified. The section starts by briefly discussing different areas in CG  
before focussing on the main area of interest, compliance. 
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3.2.7 Corporate Governance & Culture 
Hofstede (2005) identifies four universal dimensions
16
 of national culture that attempt 
to explain general similarities and differences in culture around the world. Hofstede (2005) 
suggests that specific relationships exist between these cultural dimensions and individuals’ 
preferences and actions. These dimensions are uncertainty avoidance, individualism versus 
collectivism, masculinity versus femininity, and large versus small power distance.  Gray 
(1988) proposes a connection between these cultural dimensions and countries’ financial 
reporting systems. Specifically, Gray identifies four accounting values
17
 (professionalism, 
uniformity, conservatism and secrecy) and posits that accountants’ levels of these accounting 
values are related to and derived from Hofstede’s cultural values. 
Tsakumis (2007) reviews literature which has tested Gray’s hypotheses at the country 
level using financial statement data to examine the relationship between Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions scores and one or more aspects of countries’ financial reporting systems (e.g. 
Eddie, 1990; Salter and Naswinder, 1995; Gray and Vint, 1995; Sudarwan and Fogarty, 1996; 
Zarzeski, 1996; Wingate, 1997; Jaggi and Low, 2000; Hope, 2003). 
                                                          
16 These dimensions are determined empirically from an attitude survey of approximately 116,000 IBM 
employees. These dimensions are: uncertainty avoidance (UA), the degree to which individuals in a society feel 
uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity; individualism (IND), relating to people’s self-concept of ‘I’ or 
‘we’, or a society’s preference for a loosely knit social fabric or a more interdependent, tightly knit social fabric; 
masculinity (MASC), the extent to which gender roles are differentiated within a society and the extent to which 
traditional masculine values of performance and visible achievement are emphasized relative to traditional 
feminine values of relationships, caring and nurturing; and power distance (PD), the extent to which hierarchy 
and unequal power distribution in institutions and organisations are accepted. Hofstede’s framework has been 
used extensively in numerous disciplines to examine the influence of culture on individuals’ performance 
and decision-making (e.g., Lu et al., 1999; Ryan et al., 2000; Thomas and Bendixen, 2000). In addition, 
accounting studies (e.g., Schultz et al., 1993; Cohen et al., 1995; Harrison and McKinnon, 1999; Patel et al., 
2002) show that Hofstede’s dimensions appear to capture the essence of national culture in a way that has been 
useful in academic research. 
 
17 Gray’s identified four accounting values as follows (Gray, 1988, p. 8): the higher a country ranks in terms of 
Individualism and the lower it ranks in terms of Uncertainty Avoidance and Power Distance, the more likely it is 
to rank highly in terms of Professionalism. The higher a country ranks in terms of Uncertainty Avoidance and 
Power Distance and the lower it ranks in terms of Individualism then the more likely it is to rank highly in terms 
of Uniformity. The higher a country ranks in terms of Uncertainty Avoidance and the lower it ranks in terms of 
Individualism and Masculinity, the more likely it is to rank highly in terms of Conservatism. “The higher a 
country ranks in terms of Uncertainty Avoidance and Power Distance and the lower it ranks in terms of 




In this study, Hofstede and Gray’s framework is used to try to explain the association 
between compliance with CG principles and ethnicity. Few studies in Malaysia have been 
identified which have examined the relationship between ethnicity and CG (e.g. Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002; 2005; Wahab et al., 2007). Results of these studies may not be extended to 
other countries because cultures vary across countries. These studies are reviewed in sections 
3.1.3 and 3.1.5. 
 
3.3 Literature Review 
Corporate governance covers a wide variety of areas or themes such as compliance, 
performance, disclosure, auditing, control mechanisms, ownership and 
remuneration/compensation. Figure 3.2 presents a pictorial view of the various areas/themes 































Figure 3.2 Corporate Governance Themes 
 
 












































3.3.1 Studies on Corporate Governance 
Studies on CG and performance have examined the relationship between corporate 
performance and various CG characteristics such as board size (e.g. Yermack, 1996; Vafeas, 
1999; Coles et al., 2008; Eisenberg et al., 1998; Bozec, 2005; Guest, 2009; Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2006; Adams and Mehran, 1995; Beiner et al., 2005; Beiner et al., 2006; Henry, 
2008; Sanda et al., 2005; Mangena and Tauringana, 2008), board composition (, board 
leadership or role duality (see Rechner and Dalton, 1991; Dahya et al., 1996; Ho and 
Williams, 2003; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Bozec, 2005; Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998; 
Laing and Weir, 1999; Weir and Laing, 2000; Sanda et al., 2005; Mangena and Chamisa, 
2008) and concentrated ownership by insiders and outsiders (e.g. Ho and Williams, 2003; 
Mangena and Tauringana, 2008Yermack, 1996; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Laing and 
Weir, 1999; Bozec, 2005; Sanda et al., 2005).  
Instead of examining single CG mechanisms, some researchers construct a 
comprehensive set of CG recommendations to investigate the CG-performance association, 
see Gompers et al. (2003); Bebchuk et al. (2009); Core et al. (2006); Bhagat and Bolton, 
(2008) and Ntim (2009) among others. Generally, findings from these studies are contrasting. 
For instance, others find a positive nexus between CG-performance association e.g. Gompers 
et al. (2003); Bebchuk et al. (2009); Ntim (2009) while others report a negative association 
i.e. Arcot and Bruno (2007); Henry (2008); Core et al. (2006). 
Studies have also been conducted to examine how corporate governance mechanisms 
shape executive pay (Conyon, 1997; Jensen, 1993). For instance, in the UK, Main and 
Johnson (1993) find a positive relationship between presence of a remuneration committee 
and higher executive pay. Other studies find a negative association between presence of 
remuneration committee and executive pay (e.g. Vefeas, 1999; Conyon, 1997a; Chhaochharia 
and Grinstein, 2009; Sun and Cahan, 2009) while others report a limited role of remuneration 
committees in determining management compensation (i.e. Conyon and Peck, 1998). Another 
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stream of literature finds no evidence of an association between remuneration committee and 
executive compensation (e.g. Girma et al., 2007; Conyon, 1997b; Vafeas and Theodorou, 
1998). Recently, Weir and Laing (2000), Weir et al. (2002), Dulewicz and Herbert (2004), 
and Bozec (2005) provide evidence which shows that the establishment of the three board 
committees has no significant impact on financial performance. 
Studies have also been conducted to investigate the association between corporate 
characteristics and disclosures in annual reports (see, for example, Singhvi and Desai, 1971; 
McNally et al., 1982; Cooke, 1989, 1992, 993; Wallace and Nasser, 1995; Deegan et al., 
2002; Brammer and Pavelin, 2006; Alsaeed, 2006; Ghazali, 2007) among others. Most of 
these studies measure corporate disclosure by developing a country level disclosure index and 
then attempt to relate the quantity of items disclosed and corporate characteristics.  
Other studies extend previous studies on the determinants of corporate disclosure by 
examining the association between corporate disclosure and CG mechanisms (e.g. Chen and 
Jaggi, 2000; Eng and Mak, 2003; Gul and Leung, 2004; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002, 2005; 
Mangena and Chamisa, 2008) among others. Current study is on CG and compliance; as such 
attention will be paid to studies on corporate governance and compliance. 
 
3.3.2 Corporate Governance and Compliance 
3.3.2.1 Studies from the Developed World  
Most studies on compliance with CG codes have been conducted in the developed 
world such as in the UK (see Arcot et al., 2010; Conyon and Mallin, 1997; MacNeil and Li, 
2006; Weir and Laing, 2000), Germany (see Talaulicar and v. Werder, 2008; Werder et al., 
2005), Portugal (see Alves and Mendes, 2004) and Spain (see Fernández-Rodríguez et al., 
2004) among others. In the UK, Weir and Laing (2000) analyse the extent of compliance with 
three key Cadbury recommendations (e.g. CEO duality, non-executive directors and the 
existence of board committees) and examined whether size affects firm compliance and the 
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impact of compliance on corporate performance. Based on a sample of the largest 200 non-
financial London Stock Exchange (LSE) listed companies, they compare data for the years 
1992 (Pre-Cadbury) and 1995 (post-Cadbury). They find that compliance with 
recommendations from Cadbury increased between 1992 and 1995. For instance they find 
that the proportion of boards with at least three outside directors was high in 1992 at 83% and 
rose to 90% in 1995. In 1992, 29% of firms had a combined CEO and chair. By 1995 the 
figure had fallen to 15% indicating a clear move away from this type of structure. They also 
find a large increase in the percentage of firms with remuneration committee from 51% in 
1992 to 95% in 1995. They also find that the impact of Cadbury seems to depend on the type 
of performance measure used e.g. higher market returns if firms have a remuneration 
committee but this is not reflected in ROA. 
They find that large UK listed firms have embraced the Cadbury Code in terms of 
compliance with CEO duality, the number of outside directors on the board and the 
appointment of board subcommittees, consistent with Conyon and Mallin (1997). Their 
results also show that complete compliance with the model proposed by Cadbury does not 
appear to result in superior performance when compared to the performance of firms which 
complied in part or did not comply at all. Their results suggest that the increase in compliance 
with the Code may have been influenced by the LSE requirement on quoted companies to 
explain their governance policies and give reasons for not complying with it. The public 
nature of the justifications which firms have to proffer may have influenced compliance with 
the Code. In a similar study, but using a larger sample size of 320 non-Financial Times 1000 
companies, Weir and Laing (2001) analyse the extent of compliance with three key Cadbury 
recommendations (e.g. CEO duality, appointment of non-executive directors on the boards of 
quoted companies and the existence of board committees) and its impact on corporate 
performance pre- and post-Cadbury for 1995 and 1996. They find that widespread adoption 
of Cadbury’s recommendations does not necessarily lead to better performance (ROA). Their 
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results suggest that merely adopting a “tick box” approach does nothing to ensure that 
shareholder interests are being actively pursued. In a study of FTSE 100 serial non-compliers, 
MacNeil and Li (2006) show that although compliance with the UK Combined has increased 
over time, investors’ tolerance for non-compliance is related to a great degree to superior 
financial performance and that investors seem to rely on financial performance as a proxy for 
non-compliance rather than engaging in the tedious task of evaluating the merits of corporate 
provisions. As such, this casts a doubt that compliance does not necessarily lead to positive 
financial performance. 
Dedman (2000) examines whether compliance with the recommendations of the 
Cadbury Report (1992) on CEO duality would be influenced by firm size, ownership 
structure, performance and the level of entrenchment of the top executive. Using a sample of 
333 non-financial firms from the FT All Share Index in April 1990 and April 1993, she finds 
that the decision to split the roles of top executive and chairman is unrelated to firm size, 
ownership structure and performance. 
Arcot and Bruno (2010) analyse 245 non-financial FTSE350 companies for the period 
1998 to 2004 to determine if companies do embrace the Combined Code and how the code 
has impacted on monitoring of governance by shareholders. They also examine whether 
companies provide adequate explanations in case of non-compliance. They hand collect data 
from CG statements included in annual reports and details of each company’s compliance 
with the provisions of the code and the explanations provided in case of non-compliance. 
They find that compliance with the code increased monotonically between 1998 and 2004 
(e.g. a low of 10% in 1998–99 to a high of 56% in 2003–04). They report high percentages of 
compliance for companies that are non-family owned, members of the FTSE100 index, and 
companies cross-listed in other exchanges (mainly in the US)
18
. They also find that 17% of 
non-complying companies over the period of study failed to provide any explanations of non 
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compliance. Non-complying companies were also found to provide standard and 
uninformative statements (51%) or provide the same explanation from one period to the next. 
They argue that the common use of uninformative explanations indicates a possible 
monitoring problem and issues of enforcement. This also raises concerns of inadequate 
information conveyed to minority shareholders. 
In Germany, Pellens et al. (2001) survey companies in the DAX100 and find that 95.6 
per cent of the firms comply with the provisions of the German code of good governance and 
48.5 per cent have already implemented the German Code as a company guideline. More 
recently, Werder et al. (2005) have examined the degree of conformance to mandatory 
recommendations put forward in the German Corporate Governance Code (GCGC)
19
 by 188 
corporations listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange and 220 other companies which do not 
belong to any index for the period Feb 2002 – Feb 2003. Their study is based on a total of 
408 compliance declarations which were content analysed to determine compliance with the 
62 recommendations of the Code. They rate items as “yes” (complied with), “no” (not 
complied with) or “in the future” (to be complied with in the future), depending on the 
reported compliance with the corresponding norm. They find that overall, the 
recommendations of the GCGC attain a high degree of conformance and that it increases with 
the size of the companies
20
.  
Studies on compliance have also been conducted in Portugal and Spain by Alves and 
Mendes (2004) and Fernández-Rodríguez et al. (2004) respectively. In Portugal, Alves and 
Mendes (2004) analyse whether public companies complying with 13 best practice CG 
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 The Code contains provisions which are mandatory (“must provisions”) and those which are voluntary (i.e. 
“shall recommendations” and “should or can suggestions”). As per Section 161 of the Stock Corporations Act, 
German corporations are required to issue declaration of conformity with the Code, stating the GCGC code 
provisions they have complied with (“shall provisions”) and those they have not complied with (Werder et al., 
2005, p. 179). 
20
 Also, in Germany, Bebenroth (2005) examines the impact of EPS and average stock price to Most Commonly 
Unaccepted Recommendations (MCURs) of GCGC. She finds no significant association between EPS and 




recommendations from the CMVM
21
 perform better. Compliance was measured using a 
closed-ended questionnaire sent by CMVM to listed companies between 1998 and 2001. To 
determine the degree of compliance with the 13 recommendations in the questionnaire, they 
adopted a dichotomous un-weighted scoring regime which scored an item “1” if companies 
complied with it and “0” otherwise. They find that compliance with recommendations from 
CMVM improved between 1998 and 2001. They conduct a series of regression analyses (154 
equations) between company returns and measures of compliance and find significant 
association between the compliance of some CG recommendations and company returns. 
Overall they conclude that CMVM code of best practice has a negligible effect on company 
returns. 
Fernández-Rodríguez et al. (2004) use a database of the announcements of 
compliance with the Spanish Code of Best Practice for 1998-2000, to analyse investors’ 
valuation of firms’ compliance with the Spanish Code. They also investigate the extent to 
which the degree of compliance, the companies’ prior performance and firms’ corporate 
characteristics may account for the observed excess returns. Using announcements from a 
sample of 57 Spanish Stock Exchange listed firms, they find that firms which make 
announcements of compliance with the Code experience positive abnormal returns. Their 
results suggest that the markets value positively announcements relating to significant 
restructuring of the board, more especially in low geared firms and firms with a higher 
percentage of executive directors. They conclude that investors value the monitoring role of 
the Spanish Code of Best Practice in firms which are not actively monitored by debt and 
where managers may dominate the board. 
In Australia, Henry (2010) examines whether adherence to Australian Principles of 
Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations of 2003 is associated with 
agency cost benefits for companies listed in the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) for the 
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period of 1992 to 2002. He randomly selected 120 of the largest companies listed on the ASX 
as at June 1996 excluding property and investment trust companies, banking and utilities 
because of unique management, financing and ownership structures. The analysis involves 
relating the index of compliance by ASX listed firms with a number of agency cost proxies 
(e.g. asset utilisation ratio, discretionary expenditure ratio, Q ratio and interaction of free cash 
flow and growth) to determine whether compliance with code recommendations will generate 
agency cost reduction benefits. He constructs an un-weighted compliance index by scoring 
provisions “1” if complied with and “0” otherwise. By controlling for a number of company 
characteristics examined in prior literature, he finds that compliance with individual 
provisions from the Code has no substantial impact on firm level agency costs. However, 
greater conformity with the governance compliance index is found to significantly reduce 
firm agency cost levels.  
 
3.3.2.2 Studies from Emerging Markets 
Studies on corporate compliance with governance codes have also been conducted in 
the emerging markets. For instance, in Malaysia, Wahab et al. (2007) examine the extent of 
compliance of Malaysian companies with the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 
(MCCG). They test whether ethnicity (proportion of Bumiputera directors on the board) and 
political connections, in addition to other factors which past studies have found to be 
significant such as firm size, auditor type, performance, debt, managerial ownership, 
institutional ownership etc, influence the extent of compliance. Using a sample of 440 firms 
listed on the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia from 1999 to 2002 they investigate compliance 
with 30 provisions consisting of a wider group of governance features from the MCCG. They 
score compliance with provisions from MCCG on the basis of an un-weighted scoring regime 
which scored an item “1” if adhered to and “0” otherwise. 
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They find that the extent of compliance with the best practice CG principles from 
MCCG increased twofold (31.25 to 62.50) after the reform in 2001. They also find that 
compliance with board and directors issues
22
 was higher indicating that firms adopted these 
practices long before the 2001 reform. With regard to factors which influence compliance, 
they find a significant relationship between stock performance and CG. They suggest that 
firms may adopt good governance principles following good performance. They also find an 
association between institutional ownership and CG for politically connected firms, which 
suggest that politically connected firms have high institutional shareholding. Contrary to 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002), they find a positive association between the proportion of 
Bumiputera directors on the board and extent of compliance. Their results suggest that 
Bumiputera directors are less secretive and more willing to inform investors about firms’ 
governance structures. 
 
3.3.2.3 Studies from the Developing World 
Few studies on corporate compliance with CG codes have been conducted in the 
developing world such as in Cyprus by Krambia-Kapardis and Psaros, (2006) and SA (see 
Deutsche Bank, 2002, KPMG, 2003, 2004; 2006 and Ntim, 2009). 
In Cyprus, Krambia-Kapardis and Psaros (2006) investigate the level of compliance 
with the Cyprus Corporate Governance Code by companies listed on the Cyprus Stock 
Exchange. Using a sample of 46 listed Cypriot companies for the year 2002 they compared 
compliance narrations from CG reports of the sample firms with the Code and found that 
only 29% of listed firms are “CG sensitive”. They attribute low compliance with the Code to 
the lack of important free market controls that facilitate international institutional investment 
(e.g. low degree of ownership concentration, reliable and timely information flows and 
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 These consist of 6 provisions thus: Role duality, board independence, independence of audit and remuneration 
committee, CEO not sitting on the remuneration committee and disclosure of board appointments. 
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opportunities for investor diversification). Their results suggest that CG codes may not be 
effective if not backed by important CG framework. These results have implications for 
developing countries which tend not to have fully developed legal and regulatory systems, 
enforcement capacities and private sector institutions required to support effective CG 
(Gregory and Simms, 1999, p. 6). 
 
3.3.2.4 Studies from SA 
In SA, a few opinion surveys have examined some aspects of compliance with the 
King Code II (see for example KPMG, 2003, 2004, 2006 and Deutsche Bank, 2002). In 2003, 
KPMG analysed corporate reporting of JSE’s Top 100 Companies on integrated 
sustainability reporting and found that 85% of the companies reported on sustainability 
related issues and 77% of the companies referenced the existence of an internal code of ethics 
or code of corporate conduct. The survey also reported that many companies were only 
giving superficial and general disclosures for the King II Code. In 2004, KPMG conducted a 
similar survey on 154 companies listed on the JSE All Share Index and found that the 
companies which have been providing some form of sustainability reporting within their 
public reports had declined to 64%. They attribute the difference between compliance with 
integrated sustainability reporting issues in 2003 and 2004
23
 to the use of different sample 
sizes as well as different interpretations of the information provided in the published annual 
reports. 
Similar to its other previous studies, KPMG (2006) surveyed 141 JSE All Share Index 
companies, focussing on one aspect of the King Code [Integrated Sustainability Reporting]. 
The survey reflects on the extent to which business has complied with the recommendations 
of King II through an assessment of the non-financial reporting of business on issues 
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 Similar studies conducted annually and based on different sample sizes. 
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including social, transformation, ethical, safety, health and environment. Using reports
24
 
published during the period June 2005 to June 2006, they report that JSE listed companies are 
“attempting to improve the level and extent of their sustainability reporting (p.1)” especially 
on Black Economic Empowerment and HIV/AIDS related issues
25
. They also report that 
significant improvement is still required in terms of reporting on the severity of 
environmental incidents, accounting for the value of Corporate Social Investment 
contributions and environmental management. 
The Deutsche Bank (2002) survey sought to evaluate SA’s (SA) CG framework and 
the individual CG practices of 73 companies which the bank follows. The report’s main 
objectives were to establish a list of emerging market companies that the bank considered to 
have exemplary CG standards on a global basis and to explore and quantify the relationship 
between CG, stock performance and valuation. The survey found very limited cases of full 
compliance with the King Code and a tendency to comply only with the letter and not the 
spirit of the Code. Specifically, the report found that board membership in SA companies 
ranged from 5 to 30 with an average of 12 board members; 60% of companies had 
established an audit committee while 47% and 16% had established compensation and 
nominating committees, respectively. Almost two-thirds of companies surveyed had not met 
the requirement to have a majority of board members independent. In terms of the set 
objectives, the report found that SA companies with better CG trade at a higher valuation 
than those with poor CG standards. 
More recently, Ntim (2009) conducted a comprehensive study on internal CG and 
firm performance in SA. Using a sample of 100 South African listed firms from 2002 to 2006 
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 They used sustainability reports, annual reports or a combination of the two. They classified companies in 
terms of 8 industry groups and developed a questionnaire which was used for scoring annual reports of 
companies. Annual reports were read and sections relating to integrated sustainability reporting identified and 
scored. 
25
 Their analysis of compliance is divided into three categories; fully addressed, partially addressed and not 
addressed in the report. Their results indicate that in 2004, 56% (20% in 2006) made no reference to code of 
ethics; 70% (23% in 2006) made no reference to whistleblowing, and 62% (28% in 2006) made no reference to 
preferential procurement. Generally, the results indicate that although there was an improvement between the 
two periods, compliance was still very low among sampled firms. 
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(500 firm year observations), he self-constructed a compliance checklist consisting of 50 
items from the King Code II to investigate the level of compliance with the provisions of the 
King Code (2002) and whether such compliance leads to better performance. He finds that, 
on average, corporate compliance with the King Code II increased from 48% in 2002 to 68% 
in 2006. In terms of factors influencing compliance, he finds that on average, large firms 
complied more with the King Code II than small firms. For instance, large firms had an 
average compliance with the Code provisions of 75% compared to 44% by small firms. 
Similarly, firms audited by Big 4 audit firms were found to comply more with the King Code 
than their non-Big 4 audited counterparts. He also finds a statistically significant and positive 
relationship between compliance and performance
26
 measured in terms of ROA and Q-ratio. 
These results suggest that South African listed firms with better CG trade at a significant 
valuation premium compared to those with poor CG standards. 
 
3.4 Literature Gap 
Studies on compliance with corporate governance principles suffer from several 
limitations. First, some of them examine compliance with a few governance factors such as 
CEO duality, non-executive directors and the existence of board committees (see Weir and 
Laing, 2000; Weir and Laing, 2001). Compliance with a few code provisions may not show 
the true extent of compliance with the entire code. To overcome this limitation, the current 
study examines compliance with all provisions from the code so as to understand the true 
                                                          
26  In terms of specific CG variables and performance, he reports an insignificant negative association 
between board diversity and ROA & Q-ratio. The negative relationship between board diversity and firm 
performance could be attributed to the fact that the number of board members from diverse backgrounds on the 
boards of South African listed firms is substantially small. As such they may not be able to make a significant 
impact on firm financial performance. There is a negative insignificant relationship between board size and 
ROA and a positive significant association with Q-ratio, in line with the argument that the market appears to 
perceive larger boards as more effective. A statistically significant and positive relationship between ROA & 
performance and a statistically insignificant and negative relationship between Q-ratio and performance is 
reported meaning that duality has no significant impact on the sampled firms’ market value. Other variables 
tested include percentage of non-executive directors on the board, frequency of board meetings, presence of 




extent of compliance with the King Code. Second, their samples are biased towards large 
firms (e.g. Times 1000, FTSE350) (see Weir and Laing, 2000; Weir and Laing, 2001; Bruno 
and Arcot, 2010); as such, the results cannot be extended to smaller firms. The current study 
will use a sample drawn from all firms listed in the JSE. Third, others do not statistically test 
the relationship (based on descriptive statistics only) between compliance and factors which 
influence compliance (e.g. Werder et al., 2005; Arcot and Bruno, 2010) and do not examine 
factors which influence compliance (see Alves and Mendes, 2004). The current study will 
conduct descriptive analysis, correlation and multiple regression tests to determine the 
relationship between compliance and factors which influence compliance. In a way, the study 
will determine the causal effect of one variable upon another.  
Fourth, other studies such as Fernández-Rodríguez et al. (2004) examine compliance 
and factors which influence compliance but do not examine the effect of culture on 
compliance. Although other studies such as Wahab et al. (2007) examine compliance and 
whether culture (proxy ethnicity) influences compliance, their results may not be extended to 
other countries because of cultural differences. For instance, the Ubuntu culture of blacks in 
SA is different from the culture of the Bumeputera in Malaysia, which implies that results 
from this study may not be extended to SA. As such, the current study will examine whether 
the Ubuntu culture influences compliance in the SA setting. 
Other limitations of these studies include sample selection bias (e.g. Deutsche Bank 
and KPMG) as companies under consideration consist mainly of large companies including 
some with dual listings (e.g. Anglo American Plc, SAB Plc) in other stock exchanges such as 
the London Stock Exchange. In addition, the sample consists of companies followed by 
Deutsche Bank only and may not be representative of all JSE listed companies. Furthermore, 
they focussed on one aspect of the King Code (e.g. KPMG 2003, 2004, 2006), i.e. integrated 
sustainability reporting, and did not examine factors which may influence compliance with 
the King Code.  
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In the case of Ntim (2009), he only considered compliance-performance relationship 
in the post-King Code II period and not during the King Code I and did not consider ethnicity 
as a possible explanatory variable (see section 1.1 on limitations relating to Ntim’s (2009) 
study).  For instance Ntim’s (2009) focuses on compliance with King II only while current 
study examines compliance with both King I and II and does not examine compliance with 
the four key issues as recommended in the Code. Also, although Ntim (2009) investigate 
some factors affecting compliance, he does not examine the effect of ethnicity on compliance 
with the Code. An examination of this aspect will help us to understand how corporate SA 
behaves in terms of compliance when their structures are occupied by people from the two 
main ethnic groups (e.g. blacks and whites). The aspect is even more important to investigate 
given the stark contrasts between the blacks and whites culture in SA (Poovan, 2005). 
Based on a review of previous studies, gaps in the literature were identified in terms 
theory, methods employed and context of the studies. The literature review has established 
that most studies focussed on board, company and market characteristics in explaining CG 
and compliance (e.g. Arcot et al., 2010; Fernández-Rodríguez et al., 2004; Ntim, 2009; Weir 
and Laing, 2000). For instance, most studies on compliance with CG codes have examined 
various factors which are associated with compliance such as size, auditor type, debt, 
profitability, listing status etc. and only a few studies on compliance (e.g. Wahab et al. 2007) 
with CG codes, considered ‘ethnicity’ as a potential explanatory variable. One possible 
reason is perhaps due to ethnicity not being an important issue in the context of the countries 
where those studies were conducted. However, it is important to examine this aspect in 
countries where there is positive economic discrimination such as in Malaysia (Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002), Fji (Narayan, 2008; Prasad, 1998), Sri Lanka (Xu et al., 2007) including SA. 
Given the political history of SA and the cultural differences between the two main ethnic 
groups (“blacks” and “whites”) in the country, it is important to examine the behaviour of 
corporations with structures occupied by “black” and “white” executives, not only in terms 
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of compliance with the King Code, but also in terms of other CG issues (e.g. disclosure, 
performance etc). Corporate governance is an activity which involves “both human and non-
human resources or techniques as well as the interaction between the two (Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2005, p. 392). People have cultural backgrounds which may influence them to behave 
in certain ways. As such it is important to investigate whether individuals from different 
cultural backgrounds (e.g. blacks and whites) may influence corporations to behave in 
accordance with the dictates of their cultures. Therefore, the current research seeks to extend 
the literature on compliance with CG codes by factoring in the ‘ethnicity’ aspect. As a 
consequence, in addition to agency, stakeholder and other theories, current research will use 
Hofstede-Gray theory to explain the association between firm compliance and CG in SA. 
Literature review has also found that most studies on compliance with CG codes tend 
to examine extent of compliance with a few CG factors e.g. boards and directors issues only 
(see Weir and Laing, 2000; Conyon and Mallin, 1997). As such, results of these studies do 
not show clearly the extent to which listed firms comply with all provisions from CG codes. 
To overcome this limitation, the current study will not only examine the extent of compliance 
with all provisions from the King Code, but will analyse compliance with the Code in terms 
of the four key issues e.g. boards and directors, risk management, accounting and auditing 
and integrated sustainability reporting. This will help us to understand which of the four key 
issues (provisions) from the Code JSE listed firms tend to comply with more/less. This is 
particularly important because the King Code makes recommendations on aspects such as 
black economic empowerment, employment equity, etc which are traditionally not part of 
corporate reporting.  
In terms of research methods, the literature review has found that most of the studies 
are limited to quantitative analysis only (statistical analysis). In addition to quantitative 
analysis, the current study seeks to extend literature on corporate governance by examining 
the views/opinions of key stakeholders [e.g. regulators, King Code Commissioners, 
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companies and institutional investors] on the King Code, corporate compliance with the 
Code, corporate governance in SA in general and the influence of the Code in the SADC 
region. The views of key stakeholders are important to examine so as to understand whether 
key stakeholders view the Code as relevant and important for SA. It is also important to find 
out from key stakeholders whether the Code serves the purpose for which it was intended 
(e.g. improvement of corporate governance standards) and whether. As discussed in section 
1.0, it is important to understand whether the King Code has had a positive impact in the 
SADC region. This understanding will help investors and other stakeholders to appreciate the 
status of CG in this region. 
By addressing these gaps, current research will contribute to the thin literature on 
compliance with the King Code, but also to the lack of literature on CG in Africa (Mangena 
and Chamisa, 2008; Okeahalam, 2004; Tsamenyi et al., 2007). 
 
3.5 Chapter Summary 
The main objective of this chapter has been to review the literature on CG. In this 
regard, selected studies on CG were reviewed such as on performance, compensation and 
disclosure. Generally, empirical evidence from these studies indicates conflicting results. The 
chapter also presents a comprehensive review of literature on corporate compliance with CG 
principles. Most studies on compliance with CG codes have been conducted in developed 
countries, with a limited focus on board and directors’ issues only. Also, some of these 
studies examine performance and some aspects of compliance while a few examine 
comprehensive compliance with CG principles.  
Further, not many studies have been found which examine the effect of ethnicity of 
corporate compliance with CG principles. As such, this chapter has established that prior 
literature has not examined whether ethnicity influences corporate compliance with CG 
principles. Literature review has also established that most studies on compliance with CG 
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principles tend to rely on agency theory to explain the association between compliance and 
CG.  
In the next chapter, hypotheses necessary to test the relationship between corporate 
compliance and factors which influence compliance will be developed. 
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In Chapter Three, the extant literature on corporate governance was discussed. More 
importantly, a gap in the literature on corporate compliance with corporate governance 
principles was identified. In particular, it was noted that research on the extent of compliance 
with corporate governance recommendations and the factors influencing compliance is 
limited. Most importantly, it was observed that the effects of ethnicity on compliance with 
corporate governance is very limited internationally, and non-existent in South Africa. It was 
also found that prior literature on corporate compliance with governance principles tends to 
rely on quantitative analysis only to examine corporate compliance with corporate 
governance principles. Consequently, the research objectives were developed as follows: first 
to examine the extent of compliance with the SA King Code of corporate governance, second 
to investigate the factors which influence compliance with the Code and to examine whether 
in particular ethnicity influences compliance with the Code. In this chapter, the hypotheses to 
be tested in answering the research questions are formulated. The chapter ends with a 











Figure 4.1 Chapter Plan 
 
 
4.1 Development of Hypothesis 
This section develops the hypotheses by discussing the relevant theories that attempt 
to link corporate governance structures and compliance. Various theories (as discussed in 
chapter three) underlying corporate governance, drawn from various disciplines (e.g. 
economics, accounting, law inter alia), are used to explain the link between variables under 
investigation and compliance. Figure 4.2 presents a theoretical framework of the relationship 
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4.1.1 Personal Characteristics 
An important function of the board of directors is to minimize agency
27
 costs that 
arise from the separation of ownership and decision control of the modern day corporation 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). The Board guides and monitors the business and affairs of the 
company on behalf of the shareholders by whom they are elected and to whom they are 
accountable. Various factors, such as size, composition, culture, qualifications of directors 
etc, may therefore influence the effectiveness of the board in its oversight functions. Among 
other responsibilities
 
the board has to set the company’s strategic aims, appoint or fire the 
management team, supervise the management team and report to the owners of the company on 
their stewardship (Cadbury Report, 1992, s.2.5; Rossouw et al., 2002, p.290). The board is also 
responsible for ensuring that the firm follows good CG practices by complying with good 
governance principles (King Code, 1994, 2002 and 2009). For the purpose of this research, 
corporate board variables consist of board characteristics such as the culture of the board, 
board composition, and board size. 
 
4.1.1.1 Ethnicity Variables 
Ethnicity (proxy for culture) consists of the ethnicity of the dominant board members, 
the ethnicity of the board chairman, and the ethnicity of the CEO/MD. Ethnicity is important 
to examine because it is important to understand how corporate entities behave when their 




                                                          
27 Costs incurred by the principal to limit divergence (by the agent) from his/her interests by establishing 
appropriate incentives or control mechanisms to limit the incidence of opportunistic action by the agent (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976, p.308). For instance, the principal can expend resources to design a monitoring system 
(monitoring costs) aimed at reducing the aberrant activities of the agent. This may include efforts on the part of 
the principal to control the behaviour of the agent through contractual agreements regarding budget restrictions, 
compensation policies, and operating rules, amongst others. 
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4.1.1.1.1 Ethnicity in Board Structures (Board Domination - PROPWHITES) 
The culture of blacks (Ubuntu) in SA may be described as collectivist, while that of 
whites may be described as individualistic (Booysen, 2000; Malunga, 2006a; Nussbaum, 
2003). The core values of Ubuntu culture are survival, solidarity, compassion, respect, 
dignity, sharing, communalism, and love (Kayuni and Tambulasi, 2005; Malunga, 2006a; 
Mbigi, 2000; Nussbaum, 2003). According to Hofstede and Hofstede (2005), in 
individualistic cultures people strive to be independent from other members in society and 
interpersonal bonds are not a major concern within an individualistic culture. The 
achievement of goals by people in individualistic cultures is self directed and competition 
plays a major role.  
In contrast, in a collectivist culture, members of the community are dependent on each 
other and priority is given to group goals. Behaviour is directed towards maintaining a 
communal way of life in collectivist cultures while individualistic cultures usually place a lot 
of emphasis on non-communal relationships (Malunga, 2006b; Mbigi, 2000). 
Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) hypothesise that people from a collectivist culture 
value social relevance (relationships), quality of life and welfare to others (feminine) whilst 
people from an individualistic culture value material possessions, money and assertiveness 
(masculine). Femininity, just like collectiveness, addresses the importance of interdependent 
relationships between people. As such, if the board of directors of a firm is dominated by 
people whose culture is collectivist and feminine, they may influence the firm to comply with 
the King Code because the spirit of collectivism and their feminine side influences them to 
address issues from a stakeholder or Ubuntu (collectivist/communitarian) perspective. For 
instance, the board may ensure that the company complies with recommendations on board 
diversity, social investment, employment equity, human capital development among others 





Studies based on Hofstede’s cultural dimensions of the two main ethnic groups in 
South Africa suggest that whites tend to have low uncertainty avoidance and power distance, 
are masculine, individualistic and have a long term orientation (Booysen, 2000). Blacks on 
the other hand have high uncertainty avoidance and power distance, collectivist, feminine and 
have a short term orientation. Based on results of this study and in accordance with Gray’s 
(1988) hypotheses, whites have the exact societal values that fit Gray’s (1988) description for 
high level of professionalism. Thus the whites can be predicted to have a high level of 
professionalism. The blacks on the other hand were found to have the exact opposite societal 
values to those of whites on Gray’s professionalism hypothesis. As such it may be predicted 
that blacks may have a low level of professionalism (Booysen, 2000). The blacks on the other 
hand have the exact societal values that fit Gray’s (1988) description for high level of secrecy 
whilst the whites were found to have the opposite of societal values that fit Gray’s (1988) 
description for high level of secrecy. Thus it can be predicted that blacks may have a high 
level of secrecy while whites have a low level of secrecy. Since the focus of this study is on 
compliance, then the accounting value of professionalism may be the most relevant to be 
considered. It is therefore argued that because whites are more professional, they may 
influence companies to comply more with best practice corporate governance principles 
recommended under the King Code than blacks whose cultural values suggest that they are 
less professional (Booysen, 2000).  Furthermore, because whites are individualistic and 
driven by personal goals, they may influence compliance with Code provisions in order to 
improve the firm’s share price, and perhaps increase their compensation from rewards of 
better performance. In addition, studies in South Africa show that firms complying with the 
Code have higher share prices because they are viewed positively by investors (Deutsche 
Bank, 2002). As such the individualistic culture of whites may influence a high level of 
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compliance with the Code if they dominate the board of directors, are CEOs or board 
chairman.  
In line with the above arguments, the following hypothesis is developed to test these 
aspects. 
H1:  Ceteris paribus, the extent of compliance with the King Code is greater 
for companies with boards dominated by “black or white” directors. 
 
4.1.2 Corporate Governance 
4.1.2.1 Board Size (SBD) 
From an agency theory perspective, larger boards are bad, while smaller boards are 
good and effective at improving financial performance (e.g. Jensen, 1993, p. 865; Lipton and 
Lorsch, 1992). Jensen (1993) suggests that keeping boards small can help improve their 
performance with regard to oversight duties. He believes that large boards tend to emphasise 
politeness and courtesy in the boardroom at the expense of truth and frankness. He opines 
that when boards become too big, agency problems are exacerbated and the board become 
more symbolic and neglects its monitoring and control duties. This view is supported by 
Beasley (1996) who empirically finds that as board size increases, the likelihood of financial 
statement fraud increases, implying the need for increased monitoring with larger boards. 
Lipton and Lorsch (1992, p. 67) argue that as corporate board size goes beyond a maximum 
number of ten directors, additional costs of having larger boards typically associated with 
slow decision-making are higher than any marginal gains from intense monitoring of 
management’s activities.  
On the contrary, a larger board is more likely to have a greater range of expertise to 
monitor the actions of management effectively (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). Also, Linck 
(2008) finds that firms with growth opportunities, high research and development 
expenditures, and high stock return volatility are associated with smaller less independent 
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boards, while larger firms have larger and more independent boards. A less independent 
board is likely to be inefficient in the discharge of its monitoring function. As such, results of 
this study suggest that a small board is not always better. Similarly Coles et al. (2008) 
empirically test the popular view that smaller and more independent boards are better. They 
argue that certain classes of firms are likely to benefit from large boards and boards with 
more insider representation. In particular, they argue that large firms which are diversified 
across industries with high leverage are likely to have greater advising requirements. These 
firms are therefore likely to benefit from a larger board of directors particularly from outside 
directors who posses relevant experience and expertise (Coles et al., 2008, p. 351). Their 
results are consistent with these arguments. 
In SA, the JSE Listing Requirements (2005) only specify that the minimum number of 
directors for listed firms should be four, whilst the King Report (2002) recommends that that 
the board should be of a size that allows for a diversity of expertise and experience to be 
effective. A Deutsche Bank (2002, p. 12) survey focussing on 73 major firms found that 
board size ranges from 5 to 30 directors with a mean directorship of 12. The study also 
highlights that companies with too many board members are perceived poorly given the 
collegial approach that large boards tend to adopt.  
In line with these arguments, it may be hypothesised that increased monitoring from 
smaller boards may be associated with high level of compliance with best practice corporate 
governance principles such as those recommended by the King Code. Increased scrutiny may 
influence management to comply with best practice corporate governance principles because 
if they fail to do so, the board may question failure to do so. Similarly, a larger (smaller) 
board with a greater range of expertise and more independent directors (less expertise and 
few independent directors), may influence compliance (not influence compliance) with best 
practice corporate governance because directors are able (not able) to exercise their 
independent judgment and also have (do not have) expertise on issues of compliance. In 
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contrast the collegial approach associated with large boards may be associated with low level 
of compliance with best practice corporate governance principles as the board becomes 
symbolic and neglects its monitoring and control duties 
The following hypothesis is developed to test this aspect. 
 
H3: Ceteris paribus, the extent of compliance with the King Code is higher for 
companies with a large board size.   
 
4.1.2.2 Board composition (Number of Non Executive Directors as a Proportion of Board 
Size- PROPDNEDS) 
Board composition refers to the number of non-executive directors on the board 
compared to executive directors. Non-executive directors (NEDs) are outside directors who 
monitor the decisions made by executive directors. There are two opposing views with regard 
to NEDs: those who are in favour of appointing more NEDs on corporate boards and those 
who are in favour of more executive directors on boards of directors. Arguments for the 
appointment of more NEDs are based on three theories: agency, resource dependency and 
signalling theory. 
According to agency theory, boards dominated by executive directors (insiders) are 
less accountable (Fama, 1980, p.293; Sonnenfeld, 2002, p.108). NEDs, on the other hand, 
bring independent judgment to board decisions (e.g., Cadbury Report, 1992); offer the firm 
resources in the form of experience, expertise, business contacts and reputation (Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2006, p.1039); and perform their monitoring function effectively because of the 
existence of competitive and efficient managerial labour markets both within and outside the 
firm (Fama, 1980, pp.292-294; Fama and Jensen, 1983a, p.315). Fama (1980, p.293) and 
Fama and Jensen (1983a, p.313) argue that once top internal management gains control of the 
corporate board, they are more likely to connive and collude among themselves to 
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expropriate shareholders’ wealth. Appointment of NEDs on boards of directors has the 
potential to reduce this collusion because NEDs have incentives to develop reputations as 
experts in decision control (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  
However, a contrasting view based on stewardship theory is that corporate boards 
dominated by NEDs may impact negatively on firm outcomes (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 
1990, p.74; Weir and Laing, 2000, p.267; Bozec, 2005, p.1927). Weir and Laing (2000, 
p.267) contend that NEDs often command less knowledge about the business and find it too 
difficult to understand the complexities of the company. This problem is exacerbated by the 
fact that outside directors are part-timers who normally also sit on boards of other companies 
(Bozec, 2005, p.1927). As such, they devote little time to their monitoring and advisory 
duties. As per stewardship theory, managers are essentially trustworthy individuals and so are 
good stewards of the resources entrusted to them (Donaldson and Davis, 1994, p. 51; 
Nicholson and Kiel, 2007, p. 588). Also, since inside (or executive) directors spend their 
working lives in the company they govern, they understand the businesses better than outside 
directors and so can make superior decisions (Donaldson and Davis, 1994, p. 51; Nicholson 
and Kiel, 2007, p. 588). Consequently, proponents of stewardship theory contend that 
superior corporate performance will be linked to a majority of inside directors as they 
naturally work to maximise profit for shareholders (Nicholson and Kiel, 2007, p. 588). By 
implication, decisions made by a board dominated by NEDs would be of a lower quality, and 
this would in turn lead to low firm performance. It has also been argued that corporate boards 
dominated by outside directors tend to stifle managerial initiative and strategic actions, which 
arise from excessive managerial supervision and lack of business knowledge to be truly 
effective (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006, p.1039).  
Prior literature on the effect of high percentage of NEDs and firm outcomes is 
conflicting. Some disclosure studies have reported significant positive associations between 
the proportion of NEDs and levels of voluntary disclosure (Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Haniffa 
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and Cooke, 2002) because of the positive influence on the management’s decisions (by 
NEDs) to disclose financial information. The inclusion of non-executive directors on 
corporate boards has also been found to increase a firm’s compliance with disclosure 
requirements which would result in more comprehensive financial disclosure (Chen and 
Jaggi, 2000). Studies on CG have also found a positive relationship between the proportion of 
non-executive directors on a board and foreign share ownership, because foreign investors 
perceive non-executive directors as effective in monitoring and controlling opportunistic 
behaviour of managers, and thus protecting the shareholders’ interests (Mangena and 
Tauringana, 2007, p. 75). 
The King Code (2002) and the JSE Listing Rules recommend that the majority of 
directors on the board should be NEDs independent of management so that shareowner 
interests (including minority interests) can be protected. This suggests that the King Code 
expects companies with more NEDs to have better CG practices than those with fewer NEDs. 
However, in the past there have been a series of corporate scandals in SA which were 
characterised by a pattern of weak boards which failed to engage in effective oversight of the 
business affairs of the company and failed to ensure that senior officers did not engage in 
self-dealing e.g. Regal Treasury Bank (Sarra, 2004, p. 10). In some instances, the boards 
failed to discharge their responsibilities despite having more NEDs and directors who were 
chartered accountants e.g. LeisureNet (Sarra, 2004, p. 7).  
In terms of compliance, it may be hypothesised that outside directors may influence 
compliance with best practice corporate governance principles because of their independent 
judgement (Cadbury Report, 1992) and the need to protect their reputation as directors. 
Outside directors may also influence compliance with best practice corporate governance 
principles so as to enhance their employability in competitive and efficient managerial labour 
markets. In contrast, because outside directors are part timers (Bozec, 2005, p.1927), devote 
little time to their monitoring and advisory duties and command less knowledge of business 
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activities unlike inside directors, they may not be in a position to influence compliance with 
best practice corporate governance. 
In the light of the above discussion, the following hypothesis is developed: 
 
H2: Ceteris paribus, the extent of compliance with the King Code is greater for 
companies with a high proportion of NEDs. 
 
4.1.3 Company Characteristics 
4.1.3.1 Firm Size(STA) 
The influence of size on the decision to comply with the King Code may be based on 
several arguments. First, corporations may comply with the King Code as a legitimation 
strategy. As per legitimacy theory, the organisation seeks congruency between organisational 
actions and the values of its general and relevant publics (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; 
Lindblom, 1994) or its stakeholders (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005). A disparity (actual or 
perceived) between organisational and social values may jeopardise organisational legitimacy 
and yield a legitimacy gap. Gray et al. (1995) contend that socially responsible actions by 
corporate management are part of the legitimation process. Legitimation strategy is even 
more important in large firms because large firms are more visible in the public eye and more 
politically sensitive (Watts and Zimmermann, 1978). Large firms tend to be more visible to 
relevant publics and so tend to be subject to greater political and regulatory pressure from 
external interests (Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989). Large firms are also subject to scrutiny by the 
media and may suffer bad publicity and the imposition of more regulations following non-
compliance than smaller firms (Dedman, 2000). As such, larger firms may seek to ensure that 
they are perceived as operating within the norms and bounds of their respective societies 
since they cannot escape media and public scrutiny because of visibility in the public eye. In 
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the same vein, it could be argued that corporate compliance with recommendations from 
corporate codes may be part of a legitimation process which is driven by size of the firm 
(visibility in the public eye). For this reason, larger firms are more likely to comply with the 
King Report to avoid bad publicity and regulatory risk. Second, apart from being visible in 
the public eye, large firms also tend to have more analysts following than smaller firms (Lang 
and Lundholm, 1993; McKinnon and Dalimunthe, 1993) and therefore may feel the need to 
comply with good CG practices such as the King Code to signal better CG practices to 
analysts who scrutinise their annual reports.  
In addition, large firms in South Africa may comply with recommendations from the 
King Code relating to employment equity, Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), 
HIV/AIDs, social investment among others.  Compliance with these recommendations may 
be used as a form distribution of wealth given the inequalities created by the apartheid, for 
which most large companies benefited from. From a political theory perspective, these issues 
are particularly important for large firms than for smaller firms. As such compliance in this 
case may be used to try and avoid political and regulatory pressure from government. For 
instance, in the mining sector government policy emphasises the role of indigenous people in 
this sector, and the labour unions have a similar view.  Indeed the King code also attempts to 
take this into consideration. As such compliance may be expected to be high in this sector 
and among large companies because of political and regulatory pressure. 
Following from this discussion, firm size is considered as another factor which may 
influence compliance with the King Code. Prior literature has also found a positive 
relationship between compliance with the Cadbury Report and firm size (Weir and Laing, 
2000).  Firm size has also been found to influence compliance with the German Corporate 
Governance Code (Werder et al., 2005). In SA, the Deutsche Bank (2002) survey finds that 




Firm size is therefore important to examine because it may influence compliance with 
the King Code.  The hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H4: Ceteris paribus, the extent of compliance with the King Code is greater for larger 
companies. 
 
4.1.3.2 Institutional Ownership(INSTSHARE) 
According to the managerial branch of stakeholder theory, stakeholders are identified 
by the organisation of concern, by reference to the extent to which the organisation believes 
the interplay with each group needs to be managed in order to further the interests of the 
organisation (Gray et al., 1996, p. 45). As such, institutional investors are more important to 
firms because of their significant financial investment and their power to influence corporate 
decisions in their interests (Mitchell et al., 1997). The more critical the resources controlled 
by a stakeholder group, the more responsive an organisation will be in meeting the needs and 
expectations of that stakeholder group.  
The emergence of institutional investors as equity owners is seen as another important 
external control mechanism affecting CG worldwide (Gillan and Starks, 2003). Institutional 
investors have the potential to exert influence on management actions through their 
ownership or indirectly by trading their shares e.g. acting in unison to avoid investing in the 
shares of a particular company, driving up its cost of capital in the process (Drobertz et al., 
2003; Gillan and Starks, 2003).  
Institutional investors are a significant component of equity markets in the first world 
e.g. the US and the European Union. Institutional investors have only started to take centre 
stage in emerging markets because of pension reform and privatization initiatives by 
governments in the developing world (Gillan and Starks, 2003). If institutional investors 
become dissatisfied with management performance, they may sell their shares in the 
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company (‘vote with their feet’), hold their shares and voice their dissatisfaction or hold their 
shares and do nothing (Gillan and Starks, 2003, p. 5). Institutional investors have been under 
increasing pressure to use their voting power to encourage good governance in their investee 
companies (Solomon, 2007).   
Compliance with CG codes may be another major element that can be employed by 
firms to manage (or manipulate) institutional investors in order to gain their support and 
approval, or to distract their opposition and disapproval. Due to large ownership stake, 
institutional investors have strong incentives to monitor corporate practices with regard to 
compliance with good CG practices. Thus managers may voluntarily implement good 
governance principles to meet the expectations of large shareholders.  
However, prior literature finds no evidence of exertion of pressure by institutional 
investors on poorly performing firms to comply with the Cadbury Report (Dedman, 2000). 
This is consistent with Mallin’s (1997) findings that institutional investors spread their 
investments over so many companies, which makes it unlikely that they will be able to 
monitor and apply pressure to all firms in the portfolio. 
SA has the most institutional investors relative to the size of its economy (Malherbe 
and Segal, 2001; Vaughn and Ryan, 2006). However, these well developed domestic 
institutional investors have not yet actively and publicly intervened in CG affairs (Vaughn 
and Ryan, 2006). Foreign institutional investors, on the other hand, have robustly criticised 
corporate culture, pyramid structures, governance and performance since their active return to 
South African markets in 1994 (Okeahalam and Akinboade, 2003). The following hypothesis 
is developed to test this aspect in SA, an emerging economy. 
 
H6: Ceteris paribus, the extent of compliance with the King Code is greater for 




4.1.3.3 Director Share Ownership (DRCTSHARE) 
According to legitimacy theory organisations continually seek to ensure that they are 
perceived as operating within the bounds and norms of their respective societies. The benefits 
to be derived from organisational legitimacy include enhanced stability and 
comprehensibility of an organisation’s activities plus persistence because audiences are most 
likely to supply resources to organisations that appear desirable, proper or appropriate. 
Therefore compliance with the King Code is expected to be high when managerial ownership 
is high because managers may use legitimacy strategy to enhance the image of the 
corporation to its relevant publics to ensure firm survival by addressing economic, social and 
environmental concerns as recommended by the King Code. 
The process of legitimacy on the other hand requires a firm to recognise its relevant 
publics (stakeholders), and take the interests of these stakeholders into consideration. For 
instance, about 80%  of South African population is black (South African Government, 
2002), a large section of the population which was previously disenfranchised because of the 
policy of apartheid. As a result, stakeholders relevant for firm business purposes come from 
this large section of the population e.g. customers, employees, suppliers, government etc. 
Failure to legitimate organisational activities by complying with the recommendations of the 
King Code (2002) may render organisations to be deemed as irrelevant in the new South 
Africa, resulting in a negative impact on its present and future economic activities. The owner 
managers may for instance influence compliance with the diversity aspect of the King Code 
in an endeavour to seek active support or merely passive acquiescence (Suchman, 1995, p. 
575), for corporate sustainability. This is even more important for companies which are 
owned by “white” executive directors. These companies may comply with the King Report as 
a legitimation strategy. 
The proxy for executive director ownership is the ratio of ordinary shares held by 
CEO and executive directors to the total issued share capital.  
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The following hypothesis is developed to test this aspect. 
 
H7: Ceteris paribus, the extent of compliance with the King Code is greater 
for companies with low director share ownership. 
 
4.1.3.4 Debt (LTDtoTE) 
The level of debt in a firm could possibly influence compliance with good corporate 
governance principles. First, debt-holders lend capital to firms on the expectation that the 
capital will be returned with interest within the agreed time limit. The concerns for creditors 
under this contractual arrangement, is that the managers may not act in their best interests at 
all times. These concerns are broadly categorised as actions by firms that increase the risk of 
the probability that the creditors’ capital and interest will be expropriated. Common examples 
of expropriation by managers include increasing firm leverage, unwarranted distributions to 
shareholders, issuance of higher priority debt claims, and investments in negative net present 
value projects (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; La Porta et al., 2000). As a result, monitoring the 
firms’ managers through complex debt contracts, to limit their ability to take opportunistic 
actions leading to bondholder wealth expropriation, is necessary (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). In a way debt financing constrains managerial expropriation through the imposition of 
fixed obligations on corporate cash flow (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Ultimately, the level 
of debt financing has the potential to influence corporate managers to comply with best 
practice corporate governance principles because default on financial obligations (resulting 
from poor governance), may trigger winding up proceedings. This process would force the 
corporate manager to search for re-employment, just when his reputation has been dented 
(Faccio et al., 2001). In a way, the need to protect their reputation would force managers to 
implement good governance principles which would ensure continuity of the corporate entity 
into the foreseeable future. 
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As per stakeholder theory, the more critical the resources controlled by a stakeholder 
group, the more it will compel an organisation to fulfil the expectations of that stakeholder 
group (Deegan and Unerman, 2006). If debt-holders perceive that compliance with good 
governance principles such as the King Code reduces the risk of firm failure, then they may 
be driven to demand compliance. Debt financing gives debt holders the right to make 
demands on a firm’s management in accordance with the debt contract (covenants). Failure to 
fulfil the demands of debt holders may result in a high cost of capital or refusal to offer 
finance (Dedman, 2000).  
Traditionally SA has a deep equity culture. However, debt financing is also a 
significant portion of the capital structures of most listed firms (Malherbe and Segal, 2001). 
Financial institutions in SA maintain cozy relationships with established and well connected 
businesses, as is the case in many African countries (Okeahalam and Akinboade, 2003). In 
some instances commercial firms also own and control major domestic banks, creating 
business conglomerates with ‘in house’ sources of easy financing for themselves 
(Okeahalam, 2004, p. 365). However, debt is important to consider as a control variable in 
corporate compliance with the King Report of SA. The following hypothesis is developed to 
investigate this aspect. 
 
 H5: Ceteris paribus, the extent of compliance with the King Code is greater for 
companies with high levels of debt. 
 
4.1.3.5 Auditor Type (AUDTYPE) 
According to Fombrum (1996, p. 57) as cited in Carmeli and Tishler (2005) a 
favourable corporate reputation, is a strategic resource as it reflects the firm’s competitive 
position relative to its competitors. “Having a favourable organisational reputation means that 
the firm’s constituencies perceive the firm as more attractive than other firms” (Carmeli and 
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Tishler, 2005, p. 16). As such, large audit firms may have corporate reputation concerns in 
their dealings with their client firms and may insist upon good corporate practices to 
safeguard their reputation, and also to maintain a competitive edge. Corporate reputation is 
generally defined as the sum of the perceptions and assessments of all relevant stakeholders 
with regard to the performance, products, services, persons, organisations, etc of a company 
and the respect for the company that arises from each of these factors (Wiedmann and Buxel, 
2005, p. 146). 
Prior literature document that Big 4 auditors provide higher quality audits than do the 
non-Big 4 audit firms and that the source of higher quality is a result of reputation concerns 
and differential auditor litigation exposure. If audit clients (auditees) are found to have 
financial difficulties, investors tend to partly apportion the blame to auditors by suing them 
for the financial loss incurred (Dye, 1993). Big 4 audit firms are therefore exposed to the risk 
of being sued for damages because of their perceived “deep pockets” (Hope et al., 2008, p. 
350). Litigation also has the potential to damage the reputation capital of audit firms. Big 4 
audit firms invest more to maintain their reputation as providers of quality audit than smaller 
audit firms (DeAngelo, 1981). In the event of damage to reputation, large audit firms stand to 
lose more than the small audit firms. Big 4 firms also have many clients and are therefore 
likely to be less dependent on their clients, which may compromise the quality of their work 
to a greater degree than small audit firms (Owusu-Ansah, 1998). According to the King 
Code, external auditors provide an independent and objective check on the way in which the 
financial statements have been prepared and presented by the directors when discharging 
their stewardship to stakeholders. As such, an external audit provides an essential part of the 
checks and balances required. In addition, it also forms one of the cornerstones of corporate 
governance. The Code recommends that directors and auditors should be held liable for 
damages in proportion to their contribution to the failure of companies emanating from acts 
of commission and omission by directors or officers. King Code (2002, p. 126). As such 
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auditors may influence companies to comply with best practice corporate governance so as to 
avoid corporate failure and liability for such. 
In terms of compliance with good governance principles, Big 4 audit firms may 
influence their clients to comply more with these principles to protect their reputation capital 
because in the event of corporate failure it is common practice to examine CG practices of the 
auditee.  
The following hypothesis is therefore developed to test this aspect.    
 
H9: Ceteris paribus, the extent of compliance with the King Code is greater 
for companies audited by local audit firms (no Big 4 audit firms). 
 
4.1.3.6 Listing Status (LISTSTATUS) 
Whether a company is listed domestically only or listed both in the domestic market 
and overseas, will have a significant impact on the extent of compliance with corporate 
governance principles. Listing in foreign stock exchanges other than the local stock exchange 
affords firms to have access to deeper foreign capital pools. As such, companies are able to 
attract potential shareholders to invest in their shares. However, in order to attract investors in 
the overseas market, the local firm must possess some attributes which make it an attractive 
or a worthwhile investment. For instance, the local firm must have effective corporate 
governance structures to reduce foreign investors’ risk and increase their confidence to invest 
in it (Mangena and Tauringana, 2007). In addition, the local firm must ensure that there is 
protection of  rights of minority shareholders, to avoid expropriation by controlling 
shareholders (La Porta et al., 2000).  
As per reputation theory, a firm’s constituencies perceive it as more attractive than 
other firms if it has a favourable organisational reputation (Carmeli and Tishler, 2005, p. 16). 
Reputation also plays a crucial role in helping a firm gain and maintain support from its 
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environment e.g. investors and customers. Therefore firms listing in foreign stock exchanges 
may comply with corporate governance principles both locally and internationally to enhance 
their reputation. Compliance with corporate governance principles may signal a reputation of 
being well governed which may ultimately attract stakeholder support.  In a way, reputational 
concerns would influence firms to comply with good governance principles (Burgstaller, 
2007). 
Secondly, foreign stock exchanges in more developed markets may have stringent 
listing requirements. A local firm which seeks listing in a foreign stock exchange may have to 
meet stringent requirements at the new stock exchange. The firm may face stricter corporate 
governance guidelines, which may alter the behaviour of its parent/subsidiary company. As a 
result, a local firm with foreign listings may comply more with the local corporate 
governance code because of ties to the stringent foreign stock exchange and pressure from its 
new publics. Ultimately, this may affect the local stock exchange to upgrade corporate 
governance standards. 
In recent years, JSE Securities Exchange has experienced a number of companies 
moving their primary listing to foreign stock markets such as the London Stock Exchange 
and the New York Stock Exchange. The reasons behind multiple listing are the desire to have 
access to deeper foreign capital pools, to obtain cheaper funding and to associate with 
markets with stronger corporate governance reputations (Deutsche Bank, 2002). As these 
companies are forced to comply with stricter corporate governance guidelines, their 
behaviour may impact other South African companies. Ultimately, this corporate migration 
may force the JSE Securities Exchange to face competition from exchanges with higher 
corporate governance standards, which puts pressure on the JSE to improve its own standards 
or risk losing more companies (Deutsche Bank, 2002, p. 7). 
Prior literature has found that as a firm’s operations become more geographically 
dispersed, local managers’ cultures are more likely to be influenced by a variety of factors 
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(e.g. non-local managers, foreign governments and regulations, greater shareholder base, 
foreign lenders etc) (Hope et al., 2008). “As such, the influence of any particular country’s 
national culture is likely to be lower with international expansion (Hope et al., 2008, p. 358). 
Therefore it is expected that the national culture of South Africa (Ubuntu) is likely to be 
lower in JSE listed firms with multiple listings because of the influences outlined above. As 
such JSE listed firms with multiple listings may comply less with the King Code which 
recognises the national culture of South Africa (Ubuntu) because of external influence.  
In contrast local firms (firms with single listing at JSE) would comply more with the 
King Code because the managers of these firms are not exposed to international influence and 
therefore identify more with the local culture (Ubuntu). Further, the local managers may 
influence firm compliance with the King Code because the Code recognises their culture 
therefore compliance would be a way to promote and show a sense of pride in their culture.  
If local firms were started by entrepreneurs from the Ubuntu culture, it is expected 
that these corporations would adopt and promote the Ubuntu culture even more. It is argued 
here that JSE listed firms with multiple listings would be more interested in compliance with 
governance codes from stock exchanges where they have their primary listing. As such these 
corporations may comply less with the King Code because it is not as important to them as 
the local firms whose listing is only in the JSE Securities Exchange. Also, corporations with 
multiple listing status may be more engrossed with their reputation internationally as opposed 
to locally. These corporations would be more interested in pleasing their international 
audience. Compliance with the King Code which recognises the culture of Ubuntu may not 
be very important because recommendations from this Code may not necessarily be 
important to the international audience of the company with multiple listing status. It is 
therefore expected that companies which are listed in the JSE Securities Exchange only will 




H10: Ceteris paribus, the extent of compliance with the King Code is greater 
for companies with single listing in the JSE Securities Exchange only. 
 
4.1.3.7 Industry Type (ITYPE) 
Significant differences exist in the operations and reporting practices of firms in the 
manufacturing and services industry (different reporting requirements). Firms are exposed to 
different publics because of the nature of their operations. For instance, firms in extractive 
and chemical industries may be subjected to pressure from environmental pressure groups 
because waste products from their production processes pollute the environment. Similarly, 
firms in the mining industry may choose to comply with environmental laws because of the 
effect of mining activities on the environment. For example, as per the Mine Health and 
Safety Act (No. 29 of 1996) employers are required to provide and maintain a safe and 
healthy risk-free environment. Failure to do so may result in directors and in particular the 
CEO incurring personal liability (King Code, 2002). As such compliance with best practice 
corporate governance may be high in industries which are subjected to scrutiny or highly 
regulated.  
Similarly, labour intensive industries may choose to comply with regulations which 
relate to employees. Roberts (1992), as quoted in Ghazali (2007, p. 256), defines high-profile 
industries as those with consumer visibility, a high level of political risk or concentrated 
intense competition. As such, firms in high profile industries may be compelled by the nature 
of their industry to embark on legitimation strategies to stay relevant within their industry. 
For instance, as a legitimation strategy, firms may emulate or improve upon institutional 
practices of other leading organisations in their sector to enhance external stakeholder 
perception (Deegan and Unerman, 2006). This may be in the form of compliance with 
regulations governing practices within their industry or compliance with other practices 
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which may enhance stakeholder perception such as good governance practices. Compliance 
with regulations may also be used as a strategy to avoid further regulation from government. 
Prior literature suggests that CG standards vary across industries. For instance, 
opinion-based surveys conducted by CLSA (2000) and Deutsche Bank (2002) in emerging 
markets, including SA, indicate that CG standards vary across different industries. 
In SA, companies may be pressured to comply more with labour related issues 
because of actions of labour movements such as the Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU). COSATU is an umbrella organisation of more than a dozen unions across 
industries, and is affiliated with the African National Congress (ANC) (ruling party) and the 
South African Communist Party (SACP), its ally. COSATU has the power to lobby for 
regulation of an industry because of its political connections. To reduce the likelihood of 
adverse political actions (from trade unions and politicians), JSE listed corporations may 
employ devices such as social responsibility campaigns in the media, government lobbying 
(Watts and Zimmermann, 1978) or alternatively comply with the King Code 
recommendations e.g. diversity, equal opportunity employment and Black Economic 
Empowerment. As such, compliance with labour related issues in SA may be high because of 
the political connections of labour movements. Industry type is therefore an important aspect 
to examine. In order to test industry type and compliance with the King Code, the following 
hypothesis is developed. 
 
H11, 12 & 13: Ceteris paribus, the extent of compliance with the King Code is 
associated with type of industry. 
 
4.1.3.8 Performance Variables (Profitability - ROA) 
Firms which are financially healthy can more easily meet their obligations to owner-
stakeholders and are less likely to be subject to significant pressure from other financial 
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stakeholders, such as creditors (Brammer and Pavelin, 2006a). It may also be argued that 
financially healthy firms are in a better position to implement good CG practices such as the 
ones recommended by the King Code. This may be done to signal that the firm is profitable 
because of good CG practices. In a way, this may be done to obtain personal advantages for 
management such as enhancement of reputational capital. Inchausti (1997) argued from 
agency theory that management of a very profitable firm will use information in order to 
obtain personal advantages. In a disclosure study, Singhvi and Desain (1971) have indeed 
found that managers disclose detailed information as a means of justifying their position. As 
such, it may be postulated that management may choose to comply with good CG principles 
as a way of demonstrating that good governance practices result in enhanced profitability. 
This will bolster the managers’ reputation and enhance the value of their human capital in a 
competitive labour market. 
However, non-profitable firms may also comply more with CG principles so as to 
avoid association of the firm’s non-profitability with lack of compliance with these 
principles. In this case, managers of non-profitable firms may employ this strategy to protect 
their reputation and help explain that non-profitability is caused by other factors unrelated to 
firm CG practices. It is common practice that the first port-of-call is CG in a poorly 
performing firm. Managers of poorly performing firms may thus comply with governance 
principles to exonerate themselves from the blame for poor results or corporate scandals. 
In this case, compliance with the King Code is more important to poorly performing 
firms compared to profitable firms because managers of poorly performing firms have a lot to 
lose (or have already lost it) compared to managers of profitable firms. Hence non-profitable 
JSE firms are expected to comply more with the King Code than profitable firms. 
Profitability is measured in terms of return on assets (ROA). To test this aspect the following 




H8: Ceteris paribus, the extent of compliance with the King Code is greater 
for firms with lower profitability. 
 
4.2 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has attempted to develop hypotheses to be tested following on from the 
literature review (chapter 3) from and the SA business environment (chapter 3). The chapter 
attempts to do so by discussing the relevant theories that attempt to link internal CG 
structures and compliance in section 4.1. The variables are divided into personal 
characteristics, corporate governance and company characteristics. For instance, it is 
hypothesised using culture theory that a board of directors dominated by blacks may 
influence a listed firm to comply more with recommendations from the King Code in line 
with the culture of the dominant ethnic group. First, this may be the case because the King 
Code takes into account the culture of this ethnic group; secondly, the King Code makes 
recommendations which are stakeholder oriented which in essence are in accordance with the 
Ubuntu culture of blacks e.g. placing the interests of the group before individual interests. 
Other variables such as firm size are hypothesised in the same way using various theories 










In Chapter four, discussion and development of the research hypotheses for this study 
were presented. In this chapter, the research methods undertaken to test the hypotheses are 
explained. In addition, this chapter also explains the research methods used to investigate the 
views of key stakeholders on corporate governance in SA.  The chapter starts by discussing 
two research paradigms- the positivist and interpretivist approaches, and then positioning the 
study into an appropriate approach. This will be followed by sampling method, variables and 
measures used, data collection, and data analysis.  
This study is a two-year cross-sectional single country study, conducted in SA, a 
developing country in the South African Development Community (SADC). The purpose of 
the study is to investigate whether ethnicity (proxy for culture), company characteristics, CG 
variables, market related variables, and performance related variables (independent variables) 
influence the extent of corporate compliance (dependent variable) with the King Code of CG 
in SA. This will be conducted by testing hypotheses outlined in the theoretical framework 
and development of hypotheses. In addition, the study also seeks to gain an insight into the 
views of key stakeholders (e.g. regulators, King Code Commissioners, companies and 
institutional investors) regarding the state of CG in SA. Figure 5.1 presents the main topics 















5.1 Type of Study 
Research into corporate governance issues has employed both positivist and non-
positivist approaches e.g. (Brammer and Pavelin, 2006b; Brown and Caylor, 2006; 
Dahya et al., 1996; Dedman, 2000; Girma et al., 2007; Goncharov et al., 2006; Haniffa 
and Cooke, 2005; Mangena and Tauringana, 2007; Ntim, 2009; v. Werder et al., 2005; 
von Nandelstadh and Rosenberg, 2003; Weir and Laing, 2000; Yermack, 2006). 
Positivist approach core argument is that the social world exists externally to the 
researcher, and that its properties can be measured directly through observation, inquiry 
should be based upon scientific observation (as opposed to philosophical speculation), 
and therefore on empirical enquiry (Gray, 2004). Positivist approach limits the researcher 
to what can be seen, it also implies that the results of the research will tend to be 
presented as objective facts and established truths (Crotty, 1998 as quoted in Gray, 






















simply by multiple observations since only one instance that refutes the theory would 
demonstrate it as false.  
Non positivist approaches are interpretive and critical research. Interpretive 
research approach does not predefine dependent and independent variables, but focuses 
on the full complexity of human sense making as the situation emerges. “From an 
interpretive perspective human actions are the result of external influences. These actions 
have both intentions and reflections, and take place within a structure of rules which 
binds participants.” Under interpretive research, the researcher goes beyond 
measurement to developing an understanding of the situation (Smith, 2003, p. 4). This 
may be achieved through active participation as opposed to detached observation. 
Positivist approaches tend to use quantitative data analysis tools (economic 
modelling) e.g. (Dahya et al., 1996; Mangena and Tauringana, 2007) whilst non-
positivist  studies use qualitative data e.g. (Turley and Zaman, 2007). Quantitative 
methods allow for a broader study, involving a greater number of subjects, and 
enhancing the generalisation of the results. However quantitative analysis suffer 
limitations such as omitted variable bias confounding effects, co-linearity problems and 
problems of interpretation e.g. whether association between variables imply causation.  
Quantitative methods also collect data which may limit results to numerical 
descriptions rather than detailed narrative and elaborate accounts of human perception. 
The upside on quantitative methods is that they measure data as presented e.g. in 
disclosure studies e.g. (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005) information extracted from annual 
reports or any form of publication is measured as is, unlike data collected from 
interviews which may reflect what ought to be instead of what is practiced. For example, 
respondents may provide answers which portray a good picture of themselves or their 
firm (i.e. in an interview on compliance) as opposed to what is practised by the firm (De 
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Cleyn, 2008; Wymeersch, 2006). A similar study on compliance involving quantitative 
methods may extract accurate information disclosed in the annual report.  
Non-positivist qualitative research maintains that the methods of natural science 
are inadequate to the study of social reality because the physical and social artefacts that 
people create, are fundamentally different from the physical reality examined by natural 
science (Lee, 1991). “Unlike atoms, molecules, and electrons, people create and attach 
their own meanings to the world around them and to the behaviour that they manifest 'in 
that world” (Lee, 1991, p. 347, citing Schultz 1973, p. 59). As such mixed methods 
approach is often advocated for because of  “its ability to be ‘holistic’ or to ‘give a 
rounded understanding of process and outcome’ and its ability to be inclusive of multiple 
approaches to a problem so there is more certainty in the results” (Giddings, 2006, p. 
198, citing Bazeley, 1999: 284).  
In the light of this discussion current research will adopt a positivist approach and 
an interpretivist or qualitative approach. “Quantitative analyses are best used when the 
aim is to test theoretical predictions with precise measures of variables” (Thanerou et al., 
2007, p. 17).  Therefore quantitative techniques will be used to investigate factors which 
affect compliance with the King Report and whether culture affects compliance with 
recommendations from the report. Further, qualitative approaches will be used to gain a 
thorough understanding of corporate governance in South Africa. Qualitative research 
explores the richness, depth, and complexity of phenomena and also produces findings 
not arrived at by means of statistical procedures or other means of quantification" 






5.2 Population and Sample Selection 
As noted in chapter 2, the JSE Securities Exchange lists companies on two separate 
boards, the Main Board Market and the alternative board (ALTx). However, given the 
differences in financial reporting and CG requirements between main board and AltX, the 
sample for this research is drawn from the main board.  
As of June 2008, there were 334 companies officially listed in the Main Board of the 
JSE Ltd (JSE, 2008). A list of all firms in the JSE Limited Main Board was downloaded from 
the JSE official website, which is available at http://www.jse.co.za.   
There are a total of twelve major industries including, agriculture, automotive, 
construction, consumer products, information technology, financial and insurance, hotels, 
manufacturing, media, mining, property and service industries. Table 5.1 presents a summary 
of the sample selection procedure. Panel A of Table 5.1 shows the sample population by 
industrial classification using the FTSE/JSE Global Classification System (FTSE, 2002) as of 
30
th
 June 2008. Panel A indicates that the JSE market is dominated by financials, resources 
(mining), general industries and consumer goods. The four industries account for almost 65% 
of the total population of JSE firms listed in both 2001 and 2008.  
For the sample used in this study, all financial and insurance companies are 
eliminated from this analysis because they are subject to other regulatory frameworks which 
do not apply to other quoted companies (Ntim, 2009; Weir and Laing, 2000). For instance, 
banks in SA are governed by the Banks Act (No. 94 of 1990) and are also regulated by the 
South African Reserve bank (SARB). As such compliance and disclosure requirements for 
finance and insurance companies are not similar to those of companies in other industries in 
SA. For instance, risk management committees are mandatory in banks and not for other 
companies. Leaving out financial firms may help facilitate comparison with prior studies (cf. 
Laing and Weir, 1999; Ntim, 2009; Weir and Laing, 2000; Werder et al., 2005) who also 
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exclude such firms.  Panel B of Table 5.1 shows the final sample size of 136 firms by 
industrial classification of companies. 
 
Table 5.1 Summary of Sample Selection Procedure 
Panel A: Industrial Composition of All JSE 
Listed Firms as at 30
th
 June 2008  




Financials  86 25.8 
Resources   50 15.1 
Basic Industries  12 3.6 
General Industries  34 10.1 
Cyclical Consumer Goods  46 13.7 
Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods  23 6.8 
Cyclical Services  14 4.1 
Non-Cyclical Services  11 3.3 
Utilities  4 1.1 
Information Technology  27 8.2 
Real Estate and Property  27 8.2 
  334 100.0 
Less: Financials 86   
          Firms not listed in both 2001 or 2008 105   
          Firms with missing data 7   
  (198)  
  136  
    
Panel B: Industrial Composition of JSE 
Firms available for Sampling   
 No. in each 
Industry 
Percentage of 
Population (%)  
Resources   19 14.0 
Basic Industries  10 7.4 
General Industries  13 9.6 
Cyclical Consumer Goods  21 15.4 
Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods  10 7.4 
Cyclical Services  10 7.4 
Non-Cyclical Services  8 5.9 
Utilities  3 2.2 
Information Technology  20 14.7 
Real Estate and Property  22 16.2 
  136 100.0 
    
Panel C: Total Number of Firms in the 
Sample  




Basic Industries, IT & Utilities  33 24.3 
Resources & General Industries  32 23.5 
Cyclical Services, Real Estate and Property  40 29.4 
Consumer Goods  31 22.8 




In order to qualify for inclusion in the final sample, firms had to meet the following 
criteria: (1) the firm should have been listed in 2001 and 2008 e.g. it should have been quoted 
in the Main Board of the JSE prior to 2001; and (2) the annual reports for 2001 and 2008 
should be available from the McGregor BFA Database or alternatively from the archives of 
the company on its website or other sources. This criteria enabled selection of firms which 
fall within the pre-review (2001) and post-review (2008) of the King Code. Apart from 
falling within the pre-review period, 2001 was selected taking into account the availability of 
records for the year 2001. The year 2008 was selected because it represents the most recent 
reporting year. As such, analysis of compliance with the King Code for this year will provide 
the most recent and up-to-date reflection of corporate compliance with the King Code in SA. 
The total population of 136 (Appendix 1: List of Sample Firms 2001/2008) available 
for sampling, was arrived at after deducting firms which did not meet the abovementioned 
criteria. Instead of selecting a sample from the 136 firms, all the firms were included in the 
sample considering that the deductions resulted in a smaller population, and that the analysis 
will be conducted for two years. 
The total number of industries was further reduced (Panel C of Table 5.1) by 
combining basic industries, information technology and utilities; resources and general 
industries; cyclical services real estate and property; and cyclical and non-cyclical consumer 
goods. In combining industries, care was taken to ensure that industries with similar 
characteristics were grouped together. For instance, resources and general industries have 
common characteristics with heavy equipment industries (i.e. mining, oil and gas – resources 
industries; and engineering and machinery, diversified industrials aerospace and defence – 
general industries; non-cyclical and cyclical consumer goods – consumer goods etc).  As will 
be discussed in Chapter 6, an analysis of the characteristics of the resultant sample reveals 




5.2.1 Sources of Data 
In order to investigate corporate compliance with the King Code by JSE listed firms, 
information on compliance disclosures and firm characteristics was extracted from the annual 
reports of these firms. First 86 financial firms were eliminated from the population leaving a 
total of 248 firms. Secondly, 105 firms listed after 2001 were identified and also eliminated 
from the population leaving a total population of 143 firms. Third, annual reports were 
collected for the remaining firms. Finally seven firms were eliminated from the population 
because their annual reports were not available (missing data) resulting in a total population 
of 136 firms as per Panel A of Table 5.1. The annual reports were obtained from company 
websites and from the McGregor BFA database in 2008 and 2009. An electronic request was 
sent to the marketing department of McGregor BFA to provide annual reports of JSE listed 
firms for the years 2001 and 2008. In particular most of the annual reports which were not 
available from company websites were those for the year 2001. These were mailed to the 
researcher in a digital video disk (DVD) for a payment of ZAR 4,500.00 (About £405.00).  
 
5.3 Variables and Measures Used 
This section discusses the independent and dependent variables considered in this 
study. It starts by describing the independent variables and how they were operationalised in 
this study. The section also discusses the construction, evaluation and testing of the 
compliance checklist and the compliance indices.   
 
5.3.1 Independent Variables  
The independent variables examined in this study consist of one personal 
characteristic, eight company specific characteristics and two corporate governance variables. 
These variables were drawn from prior studies  (e.g. Dedman, 2000; Laing and Weir, 1999; 
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Mangena and Chamisa, 2008; Ntim, 2009; Weir and Laing, 2000). The ethnicity variable was 
drawn from (e.g. Haniffa and Cooke, 2002, 2005; Wahab et al., 2007).   
 
5.3.1.1 Company Specific Characteristics 
The company characteristics used in this study are firm size, ownership structure, 
listing status, debt, auditor type, listing status, industry type and profitability. The following 
discussion focuses on measurement of these variables. 
 
a. Company Size 
A number of measures have been considered for inclusion in this study as proxies for 
firm size, such as market capitalisation, sales, and total assets. The strengths and limitations 
pertaining to these measures were considered. For instance, market capitalisation has a 
limitation of being subjected to market price fluctuations (Haniffa, 1998). Sales on the other 
hand may be affected by both internal and external factors and thus would not truly reflect the 
size of the company. Total assets based on historical costs may be a good proxy for size as it 
is least affected by a change in the environment in comparison to the other variables. This 
study uses total assets as proxy for firm size.  
 
b. Industry Type 
In this study, JSE Securities Exchange listed corporations were first classified into 11 
distinct groups. This list was narrowed down to 4 after combining common industry sectors. 
The financial and insurance companies were also excluded. Overall this leaves four industry 
groups to be tested under the industry membership hypothesis. Therefore industry dummy 
variables including basic industries, IT and utilities (ITYPE1); resources and general 
(ITYPE2); cyclical services, real estate and property (ITYPE3) and consumer goods (cyclical 
and non cyclical) (ITYPE4) are included as controls for these four major industries.  
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c. Listing Status 
In this study listing status will be tested by dividing companies into two categories: 
domestic only – referring to companies listed in the JSE Securities Exchange only and 
domestic and other foreign listings – referring to companies that are listed both on the JSE 
Securities Exchange and with at least one other foreign listing. 
 
d. Gearing  
Debt or gearing could be calculated in several ways e.g. debt ratio or debt/equity ratio. 
Debt ratio refers to the ratio of total debts to total assets, while debt/equity ratio refers to long 
term debt to total equity. Both ratios reflect the extent of financing through debt.  Debt to 
equity ratio would be used as a proxy for gearing because such information is readily 
available in annual reports. 
 
e. Ownership Structure 
This study examines three aspects of firms’ ownership structure, namely ownership 
concentration, directors’ ownership and institutional ownership. 
i. Director share ownership refers to the proportion of shares held by all executive 
directors of the board scaled by total number of shares. 
ii. Institutional ownership refers to the percentage of shareholding held by institutional 
investors.  Information on company share ownership was obtained from the annual 
reports of listed companies. Section 140A of the South African Companies Act (No. 
61 of 1973) mandates companies to disclose the identity of beneficial owners of 
shares held by nominees. As such, sample firms disclosed shareholdings of the main 
shareholders. 
These aspects have been examined in prior literature on compliance and other firm 




f. Performance Related Variables (Profitability) 
Profitability could be determined in several ways, through internal measures of 
performance i.e. return on equity (ROE), gross margin and return on assets (ROA). However, 
for the purpose of this study profitability represents financial valuation of the firm by 
insiders. As such ROA and ROE were considered as proxies for profitability. ROA is defined 
in this study as operating profit at the end of a financial year divided by the book value of 
total assets at the end of a financial year (Beiner et al., 2006, p. 260; Fich and Shivdasani, 
2006, p. 703; Yermack, 1996, p. 192). It measures how efficiently and effectively a firm 
manages its operations and uses its assets to generate profits.  
 
g. Type of Auditors 
Audit firm size will be measured by a dummy variable that takes a value of “1” if a firm 
is audited by any of the Big 4 auditing firms (i.e., Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG, 
and PricewaterhouseCoopers), “0” otherwise  (Henry, 2010; Ntim, 2009). 
 
5.3.1.2 Ethnicity Variables 
a. Proportion of Whites/Blacks in a Board of Directors 
The proportion of “black” or “white” directors was calculated by counting the number 
of black or white directors on the board and dividing by the total board size. In order to 
determine the ethnicity of a board member, the names and pictures of directors in the annual 
reports were employed for this task. Listed firms in SA generally publish photos
28
 of board 
members and management. More than 95% of sample firms provided names and photos of 
management and board of directors. As such, this made the task of having to decide whether 
                                                          
28
 Black and white South Africans (European descendents) have distinct physical features apart from skin colour 
such as hair, Caucasian nose versus flat African nose etc. These features were used to determine whether a 
board member is black or white. 
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a director was black or white much easier. In instances where the photographs of directors 
was not provided, the company web-page was used as back up to search for names and 
photos of board members. The features of both blacks and whites were used to tell them apart 
e.g. skin colour (black/white), hair, facial features. 
 
b. Race of Directors29 
Similarly, information on the race of the chairman and CEO/MD was also determined 
from their names and their pictures in the annual reports.  
 
5.0.1.1 Corporate Governance Variables 
 
a. Board Composition & Board Size 
Information on board compositions i.e. executive vs. non-executive directors was 
obtained from the annual reports together with information on the size of boards. The number 
of members on the board was counted to determine the board size. 
 
b. Proportion of Non Executive/Executive Directors (NEDs) to Board Size 
This information was obtained from the annual reports of listed companies. 
 
5.3.2 Dependent Variables 
This sub-section discusses construction and measurement of dependent variables. It 
also proffers a definition of compliance in the context of this study. It starts by attempting to 
define compliance. Compliance with the code was measured using the disclosure index 
                                                          
29
 Owing to the low number of black directors (as will be discussed in chapter 6) as Board Chair and CEO/MDs, 
the two variables were not included in the statistical model.  
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methodology approach (see Cooke, 1989; Ntim, 2009; Henry, 2010). A number of indexes 
were developed as follows: total compliance index (TCI), voluntary compliance index (VCI), 
mandatory compliance index (MCI), Boards and Directors (THEME1), Risk Management 
(THEME2), Accounting and Auditing (THEME3) and Integrated Sustainability Reporting 
(THEME4). To develop the indexes, a compliance checklist was constructed as follows. 
 
5.3.2.1 Construction of Compliance Checklist 
Given that the objective of the study is to examine compliance with King Code, a 
comprehensive list of all the items recommended by the code was developed. These resulted 
in 53 items. The list was divided into voluntary and mandatory items, by identifying all Code 
recommendations that have been made a listing requirement of the JSE Securities Exchange. 
This process resulted in 42 voluntary items and 11 mandatory items.  
Before developing the checklist some methodological issues had to be taken into 
consideration. It was important to address two important methodological issues with regard to 
using researcher-constructed composite indices (Marston and Shrives, 1991, pp.197-199). It 
was therefore important to address the reliability and validity of the constructed indices. The 
reliability of a measure indicates the extent to which it is without bias (error free) and hence 
ensures consistent measurement across time and across the various items in the instrument 
(Sekaran, 2003, p. 203; Thanerou et al., 2007, p. 150). A constructed compliance-index is 
reliable if it can be easily replicated by the same researcher over time (stability), as well as by 
another researcher (reproducibility), when coding the same content with higher levels of 
accuracy (Beattie et al., 2004, p. 214; Beattie and Thompson, 2007, p. 139). 
 
The process of developing the checklist follows the following steps: 
 
i. First all the two documents were read in their entirerity.  
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ii. A two-column spreadsheet was designed where recommendations and 
requirements from the two documents were noted. Common compliance items 
from the two documents were reconciled and then a final list of all the 
voluntary and mandatory compliance items was drawn up.  
iii. Compliance items were further broken down into four key compliance issues 
(Boards and Directors, Risk Management, Accounting and Auditing and 
Integrated Sustainability Reporting) in terms of the key recommendations 
under the King Code. In total the compliance checklist comprises 53 items 
broken down as follows: 48/53 (2001 /2008) items under TCI; 44 items under 
VCI; 9 items under MCI; 26/31 (2001/2008) items under THEME1; 9 items 
under THEME2; 3 items under THEME3 and 10 items under THEME4. 
Keywords pertaining to various compliance provisions were generated from 
the provisions. These words would be used to search for narrative statements 
relating to compliance provisions from company annual reports (see column 4 
of Appendix 2) 
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iv. Appendix 2: South African King Code Checklist 2001/2008). The provisions 
were also given short identity codes e.g. a board charter setting out the 
responsibilities of the board (CSRB1). 
v. The compliance checklist was then sent to supervisors for them to check its  
appropriateness for the purpose of measuring compliance with the King Code 
e.g. to check as to whether the compliance items in the checklist adequately 
measure compliance (content validity) (Saunders et al., 2003, p. 101; 
Thanerou et al., 2007, p. 156). The test for content validity in this case is 
focussed on the extent to which the content of a measure is representative of a 
wider body of material that it is trying to assess (i.e. compliance with the King 
Code in this case). In addition to investigating content validity, criterion 
validity (i.e. how well the coding instrument performs against others) as well 
as the generalisability of the results from the instrument (external and 
construct validity) were investigated. Apart from supervisors and other 
researchers, constructive criticism and suggestions were also provided by 
leading academics and experienced researchers at numerous Doctoral 
Colloquia. This greatly helped in significantly improving criteria and content 
validity of the measuring instrument. 
 
vi. The checklist was then piloted on 10 annual reports of companies selected at 
random from the sample. The pilot test is used to check whether there are any 
compliance issues which may not be covered by the two documents but 
commonly complied with by listed companies. The scoring of 10 annual 
reports was done by three people so as to check as to whether they will arrive 
at similar scores (test-retest reliability). If the checklist is reliable then it 
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should provide the same score on repeated administrators (Saunders et al., 
2003, p. 101; Thanerou et al., 2007, p. 153).  
 
vii. The final compliance checklist consisting of 53 items was then drawn up after 
incorporating all the necessary changes following the reliability and validity 
tests.  
 
5.3.2.1.1 Consideration Concerning Coding and Weighting 
There are two methodological issues researchers have to take into consideration when 
scoring corporate governance compliance disclosures in annual reports i.e. scoring and 
weighting.  
First, in the case of coding, two approaches may be adopted, first, a binary coding 
scheme, which measures the absence or presence (dichotomous procedure) of an item (“0” 
absent or “1” present). Second, a complex ordinal coding scheme which attempts to capture 
the degree of detail and specificity of the disclosed information by using a graduated scale 
(“not limited to but frequently three levels – 0, 1 and 2”) (Beattie et al., 2004, p. 210). As per 
ordinal coding if no information is disclosed on an item, a sample firm receives “0” points, if 
only qualitative information is disclosed, the firm gets “1” point, while if the disclosed 
information is quantified, the firm receives the maximum value of “2”. Binary coding has 
been critiqued for failure to allow the quality of specific corporate governance disclosures to 
be measured (Beattie et al., 2004, p.210) and to reflect the relative impacts of different 
corporate governance provisions (Gompers et al., 2003, p. 114). This research will adopt 
binary coding to score annual reports. Unlike ordinal coding, binary coding requires no, or 
very limited, researcher judgement about the degree of specificity of internal corporate 
governance provisions disclosure levels (Gompers et al., 2003, p. 144). As such, this makes it 
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relatively objective, simple and easy to replicate. Binary coding also has the advantage of 
minimising researcher bias, which enhances transparency and reliability of the constructed 
index (Milne and Adler, 1999, p. 242).  
Ordinal coding, on the other hand, is appropriate when measuring voluntary 
disclosures in which reasonable differences in the degree of disclosures can be expected (e.g., 
Botosan, 1997; Hassan and Marston, 2008). An examination of the items from the 
compliance checklist reveals that scoring provisions/recommendations from the Code involve 
straightforward present or absent compliance disclosures. However, some items under 
THEME4 (Integrated Sustainability Reporting) may involve some level of judgement.  
Other items under Themes 1 to 4 are easy to score because they involve checking the 
presence or absence of compliance with a provision.  For example, the board charter is either 
present (Item No. 1) (“1”) or not (“0”), a narrative statement of how the company has applied 
the principles set out in the  King Code (Item No. 5) is either present (“1”) or not (“0”), a firm 
has split the positions of chairperson and CEO (Item No. 7) (“1”) or not (“0”), etc. Therefore 
this leaves no avenues to qualitatively discriminate among disclosure levels, such as 
meaningfully differentiating between firms that provide a quantification of the information 
disclosed or not, which renders the use of ordinal coding inappropriate.  
The second methodological issue with regard to scoring corporate governance 
compliance disclosures in annual reports is whether to construct a weighted or an unweighted 
index (Barako et al., 2006b, p. 8; Hassan and Marston, 2008, p. 23). Both approaches have 
strengths and limitations. For instance, the use of a weighted index has been criticised in that 
it may introduce a bias towards a particular user orientation (Barako et al., 2006, p. 115). 
Unweighted index, on the other hand, has been critiqued on its fundamental assumption that 
all items are equally important (Barako et al., 2006, p. 115). This study will adopt an equally 
weighted index because the use of an unweighted index avoids the necessity of making 
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subjective value judgements as to the relative importance or efficacy of each corporate 
governance provision (Owusu-Ansah, 2005, p. 609). Secondly, a good advantage of 
unweighted index is that it does not involve arbitrarily or subjectively assigning weights. This 
eliminates a situation whereby the constructed index is unnecessarily dominated by or biased 
towards a particular set of corporate governance provisions with strong weights (if weighted 
index is used). Findings from prior literature also indicate that the use of weighted and un-
weighted indices tends to give the same results, especially where the number of corporate 
governance provisions is relatively large (e.g., Robbins and Austin, 1986; Chow and Wong-
Boren, 1987; Beattie et al., 2004; and Barako et al., 2006; 2007, amongst others). 
 
5.3.2.1.2 Scoring of Company Annual Reports 
Process of Scoring: First, each sample firm was assigned a permanent code number 
(e.g. 1 to 136) used to identify its annual reports for both 2001 and 2008 and also used for 
data entry in the checklist (scoring) and SPSS. Secondly, codes were assigned to provisions 
from the checklist (permanent identification numbers); these were also used for data entry 
into SPSS and subsequent data analysis. Keywords relating to specific compliance items (as 
in iii above) generated during the design phase of the compliance checklist and refined during 
the pilot testing of ten annual reports were used to search for and identify narrative statements 
which relate to specific compliance provisions in the compliance checklist.  
The scoring process was conducted on an Excel spreadsheet. A total of 136 checklists 
for all sample firms were created in Excel for the purpose of scoring. These consisted of four 
columns, two for 2001 and two for 2008. The columns contained cells for voluntary and 
mandatory scores. Total scores for TCI, VCI, MCI, THEMEs 1 to 4 were generated 
automatically as each item was scored as “1” complied with or “0” otherwise (Appendix 3 
Appendix 3: Results of  Completed Checklist for Company 1) at the bottom of the checklist. 
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Compliance indices were calculated by dividing the total score for each company in each year 
by the total possible score under each theme. The indices were also automatically generated 
as scores for each company were entered. 
The searching process was conducted using two computers. One computer was used 
for entering scores in the checklist/spreadsheet for each company whilst the other computer 
was used to search annual reports (in PDF Format) using keywords for statements of 
compliance with respective King Code provisions from the checklist. Page numbers where 
narrative statements of compliance provisions were found were entered in a separate column 
of each compliance checklist (see Column 7 & 8 of Appendix 3). This is important for the 
purpose of replication of the scoring process. In the event, a narrative statement relating to a 
particular compliance provision was not found through the PDF search technique; a 
meticulous task of reading through the entire annual report, searching for narrative statements 
and keywords relating to specific provisions of listed firms was undertaken so as to avoid 
wrongly penalising a company for not complying. 
Appendix 3: Completed Checklist shows a typical checklist for one of the 136 sample 
firms. Appendix 1, on the other hand, shows the four themes together with explicit definitions 
of the coding instruments and how the variables are measured. The compliance checklist is 
more comprehensive compared to composite indices used by prior literature (Ntim, 2009). 
The distribution of compliance provisions across the compliance checklist reveals that 
THEME1 makes up 54.2% to 58.5% (2001/2008) of the total items from the SA King Code, 





5.3.2.1.3 Computation of Total Scores 
After each annual report of sample firms had been scored, the un-weighted 
compliance scores were added
30
 for each company to derive the total actual score for each 
company. Since items were separated into total compliance, voluntary, mandatory 
compliance, and the themes, seven compliance scores were generated for each company. A 
compliance disclosure index was developed for each company by dividing the actual scores 
obtained by the total maximum score possible for the company in question under the seven 
categories. In order to construct the necessary indices to answer the main research hypothesis 
in this study, compliance scores were calculated using the following formulae: 
 
The compliance score (VCS) for a company is calculated as follows: 
 
                    
 
   
 
 
Where Compliance score can be voluntary, mandatory, etc, di = 1 (if a compliance 
item is complied with in the annual report) 0 (if the compliance item is not complied 
with) 
m    48/53 (2001/2008) 
 
5.3.3 Operationalisation of Independent and Dependent Variables 
Table 5.3 summarises the independent variables to be tested and how they will be 
operationalised in this study together with the sources. 
 
 
                                                          
30
 The compliance checklist was constructed on a spreadsheet. This enabled the researcher to construct formulas 
which automatically add the TCS, VCS, MCS and Theme 1 to 4 scores to separate cells as the scoring of each 
annual report is done. Further, the spreadsheet also enabled the researcher to construct formulae for calculation 
of compliance indices as binary scores from annual reports were entered. 
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Table 5.3 Summary of the Operationalisation of Independent Variables 
Independent variables Operationalisation 
Board Characteristics 
Culture 
Proportion of white board 
members 
 
Ethnicity of Board Chairman 
 
Ethnicity of CEO/MD 
 
Other Characteristics 
Proportion of non-executive 
directors 
 
Proportion white board members measured as the number of white 
board members scaled by total board members. 
 
Dichotomous (1 if “black”  & 0 if “white”)  
 
Dichotomous (1 if “black”  & 0 if “white”) 
 
 
Percentage  of NEDs on board of directors 
Company Characteristics: 
Firm Size Total assets 
Ownership Structure 










Percentage of total shares owned by institutional investors to total 
issued shares. 
Debt Debt equity ratio 
Type of Auditor Big 4 vs. Non-Big 4 (0 Big 4 and 1 Non-Big 4) 
Corporate Governance Variables: 
Board Size Total number of directors 
Market Related Variables: 






Dichotomous 1 if ITYPEi and 0 otherwise 
Basic Industries, IT & Utilities  
Resources and General Industries 
Cyclical Services, Real Estate & Property 
Consumer Goods 
Performance Related Variables: 
Profitability Return on assets 
Dependent Variables 
TCI TCI  = Total Compliance Index 
VCI VCI = Voluntary Compliance Index 
MCI MCI = Mandatory Compliance Index 
THEME1 THEME1 = Boards and Directors Issues 
THEME2 THEME2 = Risk Management 
THEME3 THEME3 = Accounting and Auditing 







5.3.3.1 Regression Models 
The full specification of the regression models is shown in Table 5.4. 




Yi =  f (β1 PROPWHITES + β2 PROPDNEDS  + β3 SBD + β4  STA + β5 DEBT + 
β6 INSTSHARE + β7 DRCTSHARE + β8 ROA + β9 AUDTYPE + β10  




Yi = alternative compliance indices (TCI, VCI, MCI, THEME 1, 
THEME 2, THEME 3 and THEME 4) 
 
TCI  = Total Compliance Index 
VCI = Voluntary Compliance Index 
MCI = Mandatory Compliance Index 
THEME1 = Boards and Directors Issues 
THEME2 = Risk Management 
THEME3 = Accounting and Auditing 




 PROPWHITES = proportion of whites on board of directors 
 PROPDNEDS = proportion of non-executive directors 
 STA = company size 
 SBD = board size 
 ROA = profitability 
 DEBT = debt/total equity ratio 
 INSTSHARE = institutional investors’ share ownership 




 BBCHAIR = black/white board chairman 
 BCE/MD = black/white Chief Executive Officer 
 LISTSTATUS = listing status 
 AUDTYPE = auditor type 
 INDTYPE = industry type 
 









5.4 Data Analysis 
Having calculated all the compliance indices, the next stage is to carry out data 
analysis. The statistical tools used in the analysis are discussed below. 
 
5.4.1 Descriptive Analysis 
The descriptive statistics involved analysing the mean, standard deviation, maximum 
and minimum, and the percentiles for each variable. Also preliminary tests were conducted to 
determine the nature of the data to be analysed. In particular, tests of normality based on 
skewness and kurtosis for both the dependent and independent variables were conducted. The 
skewness indicates the symmetry of the distribution while kurtosis provides information 
about the ‘peakedness’ of the distribution (Pallant, 2005, p. 51). A distribution with a 
skewness and kurtosis of 0 indicates perfect normality, a rather uncommon occurrence in 
social sciences research (Pallant, 2005). The rule of thumb for normality tests based on 
skewness and kurtosis is ± 1.96 and ±3.00 (Cooke, 1989) respectively.  
Many powerful statistical methods require approximate normality about the data, i.e. 
the data is a sample from a normal distribution. Normality tests are tests of a null hypothesis 
that the data are drawn from a normal population, specifically a goodness-of-fit test. It is 
important to do normality tests because this helps the researcher to determine if the data are 
well approximated by the normal distribution; but also to provide information on the 
deviation from normality. This information would then guide the researcher to the best 
approach to dealing with the non-normality of their data.  
Other tests of normality conducted include Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test (a non-
parametric version of the normality test). A K-S Lilliefors of significant value of more than 
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.05 indicates normality, whilst a lower value indicates that normality is questionable (Pallant, 
2005, p. 57). 
 
5.4.2 Hypothesis Testing 
Hypothesis testing is the second statistical analysis which has been undertaken to 
answer the research question. Both univariate and multivariate analysis tests were conducted. 
Parametric and non-parametric tests were employed to analyse the data. Parametric tests 
make stringent assumptions about the nature of the population from which the observations 
were drawn (Siegel, 1957, p. 13). These assumptions are: the observations must be 
independent, the observations must be drawn from normally distributed populations and also 
the variables must be measured on at least an interval scale to enable interpretation of results 
(Siegel, 1957). Non-parametric tests or “distribution free” statistical tests do not make 
numerous or stringent assumptions about the population, are simpler in application but are 
generally considered to be less powerful than parametric tests (Siegel, 1957, p. 13).  
Parametric and non-parametric tests are conducted because they both have different powers. 
The power of a test is the probability that the test will reject a null hypothesis when in fact it 
is false and should be rejected (Siegel, 1957, p. 13). As such a combination of these tests will 
be used so as to reduce the probability of incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis (Cooke, 
1989). 
 
a) Parametric Analysis 
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient (r) was computed to measure the 
association between the dependent variables (TCI, VCI, MCI, Theme 1, Theme 2 , Theme 3 
and Theme 4) and independent variables (ethnicity, company characteristics, market and 
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performance related variables). A Pearson correlation coefficient close to 1.00 indicates a 
very strong association between the dependent and independent variables. 
 
b) Non-Parametric Analysis 
Non-parametric tests tend to be less powerful because they may not detect differences 
or relationships even when they actually exist (Pallant, 2005, p. 82). Spearman’s non-
parametric correlation coefficients (rho) were conducted to test correlation amongst 
continuous variables. 
 
5.4.2.1 Multivariate Analysis 
Multiple regression analysis techniques were conducted to analyse if compliance with 
the King Code was associated with ethnicity, company characteristics, market and 
performance related variables. In total, there were seven separate regression procedures per 
year, which implies that there were 14 regression procedures. However, in 2008 as will be 
discussed in Chapter 7, there were 6 regression procedures because the results for Theme 3 
(Accounting and Auditing) were constant and thus rejected by the model. In order to conduct 
regression tests, assumptions required for undertaking regression procedures have to be met. 
The following section discusses the various assumptions and tests which were conducted. 
 
5.4.2.2 Regression Assumptions  
Several assumptions have to be satisfied before conducting any regression analysis. 
These include no significant multicollinearity between the explanatory variables; the variance 
of the distribution of the dependent variable must be the same for all values of the 
independent variable (homoscedasticity); the relationship between the dependent and 
independent variable must be linear (linearity); the distribution of the values of the dependent 
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variable for each value of the independent variable must be normal (normality) and there 
should be no errors related to measurement and specification. Tests of each of these 
assumptions and possible ways to overcome them are discussed below.  
 
i. Multicollinearity 
Several multicollinearity tests were conducted in this study. The first involved 
examining the correlation matrix to determine whether the explanatory variables are 
significantly correlated. The rule of thumb for checking problems of multicollinearity is when 
the correlation is >0.7 (Tabachnick and Fidell, 1996); Gujarati, 1995). Besides the correlation 
matrix, another test for the potential effect of multicollinearity on regression can be evaluated 
by computing the variance inflation factor (VIF), where a VIF exceeding 10 indicates a 
potential problem of collinearity (Pallant, 2005). The tolerance value based on collinearity 
diagnostic using SPSS for Windows may also indicate problems of multicollinearity, where 




An inspection of the scatterplot of studentised residuals against predicted values was 
inspected to determine as to whether the assumption of homoscedasticity had been violated or 
not. If the residuals appear to be randomly scattered around a horizontal line through 0, then 
the equal variance assumption is satisfied (Norusis, 1995, p. 454). If results indicate 
otherwise, this may be corrected by transforming the data. The importance of fulfilling this 
assumption is because heteroscedasticity (unequal variance) may result in loss of efficiency 





As for linearity, it was checked by plotting the studentised residuals against the 
predicted values. If a crescent or funnel pattern is observed, then the linearity assumption is 
violated and one way of overcoming this problem is by transforming the data (Norusis, 1995, 
p. 456).  
 
iv. Normality 
As described in section 5.4.1, normality tests based on skewness, kurtosis and KK-
Lilliefors may help indicate whether the sample comes from a normal population. Besides 
these tests, visual inspection of the normal Q-Q plot of standardised residual as well as the 
detrended Q-Q plot of residuals may also indicate whether the normality assumption is 
satisfied. The normality assumption is said to be met if the points in the Q-Q plot fall more or 
less on a straight line, and in the case of detrended Q-Q plot, the points fall randomly in a 
band around zero (see Norusis, 1995, p. 452).  
 
5.4.2.3 Data Transformation 
Data transformation is one approach which may be adopted to solve problems related 
to the violation of assumptions of homoscedasticity, linearity and normality. Transformation 
according to Pallant (2005, p. 82) means mathematically modifying the scores using various 
formulas until the distribution looks more normal. There are several options available for 
transforming the data which include among others, trimming, logging, ranking and 
normalising. In this study, transformation (viz. Ranking normalising both the dependent and 
independent continuous variables using Van Waerden was undertaken when the normality, 
homoscedasticity and linearity assumptions were found to be violated. Some of the 
advantages associated with transformed data include meaningful regression coefficients 
pg. 187 
 
derived from using normal scores (Cooke, 1998). Also transformed data may be used in any 
subsequent tests requiring normality of data which means the significance levels can be 
determined, the F- and t-tests may now be more meaningful and the powers of the F- and t-
tests may be used (Cooke, 1998). 
 
5.5 Perceptions of Key Stakeholders 
This section discusses the processes undertaken to answer the third question of this 
research. In addition to investigating compliance through quantitative techniques, this 
research seeks to gain an insight into the views and or opinions of key stakeholders in SA on 
the King Code, corporate compliance. This methodological approach has not been used by 
prior literature on corporate compliance around the world (e.g. in SA see Deutsche Bank, 
2002; Ntim, 2009; KPMG 2003; 2004; 2006) and other parts of the world e.g. in the UK (cf. 
Dedman, 2000; Laing and Weir, 1999; Weir and Laing, 2000). As such, this research makes a 
contribution to CG literature by not only investigating compliance through quantitative 
techniques, but also by getting opinions of key stakeholders on CG in SA through semi-
structured interviews. 
Interviews are usually conducted for the purpose of asking questions to ascertain 
people’s thoughts about, and feelings towards, issues, events, behaviours and so on 
(Thanerou et al., 2007, p. 102).  Interviews are well suited when the researcher wants to see 
the topic from the perspective of the interviewee and understand why and how she or he 
comes to have this particular perspective (King 1994) as quoted in Thanerou et al. (2007). To 
this end, the third research question deals with views of key stakeholders on corporate 
governance in general in the country, and specifically on compliance with the King Report 
and its impact on neighbouring countries. An understanding of this aspect will help shed light 
on whether the King Code is good and relevant for corporate governance purposes in SA. It 
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may help bring up concerns (if any) from the stakeholders on the suitability of the King Code 
as a corporate governance guideline in the country. In order to explore this aspect, an 
interview guide was developed based on earlier findings e.g. from the archives and results of 
quantitative analysis.  
 
5.5.1 Identification Key stakeholders 
Key stakeholders were divided into two categories: external stakeholders such as 
regulators, King Code Commissioners, non-governmental organisations and internal 
stakeholders from companies such as CEOs, NEDs and compliance managers. 
 
a. King Code Commissioners 
King Code Commissioners have a significant input into the formulation of guidelines 
in the King Code (King Report, 2002). They therefore form an important stakeholder group 
on CG matters in SA because of their involvement in the development of the King Report. It 
is therefore important to get their perspective on whether the King Code has served the 
purpose for which it was intended e.g. ‘promoting the highest standards of CG in SA,’ 
whether it is suitable for SA and their perspectives on CG in general in SA.  
The list of King Code Commissioners was obtained from the King Code II. In total 
there are 21 King Code commissioners (King Code, 2002, p. 156-162). Five commissioners 
were chosen randomly for the purpose of interviews.  
 
a. Non-Governmental Organisations 
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), on the other hand, refers to legally 
constituted, non-governmental organisation, created by natural or legal persons with no 
participation or representation of any government (Walters, 1993). NGOs are normally 
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funded from non-governmental sources so as to maintain their non-governmental status. They 
tend to exclude government representatives. In many jurisdictions these types of organisation 
are defined as “civil society organisations” or referred to by other names (Walters, 1993).  
Corporate governance is important to NGOs or civic society organisations because 
corporations play a crucial role towards the social up-lift of the society like NGOs. Contact 
details of various NGOs were obtained from their umbrella organisation, the South African 
National NGO Coalition, (SANGOCO). Ten NGOs were selected randomly for the purpose 
of interview. Responses were not received from all of the NGOs, even after three repeated 
reminders. 
 
b. Internal Stakeholders (CEOs, NEDs & Other Company Officials) 
Perspectives of companies on the King Code, compliance with the Code and CG in 
SA was also sought from company executives such as CEOs, NEDs, and other high-ranking 
officials such as compliance managers who are involved with CG and compliance matters. It 
is important to get the perspectives of key officials in companies because this may help 
explain why companies choose to comply/not comply with aspects of the King Code. 
A subjective process of choosing respondents (purposive sampling) was adopted to 
obtain a sample that appears to be representative of the population of important key 
stakeholders. Because of the problems of accessibility, letters of requests for interviews were 
sent to 30 listed companies. The names and contacts of potential respondents were obtained 
from the web-pages of their respective organisations. Randomly selected companies were 
balanced between small and large firms. Responses were received from four organisations 




5.5.2 Letter of Request 
A politely worded but persuasive draft letter of request (Appendix 4: Letter of 
Request) covering an introduction about the researcher and the research, stating explicitly 
that permission was sought to conduct an interview with the respondents during the months 
of November and December 2009 was sent to prospective interviewees. The letter also stated 
why the respondent was the appropriate person for the interview, the issues to be covered and 
anticipated time the interview may take e.g. 20 to 30 minutes in this case. The letter also 
briefly addressed ethical issues with regard to confidentiality of respondents, their 
organisations and the information which may be gathered during the process of the interview 
i.e. that no source, individual or organisational, will be identified or comment attributed 
without the express permission of the originator.  
The letter of request was sent to respondents on school letterhead to validate that it 
comes from the sender. Further, contact details of the researcher and supervisors were 
included in the letter for respondents to verify claims in the letter if need be. All this was 
done for credibility purposes and to give assurance to prospective interviewees that it was 
safe and beneficial to be part of this research process. 
 
5.5.2.1 Negotiating Access 
The first level of access is physical access or entry (Gummesson, 2000). Gaining 
access can be difficult because organisations or individuals may not be prepared to engage in 
additional, or voluntary activities because of the time and resources required. Secondly, many 
organisations receive frequent requests for access and cooperation and would find it 
impossible to agree to all or even some of these. The request for access and cooperation may 
also fail to interest the person who receives it because of lack of perceived value in the 
research, the nature of the topic because of its potential sensitivity or concern about 
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confidentiality of the information that would be required and perceptions about the 
researcher’s credibility and competence. Physical access in an organisation will formally be 
granted through its management. 
As such, it is important to adopt some strategies to negotiate and gain access. First, 
sufficient time was availed for the process of negotiating access. Letters of request were sent 
by electronic mail to respondents at the beginning of September 2009 for interviews to be 
conducted in November 2009. Electronic mail was used because it is direct, instant and also 
offers ease of reply by respondents. 
Access may be gained by using existing contacts (Buchanan et al., 1988; Easterby-
Smith et al., 2002; Johnson, 1975).  This approach was used to gain access to the Chief 
Executive Officer of one of the organisations, whom the researcher had met in the past 
through an international network. His knowledge of the researcher made it easy for him to 
trust the researcher’s stated intentions and the assurances given about the use of any data 
provided. As discussed in section 5.5.2, the letter of request together with subsequent 
reminders to prospective interviewees provided a clear account of the requirements of the 
researcher by specifically providing information about the researcher, the research and giving 
them guarantees with regard to issues of confidentiality and also providing information of the 
time frames. It was very important to demonstrate clarity of thought and purpose in the 
introductory letter to try and increase the possibility of gaining access (Saunders et al., 2003, 
p. 122). It was also important to ensure that organisational concerns were addressed with 
regard to granting access more especially on resources such as the time the request involved. 
Care was also taken to ensure that the specific single request was concisely stated to increase 
chances of getting access (Saunders et al., 2003, p. 122).  
With regard to the issue of sensitivity, the topic of CG was considered to be sensitive, 
especially in the case of companies when asked about compliance practices and on issues of 
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ethnicity and compliance in SA. The experience with regard to interviews conducted 
indicates that interviewees only found questions on ethnicity and compliance a sensitive area 
though they all provided [their honest] responses to the questions. Overall, all the other 
questions on issues of compliance were not of a sensitive nature. Another important aspect 
which had to be thoroughly addressed was the issue of confidentiality of the data that was 
provided and anonymity of the organisation or the individual participants (Saunders et al., 
2003, p. 123). Interviewees were given assurances that they would not be identified or their 
comments attributed to them without their express permission. Out of the ten interviews 
conducted, only one interviewee raised the issue of confidentiality and anonymity at the 
beginning of the interview by specifically stating that he will be prepared to continue with the 
interview only if it was guaranteed that his comments would not be attributed to him or his 
organisation. With regard to this case, the researcher reiterated the guarantee in the letter of 
request to facilitate the interview. Other issues which the researcher had to take into account 
included highlighting the possible benefits of the research to the organisations and above all 
using suitable language in both written and verbal communications. 
 
5.5.2.2 Interview Types 
Categories of interview types have been considered for this exercise such as 
structured interviews, unstructured interviews and semi-structured interviews. Group 
interviews were not considered because the unit of analysis for the purpose of this study is 
not a group (Saunders et al., 2003, p. 103). 
Structured interviews are composed of completely pre-set standardised questions, 
normally close ended (fixed alternative) (Seidman, 2006) as quoted in Thanerou et al. (2007, 
p. 103). In structured interviews, questions are read out aloud to the interviewee and the 
interviewer records the responses (Thanerou et al., 2007). Structured interviews have been 
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described as being essentially questionnaires that are administered verbally with immutable 
response options (Lee, 1999) cited from Thanerou et al (2007, p. 103). This type of interview 
does not fulfil the objective of gaining an insight in CG in SA because it is rigid.  
Unstructured interviews, on the other hand, are open-ended (free answer) and the 
interview is conducted in a manner that is similar to a friendly conversation (Seidman, 2006) 
cited in Thanerou et al. (2007, p. 103), with no predetermined order of questions or specified 
wording to the questions (Thanerou et al., 2007). Normally the interview starts with broad 
questions which lead to more specific questions. According to Thanerou et al. (2007), 
unstructured interviews are useful where neither the nature nor the range of participants’ 
likely opinions about the research topic are not known and cannot be easily quantified. The 
proposed research seeks to get interviewees’ perceptions on some themes developed from the 
King Code. As such, specific questions relating to those themes will be put to respondents to 
fulfil this objective. In this regard, an open ended freewheeling interview type may not be 
suitable to answer question three of this research. 
The third type of interview is the semi-structured interview. Semi-structured 
interviews have an overall topic, general themes, targeted issues, and specific questions (Lee, 
2006) cited in Thanerou et al. (2007). They are more flexible than structured interviews, but 
have more focus than unstructured interviews (Thanerou et al., 2007). According to Miller 
and Crabtree (1992) cited in Thanerou et al. (2007), semi-structured interviews are guided, 
concentrated, focused, and open-ended communication events that are co-created by the 
interviewer and interviewee and occur out of the stream of everyday life. 
Semi-structured interviews are considered to be suitable to fulfil the objectives of the 
third research question because they are flexible and focussed and would therefore allow the 




5.5.2.3 Interview Guide 
Different interview guides were developed for the various stakeholder groups (see, 
Appendix 5: Interview Guide). This was important because various stakeholder groups have 
different interests on CG matters. For instance, the interview guide for companies was 
different from that of NGOs, regulators and King Code Commissioners because different 
stakeholders affect and are affected by CG in different ways. The interview guides for the 
various stakeholders were developed based on results of the analysis from the first two 
questions. These results give a guide on the type of questions which may be developed to 
further probe on matters pertaining to the King Code, compliance and CG in general. For 
instance, if corporations were found to comply more with social responsibility in 2008, it was 
worth investigating as to why they deemed it necessary to do so. If they do not comply with 
some aspects of the King Code questions may be developed in the interview guide to explore 
why this is the case. Similarly, the interview guide for NGOs may be based mostly on social 
responsibility issues recommended by the King Code.  
 
5.5.2.4 Data Collection 
A minimum of three participants from each of the stakeholder groups identified was 
interviewed. Telephone interviewing and face-to-face interview have been considered to 
collect necessary data to answer the research question on stakeholder perspectives. 
 
a) Telephone and Face-to-Face Interviews 
Telephone interviews were chosen as the appropriate data collection method because 
they may lead to advantages associated with access, speed and lower cost. This method may 
enable the researcher to make contact with participants with whom it is impractical to 
conduct an interview face-to-face because of the distance and prohibitive costs involved and 
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time required (Saunders et al., 2003, p. 269). SA is a vast country as such key stakeholders 
may be spread across the country e.g. in Pretoria, Durban or Cape Town and other 
surrounding cities. To this end, there are prohibitive travel and accommodation costs between 
the various cities. This therefore made telephone interviews the most appropriate data 
collection method. 
However, seeking to conduct qualitative interviews by telephone may lead to issues of 
(reduced) reliability, where participants are less willing to engage in an exploratory 
discussion, or even a refusal to take part (Saunders et al., 2003). Other issues which may need 
to be addressed include ability to manage the pace of the interview and record any data 
forthcoming. However, a recording instrument which is capable of picking up sounds from a 
speakerphone was obtained for this purpose. Interviews were recorded after seeking consent 
from the concerned interviewees during the process of negotiating access. 
Other problems with conducting an interview by telephone and recording the data are 
that normal visual cues that allow the participant to control the flow of the data that they 
share with the interviewer are absent (Saunders et al., 2003). The opportunity to witness the 
non-verbal behaviour of participants like in a one-to-one interview would be lost which may 
adversely affect the researcher’s interpretation of how far to pursue a particular line of 
questioning  (Saunders et al., 2003). Further, participants may be less willing to provide the 
researcher with as much time to talk to them in comparison with a face-to-face interview. 
Also, difficulties may be encountered in developing more complex questions in comparison 
with a face-to-face interview (Saunders et al., 2003). However, given the time and financial 
constraints, telephone interviewing was considered appropriate. 
In this research, three interviews were conducted face-to-face and seven interviews 
were conducted by telephone. Apart from being costly to attend face-to-face interview 
appointments, it was problematic for the researcher to locate offices of respondents resulting 
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in failure to arrive on time at one of the interviews. Face-to-face interviews also required 
considerable amount of travelling sometimes at great risk in an unfamiliar territory. Overall 
face-to-face interview also gave the researcher an opportunity to see the body language of 
respondents when asked questions. 
With regard to telephone interviews, apart from the disadvantages already alluded to, 
there were problems of connectivity. In one of the interviews, the connection line was cut on 
three occasions which greatly disrupted the interview process. Further, there were minor 
disruptions coming from external noise. 
 
5.5.2.5 Interview Data Analysis 
A method of content analysis called template analysis was considered suitable for 
analysis of interview data. 
King (2004, p. 4) describes template analysis thus:  
“The essence of template analysis is that the researcher produces a list of codes 
(template) representing themes identified in their textual data. Some of these will 
usually be defined a priori, but they will be modified and added to as the researcher 
reads and interprets the text.”  
 
Under this approach, text is analysed through the use of an analysis guide or template, 
consisting of a number of themes or categories relevant to the research question (Thanerou et 
al., 2007, p. 255). The template is open ended and undergoes revision after encountering the 
text and the generation of the themes, patterns, and interrelationships is usually an 
interpretive, rather than statistical process (Thanerou et al., 2007, p. 255). According to 
Thanerou et al. (2007), template approaches differ in the extent to which the codebook is 
built upon existing knowledge (a priori) or is developed from the initial analysis of the data (a 
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posteriori). A priori allows for the testing of a theory, whereas a posteriori allows for a more 
inductive analysis. The template approach allows codes and categories to be shown 
hierarchically to aid the analytical process (Sanders and Mason, 1998, p. 396).  The process 
of analysing interview transcripts leads to revision of codes being used, even changes to their 
place or level in the template hierarchy. Template analysis also involves unitising data as 
discussed below. According to King (2004), a template may be modified if a new code is 
inserted as a result of a relevant issue being identified through data collection for which there 
is no existing code and when a previously inserted code is no longer needed and is deleted. A 
template may also be modified by changing the level of a code and when a code initially 
originally included as a subcategory of one higher-code should be reclassified as a sub-
category of another code (Sanders and Mason, 1998).  
Template analysis was chosen because of its advantages of being a highly flexible 
approach that can be modified for the needs of any study in a particular area and does not 
have too many prescriptions and procedures (King, 2004). The principles behind template 
analysis are also easy to grasp more especially for people who are not familiar with 
qualitative methods. Template analysis also forces the researcher to take a well structured 
approach to handling the data, which can be a great help in producing a clear, organised, final 
account of the study (King , 2004, p. 133). The disadvantage with template analysis is that 
there is a lack of substantial literature on this kind of technique compared with other 
approaches such as grounded theory or discourse analysis. This may result in a less 
experienced researcher not being sure of analytical decisions he/she has to make, resulting in 
either templates too simple to allow any depth on interpretation or too complex to be 




5.5.2.5.1 Application of Template Analysis 
In this research the process of analysing qualitative data from interviews started by 
disaggregating the mass of qualitative data collected into meaningful and related parts or 
categories. This allows rearrangement and analysis of data in a symmetrical and rigorous way 
(Saunders et al., 2003). This gives the researcher better comprehension and management of 
data, integration of related data from different transcripts and notes and identification of key 
themes or patterns from them for further exploration. The process also helps the researcher to 
develop hypotheses based on the patterns or relationships in the data and to draw and verify 
conclusions (e.g. Dey, 1993; Miles and Haberman, 1994). 
The first involved classifying the data into meaningful categories or codes (Appendix 
6 Appendix 6: Template for Analysing of Interviews).  The codes or labels were used to 
rearrange the data. For instance, three main data labels or codes and other sub-labels were 
used to label the data e.g. the King Code, Compliance and CG standards. The codes were 
based on the purpose of the research as expressed by the research question and came from 
terms used in the data. For instance, the research question in this case is to get the views of 
key stakeholders on the King Code, on corporate compliance with the King Code and on the 
impact of the King Code on CG standards in the SADC region. These labels helped to 
provide an emergent structure that is relevant to the issue under investigation and to further 
analyse the data.  
After coding the data, the next step was to unitise the data by attaching relevant ‘bits’ 
or ‘chunks’ of data to the appropriate devised categories (Saunders et al., 2003, p. 381). In 
this case, the units of data consisted mostly of paragraphs that fitted different categories. Data 
unitisation was done manually in Word by labelling data units and then cutting them and 
pasting them to the relevant code such that the Word document ended up with related units of 
data. This process has the effect of reducing and rearranging the data into a more manageable 
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and comprehensive form (Saunders et al., 2003, p. 382) (see Appendix 6:  Template for 
Analysing Interviews). 
 
5.5.3 Challenges Regarding Interviews 
There were various challenges encountered by the researcher with regard to 
interviews. As discussed in section 5.6.2.2, a total of ten interviews were conducted between 
November 2009 and March 2010. The interviews were conducted with ten respondents – 
three King Code Commissioners, two compliance managers, one secretary general of an 
NGO, one CEO/MD and three company secretaries. The original plan was to interview at 
least 15 to 20 people representing different key stakeholder groups. Each stakeholder group 
was going to be represented by at least three respondents. This objective was achieved with 
regard to King Code commissioners and company secretaries because the target number of 
respondents was reached in the two cases. However, the target number of respondents was 
not reached among non-executive directors, company CEO/MDs, NGOs and politicians.  
The King Code Commissioners stakeholder group proved to be the easiest to gain 
access to because all the Commissioners interviewed responded positively to the letter of 
request sent to them electronically. Non-executive directors, on the other hand, preferred to 
have their company secretaries take the responsibility of being interviewed as demonstrated 
from the internal electronic mail communications between them and their company 
secretaries, copied to the researcher. The groups which proved to be difficult to gain access to 
were the NGOs, politicians and government/regulators. The researcher faced the following 
challenges with regard to these groups. 
First, prospective respondents did not respond to the letter of request despite 
numerous attempts to send them reminders. This was common amongst politicians and 
NGOs. As for politicians, none responded to electronic mail requests or several messages left 
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with their personal assistants. In the case of NGOs, attempts to make telephonic follow up 
calls were unsuccessful since officials always claimed not to be the relevant people or in 
some cases not competent to address the issue of corporate governance. In one interesting 
case the relevant official promised to participate in the research during a telephone 
conversation with the researcher. Appropriate time and dates were set for the interview and 
when the researcher called the respondents to conduct the interview, he asked the researcher 
to call him in 30 minutes because he was still busy. After thirty minutes when he was called 
again he said he was at the bank and would be available in an hour’s time. The researcher 
tried to persuade him to find suitable time convenient to him for the interview and he insisted 
that the interview should be conducted in an hour’s time and after an hour his phone was not 
answered. Attempts were made to pursue him in subsequent days but to no avail. A similar 
situation of postponement of interview appointments was experienced with the one NGO 
secretary who finally took part in the interview.  
In another case (of politicians), contact was made with the personal assistant who 
promised that she would discuss the researcher’s request with the politician concerned and 
get back to the researcher the following week. No response was received as promised and 
when attempts were made to follow the matter up, more promises were made that the 
researcher would be contacted in the near future but this was not honoured.  
These cases demonstrate the difficulty with regard to accessibility which contributed 
to the limitation of not being able to interview the required number of participants. As an 
observation, all the politicians and people from NGOs who were contacted either by 
electronic mail or followed up via telephone were from the black ethnic group. The 
researcher sensed an element of reluctance on the part of this group to participate in the 
interview process. Prospective respondents seemed to have suspicions about the motives of 
the proposed interview and whether there was a hidden agenda with regard to the interview.  
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5.5.4 Ethical Issues  
Ethical issues normally emerge as the researcher plans the research, seeks access to 
organisations and to individuals, collects, analyses and reports data (Saunders et al., 2003). 
Ethics is defined as the appropriateness of the researcher’s behaviour in relation to the rights 
of those who become the subject of his/her work (Saunders et al., 2003, p. 129). According to 
Saunders et al., (2003), ethical issues have to be considered throughout the period of the 
research and that researchers have to remain sensitive to the impact of their work on those 
approached for help, those who provide access and cooperation, and those affected by results. 
In this research the researcher is guided by the Bradford University Ethics Policy for 
Research Involving the Use of Human Participants, Data and Tissue of 2010 (latest update) 
(UB, 2010). This policy document provides a statement of principles and procedures for the 
conduct of research in cases where human participants are involved. This document was 
followed to ensure that there were no transgressions of the behavioural norms established by 
Bradford University. 
Some of the ethical issues which were addressed include respecting the privacy of 
participants, by making them aware of their right not to participate in the research at any time 
of the interview process, allowing them to determine when they will participate in the data 
collection process. It is interesting to note that all the participants in this research always 
offered the researcher multiple time slots during which they might be contacted to conduct 
interviews. The researcher also promised to abide by the extent of the scope of the research at 
all times. However, when researchers brought an issue which was beyond the scope of the 
research but related to the issue being discussed permission was sought from participants to 
probe further on that issue. This happened in five of the interviews. In addition, participants 
were also made aware of their right not to answer any question or set of questions. Strict 
adherence to the time limits were ensured by the researcher, however participants were 
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always prepared and willing to carry on with the interview despite a couple of reminders that 
the researcher does not wish to take much of their time. The respondents seemed to enjoy 
talking about issues of CG in SA such that they did not observe the 20 to 30 time limit set by 
the researcher.  
Another important aspect which was observed during the interview process was the 
maintenance of objectivity during the data collection phase. Objectivity in research refers to 
making sure that data is correctly and fully without subjectivity in what is recorded by the 
researcher (Saunders et al., 2003, p. 135). In this research, interviews were tape recorded 
using a data digital recorder after seeking the express permission of interviewees at the 
beginning of the interview, and later transcribed into Word documents verbatim. As such the 
issue of subjectivity did not arise during the interview process or during the process of 
transcribing. As already pointed out, confidentiality and anonymity was observed at all times 
including during the reporting stage of the research results. During the process of transcribing 
and analysis of data, respondents and their organisations were given code names to protect 
their identity. This was done in line with the guarantees given to respondents when access 
was sought.  
Objectivity was vital during the analysis stage to make sure that data collected was 
not misrepresented. This entailed not being selective about which data to report, or 
misrepresenting facts (Zikmund, 2000; Saunders et al., 2003). Also, failure to represent the 
data honestly will extend to the reporting stage of the research which may ultimately result in 






5.6 Chapter Summary 
The main aim of this chapter is to present the research methodology employed to test 
the hypotheses developed in chapter four and to gain insight on the views of key stakeholders 
in this study is explained. The chapter sought to describe the data, sources of data, how the 
sample was selected and the methodology used in the study. This study employs quantitative 
analysis and qualitative analysis to answer research questions.  
Secondly, chapter also makes an attempt to explain the rationale for the choice of 
data, sources of data, how the sample was arrived at, research methodology. The chapter also 
attempts to explain the procedures which will be undertaken to answer the research questions 
on compliance and factors which influence compliance. 
The third objective of the chapter was to discuss the process which will be undertaken 
to answer the research question of perspectives of key stakeholders. This aspect of this 
research is different from the approaches of prior literature which focus only on quantitative 
analyses based on data from company annual reports. In this way, a discussion of who the 
key stakeholders are is presented, why they have been chosen, negotiation access and the type 
of interviews which were conducted. The chapter also discusses data collection through 
interviews, data analysis, ethical issues which had to be observed before, during and after the 
interviews. Finally, the experiences and limitations with regard to interviewing key 
stakeholders are presented. 
In the next chapter, the main objective is to present the analysis of results of 




6 Chapter Six: Descriptive Analysis & Findings on Extent of 
Compliance with the Code 
 
6.0 Introduction 
Chapter Five discusses the research methods employed to answer the research 
questions in this study. The objectives of this chapter are; first, to present a descriptive 
analysis of the sample and secondly to answer the first question on the extent to which 
JSE listed companies comply with the Code. Secondly, to discuss compliance to selected 
King Code recommendations from the compliance checklist. Figure 6.1 presents an 
overview of the rest of the chapter. 
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6.1 Profile of JSE Listed Firms for 2001 and 2008 
Table 6.1 presents descriptive statistics of the sample for 2001 and 2008.  
Table 6.1 Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables  
Panel A: 2001 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Minimum Maximum Percentiles 
     25 50 75 
PROPWHITES 0.91 0.13 0.18 1.00 0.88 0.93 1.00 
PROPDNEDS 0.48 0.23 0.00 0.92 0.33 0.50 0.64 
SBD 9.54 4.38 3.00 30.00 6.00 9.00 12.00 
STA 11,608.82 33,252.76 70.00 228,891.00 187.00 752.50 5,018.25 
LTDtoTE 0.55 1.22 0.00 8.95 0.04 0.23 0.53 
INSTSHARE 0.30 0.27 0.00 0.91 0.06 0.25 0.47 
DRCTSHARE 0.10 0.16 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.01 0.12 
ROA 0.06 0.06 -0.09 0.22 0.02 0.06 0.11 
Panel B: 2008        
PROPWHITES 0.75 0.20 0.00 1.00 0.63 0.78 0.91 
PROPDNEDS 0.63 0.17 0.00 1.00 0.56 0.64 0.75 
SBD 9.87 3.68 4.00 23.00 7.00 10.00 12.75 
STA 8,147.35 21,865.09 50.00 153,743.00 190.50 938.00 5,379.00 
LTDtoTE 0.68 1.53 0.00 15.30 0.13 0.29 0.67 
INSTSHARE 0.34 0.28 0.00 0.97 0.08 0.31 0.52 
DRCTSHARE 0.13 0.20 0.00 0.89 0.00 0.02 0.20 
ROA 0.10 0.08 -0.10 0.30 0.04 0.09 0.15 
 
The mean (median) PROPWHITES in 2001 is 0.91 (0.93) and 0.75 (0.78) in 2008. 
This indicates that the proportion of whites on boards of directors decreased by almost 28% 
(15%) between 2001 and 2008. The results also suggest that boards of sample JSE firms are 
dominated by whites in 2001 and 2008. The mean (median) proportion of Non-executive 
Directors (PROPDNEDs) in 2001 is 0.48 (0.50) and 0.63 (0.64) in 2008. These results 
suggest that in 2001 sample JSE listed firms did not comply with the recommendation to 
have majority non-executive directors on boards of directors as per the recommendations of 
the King Code. However, in 2008 boards of sample firms were dominated by non-executive 
directors as per the Code recommendations. From Table 6.1, it can be seen that the minimum 
PROPNEDs in 2001 and 2008 was 0 and the maximum was 1.00 in 2008. This indicates that 
in both years at least one firm did not appoint non-executive directors (NEDs) to the board 
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whilst in 2008 all the directors of at least one firm were NEDs. The results also indicate that 
boards of sample JSE listed firms were not dominated by NEDs in 2001. However, in 2008 
NEDs formed the majority of board members of sample JSE listed firms indicating that 
compliance with the King Code in this regard has increased by 16%. This suggests that South 
African boards are more independent following the recommendation by the King Code of the 
need to appoint NEDs to boards of directors. These results are consistent with findings from 
prior literature. For instance, Ntim (2009) finds a mean percentage of NEDs in South African 
corporate boards of 52% in 2002 and 60% in 2006 and an average mean of 57% for the five-
year period considered under this study. Similarly, Ho and Williams (2003) finds an average 
percentage of NEDs of 52%.  
The average board size (SBD) was found to be 9.54 in 2001, with a minimum of 3 
and a maximum of 30. In 2008, average SBD was 9.87, with a minimum of 4 and a maximum 
of 23. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) recommend that for greater board efficiency and 
effectiveness, the average board size must be between 8 and 10. As per the SA Companies 
Act 1973, a public company must have a minimum board size of 2, but does not specify the 
maximum board size. As such, these results are within the requirements of the Companies 
Act 1973. The results are also consistent with findings from other studies in SA e.g. Ntim 
(2009) finds an average board size of 9.69 with a minimum of 3 and a maximum of 31 
between 2002 and 2006, whereas a Deutsche Bank (2002) opinion survey finds a minimum 
board size of 5 and a maximum of 30 with an average of 12. Ho and Williams (2003) find an 
average board size of 13.02 for a sample of 84 South African firms in 1998 while Swartz and 
Firer (2005) report that the average South African board consists of 10.30 members, using a 
sample of 117 South African listed firms in 2003.  
Firm size proxied by firm’s total assets (STA) ranged from a minimum of R70.0 
million in 2001 to a maximum of R228bn in 2001, with an average of R11.6bn, while in 2008 
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the range was from R50.0 million to R153bn respectively, with an average of R8.1bn. In 
terms of industry classification and as discussed in chapter 5 section 5.2,  most of the listed 
companies are in the resources and general industrial sector (mining firms) (see figure 6.2). 
This is not surprising because historically SA’s corporate sector has traditionally been 
dominated by mining firms, the formation of which dates as far back as the late 19
th
 and early 
20
th
 century (Malherbe and Segal, 2001). In fact, the JSE was founded to enable raising of 
funds for the expansion of the fledging mining industry in Johannesburg (Mkhize and 
Msweli-Mbanga, 2006, p. 80).  
 
 




Mining in SA has been the main driving force behind the history and development of 
the country for decades since the discovery of gold and diamonds in SA in the 1800s. Mining 
has also contributed to the development of SA’s capital and money markets (Malherbe and 
























mineral revolution of the 1860s which attracted Europeans to the African continent (DTI, 
2008).  
The average long-term debt to total equity (LTDtoTE) was found to be 55% with a 
minimum of 0% and a maximum of 895% in 2001. In 2008, the average long-term debt to 
total equity was 68% with a minimum of 0% and a maximum of 1,530%. In 2001, 12 (5 in 
2008) firms had a level of gearing of 0. Of these 1 (1) was from the Basic Industries IT and 
Utilities, 3 (1) from the Consumer Goods Industry, 6 (3) from Cyclical Services, Real Estate 
and Property and 4 (0) from the Resources and General Industries.  Malherbe and Segal 
(2001, p. 25) report that the funding structure of South African firms generally reflects a 
culture of reliance on equity and retained earnings as opposed to debt. As such, it is not 
surprising to find many JSE listed firms without debt financing. 
The average shareholding by institutional investors (INSTSHARE) (proxied by 
ordinary shares held by financial banks investment banks, insurance firms, mutual 
funds/trusts and pension funds) was 30% in 2001 with a minimum of 0% and a maximum of 
91%. In 2008, the average institutional shareholding was 34% with a minimum of 0% and a 
maximum of 97%. Similarly, Ntim (2009) finds a minimum of 0.28% and a maximum of 
99% institutional shareholding with a comparatively high average institutional shareholding 
of 71%.  
The proportion of ordinary shares held by executive directors (DRCTSHARE) is also 
reported in Table 6.1. The mean director shareholding in 2001 was 10% with a minimum of 
0% and a maximum of 67%. In 2008, the minimum director shareholding was also 0% and 
the maximum was 89% with a mean director shareholding of 13%. Ntim (2009) reports 
director share ownership which ranges from 0% to 94% with an average of 20%, while 
Mangena and Chamisa (2008) report a mean of 20% and 23% for a sample of control and 
suspended JSE listed firms, respectively. Director shareholding by contrast is very high in SA 
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compared to the US and the UK. For instance, Yermack (1996) reports director shareholding 
of 9% for a sample of US listed firms while Weir et al. (2002) report an average of 3% of 
director shareholding for a sample of UK listed firms.  
Finally, Table 6.1 reports profitability proxied by return on assets (ROA). As seen 
from the results, ROA ranged from -9% to 22% in 2001 with a mean of 6% in 2001, while in 
2008 the range was from -10% to 30% with a mean of 10%. Ntim (2009) reports an average 
ROA of 11% for a sample of 500 JSE listed firms while Klapper and Love (2004) report an 
average of 9% for a cross-country sample of 374 firms including SA in 1999. Similarly, Ho 
and Williams report an average ROA value of 13% for a sample of 84 South African firms in 
1998. 
Sample firms were also analysed in terms of auditor type e.g. Big 4 and non-Big 4. 
The 2001 and 2008 distribution of audit firms across listed firms is presented in Figure 6.3. 
As shown in Figure 6.3, most used (75.0% in 2001 and 79.4% in 2008) services of Big 4 
audit firms.  
  































Figure 6.4 presents the top eight audit firms in SA by market share. In terms of the 
Big 4’s market share, the audit firm that holds the largest share in 2001 was Deloitte and 
Touché (23%), followed by PricewaterhouseCoopers (21%). In 2008, Deloitte & Touché had 
a market share of 24% of sample firms while PricewaterhouseCoopers’s market share was 
unchanged at 21%. As for non-Big 4 audit firms, Grant Thornton had a share of the market of 
5% and 6% in 2001 and 2008 respectively. This distribution shows that audit market share in 
SA is dominated by Big 4 audit firms. This has implications on corporate compliance with 
best practice corporate governance principles in the country.  
 
Figure 6.4 Top 8 Audit Firms in 2001 & 2008 
 
 
When looking at whether there was any relationship between type of auditor and 
company size (presented in Figure 6.5), it was found that out of 69 small firms in 2001, 61% 






































2008, 68% of small firms and 91% of large firms were audited by Big 4 audit firms. This 
indicates that Big 4 audit firms audited more small and large firms in 2001 and 2008.  
Between 2001 and 2008 the number of small firms audited by Big 4 audit firms increased by 
4% while the number of large firms audited by Big 4 audit firms went up by only 1%. 
Generally, the analysis indicates that there has been a shift towards the use of services of Big 
4 audit firms. This further indicates that Big 4 audit firms play a significant role in CG in SA. 
 
Figure 6.5 Company Size & Type of Auditors 
 
 
The decline in the number of Non Big 4 audit firms may be attributed to a series of 
stringent new listings requirements concerning financial directors and auditors of listed 
entities issued by the JSE Limited in September 2008 (Amoils, 2009). As per the new Listing 
Requirements, any audit firm that wishes to audit listed companies, must be registered by the 
JSE and entered onto the JSE Register of Auditors and their advisors. As such, these new 
requirements have cost implications on the audit firms and the auditee because registration by 
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such. Because of the stringent new Listing Requirements, many smaller audit firms may 
choose not to audit listed companies in future and those firms that decide to continue to audit 
listed companies will have to remain vigilant to ensure that they maintain the highest 
professional standards (Amoils, 2009). Therefore the decline in the number of sample firms 
which are audited by Non Big 4 firms may have been caused by failure of local Non Big 4 
audit firms [smaller] to meet the stringent new regulatory requirements.  
 
 
6.1.1 Board Domination, Board Chairman and CEO/MD by Ethnicity in Boards of Sample 
Firms 
Considering the history in SA of racial divisions according to skin colour 
(blacks/whites), it was interesting to examine the domination of board structures of sample 
firms in terms of ethnicity e.g. board domination (blacks/whites), white/black board chairman 
and white/black Chief Executive Officer/Managing Director (CEO/MD). Figure 6.6 shows 
the composition of boards of directors of sample firms in terms of dominant ethnicity 
(black/white) on the board of directors, whether the board Chairman is black/white and the 
ethnicity of the Chief Executive Officer, respectively. An ethnic group is deemed to dominate 















In 2001, only 1.5% of sample firms’ boards of directors were dominated by blacks 
compared to 12.5% in 2008. This indicates an increase of 11% in the number of boards of 
directors dominated by blacks over a period of seven years. The number of firms with a black 
board chairman increased from 4.4% in 2001 to 20.6% in 2008 among sample firms. 
Similarly, an increase of 8.1% in the number of firms with a black Chief Executive 
Officer/Managing Director among listed firms was recorded between 2001 (1.5%)  and 2008 
(9.6%).  
These results indicate that there were few blacks on boards of sample firms for the 
two periods and that whites dominate corporate SA as was the case during apartheid, 
whereby the whites controlled the economy and the blacks were not given access to positions 
of leadership and managerial decision-making (Thomas and Bendixen, 2000, p. 508). As 
such, the results are not representative of the make-up of the South African population in 
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terms of the two main ethnic groups (blacks and whites). SA is a nation of over 47 million 
people of diverse origins, cultures, languages and beliefs. As per the mid-2007 estimates from 
Statistics South Africa, the country's population stands at some 47.9 million (South African 
Government, 2007). Blacks form the majority of the population of SA, making up 90.9% of 
the total population. The white population is estimated at 4.3 million (9.1%).  
 
6.1.1.1 Ratio of Directors by Ethnic Grouping of Chairperson 
Another important factor to consider regarding composition of boards of directors in 
the context of SA is the composition of the boards based on ethnic grouping (e.g. blacks and 
whites). Table 6.2 shows the ratio of blacks sitting on the boards. Out of the 136 sample 
companies in 2001 and 2008, only one company (0.7%) in 2008 has 100% black directors on 
the board. In 2001 most of companies had between 0.01% and 20% black directors whilst in 
2008 the majority of boards had between 20.01% and 40% black directors. This indicates that 
structures of corporate SA of sample firms are dominated by whites. The results also indicate 
that efforts to bring on board previously disadvantaged groups under the Black Economic 
Empowerment have not as yet achieved their objectives (de Waal, 2010; Southall, 2004). 
 
Table 6.2 Ratio of Black Board Directors in 2001 and 2008 
 No. of Companies in 2001 % No. of Companies in 2008 % 
0 59 43.4 25 18.4 
0.01 – 20.00% 63 46.3 41 30.1 
20.01 – 40.00% 10 7.4 42 30.9 
40.01 – 60.00% 3 2.2 22 16.2 
60.01 – 80.00% 0 0.0 5 3.7 
80.01 - 99.99% 1 0.7 0 0.0 
100% 0 0.0 1 0.7 





It is also interesting to analyse the total number of directors for the two periods in 
terms of category of directorship (e.g. EXECs, NEDs and INEDs) and ethnicity. Table 6.3 
presents the results of this analysis. In 2001, less than 10% of the total directors in sample 
firms were black while in 2008 under a quarter (24.1%) of total directors were black.  
 
Table 6.3 Total Number of Directors by Category & Ethnicity 
 2001 % 2008 % 
Total black NEDs 89 6.9 128 9.5 
Total white NEDs 557 42.9 301 22.4 
Total black INEDs 4 0.3 138 10.3 
Total white INEDs 22 1.7 309 23.0 
Total black EXECs 20 1.5 58 4.3 
Total white EXECs 606 46.7 408 30.4 
Total Blacks 113 8.7 324 24.1 
Total Whites 1185 91.3 1018 75.9 
Total Directors 1298 100.0 1342 100.0 
Where: NEDs – Non-executive Directors; INEDs – Independent Non-executive Directors and EXECs 
– Executive Directors. 
 
 
These results indicate that whites dominate boards of corporate SA in 2001 and 2008 
and that blacks have not yet made inroads into corporate SA after 16 years of black rule. 
 
6.2 Compliance to the King Code  
This subsection answers the first question on the extent of compliance with the King 
Code by JSE listed firms in 2001 and 2008. Table 6.4 presents data on the extent of 








Table 6.4 Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Continuous Variables 
Panel A: 2001 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Minimum Maximum Percentiles 










TCI 0.406 0.151 0.080 0.810 0.292 0.386 0.521 
VCI 0.361 0.165 0.050 0.820 0.256 0.333 0.487 
MCI 0.602 0.179 0.000 1.000 0.472 0.667 0.750 
Theme 1 0.384 0.164 0.080 0.770 0.269 0.385 0.462 
Theme 2 0.448 0.236 0.000 1.000 0.222 0.500 0.667 
Theme 3 0.782 0.379 0.000 1.000 0.667 1.000 1.000 
Theme 4 0.315 0.265 0.000 1.000 0.025 0.300 0.500 
Panel B: 2008        
TCI 0.742 0.175 0.240 0.980 0.604 0.792 0.887 
VCI 0.717 0.192 0.200 0.980 0.551 0.795 0.864 
MCI 0.863 0.139 0.330 1.000 0.778 0.889 1.000 
Theme 1 0.718 0.192 0.130 1.000 0.589 0.774 0.871 
Theme 2 0.811 0.159 0.330 1.000 0.667 0.889 0.972 
Theme 3 0.990 0.070 0.330 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Theme 4 0.679 0.304 0.000 1.000 0.500 0.800 0.900 
PANEL C 





Theme 1 87.0% 
Theme 2 81.0% 
Theme 3 26.6% 
Theme 4 115.6% 
 
It can be seen in the table that the mean TCI (aggregation of all compliance indices) is 
40.6% in 2001 which increased to 74.2% in 2008. This indicates that the mean extent of 
compliance with the King Code increased by 82.7% between 2001 and 2008. The range (for 
TCI) is from a minimum of 8% (24%) to a maximum of 81% (98%) in 2001 (2008). As can 
be seen from the table, the index with the lowest figure is Integrated Sustainability Reporting 
(THEME4) both in 2001 (32%) and 2008 (68%) while the highest mean extent of compliance 
index was recorded under Accounting and Auditing in 2001 (78%) and 2008 (99%). Results 
from the table (Panel C) also indicate that THEME4 registered the highest change in mean 
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extent of compliance between the two years of 115.6% while THEME3 recorded the lowest 
increase in mean extent of compliance of 26.6%.  
As presented in Table 6.4, the mean compliance for other themes also shows that 
there was an increase in compliance with the King Code between 2001 and 2008. In 2001 and 
2008, THEME4 (Integrated Sustainability Reporting) had the lowest mean (median) 
compliance index of 0.315 (0.300) and 0.679 (0.800) respectively, while THEME3 
(Accounting and Auditing) had the highest mean (median) compliance index of 0.782 (1.000) 
and 0.990 (1.000) in that order. THEME4 comprises recommendations relating to social 
responsibility issues such as Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) and compliance on 
environmental issues among others. THEME3, on the other hand, comprises of 
recommendations relating to normal accounting practices which companies regularly report 
on in accordance with accounting standards. As such, the nature of recommendations in these 
themes may serve to explain why compliance was low in THEME4 and high in THEME3.  
In addition, as presented in Table 6.4, MCI, THEME2, THEME3 and THEME4 had a 
minimum mean compliance of 0.00 indicating that at least one sample firm did not comply 
with all the recommendations under these themes in 2001. In 2008 only THEME4 had a 
minimum mean compliance index of 0.00, consistent with the low compliance under this 
theme during the two periods. In 2001, TCI, VCI and THEME1 did not have a maximum 
compliance index of 1.00 while in 2008 only TCI and VCI did not register this score, 
indicating that none of the 136 sample firms complied with all the recommendations under 
TCI and VCI.  
As noted above, these results suggest that compliance for sample firms improved after 
the review of the Code in 2002. The results are consistent with Ntim’s (2009) findings in a 
study conducted in SA to investigate whether firms which comply with the King Code 
perform better between the years 2002 and 2006. In this study, Ntim (2009) finds a mean 
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percentage increase in compliance with the King Code of 20% (i.e., from 48% in 2002 to 
68% in 2006). The findings are also consistent with the results of literature on accounting 
disclosure. For instance, Conyon (1993), Conyon and Mallin (1997), Bauer et al. (2004), 
Weir and Laing (2002), Shabbir and Padgett (2005), Cui et al. (2008), Henry (2008) and 
Werder et al., (2005) report evidence of substantial improvements in the levels of compliance 
with CG standards over time across a sample of European, UK, Australian and German listed 
firms that they examined, respectively. Similarly, the Deutsche Bank (2002) survey in SA, 
suggested that CG standards among South African listed firms improved over time since the 
introduction of both King I and II. 
Frequency of compliance with the South African King Code was analysed for 48
31
 
compliance items in 2001 and 53 compliance items in 2008. The compliance checklist was 
broken into four THEMES (Tables 6.5 to 6.9) for analysis purposes. The following 
discussion attempts to analyse items with the largest change under each theme. 
 
6.2.1 Compliance to THEME1   
This theme comprises 31 items which fall under three components: board 
requirements, which consists of 5 items; board composition, 16 items for 2001 (21 items for 
2008) and board meetings, 5 items for both years. Table 6.5 shows the frequency of 
companies complying with each of the 31 items. The mean compliance index under this 
theme was 38.4% in 2001 compared to 71.8% in 2008. When this theme is split into the three 
components, the mean compliance index indicates that sample firms complied more to the 
recommendations on board composition (e.g. compliance index of 47.1% in 2001 and 76.4% 
                                                          
31
 There are 48 items in the King Code Checklist in 2001 because 5 items do not apply to this period i.e. whether 
the chairman is an independent non-executive director; whether the audit committee is chaired by an 
independent non-executive director; whether the remuneration committee is chaired by an independent non-
executive director; whether the remuneration committee consists entirely of independent non-executive directors 
and whether the appointment committee is chaired by an independent non-executive director. 
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in 2008) and less to the recommendations on board meetings (i.e. 7.4% in 2001 and 50.9% in 
2008) while the compliance index for the recommendations on board requirements was 
41.8% in 2001 and 73.5% in 2008. Compliance with board requirements may indicate that 






Table 6.5 South African King Code Checklist THEME1 - 2001 and 2008 
Panel A 
Compliance Checklist 2001 2008 Change 
Compliance Items Frequency % Frequency % % 
1 Board and Directors (THEME1)      
1.1 Board Requirements (SUBTHEME1.1)      
  Does the annual report contain:       
1 a charter setting out responsibilities of the board 
(CSRB1)? 40 29 98 72 145 
2 a statement of the purpose of the company as determined 
by the board? (SPC2) 54 40 104 76 93 
3 a statement of the values of the company as determined 
by the board? (SVC3) 55 40 97 71 76 
4 list of relevant stakeholders identified by the board? 
(LRS4) 26 19 79 58 204 
5 A narrative statement of how it has applied the principles 
set out in the King Code? (NSAKC5) (Man.) 107 79 121 89 13 
1.2 Board composition (SUBTHEME1.2) 
6 
Are the roles of CEO/MD and board chairman separated 
or a statement provided combining the roles? 
(ROLEDU6) (Man.) 99 73 135 99 38 
7 
Is the chairperson an independent non-executive 
director? (CINED7) (N/A 2001) 1 1 39 29 3800 
8 
Is the capacity of each director categorised accordingly 
e.g. Executive, non-executive & independent non-
executive. (CAPDIR8) (Man.) 67 49 134 99 100 
9 
Does the company have an audit committee? (AUDC9) 
(Man.) 109 80 132 97 21 
10 
Is the audit committee chaired by an independent non-
executive director? (AUDINEDC10) (N/A 2001) 5 4 106 78 90 
11 Is membership of the audit committee disclosed in the 74 54 126 93 70 
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annual report? (AUMBD11) 
12 
Does the annual report contain information on the 
qualifications of directors? (DIRQUAL12) 50 37 121 89 142 
13 
Does the annual report contain information on the 
experience of directors? (DIREXP13) 44 32 121 89 175 
14 
Are audit committee members financially literate? 
(Qualifications) (AUFLIT14) 46 34 109 80 137 
15 
Does the company have a remuneration committee? 
(REMCOM15) (Man.) 115 85 129 95 12 
16 
Is the remuneration committee chaired by an independent 
non-executive director? (REMCINED16) 27 20 95 70 252 
17 
Does the remuneration committee consist entirely of 
independent non-executive directors? (REMINEDS16) 26 19 87 64 235 
18 
Does the annual report contain details of director 
remuneration? (DIRREM18) 131 96 136 100 4 
19 
Does the company have an appointment/nomination 
committee? (NOMCOM19) 8 6 92 68 1050 
20 
Is the appointment committee chaired by an independent 
non-executive director? (NOMCINED20) 3 2 73 54 2333 
21 
Does the annual report contain a statement/policy of how 
board appointments are made? (BAPP21) (Man.) 87 64 122 90 40 
22 
Does the company have a corporate code of conduct on 
conflict of interest relating to directors and management? 
(CCCOND22) 16 12 66 49 313 
23 
Does the board have a procedure for directors to take 
independent professional advice? (DIRPAD23) 37 27 91 67 146 
24 
Is a statement of how performance evaluation of the 
board, its committees and its directors included? 
(PERFEV24) 3 2 42 31 1300 
25 
Is the board of directors demographically diverse (Blacks 
and whites)? (DIVERSE25) 22 16 103 76 368 




1.3 Board Meetings  (SUBTHEME1.3) 
27 
Does the board meet at least four times per year as per 
the Code? (BOARDMEET27) 42 31 123 90 193 
28 
Does the audit committee meet at least four times per 
year as per the Code? (AUDMEET28) 2 1 55 40 2650 
29 
Does the remuneration committee meet at least four 
times per year as per the Code? (REMMEET29) 2 1 37 27 1750 
30 
Does the appointment committee meet at least four times 
per year as per the Code? (APPMEET30) 1 1 30 22 2900 
31 
Does the annual report contain list of individual 
attendance by directors? (DIRATTEND31) 3 2 104 76 3367 
Mean  Frequency Compliance  
THME1Compliance Index 0.384 0.718 87.0 
Board Requirements (SUBTHEME1.1) 0.418 (19%) 0.735 (16%) 75.8 
Board Composition (SUBTHEME1.2) 0.471 (62%) 0.764 (68%) 62.2 




6.2.1.1 Board Requirements (SUBTHEME1.1) 
This sub-theme consists of five items which address recommendations on the 
requirements of the board. It is interesting to investigate why there is a big change in 
compliance with various items from the checklist and also to determine the 
characteristics of firms which comply with these items so as to understand whether 
high/low compliance to the recommendations from the King Code is influenced by 
company specific characteristics.  
A significant increase of compliance is observed in two out of five items from 
this sub-theme between 2001 and 2008. These are the recommendation on setting a 
board charter (145%) and identifying relevant stakeholders by the board of directors ( – 
204%). The results show that in 2001 29% of the firms complied with board charter 
which sets out the responsibilities of the board, whilst 72% of the firms complied in 
2008. Companies may have complied less in 2001 and more in 2008 because of an 
increased level of scrutiny by the JSE and shareholder advocacy groups which have 
gained prominence in recent times in SA. 
With regard to compliance to LRS4, a reading of the annual reports revealed 
that firms which complied with this recommendation specifically listed their 
stakeholders in the annual reports and explained their interactions with the various 
stakeholders. The level of compliance with this aspect may indicate the extent to which 
sample firms value stakeholder relations. A few firms demonstrated the importance of 




“Each Anglo Platinum operation is aware of its responsibility towards society 
and the environment in which it operates. In the spirit of Ubuntu (African 
humanism), business units have developed plans with key stakeholders, 
including Government and local communities, to address development issues in 
an integrated manner” (Anglo Platinum, 2001, pp. 78-79). 
 
The AngloGold Ashanti Report to Society 2008 is a reflection of the company's 
commitment to report on its impact and obligations in respect of its employees, 
the environment, economies and communities in which it operates. This report 
seeks to report on these issues to a wide range of stakeholders including 
shareholders, investors, communities, employees and their representatives, local 
and national governments and other interested parties. (AngloGoldAshanti, 
2008, p. 154). 
 
Firms which were found not to comply with this recommendation preferred to 
generally make reference to “all stakeholders” without pointing exactly out who these 
stakeholders are and how they interact with them. Reference to stakeholders in this case 
was used to acknowledge that the company has stakeholders but does not have a list of 
who they are. In some cases of non-compliance, firms mentioned only one stakeholder 
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but acknowledged the existence of other stakeholders without identifying who they 
were. The following extracts are examples from annual reports of firms which failed to 
comply with this recommendation or make general reference to stakeholders:  
 
 “The Group is committed to the highest standards of integrity, behaviour and 
ethics in dealing with all its stakeholders.” (Aflease in 2001, p.21). 
 
Examples of partial reference to stakeholders:  
 
“The group is committed to the long-term development of all its employees and 
stakeholders.” (Sun International, 2001, p. 23). 
 
“The company strives in its communications with stakeholders, particularly the 
investment community, to present a balanced and understandable assessment of 
the company's position.” (Wooltru in 2001, p. 12). 
 
6.2.1.2 Board Requirements (SUBTHEME1.2) 
SUBTHEME1.2 comprises of 21 items which address issues relating to 
recommendations on how the board should be composed. As discussed in section 6.2, 
JSE sample firms complied more with the recommendations under this sub-theme 
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compared to the other sub-themes in THEME1. As reported in Table 6.5, frequency of 
compliance to 4 recommendations out of 21 was 80% or above between 2001 and 2008. 
These are role duality (ROLEDU6), existence of audit committee (AUDC9), 
appointment of a remuneration committee (REMCOM15) and disclosure of director 
remuneration (DIRREM18). Five recommendations out of 21 had an average frequency 
of compliance ranging between 60% and 79%. These are categorisation of the capacity 
of each director in terms of whether they are non-executive directors (NEDs), 
independent non-executive directors (INEDs) and executive directors (EXECs) 
(CAPDIR8); disclosure of audit committee membership (AUMBD11); disclosure of 
information on the qualifications of directors (DIRQUAL12); information on the 
experience of directors (DIREXP13) and disclosure of a statement on how board 
appointments are made (BAPP21).  
Eleven recommendations out of 21 had an average frequency of compliance of 
49% and below. These are appointment of a chairman who is an INED (CINED7); 
whether the audit committee is chaired by an INED (AUDINEDC10); whether the 
chairman of the remuneration committee is an INED (REMCINED16); whether the 
remuneration committee consists entirely of INEDs (REMINEDS16); appointment of a 
nomination/appointment committee (NOMCOM19); whether the chairman of the 
appointment/nomination committee is an INED (NOMCINED20); availability of 
corporate code of conduct on conflict of interest relating to directors and management 
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(CCCOND22); whether the board has a procedure for directors to take independent 
professional advice (DIRPAD23); statement on the performance evaluation of the 
board, its committees and its directors (PERFEV24); board demographic diversity 
(DIVERSE25) and whether the board of directors includes women (BWOMEN26). The 
remaining one recommendation had a mean frequency of compliance between 50% and 
59% (e.g. AUFLIT14 – whether audit committee members are financially literate). 
Recommendations on the appointment of independent non-executive directors were not 
covered under the King Code I (1994). As such, these recommendations do not apply to 
2001 (Items: 7, 10, 16, 17 and 20). 
Even though the appointment of an INED as board chair was not covered by the 
King Code I (1994) in 2001, 0.7% (1 firm
32
) of sample firms had appointed an INED as 
board chair, 46.3% appointed EXECs and 52.9% appointed NEDs as board chair. In 
2008 the frequency of compliance to the recommendation on the appointment of an 
INED as a board chairman was 28.7%, while 25.0% of board chairpersons of sample 
firms were EXECs and 46.3% were NEDs.  
In some cases of non-compliance to this recommendation, companies offered 
explanations as to why they did not appoint an INED as evidenced by extracts from 
their annual reports: e.g. 
 
                                                          
32
 Hypro Investments – real estate and property, is audited by Grant Thornton Kessel Feinstein (Non Big 
4 audit firm). The company’s corporate structures are dominated by whites. The company is a small firm 
with a turnover of over R72m in 2001. 
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King Consolidated – The reason for not appointing a non-executive chairman is 
that, in the opinion of the Board, his position as executive chairman does not 
compromise the principles of CG. (2008, p. 8).  
 
The directors own 88.59% of the ordinary shares of the company, and as the 
majority shareholders they are able to influence appointments to board structures. Other 
similar cases included the following include Bowler Metcalf  in which directors own 
almost 40% of the ordinary shares whilst the executive chairman alone owns 21.5% of 
the shares. Only 20% of the ordinary shares are owned by institutional investors. The 
company has a single listing in the JSE and is audited by a non-Big 4 audit firm (2008). 
Also Awethu Breweries Limited – had two directors who beneficially held (TW Ford) 
44,929,235 shares and (I. Vermaak) 386,500 shares respectively. The company had a 
financial obligation to one of the directors in excess of R8 million (2008). The directors 
of PSG Group on the other hand own 52.3% (JF Mounton Exec Chairman) of the 
company, while 44.4% is owned by the public and institutional investors (2008). 
Boards of these companies were executive directors, in contrast to the recommendations 
of the Code. 
 
As seen from Table 6.5, NOMCINED19 (appointment of nomination 
committees) and NOMCINED20 (whether the appointment committee is chaired by an 
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INED) registered the highest change between 2001 and 2008 i.e. 1050% and 2333% 
respectively. Almost all companies which did not have an appointment committee (32% 
in 2008) stated that board appointments were done by the entire board. For instance, the 
following are extracts from annual reports of firms which did not comply with this 
recommendation: 
 
Isa Holdings – “The appointment of a new director to the Board is approved by 
the Board as a whole, subject to ratification by shareholders at the next Annual 
General Meeting or General Meeting, whichever is the earlier” (2008, p. 2). 
 
Hudaco Investments – “The selection and appointment of directors and the 
company secretary is a matter for the board as a whole” (2008, p. 25).  
 
Excellerate – “Procedures for appointments to the board are formal. The board 
as a whole approves the appointment of new directors” (2008, p. 18). 
 
Compliance with the requirements to have a code of conduct on conflict of 
interest relating to directors and management (CCCOND22), procedure for directors to 
take independent professional advice (DIRPAD23) and providing a statement on how 
performance evaluation of the board, its committees and its directors is conducted 
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(PERFEV24) was generally low in both 2001 and 2008 as per the results in Table 6.5. 
In the case of existence of a corporate code of conduct on conflict of interests, only 
12% of the sampled firms in 2001 complied with this recommendation compared to 
49% in 2008. In 2001, 3% of JSE sampled firms had a statement on performance 
evaluation of the board, its committees and directors included in the annual report 
compared to 31% in 2008. This implies that most firms did not have a procedure to 
determine whether the board, board committees and individual directors were 
performing effectively. For instance, in 2001, none of the small firms complied with 
this recommendation compared to 4.5% of large firms. In 2008, the level of compliance 
was 22.1% and 39.7% for small and large firms, respectively. Similarly compliance was 
high among firms with multiple listings in other stock exchanges i.e. 5.6% (35.5%) of 
firms with multiple listings compared to 1.7%  (29.5%) of firms without multiple listing 
in 2001 (2008).  
 
Demographic Diversity (DIVERSE25): The King Code recommends that 
boards of directors in SA must consider whether diversity makes them effective. The 
King Code (2002) and the JSE Listing Rules recommends that in order to assess the 
effectiveness of the board, a regular review of the required mix of skills and experience 
and other qualities such as board demographics and diversity should be undertaken 
annually through the nomination committee or similar board committee. Frequency of 
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compliance with demographic diversity in JSE sampled firms was found to be very low 
in 2001 at 16% and 76% in 2008 of sample firms. Similarly, female representation on 
boards of directors (presence of women on boards of directors) in JSE sampled firms on 
stood at 11% in 2001 and 59% in 2008 of sample firms. Consistent with the trend 
around the world, it was found that none of the boards of directors of JSE sampled 
firms consisted of a majority of women in 2001 and 2008. In contrast, 97% of the 
majority of board members of sample firms consisted mainly of “white” males in 2001 
compared to 85% in 2008.  For the purpose of determining diversity and female 
representation on boards of directors, the extent of diversity based on ethnicity (i.e. the 
number of directors representing diverse groups) was not taken into consideration. For 
instance, boards which had one woman or one “black” director were considered to be 
diverse in the same way as boards which had several women and people from diverse 
backgrounds and ethnicities. A reading of annual reports revealed that in most cases 
boards were highly male dominated and in most case dominated by white males. An 
observation from the annual reports also revealed that some boards had a single black 
director or a single female director. This may be considered as “tokenism” diversity or 
female representation, or compliance with the letter and not the spirit of the Code which 
was found to be common among JSE listed firms (e.g. Deutsche Bank, 2002). 
Generally, compliance under this sub-theme was found to be very low for some 




6.2.1.3 Board Meetings (SUBTHEME1.3) 
In 2001, only 30% of sampled firms specifically disclosed the frequency of their 
main board meetings whilst others mentioned that their boards met regularly, 
periodically or at regular intervals without stating the exact number of times and the 
dates the board met.  
In terms of board committee meetings, although most of the sampled firms 
disclosed the membership of other board committees, the frequency of meetings of such 
committees was not disclosed which resulted in low scores for the frequency of 
meetings of these committees. However, in 2008, reporting on board meetings 
(BOARDMEET27) improved significantly with 90% of sample firms reporting that 
their main board met four times in accordance with the King II recommendations while 
39%, 27% and 23% reported that their audit, remuneration and appointment/nomination 
committee respectively met four times as per the Code’s recommendations. Frequency 
of attendance of board committee meetings was found to be low because as noted in 
section 6.2.1.2 firms tended to appoint at the minimum the remuneration and audit 
committees as recommended by the King Code. An observation from the annual reports 
is that many companies which did not have nomination/appointment committees 





Table 6.6 reports the frequency of various board committee meetings by JSE 
sampled firms in 2008. 
 
 









 3 3 2 3 2 4 3 122 90 0 0 136 
Audit  
Committee  
8 6 10 7 25 18 38 28 55 40 0 0 136 
Remuneration  
Committee 
12 9 29 21 29 21 21 15 39 29 6 4 136 
Nomination  
Committee 
17 13 14 10 11 8 18 13 30 22 46 34 136 
Risk & Compliance 
 Committee  
5 4 3 2 17 13 15 11 30 22 66 49 136 
Transformation  
Committee 
4 3 1 1 10 7 6 4 12 9 103 76 136 
Health & Safety  
Committee  
4 3 1 1 2 1 6 4 2 1 121 89 136 
n/a – number of firms where committee not appointed 
 
 
Results from Table 6.6 indicate that 90% of sample firms complied with the 
recommendation for the main board to meet four times a year. As for the board 
committees, 40% of sample firms and 29% of sample firms met the provision on a 
minimum of four committee meetings per annum for the audit and remuneration 
                                                          
33
 Although four firms did not disclose that their board met in 2008. They stated in the annual reports that 
the accounts were approved by the Board of Directors, indicating that the board met atleast once to 
consider and approve financial accounts. 
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committees respectively. Results from Table 6.6 also indicate that 4% and 34% of 
sample firms did not have remuneration and nomination committees. 
 
6.2.2 Compliance to Risk Management (THEME2)  
The mean compliance index for this theme was 44.8% in 2001 compared to 
81.1% in 2008 as per the results from Table 6.7. This indicates that compliance 









Table 6.7 South African King Code Checklist THEME2 - 2001 and 2008 
Panel B 
 Frequency % Frequency % % 
2. Risk Management (THEME2)      
32 
Existence of risk management strategy. 
(RISKMAN32) 112 82 132 97 18 
33 
Does the company have a risk committee? 
(RISKCOM33) (Man.) 12 9 75 55 525 
34 
Is the number of meetings of the risk committee 
disclosed in the annual report? (MEETRISK34) 
(Man.) 10 7 73 54 630 
35 Existence of sound internal control system. (ICS35) 112 82 129 95 15 
36 
Statement on the risk appetite of the company. 
(RISKAPP36) 89 65 134 99 51 
37 
Statement on the risk assessment and adequacy of 
risk management and internal control systems. 
(RISKASSES37 85 63 134 99 58 
38 Statement on key risk areas. (KEYRISK38) 71 52 134 99 89 
39 
Statement on key performance indicators. 
(STATEKPIS38) 53 39 131 96 147 
40 
Statement on existence of confidential reporting 
process (whistle blowing) covering fraud and other 
risks. (WHISBLOW40) 2 1 51 38 2450 




The frequency of compliance for the recommendation to have a risk management 
strategy (RISKMAN32) was generally high in both 2001 at 82% and 2008 at 98%. Many 
firms reported the type of risks they are facing and the strategies they implement to mitigate 
those risks. In most cases, the risks reported were of a financial nature. However, frequency 
of compliance with the recommendation on appointment of risk committee was generally low 
in 2001 at 10% and 2008 at 57% because most firms tended to appoint the minimum board 
committees recommended by the Code but not other committees such as risk and safety 
committees. 
Generally, frequency of compliance with other recommendations on risk management 
was generally above 90% in 2008 which represented a significant improvement from 2001. 
Frequency of compliance with the recommendation to implement a confidential reporting 
process (“whistle blowing”) (WHISLBLOW40) was very low in both in 2001 at 2% and 
2008 at 36%. This is a facility whereby confidential reports can be made through a hotline on 
suspected incidents of dishonesty, fraud and other inappropriate behaviour by various 
company stakeholders. Frequency of compliance was higher among firms audited by Big 4 
(43%) audit firms than non-Big 4 (17.2%) audited firms in 2008. Firms with multiple listings 
in other stock exchanges also registered a high frequency of compliance of 61.3% compared 
to firms with single listing in the JSE (30.5%) in 2008. Frequency of compliance to this 
recommendation was also high among resources and general industry (ITYPE2) at 46.9% and 
low among cyclical services real estate and property (ITYPE3) at 30% in 2008. Similarly, 
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large firms registered a high frequency of compliance of 51.5% in 2008 compared to small 
firms at 23.5%. Sample JSE firms which complied to this recommendation provided full 
details of the procedure to be followed including a dedicated confidential hotline which 
company employees or any other entity may use to make a confidential report on fraud and 
other risks as demonstrated by the following extracts from their annual reports: 
 
“AngloGold Ashanti has a whistle-blowing policy that provides a channel for the 
reporting of practices that are in conflict with AngloGold Ashanti's business 
principles, unlawful conduct, financial malpractice, or are dangerous to the public 
and the environment. The process encourages reports to be made in good faith in a 
responsible and ethical manner. Employees are encouraged to discuss issues with 
their direct managers first (if appropriate) and then, if not resolved, to report these 
through the whistle-blowing line or directly to the internal audit or legal 
departments”. (AngloGoldAshanti, 2008, p. 155) 
 
“Nampak employs the services of Tip-offs. Anonymous, an independent, confidential whistle-
blowing hotline service, as a solution to reporting and investigating dishonesty, fraud 
and other inappropriate behaviour in the workplace. It is available for use by 
employees, customers, suppliers, managers or shareholders. Cases of proven 




“All employees within the Group have the opportunity to make anonymous 
disclosures relating to inappropriate business practices. The effectiveness of the 
whistle-blowing line is being reviewed to ensure that a proactive approach is applied 
to fraud risk management that will focus on prevention, detection and investigation.” 
(Omnia 2008, p. 45) 
 
Similar to results from other themes, compliance was generally high among large 
firms, firms with multiple listing status in other stock exchanges and firms audited by Big 4 
audit firms in accordance with theoretical predictions as will be discussed in section 6.2.5.  
 
6.2.3 Compliance to Accounting and Auditing (THEME3)  
This theme consists of three items which address accounting and auditing issues such 
as the existence of an internal audit function (INTAUD41), disclosure of amounts paid to 
external auditors (AUDPAY42) and reporting on the description of non-audit services by 
external auditors (NONAUDSERVE43). Compliance to recommendations under this theme 





Table 6.8 South African King Code Checklist THEME3 - 2001 and 2008 
Panel C  
3. Accounting and Auditing (THEME3) Frequency % Frequency % % 
41 
Does the company have an internal audit function? 
(INTAUD41) 101 74 133 98 32 
42 
Has the company reported the amount paid to 
external auditors? (AUDPAY42) 114 84 136 100 19 
43 
Has the company reported on the description of non-
audit services rendered by the external auditor? 
(NONAUDSERV43) 104 76 135 99 30 
THEME3 Compliance Index 0.782 0.990 26.6 
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Mean frequency of compliance to recommendations under this theme was higher than 
the mean frequency of compliance in THEMES 1, 2 and 4. In cases of non-compliance with 
recommendations under this theme, firms offered explanations as to why they did not deem it 
necessary to do so. For instance, in 2001, 74% of sample firms complied with the 
recommendation to have an effective internal audit function (INTAUD41) compared to 98% 
in 2008. Companies which did not comply with this recommendation in 2008 stated that they 
were small and as such, the board and management did not see it prudent to appoint internal 
auditors. The following extract from the annual report illustrates a reason for non-compliance 
from All Joy Foods: 
 
“Due to the current size of the business, there is currently no internal audit function 
within the Group, but this decision is reviewed each year by the audit committee.” 
(All Joy Foods, 2008, p. 41). 
 
One firm reported that the internal audit function had not yet been created and that the 
directors will review the need for such functions on an ongoing basis, without giving specific 




“An internal audit function has not, as yet, been created, and a remuneration 
committee has not been created as directors are not drawing emoluments. The 
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directors review the need for such functions on an ongoing basis.” (Awethu 
Breweries, 2008 p. 3) 
 
Further, one firm noted that this function was considered unnecessary; 
“The Company does not have an internal audit function as this has been deemed 
unnecessary in the past.” (Premium Properties, 2008 p. 10) 
 
In some cases where firms did not comply with this recommendation, explanations 
were offered as to why the internal audit function was deemed not necessary. Where 
explanations were offered for non-compliance, such firms were considered to have complied 
with the Code regime of “comply or explain”: 
 
“The responsibility for the operation of these systems of internal control lies with the 
executive directors who review them regularly to be satisfied that they are 
appropriate to provide reasonable assurance against material misstatement or loss. 
Because of this compensating control and the small size of the Group it is the view of 
the Board that no internal audit function is required.” (Spanjaard, 2008,  p. 4) 
 
“In view of the limited extent of the nature of the company’s business, the board 
considers it unnecessary to operate an internal audit function.” (Wesco, 2008, p. 14) 
pg. 242 
 
Generally high frequency of compliance was found among large firms, firms with 
multiple listing status and firms audited by Big 4 audit firms as reported in Appendices 7a to 
7g: Analysis of Compliance and Firm Characteristics.  
 
6.2.4 Compliance to Integrated Sustainability Reporting (THEME4) 
 Overall, there are ten recommendations under this theme, as seen from Table 6.9. The 
mean frequency of compliance for THEME4 was 31.5% in 2001 and 67.9% in 2008. These 
results indicate that this theme has the least frequency of compliance in 2001 and 2008 
compared to the other three themes. This may indicate that JSE listed firms comply less with 
the recommendations under integrated sustainability reporting which consists of aspects 
which form part of the principles of Ubuntu. Analysis of frequency of compliance reveals 
that, in 2001, 55% of sample firms had developed a Code of ethics (CODEETHIC44) 
compared to 78% in 2008. The Code of ethics helps an organisation to demonstrate its 
commitment to organisational integrity by codifying its standards in the code of ethics. Firms 
audited by Big 4 audit firms had a high frequency of compliance to this recommendation of 
59.4% in 2001 compared to 85% in 2008 while firms audited by non-Big 4 audit firms had a 
frequency of compliance of 42.9% in 2001 and 51.7% in 2008. Frequency of compliance was 
also high among firms with listings in other stock exchanges in 2001 compared to firms with 
single listing in the JSE. However, in 2008 frequency of compliance to this recommendation 
was slightly higher for firms with single listing in the JSE at 78.1% compared to firms with 
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multiple listings (77.4%) in other stock exchanges. Further to the development of the ethics 
code, the Code recommends that firms develop standards and practices in the company based 
on the code of ethics (STATSCODE45). Frequency of compliance to this recommendation 
was 54% in 2001 and 77% in 2008. Compliance to these recommendations improved 
between the two periods even though compliance to the development of standards and 




Table 6.9 South African King Code Checklist THEME4 - 2001 and 2008 
Panel D 
4. Integrated Sustainability Reporting (THEME4) 
  Frequency % Frequency % % 
  Has the company reported on:      
44 existence of a code of ethics? (CODEETHIC44) 75 55 106 78 41 
45 
whether it has developed and implemented 
standards and practices in the company based on 
code of ethics? (STATSCODE45) 73 54 105 77 44 
46 
compliance with corporate social investment? 
(CSI46) 33 24 75 55 127 
47 
compliance with BEE partnership or in the process 
of establishing partnerships. (BBBEE47) 15 11 110 81 633 
48 
compliance with employment 
equity/transformation? (CEE48) 71 52 114 84 61 
49 
compliance with human capital development/skills 
training? (CHCD49) 22 16 65 48 195 
50 
compliance with preferential procurement? 
(CPREFP50) 10 7 60 44 500 
51 compliance with HIV/AIDS? (HIVAIDS51) 34 25 92 68 171 
52 
compliance with environmental management? 
(CEM52) 46 34 97 71 111 
53 
compliance with health and safety policies and 
practices? (CH&S53) 52 38 99 73 90 
Total Items in the Compliance Checklist  48 53  
THEME4 Compliance Index 0.315 0.679 115.6 
TCI 0.406 0.742 82.8 
Sample Size 136;  
Mandatory – 8, Voluntary – 40 (2001) and 45 (2008) 
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As per results from Appendices 7a to 7g, firms audited by Big 4 audit firms, firms 
with multiple listing status and large firms had high proportions of compliance to these 
recommendations. An observation from reading the annual reports of sampled firms reveals 
that large firms provided details of their compliance with integrated sustainability reporting in 
comparison to small firms. For instance, firms detailed the kind of social investment projects 
that they are involved in, such as Bumbanani (“let’s build together”) in the case of AFROX, 
the amount of money spent on these projects and the activities undertaken in these projects
34
.  
Some companies stated that they donate 1% of their after tax earnings to these worthy 
courses and provided details of the beneficiaries for the 2008 financial year. Compliance with 
other recommendations such as preferential procurement was also demonstrated by disclosing 
the percentage and amount of expenditure which went to Broad Based Black Economic 
Empowerment (BBBEE) firms and the shareholding by people from previously 
disadvantaged groups or their positions in management. Skills training also featured 
prominently in most annual reports of large firms through disclosures of the kind of skills 
development undertaken, the cadre and the number of trainees inducted in the programmes. 
Large companies also produced Corporate Social Investment (CSI) (Sustainability) reports in 
addition to the annual reports.  
 
6.2.5 Frequency of Compliance in Terms of Firm Characteristics 
This sub-section briefly discusses firm characteristics and compliance. Figure 6.7 
shows average compliance in terms of firm size between 2001 and 2008.  
 
 
                                                          
34 Other projects which companies were involved in include orphanage/place of safety for orphaned, abandoned, abused or 
destitute children, many of whom are living with HIV/Aids, school crèche facility, centre for physically and/or mentally, 
disabled children, youth sports club, drug rehabilitation centre for teenagers and children’s feeding scheme. 
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Figure 6.7 Average Frequency of Compliance in Terms of Firm Size in 2001 and 2008 
 
 
Results from Figure 6.7 indicate that compliance with provisions from the King Code 
increased between 2001 and 2008. Second, on average large firms registered the highest 
average compliance of 41.5% in 2001 and 80% in 2008. As already mentioned above, this is 
in accordance with the theory that large firms tend to be more visible to relevant publics and 
so tend to be subject to greater political and regulatory pressure from external interests 
(Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989), are also subject to scrutiny by the media and may suffer bad 
publicity and the imposition of more regulations following non-compliance than smaller 
firms (Dedman, 2000). Consequently, large firms have additional incentives of reducing 
political costs of strict central regulation or even nationalisation through increased disclosure 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1978, p.115; Marston and Shrives, 1991, p.205), hence the high 
frequency of compliance with the King Code for large firms compared to small firms. Also, 
large firms tend to have more analysts following than smaller firms (Lang and Lundholm, 
1993; McKinnon and Dalimunthe, 1993). As such, large firms may comply with good 
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analysts who scrutinise their annual reports. Agency theory also suggests that large firms 
have greater agency problems (Jensen, 1986, p.323; Core, 2001, p.443). This means that 
larger firms may have to adhere to good governance practices by complying with 
recommended best practice in order to reduce the problem of information asymmetry. 
Figure 6.8, on the other hand, indicates average frequency of compliance in terms of 
auditor type.  
 
Figure 6.8 Average Frequency of Compliance in terms of Multiple Listed and Firms 
with Single Listing 
 
 
Results from Figure 6.8 indicate that compliance with provisions from the King Code 
increased between 2001 and 2008 for both Big 4 and non-Big 4 audit firms. Second, firms 
audited by Big 4 audit firms complied with provisions from the King Code more than firms 
audited by non-Big 4 audit firms. Prior literature suggests that the levels of auditor 
independence and audit quality are positively associated with audit firm size (e.g., Pearson, 
1980; DeAngelo, 1981). A major implication of this is that, on average, larger audit firms 
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the reputation, resources (i.e., financial, human, information and knowledge), and 
independence advantages that larger audit firms posses. Big 4 audit firms may influence their 
auditee clients to comply more to good governance principles because of reputational 
concerns (Carmeli and Tishler, 2005, p. 16). As such, large audit firms may have corporate 
reputation concerns in their dealings with their client firms and may insist upon good 
corporate practices to safeguard their reputation, and also to maintain a competitive edge. 
Large audit firms may therefore prefer to do business with large firms because they can be 
expected to afford costs of compliance with CG rules and also to comply with good 
governance principles. 
 
Frequency of compliance with King Code provisions was also found to be high for 
firms with multiple listing/cross-listings in other stock exchanges (Figure 6.9).  
 

































Figure 6.9 Frequency of Compliance in Terms of Auditor Type 
in 2001 & 2008 
2001 Big 4 
2001 Non Big 4 
2008 Big 4 
2008 Non Big 4 
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These findings are in accordance with the theory that cross-listed firms may have 
better CG practices because of stringent accounting, governance and disclosure requirements 
of the foreign stock exchanges to which they are cross-listed (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002, 
p.329; Black et al., 2006, p.403). Cross-listed firms can be expected to want to signal their 
quality through the adoption of better governance, disclosure and transparency (Klapper and 
Love, 2004, p.713). This may help explain why JSE listed firms with multiple listings in 
other stock exchanges comply more to the recommendations from the Code. 
 
As for industry type, compliance with King Code provisions was found to be varied 
as per Figure 6.10. For instance ITYPE2 and ITYPE3 registered the highest compliance to 
the Code in 2001 whilst in 2008 compliance across industries was almost as par. 
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6.3 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has described the characteristics of the sample. In this regard, 
characteristics of the sample such as firm size, auditor type, and industry type were discussed. 
It was found that the sample is almost balanced between small and large firms in the two 
years. The findings also indicate that JSE sample firms used Big 4 audit firms in the two 
years more than non-Big 4 audit firms. The sample was also analysed in terms of CG 
characteristics of role duality, multiple directorships and position of chairperson. In 2001, 
less than 20% of JSE sample firms had infused the position of chairman and CEO, while in 
2008 all JSE sample firms had separated the role of chairman and CEO. The findings from 
the chapter also indicate that sample firms appointed more non-executive directors on the 
board of directors in 2001 than in 2008. In terms of multiple directorships, only 36% and 
22.8% of JSE sample firms did not have directors holding multiple directorships in other 
companies in 2001 and 2008 respectively.  
The chapter also paid attention to analysis of corporations in terms of ethnicity. What 
has emerged is that overall SA companies are still very much in the hands of whites as was 
the case under apartheid. This is despite some intervention strategies which have been 
introduced by the SA government to try to address imbalances from the past such as BEE, 
and employment equity. White directors make the highest percentage of executives, NEDs 
and INEDs in 2001 and 2008. As an example, only 1.5% and 12.5% of sample firms’ boards 
of directors were dominated by blacks in 2001 and 2008 respectively. As such, this chapter 
indicates that it may not be possible to statistically test two ethnicity variables i.e. ethnicity of 
CEO/MD and ethnicity of board chair influences compliance because the numbers are too 
small to enable meaningful conclusions to be drawn from the results of such tests. 
In the next chapter, hypotheses will be tested to determine the factors which influence 
compliance are developed. 
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7 Chapter Seven: Empirical Results 
7.0 Introduction 
In chapter six, the extent of compliance with King Code was analysed. The findings 
showed that compliance with the code in the pre-review period (2001) was low, but increased 
significantly in the post-review period (2008). The results of the analysis also indicate that 
there are variations in compliance among companies because of size, auditor type, industry 
type and listing status. In this chapter, the relationship between company specific, corporate 
governance and ethnicity variables which have been theoretically hypothesised to influence 
the extent of compliance with the King Code, will be examined, thus addressing research 
question three. Descriptive statistics of the dependent variable (aggregate extent of 
compliance index) are reviewed, followed by discussion of results of both univariate and 
multivariate tests. In addition, the results of multiple regressions based on rank order 
transformation will also be discussed. The chapter also discusses the views of key 
stakeholders on the King Code and corporate governance in general in SA. As such this 
chapter answers questions two, three and four of this research. Figure 7.1 presents an 
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7.1 Descriptive Statistics 
7.1.1 Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variable (Extent of Compliance) 
Table 7.1 provides the descriptive statistics for the extent of compliance indices 
comprising of Total Compliance Index (TCI), Voluntary Compliance Index (VCI), 
mandatory Compliance Index (MCI), Boards and Directors Issue Index (THEME1), Risk 
Management Index (THEME2), Accounting and Auditing Index (THEME3) and Integrated 
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Table 7.1 Descriptive Statistics: Extent of Compliance Indices)    
Panel A: 2001 Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum K-S Lilliefors Shapiro-Wilk 
       Statistic Sig Statistic Sig 
TCI 0.406 0.151 0.186 -0.564 0.080 0.810 0.083 0.024 0.985 0.153 
VCI 0.361 0.165 0.275 -0.513 0.050 0.820 0.086 0.015 0.980 0.048 
MCI 0.602 0.179 -0.548 0.713 0.000 1.000 0.178 0.000 0.940 0.000 
Theme 1 0.384 0.164 0.481 -0.238 0.080 0.770 0.090 0.009 0.965 0.002 
Theme 2 0.448 0.236 -0.241 -0.979 0.000 1.000 0.177 0.000 0.922 0.000 
Theme 3 0.782 0.379 -1.388 0.184 0.000 1.000 0.431 0.000 0.589 0.000 
Theme 4 0.315 0.265 0.471 -0.773 0.000 1.000 0.132 0.000 0.917 0.000 
Panel B: 2008           
TCI 0.742 0.175 -0.771 -0.339 0.240 0.980 0.158 0.000 0.915 0.000 
VCI 0.717 0.192 -0.733 -0.453 0.200 0.980 0.173 0.000 0.916 0.000 
MCI 0.863 0.139 -0.657 0.115 0.330 1.000 0.265 0.000 0.823 0.000 
Theme 1 0.718 0.192 -0.872 0.320 0.130 1.000 0.124 0.000 0.933 0.000 
Theme 2 0.811 0.159 -0.580 -0.180 0.330 1.000 0.217 0.000 0.878 0.000 
Theme 3 0.990 0.070 -7.839 65.773 0.330 1.000 THEME3 Constant - Omitted 
Theme 4 0.679 0.304 -0.776 -0.535 0.000 1.000 0.184 0.000 0.879 0.000 
Where: TCI – Total Compliance Index; VCI – Voluntary Compliance Index; MCI – Mandatory Compliance Index; Theme 1 – Boards & Directors; Theme 2 – Risk 
Management; Theme 3 – Accounting and Auditing; and Theme 4 – Integrated Sustainability Reporting 
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Results from the above table indicate that as per the standard tests on skewness and 
kurtosis of the mean compliance indices, most of them are normally distributed. The rule of 
thumb for normality tests based on skewness and kurtosis is ± 1.96 and ±3.00 (Cooke, 1989) 
respectively. However, other tests of normality support the non-normality conclusion. For 
instance, Kolmogorov-Smirnov normality test (or K-S Lilliefors)
35
  indicate that the 
significance value of all the compliance indices fail the normality test (Sig value of more than 
.05) in 2001 and 2008. The Shapiro-Wilk test of normality also indicates that the indices are 
not normally distributed. The rule of thumb is that if the Sig. value of the Shapiro-Wilk Test 
is greater the 0.05 then the data is normal. If it is below 0.05 then the data significantly 
deviate from a normal distribution (see Pallant, 2005; p. 59).   
 
7.1.2 Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables 
Tests of normality were also conducted on the independent variables. Table 7.2 




                                                          
35
 K-S (Lilliefors) with significance of >.05 indicates normality and small significance value indicates reason to 
doubt the normality assumption (see Pallant, 2005; p. 57). 
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Table 7.2 Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables 
Panel A: 2001 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum K-S Lilliefors Shapiro-Wilk 
       Statistic Sig Statistic Sig 
PROPWHITES 0.91 0.13 -2.53 8.61 0.18 1.00 0.242 0.000 0.707 0.000 
PROPDNEDS 0.48 0.23 -0.45 -0.22 0.00 0.92 0.128 0.000 0.958 0.000 
SBD 9.54 4.38 1.07 2.32 3.00 30.00 0.109 0.000 0.923 0.000 
STA 11,608.82 33,252.76 4.66 24.05 70.00 228,891.00 0.364 0.000 0.381 0.000 
LTDtoTE 0.55 1.22 5.00 28.46 0.00 8.95 0.327 0.000 0.422 0.000 
INSTSHARE 0.30 0.27 0.70 -0.58 0.00 0.91 0.133 0.000 0.904 0.000 
DRCTSHARE 0.10 0.16 1.92 2.81 0.00 0.67 0.278 0.000 0.654 0.000 
ROA 0.06 0.06 0.38 -0.17 -0.09 0.22 0.074 0.063 0.979 0.032 
Panel B: 2008           
PROPWHITES 0.75 0.20 -0.82 0.65 0.00 1.00 0.109 0.000 0.932 0.000 
PROPDNEDS 0.63 0.17 -0.69 0.83 0.00 1.00 0.091 0.008 0.970 0.004 
SBD 9.87 3.68 0.46 0.18 4.00 23.00 0.091 0.008 0.968 0.003 
STA 8,147.35 21,865.09 4.84 26.91 50.00 153,743.00 0.355 0.000 0.395 0.000 
LTDtoTE 0.68 1.53 7.22 64.16 0.00 15.30 0.327 0.000 0.373 0.000 
INSTSHARE 0.34 0.28 0.54 -0.71 0.00 0.97 0.111 0.000 0.929 0.000 
DRCTSHARE 0.13 0.20 1.80 2.58 0.00 0.89 0.260 0.000 0.698 0.000 
ROA 0.10 0.08 0.18 -0.08 -0.10 0.30 0.090 0.010 0.985 0.147 
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Results from Table 7.2 also indicate that as per the standard tests on skewness and 
kurtosis, the independent variables are not normally distributed. The non-normality 
conclusion is also supported by other tests of normality viz. K-S Lilliefors and Shapiro-Wilk 
tests. Since the dependent variable(s) and independent variables are found to show non-
normality, steps were taken to transform the data. As such techniques of transformation were 
employed to transform the data viz. log odds ratio, ranking and normalising (using van der 
Waerden). Standard tests of normality based on skewness and kurtosis, K-S Lillierfors and 
Shapiro-Wilk tests (see Appendices 7 to 10 (Independent & Dependent Variables after 
Transformation) provides descriptive statistics of the 2001 and 2008 dependent and 
independent variables after transformations. Generally the skewness and kurtosis indicate 
mild non-normality for both the dependent and independent variables while K-S Lillierfors 
and Shapiro-Wilk tests indicate mild non-normality in some cases.  
 
7.2 Empirical Results: Tests of OLS Assumptions and Bivariate Correlation 
Analysis 
As discussed in section 5.4.2, in order to answer the research questions for this 
research, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) multivariate regression technique is used to test all 
the hypotheses that have been discussed in chapter four. As such, this requires that OLS 
assumptions of multicollinearity, autocorrelation, homoscedasticity (opposite 
heteroscedsticity), normality and linearity are tested. First, the multicollinearity assumption 
was tested by conducting a correlation matrix among variables. Tables 7.3 and 7.4 contain 
correlation matrices for the dependent and independent variables for 2001 and 2008 
respectively. The two tables (7.3 and 7.4) report both Pearson’s parametric and Spearman’s 
non-parametric correlation coefficients. The bottom left half of the tables presents Pearson’s 
parametric correlation while the upper right half contain Spearman’s non parametric 
coefficients. The correlation matrices in Table 7.3 and 7.4 are based on logarithmic 
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transformed data. Generally, the coefficients of both the parametric and non-parametric 
bivariate correlations indicate a close similarity, which seems to suggest that there are mild 
non-normalities in the variables, in line with findings from prior literature (Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2006; Ntim, 2009). As such, multicollinearity tests appear to indicate that it may be 
statistically tolerable to use OLS techniques to test the models developed.
 pg. 258 
 
Table 7.3 Correlation Matrix [Pearson’s r (bottom) and Spearman’s rho (top)] of Continuous Independent and Dependent Variables 



































WHITES 1 -0.11 -.375** -.184* 0.063 -.184* .267** -0.139 -0.11 0.016 .182* 0.128 -.220* -0.077 -.198* -.222** 0.032 -0.165 -0.071 -0.097 -0.146 
PROP 
DNEDs -0.151 1 .277** .363** 0.091 .218* -.270** 0.129 .294** 0.107 0.061 0.067 -0.013 -0.116 .212* .181* .193* .240** 0.005 0.088 0.104 
SBD 
-.280** .233** 1 .639** 0.128 .233** -.316** .197* .314** .183* -0.099 -0.05 0.148 -0.009 .457** .453** .193* .390** .201* .208* .364** 
STA 
-.172* .301** .588** 1 0.116 .344** -.345** 0.166 .432** .252** 0.053 0 0.057 -0.117 .378** .378** 0.116 .331** 0.071 .230** .327** 
LTD to TE 
0.076 0.075 0.059 0.091 1 -0.022 0.02 -.171* 0.03 0.131 0.005 0.087 -0.142 0.061 0.154 0.127 0.13 0.074 .209* 0.115 0.112 
INST 
SHARE 
-0.160 0.120 .250** .354** 0.017 1 -.265** 0.132 0.105 -0.021 0.033 -0.018 0.071 -0.092 .192* .191* 0.149 0.14 0.162 .241** 0.075 
DRCT 
SHARE 
.183* -.251** -.266** 
-
.274** 0.057 -.242** 1 -0.134 -.181* -0.079 0.073 -0.039 -0.14 0.117 -0.162 -0.143 -0.103 -0.129 -0.074 -0.072 -0.088 
ROA 
-0.139 0.102 .185* 0.131 
-
.260** 0.132 0.052 1 0.03 .178* -0.111 .234** 0.05 -.178* .173* .184* 0.056 .174* 0.111 0.019 0.141 
AUDTYPE 
-0.063 .272** .283** .348** -0.028 0.039 -.199* 0.023 1 0.131 0.02 -0.089 0.063 0.001 .305** .300** 0.078 .306** 0.034 0.109 .262** 
LISTSTATUS 
0.013 0.089 .225** .272** 0.067 -0.053 -0.066 0.162 0.131 1 -0.032 -0.141 0.157 0.005 0.135 0.127 0.111 0.14 -0.027 0.072 0.163 
ITYPE1 






.308** 0.039 0.05 -0.019 0.067 -0.031 0.123 -0.024 
ITYPE2 






.301** -0.077 -0.081 -0.046 -0.026 0 -0.082 -0.117 
ITYPE3 






.351** 0.1 0.121 0.008 0.013 0.058 0.045 .200* 
ITYPE4 






.351** 1 -0.072 -0.1 0.057 -0.058 -0.031 -0.092 -0.075 
TCI 
-0.149 .214* .442** .340** 0.131 0.164 -0.114 .182* .293** .173* 0.044 -0.107 0.133 -0.082 1 .976** .576** .824** .558** .505** .747** 
VCI 
-0.168 .185* .437** .343** 0.119 0.149 -0.088 .191* .296** .175* 0.06 -0.122 0.152 -0.104 .979** 1 .405** .747** .582** .534** .777** 
MCI 
0.018 .225** .204* 0.124 0.128 0.132 -0.139 0.051 0.107 0.079 -0.036 -0.006 -0.009 0.053 .569** .394** 1 .700** .191* 0.14 .255** 
THEME1 
-0.122 .248** .351** .270** 0.018 0.083 -0.084 0.135 .281** 0.157 0.083 -0.061 0.028 -0.054 .817** .751** .676** 1 .221** .213* .414** 
THEME2 
-0.072 -0.008 .222** 0.089 .227** 0.159 -0.075 0.098 0.036 -0.035 -0.047 -0.025 0.084 -0.018 .572** .578** .232** .187* 1 .343** .313** 
THEME3 
-0.085 0.119 .221** .179* 0.104 .219* -0.12 0.012 0.109 0.087 0.102 -0.078 0.075 -0.107 .499** .512** 0.167 .205* .362** 1 .351** 
THEME4 
-0.121 0.127 .365** .316** 0.123 0.091 -0.06 .183* .278** .183* -0.03 -0.124 .207* -0.069 .735** .771** .222** .381** .316** .331** 1 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 7.4 Correlation Matrix [Pearson’s r (bottom) and Spearman’s rho (top)] of Continuous Independent and Dependent Variables 































1 -0.061 -.198* -0.073 -0.072 -0.116 0.093 -0.104 -0.036 -0.027 0.167 0.087 -.197* -0.044 -.321** -.332** -0.141 -.333** -0.06 -.304** 
POPDNEDs -0.054 1 .279** .301** 0.102 0.026 -.305** -0.009 .280** .180* .232** -.202* 0.035 -0.071 .317** .286** .313** .291** .286** .201* 
SBD 
-0.132 .212* 1 .374** -0.007 .225** -.269** .209* .370** 0.165 -0.05 0.002 0.091 -0.049 .516** .498** .368** .469** .384** .416** 
STA -0.034 .256** .269** 1 .203* .264** -.327** 0.167 .318** .230** 0.087 -0.134 -0.023 0.072 .527** .521** .313** .486** .364** .430** 
LTD to TE -0.068 0.118 0.004 .201* 1 -0.015 -0.07 -0.102 0.011 0 0.083 -0.102 -0.099 0.126 0.04 0.058 -0.043 0.058 -0.027 0.051 
INST 
SHARE 
-0.119 0.017 0.166 0.156 -0.044 1 -.209* 0.075 0.153 0.106 0.105 -0.006 -0.084 -0.01 0.148 0.167 -0.042 0.132 0.053 .176* 
DRCT 
SHARE 
0.057 -.204* -.296** -.232** 0.009 -.259** 1 -0.036 -.169* -.294** -0.124 0.166 -0.158 0.131 -.309** -.307** -.195* -.266** -.211* -.277** 
ROA -0.127 -0.005 0.154 .194* -0.02 0.02 -0.046 1 .257** 0.055 0.012 -0.048 0.016 0.018 0.148 0.152 0.072 0.156 0.044 0.145 
AUDTYPE 
-0.008 .278** .346** .213* 0.031 0.122 -0.135 .249** 1 0.154 0.082 -0.077 -0.139 0.145 .372** .372** .250** .360** 0.162 .395** 
LISTSTATUS -0.023 .174* .179* .293** 0.014 0.086 -.200* 0.073 0.154 1 -0.101 -.194* .274** 0.003 0.081 0.087 -0.014 0.109 0.077 -0.061 
ITYPE1 
.171* .238** -0.058 0.032 0.121 0.122 -0.117 -0.005 0.082 -0.101 1 -.314** -.365** -.308** -0.051 -0.042 -0.081 -0.052 -0.064 -0.015 
ITYPE2 
0.108 -.193* 0.033 -0.121 -0.093 -0.029 0.044 -0.067 -0.077 -.194* -.314** 1 -.358** -.301** -0.04 -0.065 0.104 -0.048 0.059 -0.105 
ITYPE3 -.201* 0.01 0.114 0.049 -0.106 -0.07 -0.044 -0.009 -0.139 .274** -.365** -.358** 1 -.351** 0.113 0.107 0.058 0.104 0.138 0.056 
ITYPE4 
-0.065 -0.059 -0.097 0.037 0.085 -0.019 0.123 0.083 0.145 0.003 -.308** -.301** -.351** 1 -0.03 -0.007 -0.085 -0.011 -0.144 0.06 
TCI -.315** .293** .490** .453** 0.064 0.113 -.314** 0.161 .431** 0.058 -0.055 -0.043 0.065 0.029 1 .989** .661** .957** .702** .791** 
VCI 
-.324** .273** .483** .457** 0.079 0.125 -.307** 0.166 .432** 0.064 -0.047 -0.065 0.064 0.044 .994** 1 .556** .955** .631** .806** 
MCI 
-0.144 .304** .345** .262** -0.056 -0.025 -.230** 0.07 .251** -0.012 -0.083 0.101 0.056 -0.078 .673** .586** 1 .583** .817** .438** 
THEME1 -.332** .283** .465** .443** 0.071 0.104 -.259** 0.162 .413** 0.1 -0.057 -0.042 0.061 0.035 .962** .962** .600** 1 .613** .646** 
THEME2 
-0.036 .248** .359** .337** -0.037 0.046 -.237** 0.027 .186* 0.073 -0.078 0.092 0.129 -0.154 .671** .612** .812** .583** 1 .419** 
THEME4 -.282** .207* .395** .350** 0.072 0.126 -.324** 0.159 .416** -0.055 -0.02 -0.113 0.032 0.099 .836** .845** .470** .691** .411** 1 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Results from Table 7.3 and Table 7.4 reveal significant relationships (P<0.01; P<0.05) 
among dependent and independent variables. All the correlations are below 0.70 except for 
correlation between compliance indices e.g. TCI and its sub-indices. Correlations between 
these variables are expected to be high because they measure the same thing (compliance) i.e. 
total compliance index (TCI) and voluntary compliance index (VCI) are both measures of 
compliance to the King Code; as such, it is expected that there will be high correlation 
between these variables. The same thing applies to all the other dependent variables. Table 
7.4 also indicates that correlation figures for THEME3 (Accounting and Auditing) could not 
be computed because the variables in it are constant e.g. all firms complied with 
recommendations under this theme in 2008.  As a rule of thumb, multicollinearity in 
regression analysis is considered harmful only when correlation exceeds 0.7 (Tabachnick and 
Fidell, 1996). Generally results from both Table 7.3 and 7.4 indicate that multicollinearity is 
not a problem, which implies that OLS techniques may be used to attempt to answer the 
question of compliance to the King Code. 
Additionally, the variance inflation factor (VIF), tolerance statistics, eigenvlues, 
condition indices and variance proportions which test for multicollinearity were computed. 
Appendices 16a to 28c (Results of Model Summary) report tolerance and VIF statistics after 
transformation for the compliance indices. Appendices 29a to 30g present eigenvalues, 
condition indices, and variance proportions after transformation of compliance indices for 
2001 and 2008. According to Pallant (2005, p. 150), tolerance statistics
36
 of more than 0.10 
indicates low multicorrelation with other variables, whereas tolerance values of less than 0.10 
indicates that multicorrelation with other variables is high, suggesting the possibility of 
multicollinearity. Similarly, a VIF statistic below the value of ten implies non-existence of 
multicollinearity (Pallant, 2005, p. 150). As per appendices 16a to 28c, none of the variables 
                                                          
36
 Tolerance statistics may be replaced by Variance Inflation Factor, which is just the inverse of the Tolerance 
value (1 divided by Tolerance) (Pallant, 2005). 




 have tolerance values less than the critical values of 0.10 and VIF 
statistics of above the critical value of 10. Pallant (2005, p. 179) and Gujarati (2003, pp. 351-
353) suggests that eigenvalues of above the critical value of zero and condition indices below 
the critical value of thirty indicates that multicollinearity may not be a major problem. As per 
Appendices 29a to 30g (Collinearity Diagnostics) all the variables of the compliance indices 
have eigenvalues above the critical value of zero and condition indices below the critical 
value of thirty. 
To test for the presence of autocorrelation Durbin Watson test was conducted (see 
appendix 16a to 28c Results of Model Summary). This test is conducted under the null 
hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation in the data. A test statistic called ‘d’ is computed. 
A ‘d’38 closer to 0 means positive autocorrelation, a ‘d’ closer to 4 means negative 
autocorrelation while a value of 2 means that there is no autocorrelation in the sample. 
According to Gujarati (2003, p. 351-353) if ‘d’ value is  between 1.760 and 2.240, the null 
hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation is accepted. As per results from 16a to 28c Results 
of Model Summary, all the models have ‘d’ values which are between the upper and lower 
critical values of the Durbin-Watson test indicating that there is no positive or negative 
autocorrelation. These results indicate that it may be statistically tolerable to use OLS 
technique to investigate the relationships between dependent and independent variables. 
In order to test for heteroscedasticity (opposite homoscedasticity) a number of tests 
were conducted. First a visual inspection of residuals (see Appendix 12a to 13f Scatter Plot 
and Normal Probalibility Plots) was done. This was conducted to determine if the residuals 
shows some uneven envelope of the residuals. A further test of heteroscedasticity, the 
                                                          
37
 Compliance Indices includes Total Compliance Index (TCI), Voluntary Compliance Index (VCI), Mandatory 
Compliance Index (MCI), THEME1, THEME2, THEME3 and THEME4. 
38
 “d” is defined as the ratio between the sum of the square of the difference in the residuals with ith and (i-1) 
time and the square of the residual in ith time. If the upper critical value of the test comes out to be less than the 
value of ‘d,’ then there is no autocorrelation. If the lower critical value of the test is more than the value of ‘d’ 
then there is autocorrelation (Pallant, 2005). 
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Breusch-Pagan test (hetest - after regression) was conducted to determine any linear form of 
heteroscedasticity. The Breusch-Pagan test tests whether the estimated variance of the 
residuals from a regression are dependent on the values of the independent variables. 
(Breusch and Pagan, 1979). According to this test, a large chi-square and a low p-value 
would indicate that heteroscedasticity was present. Results of the Breusch-Pagan test show 
that the models for 2001 and 2008 are subject to mild heteroskedasticity (P-value .0421). The 
results indicate that the 2001(2008) models had a chi2 (1) = 6.598 (14.155) and Prob>chi2 = 
0.5805 (0.0778). Based on these results both the graphical analysis and the Breusch-Pagan 
test for the overall model suggest mild heteroskedasticity.  
Tests for homoscedasticity, normality and linearity assumptions were conducted. For 
instance, scatter plots, Cook’s distances, Durbin-Watson, leverage values, studentised 
residuals, normal histogram, probability-probability (P-P) plots of residuals, skewness and 
kurtosis tests were conducted. In order to test for the existence of outliers which may cause 
hetereoscedasticity and non-linearity in the variables, regression standardised residual plots 
for all the compliance indices variables are presented in Appendices 12a to 13f (Scatter Plot 
and Normal probability-Probability Plot). All scatter plots indicate that outliers are no longer 
present since the distribution in all the plots looks fairly normal and linear. Other tests of 
normality, such as normal histogram (see Appendices 11a to 11m: Normal Histogram Plot) 
also indicate mild non-normality. 
Appendices 14a to 14m (Residuals Statistics) report the summary studentised 
residuals (stud. Residuals), leverage values, and Cook’s distances after transforming the 
dependent and compliance indices. According to Pallant (2005, p. 152) Cook’s distance and 
leverage value greater than 1 indicates the presence of outliers (Tabachnick and Fidel, 2001, 
p. 69), whereas studentised residual greater than 3 suggests the presence of outliers. As can 
be seen from the results, none of the Cook’s distances and Leverage values is greater than 1. 
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Durbin-Watson test is also conducted to test for the presence of autocorrelation in the 
residuals from the regression. Durbin-Watson statistics are reported in Appendix 15: 
Comparison of Regression Results for the Years 2001 and 2008. The results indicate that the 
Durbin-Watson statistics range between 1.974 and 2.480, indicating the presence of moderate 
positive autocorrelation problems. According to Gujarati (2003, pp. 467–469) Durbin-Watson 
value of two and above suggests that successive residual terms are, on average, much 
different in value to one another.  
Generally, the analysis suggests that multicollinearity, hetereoscedasticity, non-
normality, and non-linearity in the variables are mild such that they may not cause serious 
violations of the OLS assumptions. As such, it is statistically appropriate to conduct 
multivariate OLS regression analyses. Therefore, in the next section, results of the estimated 
OLS multivariate regression results will be discussed.   
 
7.2.1.1 Discussion of Collinearity Test between Dependent, Independent & Binary 
Variables 
Results from Table 7.3 indicate that in 2001, PROPWHITES has a negative 
correlation with six of the seven compliance indices i.e. TCI, VCI and THEME1 to 4. The 
negative relationship is significant at the 5% level for TCI and 1% level for VCI. Similarly, in 
2008 PROPWHITES also has a negative significant correlation with TCI, VCI, THEME1 and 
THEME4 (P<0.01) and an insignificant negative relationship with MCI and THEME2. The 
negative results are in accordance with the prediction. For instance, this is in accordance with 
the prediction that boards of directors dominated by whites in SA may comply less with the 
King Code because of their individualistic culture. 
As per the Pearson’s and Spearman’s correlation results presented in Table 7.3 
PROPDNEDS has a significant positive correlation (P<0.05) with TCI, VCI, MCI and Theme 
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1 (P<0.01) in 2001. In 2008, the correlation between PROPDNEDS and compliance indices 
is positive and significant at both 1% (for TCI, VCI, MCI, THEME1 & THEME2) and 5% 
THEME4. This is in accordance with the popular view that firms with independent boards 
may practice good CG compared to firms with boards which are not independent. The results 
are also in line with findings from prior literature (i.e. Ntim, 2009). 
Similarly, SBD (Board Size) has a significant positive correlation with all the 
compliance indices in 2001 and 2008 in accordance with the argument that a larger board 
offers the firm varied expertise and will be better placed to subject managerial decisions to 
greater scrutiny and monitoring (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003, p.194), which may result in good 
CG practices. 
Results from Table 7.3 and 7.4 also indicate that STA (Firm Size) has a significant 
positive correlation with all the compliance indices in 2001 and 2008. These results support 
the argument that large companies may comply more with good CG principles because they 
are visible and subject to scrutiny (Lang and Lundholm, 1993). Further, they may also 
comply so as to minimise potential political costs, such as stringent regulation, taxation, and 
nationalisation (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978, p.115; Andreasson, 2009, p.22). 
In 2001, LTDtoTE has a positive insignificant relationship with all the other 
compliance indices except THEME2 which is significant at 5%. These results lend credence 
to the argument that the use of debt financing can induce extra monitoring by lenders 
(Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996, p.377) and hence improve CG practices and firm performance. 
However, in 2008 correlation results between LTDtoTE are negative for MCI and THEME2. 
INSTSHARE has a positive correlation with all the compliance indices in 2001. In 2008, 
LTDtoTE has a negative correlation with MCI and a positive insignificant correlation with all 
other variables.  
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INSTSHARE has a significant positive relationship with TCI, VCI (P<0.05) and 
Theme 3 (P0<01), in 2001. This suggests that institutional shareholders may impact 
positively on internal CG structures due to their relative financial clout, reputation, 
knowledge and information advantages (Gillan and Starks, 2003). It also suggests that 
institutional shareholders can complement, as well as impact positively on, a firm’s internal 
CG structures, including board size and percentage of non-executive directors, because they 
possess superior financial resources, specialised knowledge, information collection and 
analysis advantages over the average individual investor (Young et al., 2008, p. 1108). In 
2008, INSTSHARE correlation is positive but insignificant with all compliance indices (MCI 
significant (P<0.01)). The positive results are also in line with the findings from prior 
literature (e.g. Ntim (2009). 
DRCTSHARE, on the other hand, has an insignificant negative relationship with all 
the compliance indices in 2001, as seen from results in Table 7.3 as per the expectation that 
firms with higher director shareholding tend to have poor CG practices. DRCTSHARE also 
has a significant negative relationship with PROPWHITES (P<0.05), PROPDNEDS, SBD, 
STA and INSTSHARE (P0<01). In 2008, the correlation is negative and significant at both 
1% and 5% level as per expectation. 
Table 7.3 and 7.4 also indicate that ROA has a positive correlation with all the 
compliance indices in 2001 and 2008 in accordance with the argument that financially 
healthy firms are in a better position to implement good corporate governance practices such 
as the ones recommended by the King Code. Also, this means that firms with higher quality 
internal corporate governance structures performed better (ROA). The results are also 
consistent with prior South African studies (e.g. Ntim, 2009) reports a positive correlation 
between ROA and Q-Ratio and the South African Corporate Governance Index). Similarly, 
using a cross-country sample of listed firms that include SA, Klapper and Love (2004) find a 
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statistically significant and positive coefficient of .10 between ROA and their composite 
corporate governance index. 
In the case of binary variables, results from Table 7.3 and 7.4 indicate a positive 
significant correlation between AUDTYPE and all compliance indices in 2001 while in 2008 
the correlation is positive and significant at 1% level except for THEME2 which is 
insignificant. These results support the argument that because of reputational concerns and 
the threat of litigation, Big 4 audit firms may influence their clients to comply with best 
practice corporate governance so as to avoid corporate failure and liability for such (Hope et 
al., 2008, p. 350). As for LISTSTATUS, the results are mixed. For instance in 2001, some 
correlations are positive but insignificant (i.e. TCI, VCI, MCI, THEME1, THEME3, & 
THEME4) while the rest are negative but insignificant. In 2008, the results also show a mix 
of insignificant positive and negative correlations (e.g. MCI & THEME4). As such, these 
results are inconclusive. As for industry types almost all the results show a mix of 
insignificant correlations between compliance indices and INDTYPE. These results are in 
line with the argument that corporate governance standards vary across industries (e.g. 
CLSA, 2000; Deutsche Bank, 2002). 
 
7.2.2 Empirical Results: Multivariate Regression Analysis 
In order to test whether the extent of compliance with the King Code is significantly 
associated with the selected variables, a multiple linear regression analysis was conducted. 
Regressions were run for the TCI, VCI, MCI, and each of the themes. However, because 
THEME3 (Accounting and Auditing) in 2008 had no sufficient variation, given that almost 
all firms complied, no regressions were run. The results are reported in the following sub-
sections. Two variables – BBCHAIR, BCEO/MD – are excluded from the regression analysis 
because results from chapter 6 indicate that the number of firms with black board chairman 
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and black CEO/MD are too small to conduct statistical tests and draw meaningful 
conclusions. 
 
7.2.2.1 Results Based on TCI & VCI Regression Models 
Regression results for TCI and VCI models are presented in Table 7.5.  
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Table 7.5 OLS Regression Results of the Dependent Compliance Variables for 2001 and 2008 
  2001    2008    





t-statistic Coefficient  
Value 
t-statistic Coefficient  
Value 
t-statistic Coefficient  
Value 
t-statistic 
(Constant)  -0.718 -0.201 -1.353 -0.359 -9.716 -4.65*** -10.749 -4.743*** 
REFLOGPROPWHITES - -0.027 -0.313 -0.06 -0.712 -0.259 -3.893*** -0.267 -3.988*** 
REFLOGPROPDNEDS + 0.061 0.719 0.026 0.311 0.082 1.168 0.054 0.764 
REFLOGSBD + 0.312 3.137*** 0.302 3.054*** 0.246 3.391*** 0.243 3.333*** 
REFLOGSTA + 0.003 0.026 0.02 0.187 0.34 4.756*** 0.343 4.772*** 
REFLOGLTDtoTE + 0.173 2.06** 0.17 2.033** -0.031 -0.467 -0.016 -0.246 
REFLOGINSTSHARE + 0.035 0.404 0.016 0.186 -0.062 -0.93 -0.051 -0.764 
REFLOGDRCTSHARE - 0.022 0.26 0.047 0.558 -0.154 -2.235** -0.147 -2.117** 
REFLOGROA + 0.166 1.883** 0.173 1.977** -0.039 -0.587 -0.038 -0.567 
AUDTYPE + 0.173 2.041** 0.184 2.183** 0.283 3.904*** 0.286 3.924*** 
LISTSTATUS + 0.018 0.213 0.018 0.212 -0.183 -2.624*** -0.175 -2.491*** 
ITYPE1 -/+ 0.005 0.055 0.015 0.155 -0.085 -1.035 -0.074 -0.891 
ITYPE2 -/+ -0.154 -1.577 -0.17 -1.75** -0.013 -0.164 -0.029 -0.367 
ITYPE4 -/+ -0.092 -0.981 -0.124 -1.335 -0.018 -0.237 -0.01 -0.127 
          
Adjusted R²   0.214  0.223  0.479  0.473 
Standard Error   0.04171  0.04409  0.04262  0.04622 
F Value   3.831***  3.975***  10.556***  10.327*** 
No. of Observations   136  136  136  136 
Where: ***,  **  and * denote p-value is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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Results from Table 7.5 indicate that the F-value of the TCI regression model is 
statistically significant at the 1% significance level for both 2001 and 2008 firm years. This 
implies that the null hypothesis that the coefficient on the TCI is equal to zero can be 
rejected. The results indicate that the level of compliance as represented by TCI can be 
explained by the independent variables. The adjusted R-squared of TCI model in 2001 and 
2008 indicates that at least 21.4% and 47.9% of the variations in the compliance indices are 
explained by the thirteen independent variables respectively. This compares, for example, 
with the adjusted R² 42% (1992) and 24% (1995) of Weir and Laing (2000) who investigate 
whether compliance with best practice governance principles influences performance. The 
results also compare well with 46% of Fernandez-Rodriguez et al (2004) who examine 
market reaction to Spanish firms which comply with best practice corporate governance 
principles.  
The VCI model is made of recommendations from the King Code which have not 
been made compulsory by the JSE Listing Rules. Results from Table 7.5 indicate that the F-
values of the VCI regression models are statistically significant at the 1% significance level 
for both 2001 and 2008 firm years. The adjusted R-squared of VCI models in 2001 and 2008 
indicate that at least 22.3% and 47.3% (respectively) of the variations in the compliance 
indices are explained by the independent variables in the model. As such, the null hypothesis 
that the coefficient on the VCI is equal to zero can be rejected. 
Results from Table 7.5 also indicate that PROPWHITES is negative in the direction 
predicted for both TCI and VCI in 2001 while in 2008 it is negative as hypothesised and 
significant at the 1% level for all the models. These results seem to support H1 that a high 
proportion of whites in board of directors may lead to a low level of compliance with the 
King Code. This lends support to the argument that ethnicity influences the level of 
compliance with the King Code. PROPDNEDS is positive (but insignificant) for the TCI and 
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VCI models in 2001. In 2008, PROPDNEDS is positive (but insignificant) in line with the 
argument that the inclusion of non executive directors in boards may enhance their 
independence and promote good governance practice. As such H2 is rejected for the 2001 
and 2008 models. Board size (SBD) is positive and significant at the 1% level in 2001 and 
2008 in line with the argument that there is a positive relationship between board size and 
firm compliance with the King Code.  Auditor type (AUDTYPE) is positive and significant at 
the 5% level in 2001 while in 2008 it is positive and significant at the 1% level in line with 
the argument that large audit firms may have corporate reputation concerns in their dealings 
with their client firms and may insist upon good corporate practices to safeguard their 
reputation, and also to maintain a competitive edge. LISTSTATUS (listing status) is positive 
as per prediction for both models in 2001 and surprisingly negative and significant at the 1% 
level in 2008. The positive association between multiple listing status and compliance with 
the King Code is in line with the argument that, firms with foreign listings may comply more 
with the local corporate governance code because of ties to the stringent foreign stock 
exchange and pressure from its new publics.  
The negative significant relationship between compliance and LISTSTATUS in 2008 
may be attributed to the fact that as firms’ operations become more geographically dispersed, 
local managers’ cultures are more likely to be influenced by a variety of factors (e.g. non-
local managers, foreign governments and regulations, greater shareholder base, foreign 
lenders etc) (Hope et al., 2008). “As such, the influence of any particular country’s national 
culture is likely to be lower with international expansion (Hope et al., 2008, p. 358). 
Therefore it is expected that the national culture of South Africa (Ubuntu) is likely to be 
lower in JSE listed firms with multiple listings because of the influences outlined above. As 
such JSE listed firms with multiple listings may comply less with the King Code which 
recognises the national culture of South Africa (Ubuntu) because of external influence.  
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A summary of all hypotheses and results of the TCI model for 2001 and 2008 are 
presented in Tables 7.6 and 7.7. As per summary of results in Table 7.6, H3, H5 and H9 are 
rejected for the TCI models in 2001 while H1, H3, H4, H9 and H10 are accepted for the TCI 
model in 2008.
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Table 7.6 Summary of All Hypotheses and Results of the TCI Model for 2001 and 2008 
  2001  2008 
Dependent Variable  TCI  TCI 













REFLOGPROPWHITES H1 - - Insignificant Reject - Sig at 1% Accept 
REFLOGPROPDNEDS H2 + + Insignificant Reject + Insignificant Reject 
REFLOGSBD H3 + + Sig at 1% Accept + Sig at 1% Accept 
REFLOGSTA H4 + + Insignificant Reject + Sig at 1% Accept 
REFLOGLTDtoTE H5 + + Sig at 5% Accept + Insignificant Reject 
REFLOGINSTSHARE H6 + + Insignificant Reject + Sig at 5% Accept 
REFLOGDRCTSHARE H7 - + Insignificant Reject + Insignificant Reject 
REFLOGROA H8 + + Sig at 5% Accept + Insignificant Reject 
AUDTYPE H9 + + Sig at 5% Accept + Sig at 1% Accept 
LISTSTATUS H10 + + Insignificant Reject + Sig at 1% Accept 
ITYPE1 H11 -/+ + Insignificant Reject + Insignificant Reject 
ITYPE2 H12 -/+ - Insignificant Reject - Insignificant Reject 
ITYPE4 H13 -/+ - Insignificant Reject - Insignificant Reject 
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Table 7.7 Summary of All Hypotheses and Results of the VCI Model for 2001 and 2008 
























REFLOGPROPWHITES H1 - - Insignificant Reject - Sig at 1% Accept 
REFLOGPROPDNEDS H2 + + Insignificant Reject + Insignificant Reject 
REFLOGSBD H3 + + Sig at 1% Accept + Sig at 1% Accept 
REFLOGSTA H4 + + Insignificant Reject + Sig at 1% Accept 
REFLOGLTDtoTE H5 + + Sig at 5% Accept - Insignificant Reject 
REFLOGINSTSHARE H6 + + Insignificant Reject - Insignificant Reject 
REFLOGDRCTSHARE H7 - + Insignificant Reject - Sig at 5% Accept 
REFLOGROA H8 + + Sig at 5% Accept - Insignificant Reject 
AUDTYPE H9 + + Sig at 5% Accept + Sig at 1% Accept 
LISTSTATUS H10 + + Insignificant Reject - Sig at 1% Accept 
ITYPE1 H11 -/+ + Insignificant Reject - Insignificant Reject 
ITYPE2 H12 -/+ - Sig at 5% Accept - Insignificant Reject 
ITYPE4 H13 -/+ - Insignificant Reject - Insignificant Reject 
 pg. 274 
 
As indicated in Table 7.7, H3, H5, H8, H9 and H12 are accepted in 2001 for the VCI 
model while H1, H3, H4, H7, H9 and H10 are accepted in 2008 for the same model.  
 
7.2.3 Results Based on MCI and THEME1 Regression Models 
MCI model consists of nine recommendations from the King Code which have been 
adopted by the JSE Listing Rules and, as such, are compulsory for JSE listed firms. Results 
of MCI and THEME1 regression models are presented in Table 7.8. As reported in Table 7.8, 
the F-value of the MCI model in 2001 is 1.310 and insignificant at any of the three levels of 
significance. This implies that the null hypothesis that the coefficient on the MCI is equal to 
zero can be accepted. The results indicate that the level of compliance as represented by MCI 
cannot be explained by the independent variables. An explanation for the insignificant result 
for this model may be that firms may generally comply with recommendations under MCI 
because failure to do so will attract punitive measures from the JSE such as censure, fine and 
possibly delisting (JSE Listing Rules, 2007). However, in 2008, the MCI model is significant 
at the 1% level of significance with an F-value of 4.065. The adjusted R-squared value of the 
2008 model indicates that 22.8% of the variation in the model is explained by the 
independent variables and hence the null hypothesis that the coefficient on the 2008 MCI is 
equal to zero can be rejected. The significant result in this case may be explained by the fact 
that although mandatory in the context of JSE listing rules, compliance with provisions under 
MCI is largely inspirational which explains why the thirteen variables in the model may 
account for 22.8% in variation in compliance with the provisions. Table 7.8 also presents 
results of THEME1 regression model for 2001 and 2008. As reported, the model is 
significant at the 1% level in 2001 and 2008 with F-values of 2.361 and 8.766 respectively. 
The adjusted R-squared values of 2001 and 2008 model indicate that 11.6% and 42.8% of the 
variations in the compliance model are explained by the independent variables.  
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Table 7.8 OLS Regression Results of the Dependent Compliance Variables for 2001 and 2008 
  2001    2008    





t-statistic Coefficient  
Value 
t-statistic Coefficient  
Value 
t-statistic Coefficient  
Value 
t-statistic 
Constant  2.984 0.689 -0.439 -0.107 -4.152 -1.913** -10.038 -4.332*** 
REFLOGPROPWHITES - 0.135 1.427* -0.04 -0.448 -0.115 -1.413* -0.287 -4.112*** 
REFLOGPROPDNEDS + 0.192 2.046** 0.135 1.508* 0.228 2.647*** 0.081 1.092 
REFLOGSBD + 0.173 1.563* 0.26 2.46*** 0.176 1.998** 0.235 3.099*** 
REFLOGSTA + -0.091 -0.771 0.008 0.075 0.206 2.372*** 0.33 4.406*** 
REFLOGLTDtoTE + 0.121 1.294* 0.004 0.05 -0.111 -1.389* -0.026 -0.386 
REFLOGINSTSHARE + 0.101 1.055 -0.01 -0.112 -0.129 -1.59* -0.062 -0.883 
REFLOGDRCTSHARE - -0.079 -0.832 0.059 0.651 -0.137 -1.627* -0.09 -1.247 
REFLOGROA + 0.064 0.65 0.07 0.751 -0.029 -0.354 -0.034 -0.49 
AUDTYPE + 0.023 0.247 0.165 1.835** 0.144 1.634* 0.264 3.478*** 
LISTSTATUS + 0.017 0.178 0.057 0.634 -0.178 -2.101** -0.113 -1.548* 
ITYPE1 -/+ -0.046 -0.435 0.116 1.161 -0.127 -1.268 -0.054 -0.622 
ITYPE2 -/+ -0.041 -0.381 -0.012 -0.114 0.082 0.859 0.015 0.181 
ITYPE4 -/+ 0.079 0.756 0.009 0.087 -0.072 -0.757 -0.004 -0.044 
          
Adjusted R²   0.029  0.116  0.228  0.428 
Standard Error   0.05062  0.0478  0.04427  0.04727 
F Value   1.31  2.361***  4.065***  8.776*** 
No. of Observations   136  136  136  136 
Where: ***,  **  and * denote p-value is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
. 
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As reported in Table 7.8, results for PROPWHITES are mixed. In 2001 
PROPWHITES is positive and significant at the 10% level while in 2008 it is negative as per 
prediction significant at the same level (10%) for the MCI model. PROPWHITES is negative 
for THEME1 and insignificant in 2001 while in 2008 it is significant at the 1% level. 
Although the results are conflicting, they indicate that generally there is a negative 
relationship between the level of compliance with the King Code and a high proportion of 
whites in the board of directors of JSE listed firms. This is in line with the hypothesised 
argument that the individualistic culture of whites may influence firms to comply less with 
the King Code.  
Other results indicate that SBD is positive and significant for the two models in 2001 
and 2008, while STA is negative and insignificant for MCI in 2001 and positive and 
insignificant for THEME1. In 2008 STA is positive and significant at the 1% level for MCI 
and THEME1 respectively. Results for LTDtoTE are generally mixed. In 2001 the results are 
positive and mostly insignificant against prediction while in 2008 they are negative as 
predicted but insignificant. INSTSHARE and DRCTSHARE are generally negative as 
predicted for both models in both years but generally insignificant. ROA is positive and 
insignificant in 2001 and negative and insignificant in 2008. Among the control variables, 
AUDTYPE is positive and significant in line with the prediction for THEME1 of 2001. In 
2008 AUDTYPE is positive and significant at the 10% and 1% levels for MCI and THEME1 
respectively. Results for LISTSTATUS and INDTYPE are generally mixed.  
Table 7.9 and 7.10 presents a summary of the results from the MCI and THEME1 
models. Results from Table 7.9 indicate that in 2001 only H2 may be accepted for MCI. The 
results also indicate that H2, H3, H4 and H10 may be accepted in 2008. Results from Table 
7.10 indicate that H3 and H9 may be accepted in 2001 for THEME1 while in 2008 H1, H3, 
H4 and H9 are accepted.    
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Table 7.9 Summary of All Hypotheses and Results of the MCI Model for 2001 and 2008 






Dependent Variable   













REFLOGPROPWHITES H1 + + Sig at 10% Reject - Sig at 10% Reject 
REFLOGPROPDNEDS H2 + + Sig at 5% Accept + Sig at 1% Accept 
REFLOGSBD H3 + + Sig at 10% Reject + Sig at 5% Accept 
REFLOGSTA H4 + - Insignificant Reject + Sig at 1% Accept 
REFLOGLTDtoTE H5 + + Sig at 10% Reject - Sig at 10% Reject 
REFLOGINSTSHARE H6 + + Insignificant Reject - Sig at 10% Reject 
REFLOGDRCTSHARE H7 - - Insignificant Reject - Sig at 10% Reject 
REFLOGROA H8 + + Insignificant Reject - Insignificant Reject 
AUDTYPE H9 + + Insignificant Reject + Sig at 10% Reject 
LISTSTATUS H10 + + Insignificant Reject + Sig at 5% Accept 
ITYPE1 H11 -/+ - Insignificant Reject + Insignificant Accept 
ITYPE2 H12 -/+ - Insignificant Reject - Insignificant Reject 
ITYPE4 H13 -/+ + Insignificant Reject + Insignificant Reject 
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Table 7.10 Summary of All Hypotheses and Results of the THEME1 Model for 2001 and 2008 
   2001   2008   
Dependent Variable   THEME1   THEME1   













REFLOGPROPWHITES H1 - - Insignificant Reject - Sig at 1% Accept 
REFLOGPROPDNEDS H2 + + Sig at 10% Reject + Insignificant Reject 
REFLOGSBD H3 + + Sig at 1% Accept + Sig at 1% Accept 
REFLOGSTA H4 + + Insignificant Reject + Sig at 1% Accept 
REFLOGLTDtoTE H5 + + Insignificant Reject - Insignificant Reject 
REFLOGINSTSHARE H6 + - Insignificant Reject - Insignificant Reject 
REFLOGDRCTSHARE H7 - + Insignificant Reject - Insignificant Reject 
REFLOGROA H8 + + Insignificant Reject - Insignificant Reject 
AUDTYPE H9 + + Sig at 5% Accept + Sig at 1% Accept 
LISTSTATUS H10 + + Insignificant Reject - Sig at 10% Reject 
ITYPE1 H11 -/+ + Insignificant Reject - Insignificant Reject 
ITYPE2 H12 -/+ - Insignificant Reject + Insignificant Reject 
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7.2.4 Results Based on THEME2 and THEME4 
Table 7.11 presents results of THEME2 and THEME4 regression models.  
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Table 7.11 OLS Regression Results of the Dependent Compliance Variables for 2001 and 2008 
  2001  2008  2001  2008  





t-statistic Coefficient  
Value 
t-statistic Coefficient  
Value 
t-statistic Coefficient  
Value 
t-statistic 
Constant  4.258 0.783 -7.267 -2.917*** -4.266 -0.762 -12.009 -3.308*** 
REFLOGPROPWHITES - 0.015 0.164 0.012 0.144 -0.012 -0.141 -0.219 -3.047*** 
REFLOGPROPDNEDS + -0.085 -0.928 0.153 1.748** -0.014 -0.158 0.01 0.133 
REFLOGSBD + 0.218 2.016** 0.202 2.248** 0.213 2.079** 0.18 2.299** 
REFLOGSTA + -0.116 -1.008 0.283 3.205*** 0.064 0.589 0.255 3.315*** 
REFLOGLTDtoTE + 0.314 3.443*** -0.078 -0.962 0.195 2.254** -0.003 -0.043 
REFLOGINSTSHARE + 0.096 1.026 -0.045 -0.539 -0.027 -0.312 -0.034 -0.473 
REFLOGDRCTSHARE - -0.073 -0.786 -0.106 -1.246 0.034 0.387 -0.23 -3.089*** 
REFLOGROA + 0.182 1.902** -0.06 -0.73 0.194 2.141** -0.022 -0.313 
AUDTYPE + 0.03 0.323 0.079 0.885 0.187 2.148** 0.314 4.018*** 
LISTSTATUS + -0.124 -1.357* -0.11 -1.276 0.016 0.183 -0.289 -3.851*** 
ITYPE1 -/+ -0.11 -1.072 -0.175 -1.716** -0.113 -1.17 -0.089 -0.997 
ITYPE2 -/+ -0.157 -1.48* 0.019 0.192 -0.229 -2.283** -0.109 -1.294* 
ITYPE4 -/+ -0.095 -0.932 -0.17 -1.768** -0.145 -1.511 0.019 0.224 
          
Adjusted R²   0.074  0.201  0.17  0.395 
Standard Error   0.06356  0.05081  0.06547  0.07405 
F Value   1.834**     3.617***  3.121***  7.766*** 
No. of Observations   136  136  136  136 
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As can be seen from Table 7.11, THEME2 is significant at the 5% level in 2001 with 
an F-value of 1.834 and adjusted R squared of 7.4%. This implies that the null hypothesis that 
the coefficient on THEME2 model is equal to zero can be rejected in 2001. In 2001, 7.4% of 
the variation in THEME2 model is explained by the independent variables while this figure is 
20.1% in 2008. Regression analysis was not conducted for THEME3 because almost all 
companies complied with the provisions under this theme in 2001 and 2008. THEME3 
consists of provisions which relate to normal accounting reporting requirements. Generally, 
firms comply with these provisions irrespective of size, listing status and other firm 
characteristics. It is therefore not surprising that variations in compliance to THEME3 are not 
explained by the thirteen variables in the model. It should also be noted as discussed in 
section 7.2 that in 2008, compliance to provisions under THEME3 was 100% which resulted 
in the model being rejected by SPSS. A summary of the hypotheses and results of the models 
are presented in Table 7.12. 
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Table 7.12 Summary of All Hypotheses and Results of the THEME2 Models for 2001 and 2008 
   2001   2008   
Dependent Variable   THEME2   THEME2   
Independent Variables Hi Predicted 
Sign 
Actual Sign Statistical  
Significance 
Conclusion Actual Sign Statistical 
Significance 
Conclusion 
REFLOGPROPWHITES H1 - + Insignificant Reject + Insignificant Reject 
REFLOGPROPDNEDS H2 + - Insignificant Reject + Sig at 5% Accept 
REFLOGSBD H3 + + Sig at 5% Accept + Sig at 5% Accept 
REFLOGSTA H4 + - Insignificant Reject + Sig at 1% Accept 
REFLOGLTDtoTE H5 + + Sig at 1% Accept - Insignificant Reject 
REFLOGINSTSHARE H6 + + Insignificant Reject - Insignificant Reject 
REFLOGDRCTSHARE H7 - - Insignificant Reject - Insignificant Reject 
REFLOGROA H8 + + Sig at 5% Accept - Insignificant Reject 
AUDTYPE H9 + + Insignificant Reject + Insignificant Reject 
LISTSTATUS H10 + - Sig at 10% Reject - Insignificant Reject 
ITYPE1 H11 -/+ - Insignificant Reject - 5% Accept 
ITYPE2 H12 -/+ - Sig at 10% Reject + Insignificant Reject 
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As per results from Table 7.11, the coefficient of the main variable of interest, 
PROPWHITES, is positive for THEME2 model in 2001 and negative in 2008, but 
insignificant in both cases. In 2001, the coefficient of PROPWHITES is positive in contrast 
to the prediction. This does not support the prediction that compliance with the King Code 
will be low when the proportion of whites is high on boards of JSE listed companies. The 
insignificant results imply that the results are rejected. 
In 2001, two variables are significant at the 5% level of significance in the direction 
predicted i.e. SBD and ROA. LTDtoTE on the other hand is positive as per prediction and 
significant at the 1% level. In 2008, PROPDNEDS, SBD and STA are positive and 
significant in line with theoretical expectation. With regard to controls, ITYPE1 and ITYPE4 
are negative and significant at the 5% level. Table 7.13 presents regression results of 
THEME4 model for 2001 and 2008.  
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Table 7.13 Summary of All Hypotheses and Results of the THEME4 Model for 2001 and 2008 
   2001   2008   
Dependent 
Variable 
















REFLOGPROPWHITES H1 - - Insignificant Reject - Sig at 1% Accept 
REFLOGPROPDNEDS H2 + - Insignificant Reject + Insignificant Reject 
REFLOGSBD H3 + + Sig at 5% Accept + Sig at 5% Accept 
REFLOGSTA H4 + + Insignificant Reject + Sig at 1% Accept 
REFLOGLTDtoTE H5 + + Sig at 5% Accept - Insignificant Reject 
REFLOGINSTSHARE H6 + - Insignificant Reject - Insignificant Reject 
REFLOGDRCTSHARE H7 - + Insignificant Reject - Sig at 1% Accept 
REFLOGROA H8 - + Sig at 5% Accept - Insignificant Reject 
AUDTYPE H9 + + Sig at 5% Accept + Sig at 1% Accept 
LISTSTATUS H10 + + Insignificant Reject - Sig at 1% Accept 
ITYPE1 H11 + + Insignificant Reject - Insignificant Reject 
ITYPE2 H12 -/+ - Sig at 5% Accept - Sig at 10% Reject 
ITYPE4 H13 -/+ - Insignificant Reject + Insignificant Reject 
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As can be seen from Table 7.11, THEME4 is significant at the 1% level of 
significance in 2001 and 2008 respectively. In 2001, 17.0% of the variation in THEME4 
model is explained by the independent variables while this figure is 39.5% in 2008.  
Results from Table 7.11 indicate that the coefficient PROPWHITES is negative but 
insignificant in 2001 while in 2008 the coefficient is significant at the 1%, supporting the 
prediction that compliance with the King Code will be low when the proportion of whites is 
high on boards of JSE listed companies. In 2001, five control variables were significant i.e. 
SBD, LTDtoTE, ROA, AUDTYPE and ITYPE2. In 2008, PROPDNEDS was negative and 
significant at the 1% level as per prediction. SBD was positive and significant at the 5% level 
while STA, DRCTSHARE and UUDTYPE were significant at the level of 1% in the 
predicted directions. In terms of other controls LISTSTATUS and ITYPE2 were significant 
hence the acceptance of the hypotheses. 
 
7.2.5 Discussion of Regression Results 
Results from the 12 regression models indicate that one model was rejected because it 
is not significant i.e. MCI 2001, while eleven models are significant. The following 
discussion attempts to analyse results of all the eleven models. Appendix 32 (Summary of 
Regression Results for Eleven Models), presents a summary of the results of the regression 
analysis indicating which variables are positive/negative and their level of significance. 
 
a) PROPWHITES 
Out of the 11 models, PROPWHITES (the main variable of interest) was negative and 
significant at the 1% level in four models (TCI & VCI 2008 and THEME1 and 4 of 2008) 
and negative but insignificant in four models (TCI & VCI 2001, THEME1 & THEME4 
2001). PROPWHITES was also positive against prediction but insignificant in two models 
(MCI 2001 and THEME2 2008). PROPWITES was only positive and insignificant against 
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expectation in two models (THEME2 2001 and 2008). However, generally PROPWHITES 
was negative and significant as hypothesised that there is a significant and negative 
relationship between compliance with the King Code provisions and board dominance by 
whites. The significant negative results seem to support the hypothesis that culture influences 
corporate compliance with best practice corporate governance principles in SA. In this case 
they support the argument that JSE listed firms whose boards of directors are dominated by 
whites may comply less with the recommendations from the King Code because of their 
culture of individualism as discussed in chapter 4, section 4.3. For instance, they support the 
argument that boards of JSE Securities Exchange listed firms dominated by “blacks” may put 
the interests of the group (all stakeholders) before the interests of individuals (shareholders) 
and vice versa if dominated by “whites” and, as such, comply with the stakeholder-oriented 
recommendations from the King Code. If a firm is dominated by people whose culture is 
collectivist and feminine; they may influence the firm to comply with the King Code because 
the spirit of collectivism and their feminine side influences them to address issues from a 
stakeholder or Ubuntu (entire group/community) perspective. The results suggest that if 
boards of directors of JSE listed firms are dominated by whites, they may comply less with 
stakeholder oriented King Code recommendations such as board diversity, social investment, 
employment equity, human capital development among others.  
Evidence from prior literature on culture and other firm outcomes in Malaysia reports 
find a positive and mostly significant relationship between the proportion of Bumiputera 
directors on the board and corporate governance (Wahab et al., 2007). The result contrasts 
the Hofstede-Gray framework of Haniffa and Cooke (2002) which suggests that Bumiputera 
directors are more secretive compared to their Chinese counterparts. Wahab et al. (2007) 
reason that since high secrecy may be associated with lower disclosure, their results suggest 
that Bumiputera directors are less secretive and are more willing to inform investors about 
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firms’ governance structures.  Overall, results of these studies seem to indicate that culture 
has an influence on corporate governance practices.  
 
b) Non-Executive Directors 
Of the eleven models, PROPDNEDs (percentage of non-executive directors on the 
boards) is positive for 9 models although insignificant except for THEME1 2001 (at 10%) 
MCI 2008 (at 5%) and THEME2 2008 (at 5%).  As such, H2 is accepted for the latter two 
models and rejected for the rest. However, the positive but insignificant relationship is 
consistent with the popular view that the inclusion of non-executive directors on boards of 
directors may enhance their independence and promote good governance practices. 
Empirically, the results are in accordance with evidence from prior South African studies of 
Ho and Williams (2003) and Mangena and Chamisa (2008) that indicate that more NEDs 
impact positively on firm outcomes. The results are also consistent with the evidence from 
disclosure studies which indicate that proportion of NEDs on boards of directors influences 
voluntary corporate disclosure (e.g. Gul and Leung, 2004; Chen and Jaggi, 2000).  
However, the finding are in contrast to previous corporate governance evidence (e.g., 
Ntim, 2009; Weir and Laing, 2000; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006), which report a negative link 
between the percentage of NEDs and ROA. The results are also in contrast to the findings 
from disclosure studies which report that the proportion of NEDs on boards of directors is 
negatively associated firm disclosure (e.g. Barako et al., 2006; Eng and Mak, 2003; Haniffa 
and Cooke, 2002, 2005). More importantly, the findings are in accordance with the 
expectations of the King Code (I & II) and more recently King III which promote the 
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c) Board Size 
Board size (SBD) is positive and significant in all the eleven models. SBD is positive 
and significant at the: 1% level for TCI 2001 and 2008, VCI 2001 and 2008, VCI 2001 and 
2008; THEME1 2001 and 2008; 5% level for MCI 2008 and THEME2  and THEME4 for 
both years. This accepts hypothesis 4, that there is a statistically significant and positive 
relationship between board size and firm compliance with the King Code.  
The positive significant result supports results of prior studies that document a 
statistically significant and positive link between board size and accounting returns (e.g. 
Alves and Mendes, 2004; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Mangena and Chamisa, 2008; Sanda et 
al., 2005; Weir and Laing, 2000).  However, the results are in contrast to evidence of prior 
South African studies (e.g. Ho and Williams, 2003; Mangena and Chamisa, 2008; Ntim, 
2009), as well as other international evidence (e.g. Eisenberg et al., 1998; Kiel and 
Nicholson, 2003; Shabbir and Padgett, 2005). For instance, Ntim (2009) reports a statistically 
insignificant and negative relationship between board size and ROA, whereas Ho and 
Williams (2003) report similar results between board size and the value added by a firm’s 
physical and intellectual resources, using a sample of 84 South African firms. Theoretically, 
these results imply that larger boards are effective in ensuring that South African listed firms 
comply with good governance principles as recommended by the King Code. 
 
d) Institutional Shareholding 
Results for institutional shareholding (INSTSHARE) from the eleven models are 
mixed. For instance, in four models the results are positive but mostly insignificant while in 
seven models the results are negative and insignificant except for MCI 2008 (at the 5% level). 
The results mean that hypothesis 6 is not supported and hence rejected. However, the 
insignificant negative results are consistent with prior literature which finds no evidence of 
exertion of pressure by institutional investors to comply with the Cadbury Code (e.g. 
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Dedman, 2000). The findings are also consistent with the popular view that South African 
institutional investors have not yet actively and publicly intervened in CG affairs (e.g. 
Vaughn and Ryan, 2006). However, the results are inconsistent with evidence from 
disclosure studies which report a positive statistically significant relationship between 
institutional share ownership and firm outcomes (e.g. Ntim, 2009; Mangena and Tauringana, 
2007). The results are also inconsistent with the findings from McConnell and Servaes (1990) 
who document a positive relationship between institutional shareholding and financial 
performance. The results are not consistent with the theoretical view that, due to their relative 
financial clout, reputation, knowledge and information advantages, institutional shareholders 
can impact positively on internal CG structures and financial performance by exerting their 
influence on board structures, composition, and functioning (e.g. Shabbir and Padgett, 2005, 
p. 22; Young et al., 2008, p. 1108).  
 
e) Director Share Ownership  
Results on director share ownership (DRCTSHARE) are also mixed across the eleven 
models. For instance, five models indicate a positive but insignificant result (i.e. TCI 2001 
and 2008, VCI 2001, THEME1 2001, and THEME 4 2001). Other models indicate an 
insignificant negative result e.g. MCI 2001 & 2008, THEME1 2008 and THEME2 2001 & 
2008. THEME4 2008 on the other hand indicates a significant negative result at the 1% level. 
These results show that hypothesis 7 is accepted for THEME4 2008 and rejected for the other 
models because the hypothesis is generally not supported.  
The negative result is consistent with results of previous South African studies (e.g., 
Ntim, 2009; Ho and Williams, 2003; Mangena and Chamisa, 2008). For instance, Ntim 
(2009) finds a negative relationship between director share ownership and ROA using a 
sample of 500 firm years in his study to investigate corporate compliance and performance. 
The negative result is also in line with findings from disclosure studies which report a 
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negative association between disclosure and director share ownership (e.g. Eng and Mak, 
2003). 
 
f) Other Variables 
Firm size (STA) is found to be positive and statistically significant at 1% level for 
TCI, VCI, MCI, THEME1, THEME2 and THEME4 all in 2008. As for other models STA is 
positive and insignificant for TCI, VCI, THEME1 and THEME4 all for 2001. SAT is 
negative against prediction but insignificant for MCI 2001. Generally, STA results indicate a 
positive association between the level of firm compliance with best practice corporate 
governance principles and firm size. The positive coefficient on firm size offers empirical 
support to past evidence, which suggests a positive link between firm size and firm outcomes 
(e.g. Weir and Laing, 2000; Gul and Leung, 2004; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; Barako et al., 
2006).  
Audit firm size (AUDTYPE) was positive and statistically significant at the 1% level 
for TCI, VCI, THEME1 and THEME4 of 2008. AUDTYPE was also positive and significant 
at the 1% level for TCI, VCI, THEME1 and THEME4 in 2008. It was also positive and 
significant at the 5% level for TCI, VCI, THEME and THEME4 in 2001 and insignificant for 
the rest of other models. Generally the results for AUDTYPE are in line with theoretical 
expectations that firms audited by Big 4 audit firms will comply more with good governance 
principles. The result is also consistent with prior literature on corporate governance and firm 
disclosure (e.g. Eng and Mak, 2003). However, the result is in contrast to other previous CG 
evidence (e.g. Gul and Leung, 2004; Barako et al., 2006).  
Listing status (LISTSTATUS) was found to be positive and significant at the 1% level 
in 2008 for TCI and VCI and positive and significant at the 5% level for MCI in 2008. 
LITSTATUS was also positive but insignificant for TCI, VCI THEME 1 & 4 off 2001. It was 
however negative and significant at the 1% level for VCI 2008. Also THEME1 2008, 
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THEME2 for both years and THEME4 2008 recorded a negative relationship with 
LISTSTATUS. Generally, the results are mixed. The mixed results may be explained in two 
ways. First, the results suggest that listing in foreign stock exchanges may influence firms to 
comply with best practice corporate governance principles both locally and internationally to 
enhance their reputation and to signal a reputation of being well governed which may 
ultimately attract stakeholder support (Klapper and Love, 2004, p. 713).  The results also 
support the argument that foreign stock exchanges in more developed markets may have 
stringent listing requirements. As such a local firm which seeks listing in a foreign stock 
exchange may have to meet stringent requirements at the new stock exchange. The firm may 
face stricter corporate governance guidelines, which may alter the behaviour of its 
parent/subsidiary company (Black et al., 2006, p. 403; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002, p. 329).  
Secondly, the negative results may suggest that the influence of the SA national culture 
on JSE firms with multiple listings (hence geographically dispersed operations), is low because 
local managers’ of these firms are influenced by a variety of factors. According to Hope et al. 
(2008) these factors include among others; non-local managers, foreign governments and 
regulations, greater shareholder base, foreign lenders etc . “As such, the influence of any 
particular country’s national culture is likely to be lower with international expansion (Hope 
et al., 2008, p. 358). As such the national culture of South Africa (Ubuntu) is may be lower in 
JSE listed firms with multiple listings because of the influences outlined above hence the 
negative association between compliance and LUISTSTATUS.  
The results for debt (LTDtoTE) are mixed across the eleven models e.g. positive and 
significant at the 1% level for THEME2 of 2001 and positive and significant at the 5% level for 
TCI, VCI and THEME1 of 2001. However, the results are also negative and insignificant for TCI 
and VCI, THEME1, THEME2 and THEME4 all of 2008 and negative but insignificant for the 
remaining models. Generally the results are positive as per prediction but insignificant, while in 
2008, they tended to show a negative relationship between debt and the level of firm compliance. 
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The negative relationship is contrary to the agency theory perspective that debt financing 
constrains managerial expropriation through the imposition of fixed obligations on corporate 
cash flow (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). As such the level of debt financing has the potential 
to influence corporate managers to comply with best practice corporate governance 
principles. The positive relationship on the other hand is consistent with the view that the 
more critical the resources controlled by a stakeholder group, the more it will compel an 
organisation to fulfil the expectations (Deegan and Unerman, 2006). Hence the results 
support the argument that debt holders may compel an organisation comply with best practice 
corporate governance principles if they perceive that compliance with good governance 
principles such as the King Code reduces the risk of firm failure. 
Profitability (ROA) was found to be generally positive and significant at the 5% level 
for TCI, VCI, THEME1 and 4 for 2001 models. This contrasted with 2008 results which 
indicated insignificant negative results for VCI, THEME1 and 2. On the other hand MCI was 
negative and significant at 10% level while THEME4 recorded a strong negative significant 
(at the 1% level) result. The negative results do not support the hypothesis that financially 
healthy firms are in a better position to implement good corporate governance practices such 
as the ones recommended by the King Code to signal that the firm is profitable because of 
good corporate governance practices. The positive relationship on the other hand supports the 
argument that  management of profitable firms may choose to comply with good corporate 
governance principles as a way of demonstrating that good governance practices result in 
enhanced profitability (Inchausti, 1997). This will bolster the managers’ reputation and 
enhance the value of their human capital in a competitive labour market. 
In terms of industry variables, the results are generally inconclusive owing to the 
mixed results for both 2001 and 2008 across the 11 models. The results show that some 
industry control variables were significant in 2001 and 2008. For instance, ITYPE1 was 
negative and significant at the 5% level for THEME2 of 2008 while ITYPE2 was negative 
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and significant at the 5% level for THEME1 and THEME4 of 2001.  Generally these results 
are inconclusive. 
 
7.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
This section discusses results based on a series of robustness or sensitivity analyses 
tests. The main objective is to try and examine how the results reported in section 7.2 are 
robust or sensitive to alternative explanations and or estimations. More specifically, a series 
of sensitivity analyses tests are conducted on the variable PROPWHITES and firm size 
(STA) to try and determine how changes in these variables may affect the results. Regression 
analyses are conducted for TCI, THEME1 and THEME4 models only.  These three models 
were selected because of the following reasons; TCI consists of all the items in the 
compliance checklist, while THEME1 consists of most of the boards and directors issues 
which form the nucleus of best practice corporate governance principles. THEME4 on the 
other hand consists of integrated social responsibility variables (social compliance).  
 First, a dummy variable is introduced for the mean proportion of whites in board of directors 
(PROPBLACKSSENSI) and regression analysis is conducted for the abovementioned 
models. Secondly, the findings are re-analysed to test the influence of firm size by separating 
the sample into large firms and small firms, first using the median as separator, and second 
using lower quartile versus upper quartile. 
 
7.3.1 Results Based on the Introduction of a Dummy Variable in the PROPWHITES 
Variable 
As already explained, a dummy variable was introduced in the model for the variable 
PROPWHITES. All companies with board domination of 51% and more were deemed to be ‘white’ 
dominated while those with 49% and less were considered to be ‘black’ dominated. As such, the 
variable was changed to a categorical variable. Regression analysis was conducted after replacing the 
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PROPWHITES continuous variable with the PROPWHITES/BLACKS categorical variable. 
Results for all the models were significant at the 1% (see Appendices 32a to 32F Sensitivity 
Analysis) indicating that the level of compliance as represented by the models can be 
explained by the independent variables. The results indicate that, in 2001, 
PROPWHITES/BLACKS was negative for all the three models (TCI, THEME1 and 
THEME4) as per prediction but insignificant, while in 2008 it was negative for all the models 
and significant at the 10% and 5% level for the TCI and THEME1 models respectively. The 
negative results although not significant lend support to the argument that ethnicity influences 
compliance as per theoretical prediction. The negative results are also in accordance with the 
findings in section 7.2 and are not sensitive to the tests which were conducted. Generally, 
other variables generally show the expected signs. 
 
7.3.2 Results Based on the Influence of Firm Size  
 
Sensitivity analysis was also conducted on firm size (STA). First, the sample size was 
split into two using the median as separator between small and large firms (STASMALLSSA 
and STALARGESSA). Secondly, the sample size was split in terms of the upper and lower 
quartiles. The new variables were introduced in the models and regression analysis conducted 
to test the influence of firm size on the extent of compliance with the Code. In the case of the 
first sensitivity analysis test, firm size (STASMALLSSA – indicating small firms) was positive 
for TCI and THEME4 (significant (P<0.05%) and negative for THEME1. In 2008, the results 
were negative and significant for all the models. The negative results indicate an inverse 
relationship between firm size and compliance with best practice corporate governance 
principles. These results support the theoretical argument that small firms unlike their large 
counterparts are not visible to the public’s and hence not subject to greater political and 
regulatory pressure from external interests (Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989). They also support 
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the argument that in contrast to large firms small firms are not subject to scrutiny by the 
media and as such may not suffer bad publicity and the imposition of more regulations 
following non-compliance than large firms (Dedman, 2000). As such, small firms are not 
under pressure (unlike large firms) from their publics to ensure that they are perceived as 
operating within the norms and bounds of their respective societies. The results are therefore 
consistent with the findings in section 7.2. 
In the second instance, two variables were introduced to the models (e.g. 
LOWERQSTA and UPPERQSTA) to test the influence of firm size on compliance. In 2001, 
UPPERQSTA was positive but insignificant for all the models, while LOWERQSTA was 
positive and significant for all the three models at 5% (for TCI and THEME4) and 10% 
(THEME1) levels. In 2008, UPPERQSTA was negative and statistically significant across all 
models while LOWERQSTA was positive in all the models but statistically significant for TCI 
and THEME1 at 5% and 1% respectively. The 2008 results are mixed and in conflict with the 
theoretical prediction that large firms will comply more with best practice corporate 
governance principles as discussed in chapter 4, section 4.1.3.1. As such the results are 
inconclusive and are sensitive when sample size is split in terms of quartiles. 
 
7.4 Findings Based on Perceptions of Key Stakeholders 
Unlike prior literature (e.g. Deutsche Bank, 2002; Ntim, 2009; Weir and Laing, 2000; 
Werder et al., 2005), this research sought to find out the views of key stakeholders such as 
King Code Commissioners, company directors, compliance managers and non-governmental 
organisations/civil society organisations (NGO/CSO). The opinions of key stakeholders 
(Appendix 28: List of Code Names of Respondents) were sought on the King Code, 
compliance with the Code and the effect or impact of the Code in the SADC region.  
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7.4.1 Opinion on King Code 
Generally the views of key stakeholders are that the King Code provides them with 
guidelines and serves as a reference point in terms of how to conduct the affairs of 
companies. However, the ability of the King Code to influence behaviours of company 
managers is entirely dependent on the honesty of management. This is because corporate 
governance involves “both human and non-human resources or techniques as well as the 
interaction between the two Haniffa and Cooke (2005, p. 392). As such, best practice CG 
principles such as the King Code, may not necessarily achieve their intended objective(s) 
because of the human element. First, respondents highlighted that there will always be 
conflict between the intentions/motives of people charged with implementing CG principles 
and the objectives of CG principles; second, there will be problems of interpretation of the 
Code which may ultimately affect implementation and finally, the Code may not necessarily 
be embraced in good spirit e.g. some managers may comply with the letter and not the spirit 
of the Code (Deutsche Bank, 2002), i.e. a “tick box” exercise. 
7.4.2 Opinions on Promotion of CG Standards in SA 
The views of key stakeholders generally suggest that corporate governance standards 
in SA have improved following the introduction of the King Code. As discussed in Chapter 7, 
compliance with the King Code increased between 2002 and 2008, which shows that JSE 
listed firms have embraced good practice governance principles. According to key 
stakeholders, improvement of CG standards in SA is also evident from capital inflow to SA 
since the introduction of the first King Code in 1994. Foreign investors are confident to invest 
in the equities of SA listed companies because of the reputation for strong corporate 
governance practices resulting from the King Code.  
However, the view that King Code has improved corporate governance standards in 
SA was not shared by all key stakeholders. While King Code Commissioners and internal 
company stakeholders were of the view that the Code has improved corporate governance 
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standards in SA, others such as secretary general of a labour union movement in SA 
expressed a divergent view on whether the King Code had improved corporate governance 
standards in SA. The labour union movement argue that company ownership, directorships of 
companies and inequities which existed in the SA economy during apartheid, are still existent 
despite the major strides SA has made in terms of political reform.  This view has been 
echoed in South Africa in recent times by prominent ruling party activists (SAPA, 2010).  
The view of the labour movement on corporate governance is that, fundamental issues 
of black economic empowerment have to be addressed before an assessment of whether 
corporate governance standards in SA have improved as a result of the King Code. In a way 
the perception of labour union movement is that blacks are still excluded from company 
ownership, directorships and senior management except for a few elite who have benefited 
from the BEE (Southall, 2006, p. 64). The movement argues that BEE has failed to address 
the problem of disempowerment among blacks. BEE has been critiqued for the creation of a 
small but remarkably wealthy ANC-connected ‘empowerment elite’ (Southall, 2006, p. 67). 
This small elite was peculiarly favoured by South Africa’s largest companies offering to sell 
or grant them equity stakes at advantageous terms, often financed by the sellers themselves, 
in return for connections to government and the black market place (Southall, 2006, p. 75).  
 
7.4.2.1 Opinions on Other CG Issues (“Tenderpreneuring”) 
 Despite improvements in corporate governance standards in SA, stakeholders also 
raised some governance issues such as corruption and bribery. Respondents highlighted a 
new wave of corruption called “tender-preneuring”, a term formed from the words tender 
and entrepreneurship. Through tender-preneuring, contracts for large public works like 
building roads are awarded through corrupt means by making use of family members and 
friends in top positions in public authority, the central government and the local council. This 
problem highlights a culture of poor disclosure and accountability practices on the part of 
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public officers in SA. A code of conduct for public officers with regard to disclosure of 
interests may best address this problem. Alternatively, public officers may be compelled to 
disclose their interests through a public disclosure Act. Disclosures could be made in a 
register which may be available for public viewing. This to some degree may address the 
problem of conflict of interests. Further suggestions were made by some respondents to 
employ what are termed life style audits by auditing lifestyles of public officers to combat 
corruption. 
 
7.4.3 Opinions on Suitability of King Code to South Africa 
The King Code borrows heavily from the Cadbury Report of UK. It was therefore 
important to get the perspectives of key stakeholders on whether copying or “mimicking” 
(Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006, p. 1057) recommendations from a Code developed in a 
developed country like the UK, and implementing it in a developing country like South 
Africa could have the same desired effect similar to that in the developed country.  Generally 
the views of other respondents on the issue of mimicking, was that although the King Code 
borrows from the Cadbury Report of the UK, it takes into account local circumstances such 
as the BEE which is unique to South Africa and not other countries.  
 
7.4.4 Opinions on Compliance 
On the issue of compliance, key stakeholders are of the view that companies comply 
more with boards and directors issues, because that section is probably the most ‘influential 
in companies and probably the most visible.’ It is ‘visible’ because people can see the 
composition of company boards, the structure of companies, board committees and question 
why the structures are not in accordance with recommended best practice.  
Respondents opine that companies were not complying in good faith more especially 
on sustainability reporting. They mentioned that companies were reporting “in a silo of 
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sustainability and a lot of companies are guilty of green-washing”. For instance they will talk 
about what they are doing for the “green” but “showing nothing on how those environmental 
issues impact on the business and how the business is impacting on the environment.” 
Generally, respondents alluded to the fact that claims of compliance with integrated 
sustainability reporting by JSE listed firms were not backed by evidence of compliance with 
regard to how company activities were impacting the environment and how the environment 
was impacting company activities and that reporting on integrated sustainability was not 
linked to long term strategies of companies.  
 
7.4.4.1 Compliance with Letter and not Spirit of the Code (Tokenism Compliance) 
Respondents spoke against tokenism appointments in boards of JSE listed firms. They 
argue that a board of directors in a South African company should represent the diverse 
nature of the SA population. Generally, respondents were of the view that “tokenism 
appointments” to boards of directors are not in the best interests of the company and are 
dishonest. According to respondents, tokenism appointment of blacks (“box-ticking for image 
purposes”) to boards of directors is a “gross violation of a company’s fiduciary 
responsibilities and irresponsible.” They contend that, the reason for bringing ethnicity into 
King II was to break the strangle hold of a select group of people who tend to circulate 
among all the boards, that was existing in the boards of directors in South Africa as does exist 
in many other countries like the US and UK.  
Another form of tokenism appointment noted by stakeholders is fronting. Under 
“fronting” a black person is appointed to be the spokesperson or the face of the company on 
national television, radio interviews and other media such as in print media. Because the BEE 
policy rewards the appearance of black ownership and management by awarding government 
contracts and tenders to compliant companies, it inadvertently invites companies to use 
superficial means to seem compliant. It encourages illegal "fronting" in which some 
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companies superficially use black people as token directors for the purpose of winning 
government contracts. These perspectives are supported by reports of scrutiny of sham BEE 
deals in the financial media. For instance, in some cases a black person, such as a gardener, is 
identified as a director or shareholder of a company in white hands, but that person derives no 
benefit from and has no say in the company (de Waal, 2010). Fronting can take different 
forms: sometimes black people were unwittingly used as fronts; sometimes they were 
promised a 51 percent stake that never materialised; and sometimes they knowingly and 
willingly acted as fronts for a fee or commission (Marais, 2010). These acts according to 
Marais (2010) constitute fraud which must be punishable by law. These acts highlights the 
shortcomings of BEE, that it tends to focus heavily on company ownership and management. 
As such companies tend to cynically think that this is all that is required for transformation
39
.  
Marais (2010) argues that BEE empowerment should move away from focussing only on 
boardroom transformation (empowering a small elite) to broad-based economic 
empowerment by getting business to commit to skills development and on-the-job training so 
that marginalized workers can enjoy economic freedom (Marais, 2010). Also, the Department 
of Trade and Industry's Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) Advisory Council proposed 
legislation which criminalises BEE fronting (Marais, 2010).  
 
7.5 Chapter Summary 
The main aim of this chapter is to answer three questions of this research. In this way, 
the chapter presents regression results of compliance with the King Code, results of factors 
which influence compliance to the King Code and results of opinions of key stakeholders on 
the Code and corporate governance in SA.  In this regard, the chapter attempted to discuss 
                                                          
39
 To benefit from government empowerment contracts sometimes businesses appoint politically connected 
individuals. As such this creates the problem whereby BEE does nothing to actually create further opportunities 
for the marginalised in society as the BEE model usually means that only the same minority of connected elites 
benefit from empowerment deals. Having benefitted from the model, these individuals, who should no longer 
qualify as economically disadvantaged, often continue to benefit to the detriment of real redistribution of wealth 
to the majority (Marais, 2010). 
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regression results of compliance indices on ethnicity, corporate governance and some control 
variables. First, descriptive statistics of both the dependent variables and independent 
variables are discussed and tests conducted to ensure that the data does not violate OLS 
assumptions. Regression analysis is conducted for the thirteen models.  As per results from 
the chapter, eleven models out of thirteen were significant indicating that the variations in the 
compliance indices are explained by the variables in the models. Ethnicity was found to have 
a negative relationship with compliance in accordance with the prediction. Results of other 
variables such as board size and non-executive directors were also in accordance with 
predictions while other variables were in contrast to theoretical predictions e.g. institutional 
shareholding and director shareholding. The chapter also attempted to discuss the views of 
key stakeholders who were interviewed in this research. Generally, key stakeholders consider 
the King Code important for SA. They also attribute improvement in corporate governance 
standards in SA to the introduction of the Code. 
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8 Chapter Eight: Conclusion, Summary of Findings, Implications of 
the Research, Limitations and Avenues for Future Research 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the conclusions of the thesis. It seeks to achieve five main 
objectives. First, it summarises the research findings. In this regard, the research findings based 
on the: levels of compliance with the South African King Code, factors which influence 
compliance to the Code and the views of key stakeholders on the Code and corporate governance 
in general in SA. As such, the chapter discusses the research findings on whether JSE listed 
firms are complying with the King Code and the extent of such compliance. Secondly, the 
chapter discusses factors which influence compliance with the Code focussing particularly on 
whether ethnicity influences compliance. Third, the chapter summarises the perceptions of 
key stakeholders with regard to the importance of the King Code, compliance with the Code 
and their opinions on the influence of the Code in the SADC region. Fourth, the chapter tries 
to present the implications and recommendations of the research findings. Lastly, the 
contribution to research, research limitations and avenues for future research will also be 
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8.2 Summary of Research Findings 
 
As discussed in chapter one, this research sought to answer three main research 
objectives. First, to examine the extent to which JSE Securities Exchange listed companies 
comply with key aspects of the inclusive approach to CG as recommended by the King Code. 
Secondly, to examine whether ethnicity of board structure (Board Dominance) influences 
compliance with the King Code. Third, to investigate whether company characteristics, 
market and performance related variables are related to compliance with code. Finally, to 
examine the views/opinions of key stakeholders [e.g. regulators, King Code Commissioners, 
companies and institutional investors] regarding the state of corporate governance in SA. The 
motivation to investigate these aspects is borne out of a number of factors.  
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First, corporate governance is an activity which involves both human and non-human 
resources or techniques as well as the interaction between the two (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005, 
p. 392). These humans have cultural background and as per Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) 
culture partially accounts for the behaviour and actions of individuals. Because of these 
unique characteristics between people from different backgrounds, socialisation processes, 
religion etc (cultural traits), it is clear that culture is important to examine with regard to CG.  
In the context of this study, the importance of culture emanates from the cultural 
differences based on ethnic backgrounds of blacks and whites in SA. SA, the focus of study, 
is a country with a history of colonisation by Dutch and English settlers, followed by more 
than four decades of apartheid (West, 2006, p. 435). Under apartheid, blacks were not 
allowed to play a meaningful role in the economy of their country (South African 
Government, 2007). For instance, they received rudimentary schooling, were forbidden to 
organisation trade unions or engage in collective bargaining, forbidden to work in urban 
centres and proscribed by law from filling skilled and better paid jobs (Malherbe and Segal, 
2001; South African Government, 2007). In short, they did not participate in management of 
direction of companies. Following the 1994 democratic elections, blacks were allowed to 
have a meaningful participation in the economy of their country following the dismantling of 
apartheid (Vaughn and Ryan, 2006). Blacks are now allowed to be CEO/MDs of 
corporations, shareholders in these corporations, board members and board chairs. Given this 
development, it is interesting to investigate how corporations may behave when their 
structures are dominated by blacks and whites. This is even more interesting taking into 
account the fact that the cultures of the two main ethnic groups are different. For instance, the 
black culture (Ubuntu) is largely considered to be collectivist while the white culture is 
individualistic (Booysen, 2000; Karsten and Illa, 2005). As such this study will test as to 
whether ethnicity influences compliance with good governance principles as recommended 
by the King Code. 
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Second, the King Code of SA is a unique code compared to other codes like the 
Cadbury Report (1992) because it takes the SA local circumstances into consideration i.e. it 
takes into account the culture of the context in which CG is practised i.e. the Ubuntu culture 
of blacks. Third, it is also interesting to examine compliance with the King Code because 
despite having the best CG code around the world (e.g. McKingsey, 2000 CLSA, 2000), SA 
has experienced a spate of CG scandals pre- and post-revision hence the need to investigate 
compliance with the Code. This study will also contribute to the scarce literature on CG in 
Africa and CG in general. 
Compliance in the context of this study was limited to disclosure compliance in the 
corporate annual reports of JSE listed firms. Compliance with the Code is not mandatory, 
while disclosure relating to the Code is. As such, failure to disclose compliance or failure to 
provide a statement of non-compliance constitutes failure to comply. Specifically, using a 
sample of 136 JSE Securities Exchange listed firms for 2001 (pre-review) and 2008 (post-
review) of the Code, a scoring of 53 items was prepared and completed for all 136 
companies. A SACGCI was used to measure (in percentage) the extent to which companies 
embrace the recommendations from the Code. The index was further disaggregated into 
various themes i.e. THEME1 (boards and directors), THEME2 (risk management); THEME3 
(accounting and auditing) and THEME4 (integrated sustainability reporting). This enabled 
the research to examine whether JSE listed firms comply equally with all provisions across 
themes.  
Unlike prior literature, the study also examined whether ethnicity influences 
compliance with the Code. On the basis of the literature search and applicability to the 
environment in SA, hypotheses were developed to test whether ethnicity, company and 
market related variables influence compliance. In addition, and in a departure from most 
studies on CG, the study went further by examining the views of key stakeholders on 
compliance with the King Code.  
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In the next sub-sections, the research findings as discussed in Chapters Six and Seven 
are summarised. Specifically, sub-section 8.1.1 will summarise the research findings based 
on extent of corporate compliance with the King Code. Subsection 8.1.2 will offer a summary 
of the research findings based on factors which influence compliance with the King Code, 
including whether ethnicity influences compliance with the King Code. Section 8.1.3 will 
offer a summary of findings based on perceptions of key stakeholders. 
 
8.2.1 Findings based on Extent of Compliance to the King Code 
 
As discussed in Chapter Seven, this study sought to investigate the extent of 
compliance with the King Code by measuring compliance with the Code through a 
compliance checklist (CC). The CC consisted of 48 items for 2001 and 53 items for 2008, 
because some items were not covered in 2001. The Code was divided into voluntary (VCI), 
mandatory (MCI), total (TCI) compliance and four themes: THEME1 – Boards and 
Directors, THEME2 – Risk Management, THEME 3 – Accounting and Auditing and 
THEME4 – Integrated Sustainability Reporting. As per compliance indices under each theme 
and consistent with prior studies (e.g. Ntim, 2009), the findings from Chapter Six indicate 
that the level of compliance with the SACGCI increased substantially between 2001 and 
2008. For instance, in 2001 the extent of compliance with the various themes was as follows 
(2008 figures in parenthesis): TCI 40.6% (74.2%), VCI 36.1% (71.7%), MCI 60.2% (86.3%), 
THEME1 38.4% (71.8%), THEME2 44.8% (81.1%), THEME3 78.2% (99.0%) and 
THEME4 31.5% (67.9%). The highest increase in compliance was registered under THEME4 
at 115.6% and the least increase in compliance was registered under THEME3 at 26.6%. 
THEME4 was the least theme complied with both in 2001 and 2008 while THEME3 
registered the highest compliance in both 2001 and 2008. The reason for high compliance 
with THEME3 is possibly because THEME3 consists of items which relate to normal 
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accounting disclosure practices which companies regularly disclose in annual reports as per 
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). THEME4, on the other hand, consists of 
items relating to social and environmental reporting. The low level of compliance to this 
theme indicates that JSE sample firms are not complying with recommendations under this 
theme possibly because the theme consists of non-financial reporting issues. Research has 
established that any organisation facing a conflict between its financial performance 
(performance that affected share price dividend) and its social environmental performance is 
bound to give preference to the financial (Gray and Milne, 2002). Opinion based surveys by 
KPMG (2006) and Deutsche Bank (2002) also found that there is ample room for 
improvement on compliance with recommendations on integrated sustainability reporting by 
JSE listed firms.  
These results suggest that JSE sample firms do not fully embrace the triple bottom 
line reporting as espoused in the King Code e.g. although companies do generally recognise 
that they no longer exist independently of the societies/communities and environment in 
which they do business, as recommended by the King Code, there is still room for 
improvement with regard to compliance with this aspect. This aspect of the Code makes it 
unique compared to other Codes such as Cadbury (1992). Integrated sustainability reporting 
in the context of SA is in line with the Ubuntu concept of helping thy neighbour and also in 
addressing the legacy of apartheid which disadvantaged blacks by excluding them from 
meaningful participation in the economy of their country. As such, low compliance with this 
recommendation may imply that JSE sample firms are to some degree rejecting the Ubuntu 
culture because, as already discussed in Chapter Six, their structures are dominated by people 
who are not from this culture i.e. people from the individualistic culture. Also, the low 
compliance with integrated sustainability reporting could be attributed to the fact that 
yesterday’s oppressors (under apartheid) are being asked through integrated sustainability 
reporting to make good their past misdeeds, taking into account the fact that structures of JSE 
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sample firms, as per the findings from Chapter Six, are dominated by whites, and hence are 
rejecting this call by the King Code. As noted in Chapter Six and section 8.1.1.1, blacks have 
not yet made inroads into corporate SA (except for a small cortege of politically connected 
elite (Southall, 2006) despite government intervention strategies to try and bring them on 
board. Low compliance to THEME4 may also help to explain why blacks have not been able 
to make inroads into corporate SA. 
 
8.2.2 Findings Based on Factors which Influence Compliance with the King Code  
The following sub-sections discuss summary of findings in terms of frequency of 
compliance with the King Code and regression results. 
8.2.2.1 Findings Based on extent of Compliance and Firm Characteristics 
Frequency of compliance with the SACGCI (e.g. TCI, VCI, MCI, and THEME1 to 4) 
was further analysed in terms of firm size, auditor type, listing status and industry type. 
Consistent with findings of prior literature (e.g. CLSA, 2000; KPMG, 2006; Deutsche Bank, 
2002; Ntim, 2009; Werder et al, 2005) the analyses indicate that the frequency of compliance 
with the King Code is high amongst larger firms, firms audited by Big 4 audit firms and firms 
with multiple listings in other stock exchanges. For instance, taking TCI as an example, 
frequency of compliance for large firms (small firms) was 41.5% (31.2%) in 2001 and 80.0% 
(67.2%) in 2008. This indicates that on average large firms complied with 41.5% of the 
provisions in the CC in 2001 and 80% of the provisions in 2008 compared to 31.2% and 
67.2% for small firms respectively. As already discussed, large firms also have additional 
incentives of reducing political costs of strict central regulation or even nationalisation 
through increased disclosure (Andreasson, 2009; Watts and Zimmermann, 1978, p. 115). As 
such, large firms may comply more and disclose their CG practices more than small firms. 
As already mentioned, the results also indicate that frequency of compliance with the 
King Code was high among firms audited by Big 4 audit firms compared with their 
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counterparts audited by non-Big 4 audit firms. Prior literature argues that because of the cost 
implications with regard to compliance with CG rules, larger firms can be expected to be 
better able to afford the costs of compliance compared to small firms (Botosan, 1997; Lang 
and Lundholm, 1993). Big 4 audit firms may also not be affordable to small firms. As a 
result, compliance with CG rules tends to be low among firms audited by non-Big 4 audit 
firms. 
As for industry types, frequency of compliance was not very different across the four 
industry types. This may be attributed to the fact that the industry types consist of different 
industry groups. 
 
8.2.2.2 Regression Results on Compliance with the Code 
8.2.2.2.1 Ethnicity Variables 
As already discussed in Chapter Six, only one ethnicity variable was tested in this 
study because the number of blacks in the structures of JSE sample firms is insufficient to 
conduct OLS tests. As such, only PROPWHITES (proportion of whites on board of 
directors/proportion of blacks on board of directors) was tested to determine whether 
ethnicity influences compliance. The findings from the study indicate that that there is a 
negative relationship between PROPWHITES and compliance with the King Code. The 
negative relationship (although insignificant) was registered across all models in 2001. In 
2008, PROPWHITES was negative and significant for four models (i.e. TCI at 5% level, VCI 
at 1% level, THEME1 at 1% level, and THEME4 at 5% level) as per prediction and negative 
but insignificant for MCI model. However, it was positive and insignificant for THEME2 
against prediction.  
Generally, these results indicate that ethnicity influences compliance with the King 
Code. For instance, the results seem to support the argument that compliance with best 
practice corporate governance principles may be high if structures of JSE listed firms are 
 pg. 310 
 
dominated by people from a particular ethnic group (blacks) and less when dominated by 
another ethnic group (whites). This finding was confirmed even when the variable 
PROPBLACKS (opposite of PROPWHITES) was used in the OLS models. 
 
8.2.2.2.2 Corporate Governance Variables 
In terms of board characteristics, PROPDNEDS was generally positive in the 
direction predicted but insignificant in 2001 across most of the themes. However, it was 
negative for THEME2 and THEME4 indicating that a high proportion of NEDs on the board 
of directors does not lead to an increase in compliance with risk management and integrated 
sustainability reporting provisions. The negative relationship in 2001 between these two 
themes and more NEDs on company boards may suggest that the two themes were less 
important to NEDs compared to the other themes.  
However, in 2008, and as discussed in Chapter Seven, PROPDNEDS was positive 
across all themes (significant for MCI at 5% level and THEME2 at 5% level) indicating a 
positive relationship between a high proportion of NEDs on boards and compliance with the 
Code. The results are also consistent with the popular view that the inclusion of non-
executive directors on boards of directors may enhance their independence and promote good 
governance practices. These results suggest that NEDs may be important to ensure proper 
monitoring of corporate board activities and compliance with the King Code, which make the 
corporate boards more transparent. The findings are also in accordance with the expectations 
of the King Code I, II and III, which promote the inclusion of more NEDs on corporate 
boards. 
 
8.2.2.2.3 Company Characteristics 
a) Board Size 
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Board size, on the other hand, was positive across all models in 2001 and 2008 in accordance 
with the view that larger boards are effective in ensuring that South African listed firms 
comply with good governance principles as recommended by the King Code. The results 
suggest that JSE sample firms with large boards comply more to the Code than those with 
smaller boards. 
 
b) Director Shareholding 
Director shareholding was surprisingly positive (but mostly insignificant) in 2001 
across all models against expectation and significant at 10% level for VCI. The 2001 results 
indicate that companies with a high proportion of shares owned by directors comply more 
with the King Code than those with less director share ownership. However, in 2008, director 
share ownership was negative across all models in accordance with prediction and significant 
for THEME4.   
In 2001, SA was still very much on the drive to attract foreign capital through good 
governance practices which indicate that the country is a safe destination for capital. As such, 
directors with shares in listed firms may have encouraged compliance with good governance 
principles such as the King Code so as to improve investor confidence. The period 2008, on 
the other hand, falls within a period in which there is awareness of good CG and the country 
has experienced capital inflow as per evidence from opinion based surveys (e.g. CLSA, 2000, 
Deutsche Bank, 2002) because of good governance practices. The campaign to woo investors 
may now have stabilised, hence the negative results between compliance and director share 
ownership. The 2008 results are also in accordance with results from prior literature (e.g. Ho 
and Williams, 2003; Mangena and Chamisa, 2008; Ntim, 2009) and elsewhere (e.g. Eng and 
Mak, 2003). 
 
c) Firm Size (STA) 
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The results for firm size are generally consistent with findings from prior literature on 
corporate compliance with governance codes (e.g. Dedman, 2002; Weir and Laing, 2000; 
Werder et al., 2005). As discussed in section 7.1.8, large firms are expected to comply more 
with CG principles than small firms. As such, results are in accordance with expectation and 
theory. 
 
d) Institutional Shareholding (INSTSHARE) 
Institutional shareholding was mostly positive but insignificant in 2001 in accordance 
with prediction. However, in 2008 it was negative and insignificant against the direction 
predicted across all models except for MCI (at 5% level). The 2001 results suggest that 
institutional shareholding and compliance with CG principles complement each other. 
Theoretically, firms with poor CG structures can compensate that with a dominant vigilant 
block shareholder (e.g., Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Beiner et al., 2006). However, in 
contrast to this theory, positive relationship between the SACGCI and institutional 
shareholding in 2001 indicates that they complement each other. 
The 2008 results, however, indicate that institutional directors are not playing an 
active role in CG as per findings from other studies (e.g. Malherbe and Segal, 2001; Mangena 
and Chamisa, 2008; World Bank, 2003). Institutional investors are well placed to influence 
good governance practices, first, because of their high share ownership on the JSE and, 
second, they possess superior financial resources, specialised knowledge, information 
collection and analyses advantages over the average individual investor (Young et al., 2008, 
p.1108). However, these results (2008) indicate that institutional investors are not playing this 
role. The negative relationship between INSTSHARE and SACGCI supports the idea that 
firms optimally choose CG structures, whereby a greater usage of one CG mechanism results 
in a lesser usage of another. Theoretically, the results may suggest that institutional 
shareholding plays a substitute-monitoring role to compliance (e.g. Eng and Mak, 2003). For 
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instance, high institutional shareholding may act as a substitution for compliance disclosure 
with CG principles since monitoring may be done by institutional investors. The results are in 
contrast to Ntim (2009), who finds a positive relationship between institutional shareholding 
and South African CG index.  
 
e) LTDtoTE (Debt) 
In 2001, the regression results generally indicate a positive association with SACGCI 
as per prediction, but mostly insignificant. In 2008, only TCI and THEME2 have a positive 
insignificant relationship with SACGCI. Ntim (2009) finds a significant and positive 
association between debt and South African CG index. Although insignificant, the positive 
association between debt and SACGCI indicates that there is a complementary relationship 
between debt and SACGCI. It also implies that JSE sample firms with good CG standards are 
better placed to raise debt at a cheaper cost and that generally they are in a better position to 
secure lines of credit unlike their counterparts with poor governance practices. 
 
f) Auditor Type (AUDTYPE) 
Regression results indicate a positive and significant relationship between AUDTYPE 
and SACGCI in 2008 while in 2001 the results are insignificant. Generally, firms audited by 
BIG 4 audit firms may comply with good governance principles because such firms offer 
higher quality audits than do the non-Big 4 audit firms and that the source of higher quality is 
a result of reputation concerns and differential auditor litigation exposure (Carmeli and 
Tishler, 2005).  
 
g) Listing Status (LISTSTATUS) 
Generally, LISTSTATUS had a positive association with SACGCI with six out of 
eleven models (including TCI for 2001 (insignificant) and 2008 (significant for TCI, MCI 
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and THEME4)) as per prediction. Theoretically, firms that maintain multiple listing on 
foreign stock markets are more likely to have better CG structures, because they are more 
likely to be subjected to additional accounting, governance and disclosure requirements of the 
foreign stock exchanges that they are cross-listed to (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002, p.329; Black 
et al., 2006a, p.403). As such, the results (2008) suggest that JSE listed firms with multiple 
listings in other stock exchanges, such as the LSE and NYSE, comply with good governance 
principles more than their counterparts with single listing in the JSE only. 
 
h) Industry Type (ITYPE) 
The industry control variables generally seem to have an insignificant association 
with SACGCI. However, in 2001, ITYPE2 and ITYPE4 were positive and significant at 5% 
and 10% levels respectively under THEME4. Similarly, in 2008 ITYPE1 was significant at 
the 5% level for MCI and THEME2 while IYTP4 was significant at the 5% level for 
THEME2. These results lend support to the argument that CG practices vary across industries 
(e.g. CLSA, 2000; Deutsche Bank, 2002). 
 
i) ROA 
As hypothesised, ROA has a positive relationship (insignificant) with SACGCI in 
2001 and a surprisingly negative (insignificant) relationship with SACGCI in 2008 against 
prediction. This implies that firms which perform better comply with good CG principles (in 
2001) while in 2008 the opposite holds. This is surprising because it is expected that 
financially healthy firms can more easily meet their obligations to owner-stakeholders and are 
less likely to be subject to significant pressure from other financial stakeholders, such as 
creditors (Brammer and Pavelin, 2006a). The results are also against expectation that 
financially healthy firms are in a better position to implement good CG practices such as 
those recommended by the King Code. The results contradict the theory that management of 
 pg. 315 
 
profitable firms will use information in order to obtain personal advantages (Inchausti, 1997) 
by signalling good performance through good governance practices and disclosure. 
 
8.2.2.3 Findings Based on Perceptions of Key Stakeholders 
Key stakeholders interviewed in this research believe that the Code serves as an 
important reference point on corporate governance issues in SA. They however are of the 
opinion that even the best corporate governance principles in the world may not necessarily 
prevent fraud because corporate governance involves humans. Generally, they opine that 
despite good intentions as per the Code principles, those charged with the responsibility to 
lead corporations may defraud them if they have the intent to do so. The stakeholders 
attributed the improvement in corporate governance standards in SA to the introduction of the 
King Code. The improvement in corporate governance standards they argued is evident from 
the suitability of SA as a destination for investment capital.  Despite the improvement in 
corporate governance standards in SA, some stakeholders mentioned that there are still bad 
governance practices more especially in government whereby underhand tactics are 
employed to award tenders to non-deserving politically connected entities (tender-
preneuring).  
On the aspect compliance with the Code, respondents noted high compliance on 
boards and directors issues and low compliance with integrated sustainability issues.  On 
other issues regarding compliance some respondents noted that there was a tendency to 
comply in bad faith (e.g. tokenism compliance) or to claim compliance with some aspects of 
the Code more especially on integrated sustainability reporting without providing evidence to 
back such compliance.  
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8.3 Policy Implications of the Research Findings & Recommendations 
8.3.1 Policy Implications of Compliance with the Code 
Several implications can be drawn from this study. First, this study has found that 
structures of sampled JSE Securities Exchange firms are predominantly controlled by whites. 
For instance, the findings indicate that in 2001 less than one-tenth of total directors of sample 
firms are blacks while in 2008 under one-quarter of total directors of sample firms are blacks. 
This is surprising considering that the SA government passed pieces of legislation which 
were meant to address this imbalance i.e. the Employment Equity Act  55 of 1998 and the 
BBBEE Act 53 of 2003. As such, these results suggest that the intended objectives of these 
Acts have not been realised. The implication of this finding is that more needs to be done in 
SA to ensure that blacks are able to make inroads into corporate SA. The SA authorities may 
have to review the impact of BBBEE and other Acts which were intended to address the 
legacy of apartheid so as to come up with proper intervention strategies to increase 
participation of blacks in the economy of SA. Further, the results confirm that the South 
African economy is not transformed as claimed by some prominent politicians within the 
ruling ANC in recent times.  
Secondly, these results indicate that the introduction of the King Code I, II and now 
III, coupled with other statutory documents such as the Companies Act of 1973, JSE Listing 
Rules and the Insider Trading Act No. 135 of 1998, has contributed towards improving CG 
standards in SA. The improvement in CG standards is evidenced by the increase in the level 
of compliance with good governance principles as recommended by the King Code between 
2001 and 2008. By implication, SA JSE listed firms do embrace self-regulatory good 
governance principles; as such, these results suggest that SA companies (listed) may be safe 
to invest in. Prior literature has found that investors are prepared to pay a premium for 
companies which practice good governance (see CLSA, 2000; Deutsche Bank, 2002). The 
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implication of this finding is that the ‘comply or explain’ regime is working in SA like in 
other countries such as the UK. This suggests that this regime is suitable for SA. 
Third, the results of this study imply that generally compliance with the King Code 
varies across themes. As discussed in section 8.1.1.2, the extent of compliance with the 
various themes was as follows in descending order: THEME3, THEME2, THEME1 and 
THEME4. THEME3, as already discussed, consists of recommendations which companies 
generally comply with in accordance with generally accepted accounting practices, hence the 
high compliance. THEME2, on the other hand, consists of recommendations on risk 
management. The high compliance with recommendations relating to risk management may 
indicate that JSE sample firms devote resources to risk management in line with 
recommendations from the Code. THEME1, on the other hand, consists of boards and 
directors issues. These recommendations relate to company structures. It is therefore 
generally expected that compliance with these recommendations will be high because 
company structures are visible to stakeholders, and they may question non-compliance with 
such at AGMs. The low compliance with other themes suggests that companies give different 
weights to provisions from the Code. Clearly, the results suggest that provisions under 
THEME4 are given less weight, hence the low compliance with this theme.  
THEME4, as already discussed in Chapter Six, consists of recommendations which 
relate to social and environmental reporting. It consists mostly of recommendations which 
relate to the culture of Ubuntu which the Code recommends should be taken into 
consideration as the culture in which CG is practised, and those which relate to 
environmental issues. Compliance with these recommendations may signal that corporate SA 
embraces the culture of Ubuntu and also indicates the desire of corporate SA to contribute 
towards helping to address social imbalances which still exist in SA society as a result of 
apartheid e.g. through skills development, community projects, giving opportunities to 
previously disadvantaged people, among others. It may also signal that corporate SA protects 
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the environment for future generations. As noted above, structures of JSE sampled firms are 
dominated by whites, who have a different culture from the local Ubuntu culture. As 
discussed in Chapter Two, the culture of whites is individualistic while the Ubuntu culture of 
blacks is collectivist.  
The views of key stakeholders also indicate that compliance with social and 
environmental reporting is disingenuous among JSE Securities Exchange listed firms. For 
instance, key stakeholders described compliance under social and environmental 
reporting/integrated sustainability reporting (THEME4) using words such as; “tokenism 
compliance” or “black tokenism”, “fronting”, “silo reporting”, “green-washing” and “box 
ticking”40.  
Therefore, the implication of low compliance with social and environmental issues 
(THEME4) as found in this study may be that: 
a) Corporate SA may be rejecting the collectivist Ubuntu culture of 
blacks because the people responsible for compliance (who dominate corporate 
structures) in JSE sample firms are not from this culture. 
b) Corporate SA may be rejecting government and King Code 
recommendations to try to address the legacy of apartheid and  
c) Corporate SA may be practicing green-washing when it comes to 
environmental issues. 
 
Fifth, as discussed in Chapter Seven, the results of this study suggest that compliance 
may not be culture free. In 2001, PROPWHITES (for TCI) was negative and insignificant, 
                                                          
40
 Tokenism compliance refers to a situation whereby a firm complies with a provision in bad faith e.g. 
compliance with the letter and not the spirit of the Code such as appointment of a token black to the board of 
directors. Fronting, on the other hand, is a fraudulent act undertaken by firms to create an impression that they 
have met BEE requirements so as to qualify for government contracts. Extreme examples of fronting include 
listing a black person as a shareholder in a company where she/he does not derive any benefits. Silo reporting 
refers to a situation whereby companies claim to comply with provisions on integrated sustainability reporting 
without necessarily showing how such compliance is integrated to their operations (e.g. empty claims in most 
cases). Green washing is another form of silo reporting but relating to environmental reporting. 
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while in 2008, it was negative and significant, in line with the prediction that whites may 
influence corporate SA to comply less with the King Code when they dominate structures of 
JSE sample firms because of their individualist culture which may not favour compliance 
with stakeholder-oriented provisions under the King Code’s integrated sustainability 
reporting. PROPWHITES was significant in 2008 only, i.e. for VCI, THEME1 and 
THEME4. Further, PROPWHITES was negative in nine out of eleven models in accordance 
with the prediction that PROPWHITES has a negative relationship to compliance with the 
King Code. As discussed in Chapter Two and Chapter Four, the culture of blacks and whites 
is different. For instance, the culture of blacks (Ubuntu) is considered to be collectivist while 
that of whites is considered to be individualistic (see Booysen, 2000; Malunga, 2006b; 
Nussbaum, 2003). Following from Hofstede and Hofstede’s (2005) argument that culture 
partly accounts for the way people behave, it may be expected that culture may account for 
the way JSE sample firms behave in terms of compliance with a Code of CG which takes a 
specific culture into consideration e.g. Ubuntu culture.  
If people who dominate structures of sample firms are blacks from the Ubuntu 
culture, it may naturally be expected that they may influence compliance with provisions 
from this Code because not only does the Code take their culture into consideration, but their 
culture dictates that they value relationships with others, hence compliance with stakeholder-
oriented aspects which serve to nurture interrelationships between the firm and community in 
which it conducts its business. However, the opposite may be expected if whites dominate 
board structures of JSE sample firms because first, the Ubuntu culture does not represent 
their values, beliefs and way of life, secondly their culture dictates that they are 
individualistic and hence stakeholder-oriented issues may not be first priority in their case. 
The implication of this finding is that if compliance with good governance principles is to be 
achieved in SA, more blacks should be given opportunities to make inroads into structures of 
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corporate SA because they may influence compliance with the King Code since the Code 
promotes their culture in addition to recommending best practice CG. 
Sixth, the findings of this study indicate that compliance is generally high among 
large firms and low among small firms. Theoretically, and as discussed in Chapter Seven, 
compliance with CG provisions is costly both in terms of money and time. Such large firms 
tend to have enough resources at their disposal to enable them to afford to implement 
recommendations/provisions from CG codes. This therefore explains why compliance may 
generally be expected to be high amongst large firms. Also, as discussed in Chapter Seven, 
prior literature suggests that large firms have greater agency problems compared to their 
small counterparts. Large firms also stand out in the public domain e.g. have a large analyst 
following and are subject to scrutiny from the media. This makes it imperative for them to 
comply with good governance principles because if they fail to do so, they may suffer bad 
publicity and the imposition of more regulations following non-compliance than smaller 
firms (Dedman, 2000). 
The findings from this research also imply that compliance among JSE sample firms 
is high among firms audited by Big 4 audit firms than firms audited by non-Big 4 audit firms. 
Also, large firms are mostly audited by Big 4 audit firms compared to small firms. This 
finding is in accordance with the theoretical expectation that large firms may afford good 
quality service offered by Big 4 audit firms and Big 4 audit firms may prefer to do business 
with large firms to protect their reputational capital (Carmeli and Tishler, 2005).  
Compliance was also found to be high among firms with multiple listings in other 
stock exchanges, especially in the US and the UK than for firms with single listing in the JSE 
only. This finding is in accordance with evidence from prior literature (see Ntim 2009). The 
finding is also consistent with theory because stock exchanges in the US and UK e.g. the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and London Stock Exchange (LSE) often maintain 
rigorous CG requirements and have proper enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance 
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with such. The JSE has experienced a number of companies moving their primary listing 
offshore in recent times e.g. SAB, Old Mutual, Billiton (Deutsche Bank, 2002). The reasons 
advanced for such relocations include the desire to tap deeper pools of capital and to obtain 
cheaper funding as the desire of these companies to associate themselves with markets with 
stronger CG reputations. This implies that SA corporations relocating to these stock 
exchanges must meet high CG standards in order to be listed on the LSE. The listing of 
shares in foreign stock exchanges by SA companies may force the JSE and the SA authorities 
to upgrade their CG standards.  
 
8.3.2 Policy Implications of Findings from Interviews 
As per the findings from the interviews with stakeholders, the King Code is suitable 
for SA because it takes into account the local context by including recommendations which 
seek to address social and environmental issues. The Code also promotes good governance 
practices in addition to having raised the awareness on good governance practices in the 
country. This implies that the Code is appropriate for SA and makes recommendations which 
make it applicable in the context of SA. Although the Code is considered to be good for SA, 
the study also found that key stakeholders are concerned that the Code may not necessarily 
help prevent CG scandals because of the involvement of humans in CG.  
The findings from this study also indicate that compliance with recommendations 
from the King Code vary across themes. For instance, compliance was found to be highest for 
accounting and auditing theme and lowest for integrated sustainability reporting. The 
implication of this finding is that more needs to be done to ensure that corporate SA complies 
with social and environmental reporting. However, the King Code III addresses this aspect by 
integrating sustainability reporting into company processes and activities. Findings from 
interviews also indicate that the King Code has had a positive impact in the SADC region 
with regard to improving CG standards. The implication of this finding is that the King Code 
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is important for the SADC region and it should be promoted so as to create awareness of the 
need for good CG practices in the region. This may ultimately create a better impression 
about the SADC region as a suitable destination for capital. Good CG may attract much 
needed foreign direct investment in the SADC region. 
 
8.4  Research Contribution 
This research makes contributions to CG literature in a number of ways. First, the 
study makes a contribution on the level of compliance with the King Code. Not many studies 
have comprehensively examined compliance with the King Code. This study has not only 
examined aggregate compliance with the entire Code, it has also disaggregated the Code into 
various themes and into voluntary and mandatory recommendations. As such, for the first 
time this offered evidence on the level of compliance with the various themes from the King 
Code. For instance, the study offered evidence on overall compliance with the Code, the level 
of compliance with boards and directors issues (THEME1), the level of compliance with risk 
management issues (THEME2), the level of compliance with accounting and auditing issues 
(THEME3) and the level of compliance with integrated sustainability reporting (THEME4). 
In addition, for the first time the study offered evidence on the level of compliance with 
voluntary and mandatory (provisions adopted by the JSE Listing Rules) items from the code. 
Unlike prior literature, this study has considered all the recommendations from the Code 
(SACGCI).  
Second, this study has offered empirical evidence on the extent of compliance with 
non-financial issues (social and environmental reporting) as recommended by the King Code 
under integrated sustainability reporting. The study has offered evidence on whether 
corporate SA embraces the Ubuntu culture as per the recommendations of the King Code. 
The findings indicate that although corporate SA complies with recommendations under 
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THEME4, in general corporate SA has been slow to embrace the Ubuntu culture as 
demonstrated by the low compliance under this theme. 
Third, this study has offered empirical evidence on the SA business environment. For 
instance, this study has empirically examined the extent to which blacks have made inroads 
into corporate SA. As per the findings from the study, blacks have not made many inroads 
into corporate SA despite the passage of pieces of legislation by the African National 
Congress (ANC) led government to try and enable blacks to have a stake in corporate SA. As 
per the findings from this study, more than sixteen years after political power was transferred 
to blacks in SA, just under a quarter of directors (in 2008) of JSE sampled firms are black. To 
some extent this confirms arguments that the SA economy has not been transformed and is 
still very much dominated by white males as was the case during apartheid. These sentiments 
have recently been expressed by leading political figures within the ANC (SAPA, 2010).   
Fourth, for the first time this study has offered empirical evidence on whether culture 
influences corporate compliance with CG principles. Using ethnicity as a proxy for culture, 
this study investigated whether the culture of blacks and whites influences compliance with 
CG principles. This aspect has not been examined before in the context of SA. As such, this 
study fills the gap in the literature by offering for the first time direct evidence on whether 
ethnicity influences compliance with the King Code of SA. 
Fifth, prior literature has tended to rely on one source of information to investigate 
CG and firm outcomes. This study extends literature on CG by examining the views of key 
stakeholders with regard to CG in SA. Unlike prior literature, the study examined the views 
of King Code commissioners, company directors and officials from NGO/CSOs on CG. This 
provided a human face to CG issues as opposed to restricting analysis to annual reports only. 
It also offered an opportunity to gain insight into the views of various stakeholders and to 
interrogate issues. 
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8.5 Research Limitations 
There is no perfect study and as such this study is no exception. This section will 
discuss several limitations related to both the methodology and the overall design of the 
study.  
First, analysis of the extent of compliance to the King Code is based only on corporate 
annual reports in this study. As such, annual reports may not contain the universal set of 
information disclosed by the company’s management because such disclosures are often 
influenced by circumstances and timing of events (Haniffa, 1998). Also, companies do not 
only make disclosures in annual reports since there are other mediums through which 
companies disseminate information such as interim reports, prospectuses, financial press 
releases, company websites, company newsletters etc (Hassan and Marston, 2008, p. 5; 
Botosan and Plumlee, 2002, p. 30). However, as discussed in Chapter Six, annual reports 
contain a very wide range of comprehensive information, both voluntary and mandatory, 
which suits a wide group of users. As discussed in Chapter Six, the Companies Act and the 
JSE Listings Rules mandate listed firms to issue annual reports. As such, the mandatory 
nature of annual reports makes them a regular and reliable source of CG information (e.g., 
Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Botosan, 1997). This is because failure to abide by mandatory 
obligations by a firm can attract legal suits. Annual reports have also been relied upon 
because they are a major corporate reporting document, and every other financial report is in 
some respect subsidiary or supplementary to it Botosan (1997, p. 331).  
Secondly, this study uses culture theory to explain the relationship between the extent 
of compliance and the King Code. As discussed in Chapter Two, culture theory as 
hypothesised by Hofstede (1988) has been criticised for being based on obsolete and 
irrelevant data owing to substantial modernisation which has taken place in most of the 
surveyed countries (Ng et al., 2007). Hofstede’s cultural dimensions have also been criticised 
for being based on data from a single multinational corporation which may not have the 
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power to uncover the secrets of the entire national culture and that “what Hofstede 
‘identified’ is not national culture, but an averaging of situationally specific opinions from 
which dimensions or aspects of national culture are unjustifiably inferred” (Baskerville-
Morley, 2005; McSweeney, 2002, p. 104). Critics have also raised questions over the survey 
instrument used by Hofstede. For instance, they argue that the instrument used may not be 
specifically designed to investigate national cultures and hence not correctly or completely 
suitable in identifying all the universal cultural value dimensions (Baskerville-Morley, 2005; 
McSweeney, 2002). Further, critics also argue that four or five cultural dimensions are not 
enough to explain national culture (Baskerville-Morley, 2005). Since this study uses 
Hofstede’s culture theory, it may have limitations relating to the limitations associated with 
culture theory.  
Third, this study examines compliance using cross-sectional data in two periods. The 
two-year period may be too short. A longer time period may be most suitable to examine the 
behaviour of firms in terms of how they comply with the King Code and whether culture 
influences compliance over such a period. Also, the final sample of 136 firms was imposed 
on the study because of its nature e.g. examination of compliance before and after review of 
the King Code I. A large number of firms (i.e. 105) did not fall within the two periods under 
investigation which resulted in their exclusion from the study. This may affect the 
generalisability of the results to all JSE listed firms. Similarly, financial firms were also 
excluded from the study resulting in the possibility of generalisability to all firms being 
affected. Exclusion of financial firms is, however, in line with prior studies (e.g. Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2006; MacNeil and Li, 2006; Weir and Laing, 2000). 
However, the sample size as a percentage of the original population is 37.3%. This is 
better than Ntim’s (2009) percentage of sample size to the original population of 24.9% and 
34.4% of the total sample population (i.e. 100 firms out of a sample population of 291). The 
study was also limited to similar firms which were listed in 2001 and 2008; this to some 
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degree introduced survivorship bias. However, it was important to use companies which 
existed in the two periods so as to determine actual changes between the periods. These 
weaknesses have the potential to limit the generalisability of the research findings. 
Fourth, as discussed in Chapter Four, it was found that blacks have not made inroads 
into corporate SA as evidenced by their low numbers in structures of JSE sample firms. For 
instance, only 5.8% of board chairmen/women were black in 2001 compared to 22.8% in 
2008, while the percentage of black CEOs/MDs was 1.5% in 2001 compared to 9.6% in 
2008. As such, statistical analysis could not be conducted on two of the three culture 
variables owing to the low number of blacks in positions of board chairman and CEO/MD. 
Similarly, the number of black directors on the boards of JSE sample firms is very low i.e. 
10% in 2001 and around 25% in 2008. These weaknesses may potentially limit the 
conclusions with regard to whether culture influences compliance with the King Code. 
Fifth, there may be validity and reliability problems with regard to the constructed 
composite compliance indices. The compliance indices were constructed based on a binary 
rather than an ordinal coding scheme. Binary coding, as discussed in Chapter five, has 
limitations e.g. it is less informative (see Barako et al., 2006). Also, the compliance indices 
are an un-weighted index. The critique associated with un-weighted indices is that they tend 
to treat all corporate governance provisions to be of equal importance. However, in theory 
and in practice this may not necessarily be the case (see Barako et al., 2006). The use of un-
weighted index is employed, however, because there is a general lack of a rigorously 
theoretical basis on which weights can be accurately assigned to various corporate 
governance provisions (Black et al., 2006, p. 375; Ntim, 2009, p. 364). It has been argued 
that the use of un-weighted index avoids the necessity of making subjective value judgements 
as to the relative importance of each corporate governance provision (Ntim, 2009, p. 364; 
Owusu-Ansah, 2005, p. 609). Prior literature in accounting disclosure studies employs un-
weighted indices (e.g. Black et al., 2006; Gompers et al., 2003; Henry, 2008; Ntim, 2009). 
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Also, evidence from prior literature indicates that un-weighted and weighted indices tend to 
give the same results, more especially in instances where the number of corporate governance 
provisions is substantial (see Barako et al., 2006; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987). 
The coding process for this study was done by one person over a period of ten months 
and was conducted over two rounds so as to ascertain inter-coding consistency, similar to 
prior literature (see Ntim, 2009). The stability between the first and second round of coding 
of compliance indices yielded the following results: TCI (the entire compliance index) 
0.8264; THEME1 0.7715; THEME2 0.8015 THEME3 0.9513 and THEME4 0.7814. 
According to Beattie and Thompson (2007), the recommended cut off level for acceptability 
ranges from 0.70 to 0.80. As such, the levels of stability achieved were generally above the 
recommended range. Similar to Ntim (2009) and unlike much of prior literature, a 
spreadsheet (Appendix 3: Results of Completed Checklist) containing the page numbers of 
what was coded, and where it was coded from, was developed to accompany the coding 
scheme.  
Sixth, this study relied on a combination of names and photographs of board members 
in the annual reports of JSE sample firms to determine whether they are black or white
41
. Not 
all JSE sample firms included board pictures in the annual reports, for instance around 96% 
of sample firms included pictures/photos of the management and board while in some cases 
they were excluded. In such cases the websites of concerned companies were consulted to 
determine the ethnicity of people occupying positions in the corporate structures of listed 
sample firms. Names could not be entirely relied upon because as per evidence from the 
study, some blacks (Africans) use English first and second names resulting in the picture 
being used as the final indicator of ethnicity of an individual. With regard to pictures/photos, 
the distinct features of blacks and whites e.g. skin colour (pigmentation) and other features 
such as shape of nose (flat/Caucasian) and hair were used to determine the ethnicity of 
                                                          
41
 Ethnicity is defined in terms of the definition under apartheid SA. 
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directors. Although there were no cases of uncertainty with regard to ethnicity of directors, it 
is important to acknowledge the challenges which were encountered in this study as a 
limitation. 
This study also assumed that all blacks in corporate SA subscribe to the Ubuntu 
culture while whites subscribe to the individualistic Eurocentric culture. This may not 
necessarily be the case because as culture evolves and through the evolution process some 
people may adopt different cultures.  
Seventh, similar to prior literature, there may be problems in this study of how some 
items in the compliance index are defined. First, the definition of compliance is limited to 
disclosure compliance in the annual reports. Also, there is no cut off point as to what may be 
considered to be good compliance by JSE sample firms. Compliance may range between 0% 
(no compliance) and 100% (complete compliance); as such, anything below 100% may be 
deemed to be non-compliance. With regard to annual reports, as already discussed, 
disclosures in companies are not limited to annual reports.  
Other potential definition problems include the following: board dominations – an 
ethnic group was considered to dominate a board if the ethnic group constitutes 51% or more 
of the board membership (theory and practice clearly shows that this may not necessarily be 
the case); board diversity – a board was considered to be diverse for as long as there was one 
black director in it at the end of the financial year (as per findings from interviews, this is 
clearly not the case); non-executive directors includes both independent and non-independent 
directors; director share ownership includes share ownership by both executive and non-
executive directors. Further, institutional ownership is not categorised in terms of local and 
foreign institutional ownership. 
Eighth, this study also suffered limitations with regard to interviews. This study 
conducted interviews with ten key stakeholders, which is five less than the minimum number 
for interviewees targeted for the study. As such, views of stakeholders are biased since they 
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were obtained in the main from King Code Commissioners, company directors and officials. 
There was lack of accessibility to NGOs/CSOs, politicians and other organisations which 
play a significant role in CG in SA, such as the Institute of Directors of Southern Africa. As 
discussed in Chapter Eight, it was easy to get access to King Code Commissioners and 
company directors. However, it was difficult to obtain access to politicians, NGOs/CSOs and 
government departments.  
It is interesting to note that contacted white officials were more willing to grant access 
for interviews compared to black officials, considering the number of officials who agreed to 
be interviewed and the number who declined to be interviewed (80%/20%). Generally there 
was a tendency among black potential interviewees to either promise to grant access and then 
not respond to follow ups, or postpone the interview intermittently until the researcher gave 
up. Non-response to requests for interviews among blacks was also very high as evidenced by 
the number of blacks who did not acknowledge receipt of requests for interviews and never 
responded to follow ups. As such, blacks tended to be reluctant to be interviewed, which may 
be associated with a high level of secrecy.  
According to Gray (1988), the higher a country ranks in terms of uncertainty 
avoidance and power distance and the lower it ranks in terms of individualism and 
masculinity, the more likely it is to rank highly in terms of secrecy. As discussed in Chapter 
Four, blacks were found to have the exact societal values that fit Gray’s description for a high 
level of secrecy whilst the whites were found to have the opposite of societal values that fit 
Gray’s description for a high level of secrecy. Thus, it can be predicted that blacks may have 
a high level of secrecy while whites have a low level of secrecy which may explain why they 
tended to submit to requests for interviews in this study. However, it must be stated 
unequivocally that this may not necessarily reflect the nature and culture of blacks or whites 
in SA owing to the few numbers of people who were contacted for the interview process. 
 pg. 330 
 
Other limitations and challenges experienced in this study relate to data collection 
through interviews. As already discussed in Chapter Six, two interview types were employed 
to collect data from interviewees, e.g. face-to-face interviews and telephone interviews. Data 
was recorded through a digital voice recorder and later on transcribed into Word documents. 
During the interviewing process there were challenges with regard to making telephone 
connections to interviewees. In one interview with an official of a CSO, the line connection 
was cut three times resulting in the interview flow being severely disrupted and important 
points being lost in between reconnections. There were also other challenges with regard to 
telephone interviewing such as external noise from traffic in the streets. In one of the 
interviews, the researcher was put on hold for five minutes whilst the interviewee was 
attending to a presumably more pressing issue brought by a member of staff. However, 
overall most of the interviewees respected and stuck to the appointments.  
 
8.6 Avenues for Future Research & Improvements 
This study considered whether JSE listed firms are complying with recommendations 
from the King Code and the extent of such compliance. The study also examined whether 
culture influences compliance with the Code. In addition, it examined the views of key 
stakeholders on the Code. To further enhance our understanding of compliance with the King 
Code and whether culture influences compliance with the Code, future research may consider 
these aspects through a longitudinal study so as to trace disclosure compliance practices and 
the effect of culture on compliance on a yearly basis for a particular company or a particular 
industry. This may provide insights into the relationship between compliance and culture and 
other company characteristics. Since this study considered the influence of culture and CG 
factors on SA listed firms, future studies could test the influence of culture in other countries 
such as the SADC region. This may test the assumption that the Ubuntu culture is universal 
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in the African continent. This study may also be replicated using companies listed in the AltX 
board only. 
Second, this study also focussed on compliance and internal CG mechanisms only. 
Future research may consider inclusion of several other dimensions which have an impact on 
corporate compliance by conducting surveys to determine other relevant issues which may 
affect corporate compliance. For instance, future research may examine the effect of external 
CG mechanisms on compliance such as the law, the market for external control, the 
managerial labour market etc. 
Third, this study is also limited to defining culture in terms of ethnicity because of 
constraints of data availability. Future research may consider other cultural proxies such as 
religious values and culture dimensions proposed by Hofstede (1991) and corporate 
dimensions such as age and qualifications (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005). 
As already discussed in chapter six, the number of blacks in structures of corporate 
SA (as of 2008) is not sufficient to enable statistical tests of OLS to be conducted. As such, 
future studies may replicate this study when there are more black directors in structures of 
corporate SA to enable OLS tests to be conducted on all cultural variables. Fourth, this study 
focussed only on disclosures in corporate annual reports although it is known that 
management utilise other mass communication mechanisms. Hence, future research may 
consider disclosures in other media such as newspapers, the internet, and in-house magazines. 
 
8.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter aims to provide conclusions to the thesis through a number of objectives. 
First, it attempts to summarise the research findings of the study. As such, research findings 
based on the extent of compliance with the King Code, findings based on factors which 
influence compliance and findings based on interviews with key stakeholders were 
summarised. The findings also suggest that generally compliance with the King Code has 
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improved significantly between 2001 and 2008 and that the extent of compliance with the 
Code is high for accounting and auditing and lowest for integrated sustainability reporting. 
The results also indicate that large firms, firms audited by Big 4 audit firms and firms with 
multiple listings in other stock exchanges, particularly the US and the UK, comply more with 
the King Code than their counterparts with single listing in the JSE only. The study also 
found that ethnicity does influence compliance with the Code as discussed in Chapter Seven. 
Other factors which were found to have a positive relationship with compliance include board 
size, firm size, and proportion of non-executive directors in the board. On the other hand, 
debt, director shareholding, top5%shareholding, institutional shareholding and ROA were 
found to have a negative relationship to compliance (as per current results for 2008). 
The findings as per key stakeholders indicate that the Code is important for SA; 
compliance with integrated sustainability reporting is low as per the results from quantitative 
analysis. Further key stakeholders noted that the Code has had a positive impact in the SADC 
region. 
Second, the chapter discussed the policy implications of the research findings. With 
regard to the low numbers of black executives in structures of corporate SA, more needs to be 
done to address this aspect. A review of the policies currently in place is essential to try to 
come up with effective and efficient strategies for empowerment of blacks. As for 
compliance, the results suggest that JSE listed companies comply less with integrated 
sustainability reporting possibly because of cultural issues owing to the high number of 
whites who occupy the structures of corporate SA. As such, more needs to be done to ensure 
blacks ascend structures of corporate SA. 
Third, the chapter also sought to summarise the research contributions of the study. 
The study makes several new contributions to the literature on corporate governance.  First, it 
offers for the first time empirical evidence on whether SA listed firms are complying with the 
King Code pre- and post-review of the King Code I, the extent of compliance and compliance 
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with the Code in terms of the various themes. Second, the study offers empirical evidence on 
whether corporate SA embraces the Ubuntu culture by way of compliance with provisions 
which address Ubuntu principles, as recommended by the Code. The study also offers for the 
first time in SA an analysis of whether ethnicity influences compliance with the Code. It also 
provides empirical evidence on the SA business environment which indicates that 
corporations in SA are still very much white owned and controlled as was the case under the 
old South African regime. Another first for this study was the use of interviews to examine 
the views of key stakeholders. Prior literature tended to rely on quantitative analysis only. 
This study employed both quantitative and qualitative data to examine CG in SA. 
The fourth objective of the chapter has been to outline the limitations pertaining to 
this study. First, the study relied on corporate annual reports for analysis of compliance with 
the code. Second, the study used Hofstede’s (1988) culture theory, which has its own 
limitations as discussed in section 8.4. Other limitations include sample selection method, use 
of cross-sectional data, inability to test all culture variables owing to the low number of 
blacks in structures of corporate SA and validity and reliability problems which have been 
discussed in section 8.4. The study has other limitations, such as definition of various items 
and low response rate with regard to interviews with key stakeholders which resulted in the 
use of biased interview data. 
The final objective of the chapter was to point out potential future avenues for 
research. For instance, future research may consider an examination of the factors in the 
study through a longitudinal approach, inclusion of external factors in the examination of 
















1 Adcorp Holdings Limited Cyclical Services ITYPE3 
2 Advtech Group Limited Cyclical Services ITYPE3 
3 AECI Limited Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods ITYPE4 
4 African & Overseas enterprises Limited Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods ITYPE4 
5 African Oxygen Limited Basic Industries ITYPE1 
6 Tongaat Hulettes Consumer Goods ITYPE4 
7 All Joy Foods Ltd Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods ITYPE4 
8 Allied Electronics Corporation Limited Information Technology ITYPE1 
9 AMAPS Holdings Limited Cyclical Services ITYPE3 
10 AngloPlat Corporation Limited Resources ITYPE2 
11 Anglo American plc Resources ITYPE2 
12 Anglogold Limited Resources ITYPE2 
13 Apexhi Properties Real Estate ITYPE3 
14 Arcelor Mittal General Industrials ITYPE1 
15 Argent Industrial Limited General Industrials ITYPE1 
16 Aspen Pharmacare Holdings Limited Cyclical Consumer Goods ITYPE4 
17 Assore Limited Resources ITYPE2 
18 Astral Foods Limited Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods ITYPE4 
19 Astrapak Basic Industries ITYPE3 
20 Aveng General Industrials ITYPE2 
21 Awethu Breweries Limited Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods ITYPE4 
22 Barloworld limited General Industrials ITYPE4 
23 Basil Read Basic Industries ITYPE2 
24 Bell Equipment Limited General Industrials ITYPE2 
25 Bidvest Group Limited Basic Industries ITYPE1 
26 Bowler Metcalf Limited General Industrials ITYPE4 
27 Cargo Carriers Cyclical Services ITYPE3 
28 Cashbuild Limited Cyclical Services ITYPE3 
29 Cenmag Holdings Limited General Industrials ITYPE2 
30 City lodge Hotels Limited Cyclical Services ITYPE3 
31 Combined Motor Holdings Limited Cyclical Services ITYPE3 
32 Compu-clearing Outsourcing Limited Information Technology ITYPE1 
33 Conafex Holdings  Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods ITYPE4 
34 Crookes Brothers Limited Cyclical Consumer Goods ITYPE4 
35 Datacentrix Information Technology ITYPE1 
36 Datatec Information Technology ITYPE1 
37 Isa Information Technology ITYPE1 
38 Didata General Industrials ITYPE1 
39 Digicore holdings Limited Information Technology ITYPE1 
40 Distell Group Limited Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods ITYPE4 
40 Distell Group Limited Cyclical Services ITYPE4 
41 Dorbyl Limited Cyclical Services ITYPE3 
42 Element1  Cyclical Services ITYPE4 
43 Excellerate Limited Information Technology ITYPE1 
44 Faritec Holdings Limited Cyclical Services ITYPE3 
45 Foschini Limited Telecommunications ITYPE1 
46 Telkom Information Technology ITYPE1 
47 Gijimaast (ast group) Resources ITYPE2 
48 Gold reef Casino Resorts Cyclical Services ITYPE2 
49 Goldfields Limited Resources ITYPE2 
50 Goodhope (oakfields) Cyclical Services ITYPE3 
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51 Grindrod Basic Industries ITYPE1 
52 Group Five Limited Real Estate ITYPE3 
53 Growthpoint Properties Limited Resources ITYPE2 
54 Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited Basic Industries ITYPE1 
55 Highveld Steel and Vanadium Corp. Ltd  Cyclical Services ITYPE3 
56 (HCI)Hosken Consolidated Inv.  Limited General Industrials ITYPE2 
57 Howden Africa Holdings Limited Cyclical Services ITYPE3 
58 Hudaco Industries Limited Resources ITYPE2 
59 HwangeLtd Real Estate ITYPE3 
60 Hyprop Investments Limited Telecommunications ITYPE1 
61 Stellavista  Basic Industries ITYPE1 
62 Iliad Africa Limited Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods ITYPE4 
63 Illovo sugar Limited Cyclical Services ITYPE3 
64 Imperial Holdings Limited Resources ITYPE2 
65 Intertrading Limited Cyclical Services ITYPE4 
66 Implats Basic Industries ITYPE1 
67 Invicta Holdings Limited Mining ITYPE2 
68 Thabex Cyclical Services ITYPE3 
69 Italtile Limited General Industrials ITYPE2 
70 Jasco Electronics Holdings Limited  Cyclical Services ITYPE3 
71 JD Group Limited Cyclical Services ITYPE3 
72 Kagiso Media Limited Basic Industries ITYPE1 
73 Kairos Industrial Holdings Ltd Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods ITYPE4 
74 King Consolidated Holdings Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods ITYPE4 
75 Kwv Investments Information Technology ITYPE1 
76 Labat africa Limited Resources ITYPE2 
77 Lonmin plc Resources ITYPE2 
78 Lonrho Africa plc General Industrials ITYPE2 
79 Masonite (africa) Limited Cyclical Services ITYPE4 
80 Massmart Resources ITYPE2 
81 Merafe  Cyclical Services ITYPE3 
82 Metair Investments Limited Cyclical Services ITYPE3 
83 Mr Price Group Limited General Industrials ITYPE2 
84 Mrhld (Murray & Roberts Limited) General Industrials ITYPE1 
85 Mustek Limited General Industrials ITYPE2 
86 Mvelapanda  Basic Industries ITYPE1 
87 Nampak Limited Cyclical Services ITYPE3 
88 Naspers Limited Cyclical Consumer Goods ITYPE4 
89 Netcare Cyclical Services ITYPE3 
90 Nictus Limited Resources ITYPE2 
91 Northam Platinum Limited Cyclical Services ITYPE4 
92 Nu-world Holdings Limited Cyclical Consumer Goods ITYPE4 
93 Oceana Group Limited Real Estate ITYPE3 
94 Octodec Investments Limited Basic Industries ITYPE1 
95 Omnia Holdings Limited Information Technology ITYPE1 
96 Pangbourne Properties Cyclical Services ITYPE3 
97 Paracon Poldings Cyclical Services ITYPE3 
98 Pick ‘n Pay Stores Ltd Information Technology ITYPE4 
99 Pinnacle Media Cyclical Services ITYPE3 
100 Premium Properties Limited Basic Industries ITYPE1 
101 PPC Limited Cyclical Services ITYPE4 
102 Rainbow Chicken Limited Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods ITYPE4 
103 Reunert Limited General Industrials ITYPE2 
104 Rex Trueform Clothing Co. Ltd Cyclical Services ITYPE4 
105 Richemont Cyclical Services ITYPE4 
106 Sab Miller Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods ITYPE4 
107 Sable Holdings Limited Real Estate ITYPE3 
108 Sallies Limited Resources ITYPE2 
109 Sappi Limited Basic Industries ITYPE1 
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110 Sasol Resources ITYPE2 
111 Seardel Investment Corp. Ltd General Industrials ITYPE2 
112 Securedata  Cyclical Services ITYPE3 
113 Setpoint Technology Information Technology ITYPE1 
114 Shoprite Holdings Limited Cyclical Services ITYPE3 
115 Simmer and Jack Mines Limited Resources ITYPE2 
116 PSG Group Basic Industries ITYPE1 
117 Spanjaard Limited Information Technology ITYPE1 
118 Spescom Limited Information Technology ITYPE1 
119 Square One  Cyclical Services ITYPE3 
120 Sun International Ltd Cyclical Services ITYPE3 
121 Super Group Limited Real Estate ITYPE3 
122 Sycom Property Fund Cyclical Consumer Goods ITYPE4 
123 Tiger Brands Limited Resources ITYPE2 
124 Trans Hex Cyclical Services ITYPE3 
125 Transpaco Limited Cyclical Services ITYPE3 
126 Truworths International Information Technology ITYPE1 
127 UCS Group Limited Cyclical Services ITYPE3 
128 Value Group Limited Cyclical Services ITYPE3 
129 Verimark  Resources ITYPE2 
130 Village Main Reef  Basic Industries ITYPE1 
131 WB Holdings Limited Cyclical Services ITYPE3 
132 Wesco Investments Limited Cyclical Services ITYPE3 
133 Winhold Limited Cyclical Services ITYPE4 
134 Wooltru Limited Cyclical Services ITYPE4 
135 Woolworths Holdings Limited General Industrials ITYPE2 
136 Yorkcorp  Cyclical Services ITYPE3 
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Appendix 2: South African King Code Checklist 2001/2008 
Compliance Checklist 
King Code Page 
No. 
Key words Measurement 
Compliance Items    
1 Board and Directors (THEME1)    
1.1 Board Requirements (SUBTHEME1.1)    
  Does the annual report contain:     
1 
a charter setting out responsibilities of the board (CSRB1)? 49 
Charter, responsibilities, 
tasks, obligations, function, 
board roles,  
A binary number of 1 if the board charter is set out 
and a score of 0 otherwise. 
2 
a statement of the purpose of the company as determined by the 
board? (SPC2) 49 
Purpose, objectives, vision, 
mission 
A binary of 1 if a narrative statement of purpose of 
the company is disclosed in the annual report and 0 
otherwise. 
3 a statement of the values of the company as determined by the board? 
(SVC3) 49 
Values, vision, mission, 
objectives 
A binary number of 1 if values of the company are 
disclosed in the annual report and 0 otherwise. 
4 




A binary number of 1 if a list of stakeholders is 
disclosed in the annual report and 0 otherwise. 
5 
A narrative statement of how it has applied the principles set out in 
the King Code? (NSAKC5) (Man.) 21 
Application, King Code, 
principles 
A binary number of 1 if a statement of application of 
the King Code is disclosed in the annual report and 0 
otherwise. 
1.2 Board composition (SUBTHEME1.2)    
6 
Are the roles of CEO/MD and board chairman separated or a 
statement provided combining the roles. (ROLEDU6) (Man.) 2.3.3 pp 24 
Board Chairman/CEO/MD, 
Directorate, Directors 
A binary number of 1 if the roles of chairperson and 
CEO/MD of a firm are split at the end of its financial 
year, 0 otherwise. 
7 Is the chairperson an independent non-executive director? (CINED7)    
8 
Is the capacity of each director categorised accordingly e.g. 
Executive, non-executive & independent non executive. (CAPDIR8) 
(Man.) 2.4.3 pp 24 Directors, directorate 
A binary of 1 if a narrative that clasisies directors into 
executive, non-executive and INEDs is disclosed in 
the firm’s annual reportat the end of its financial year, 
0 otherwise. 
9 Does the company have an audit committee? (AUDC9) (Man.) 3.3 pp 33 Committees, audit 
A binary of 1 if a list of aduti committee members is 
disclosed or a narrative on the audit committee 
members is disclosed and 0 otherwise. 
10 
Is the audit committee chaired by an independent non executive 
director? (AUDINEDC10)  3.3.2 pp 33 Committees, audit, chair 
A binary of 1 if the audit committee chair is 
categorised as  an INED and 0 otherwise 
11 
Is membership of the audit committee disclosed in the annual report? 
(AUMBD11) 3.3.1 pp 33 Committees, audit 
A binary of 1 if a list of audit committee members or 
a narrative is disclosed in the annual report and 0 
otherwise. 
12 
Does the annual report contain information on the qualifications of  
directors? (DIRQUAL12) 2.4.2 pp 26  
Directors, qualification, 
directorate 
A binary of 1 if the qualifications of directors are 
disclosed under their profile in the annual report or 0 




Does the annual report contain information on the experience of 
directors? (DIREXP13) 2.4.2 pp 26 
Experience, directors 
directorate 
A binary of 1 if the experience of directors is 
disclosed in the annual report and 0 otherwise. 
14 
Are audit committee members financially literate? (Qualifications) 
(AUFLIT14) 2.4.2 pp 26 
Audit, committees, 
qualification  
A binary of 1 if the audit committee members have 
financial qualifications 
(accounting/financial/business) qualifications and 0 
otherwise. 
15 
Does the company have a remuneration committee? (REMCOM15) 
(Man.) 2.5.2 pp 28 
Remuneration, 
compensation, committees 
A binary of 1 if a list of remuneration committee 
members or a narrative is disclosed in the annual 
report and 0 otherwise. 
16 
Is the remuneration committee chaired by an independent non 




A binary of 1 if the audit committee chair is 
categorised as an INED in the annual report and 0 
otherwise. 
17 
Does the remuneration committee consist entirely of independent 




A binary of 1 if the list of remuneration committee 
members consists entirely of INEDs and 0 otherwise. 
18 
Does the annual report contain details of director remuneration? 
(DIRREM18) 2.5 pp 28 
Remuneration, 
compensation, directors 
A binary of 1 if director remuneration is disclosed in 
the annual report and 0 otherwise. 
19 
Does the company have an appointment/nomination committee? 
(NOMCOM19) 4.1 pp 197 
Nomination, appointment, 
selection, committee 
A binary of 1 if a nomination/appointment committee 
or a narrative is disclosed on the committee and 0 
otherwise. 
20 
Is the appointment committee chaired by an independent non 
executive director? (NOMCINED20) 4.1 pp 197 
Nomination, appointment, 
selection, chair 
A binary of 1 if the audit committee chair is an INED 
and 0 otherwise. 
21 
Does the annual report contain a statement/policy of how board 
appointments are made? (BAPP21) (Man.) 4.1 pp 197 
Board 
appointments/selection 
A binary of 1 if a narrative on board appointments is 
provided (where there is no nomination committee) 
and 0 otherwise. 
22 
Does the company have a corporate code of conduct on conflict of 
interest relating to directors and management? (CCCOND22) 9.1 pp 41 Code of Ethics, Code 
A binary of 1 if a narrative on the code of 
conduct/ethics is disclosed in the annual report and 0 
if otherwise. 
23 
Does the board have a procedure for directors to take independent 
professional advice? (DIRPAD23) 2.1.7 pp 24 
Professional advice, board 
training 
A binary of 1 if a narrative stating that the board has 
an agreed procedure whereby 
directors may take independent professional advice, if 
necessary, at the company’s expense and 0 otherwise. 
24 
Does a statement of how performance evaluation of the board, its 




A binary of 1 if a narrative on the evaluation of the 
performance and effectiveness of a firm’s board as a 
whole individual directors is disclosed in the annual 
report, o otherwise.  
25 
Is the board of directors demographically diverse (Blacks and 
whites)? (DIVERSE25) 7.1 pp 127 
Directorate, diversity, 
board, directorate  
A binary of 1 if the board of directors consisted of a 
combination of any number of black and white 
directors at the end of the financial year, 0 otherwise. 
26 Does the board of directors include women? (BWOMEN26) 7.2 pp 127 
Diversity, women, 
directorate, board 
A binary of 1 if the board of directors consisted of 
atleast 1 woman director at the end of the financial 
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year, 0 otherwise. 
1.3 Board Meetings  (SUBTHEME1.3)    
27 
Does the board meet at least four times per year as per the Code? 
(BOARDMEET27) 2.6 pp 30 Board meetings, frequency 
A binary of 1 if a narrative stating that the board met 
four times or more during the financial year, 0 
otherwise. 
28 
Does the audit committee meet at least four times per year as per the 
Code? (AUDMEET28) 2.7 pp 30 
Board committee meetings, 
audit, frequency 
A binary of 1 if a narrative of frequency of meetings 
of the audit committee is disclosed in the annual 
report, 0 otherwise. 
29 
Does the remuneration committee meet at least four times per year as 
per the Code? (REMMEET29) 2.7 pp 30 
Board committee meetings, 
remuneration, frequency 
A binary of 1 if a narrative of frequency of meetings 
of the remuneration committee is disclosed in the 
annual report, 0 0therwise. 
30 
Does the appointment committee at least four times per year as per 
the Code? (APPMEET30) 2.7 pp 30 
Board committee meetings, 
appointment/nomination/sel
ection, frequency 
A binary of 1 if a narrative of frequency of meetings 
of the appointment/nomination committee is 
disclosed in the annual report, 0 0therwise. 
31 
Does the annual report contain list of individual attendance by 
directors. (DIRATTEND31) 2.6 pp 30 Board meetings,  frequency 
A binary of 1 if a narrative of director attendance is 
disclosed in the annual report, 0 otherwise. 
2. Risk Management (THEME2)    
32 Existence of risk management strategy. (RISKMAN32) 2.1 pp 77 Risk management, strategy 
A binary of 1 if a narrative on a system of total 
process of risk management, which includes a related 
system of internal control is disclosed in the annual 
report, 0 otherwise. 
33 Does the company have a risk committee? (RISKCOM33) (Man.) 7.1 pp 77, 209 
Risk management 
committee, risk committee 
A binary of 1 if a narrative on a dedicated risk 
management committee is disclosed in the annual 
report, 0 otherwise. 
34 
Is the number of meetings of the risk committee disclosed in the 
annual report? (MEETRISK34) (Man.) 7.4  pp 77, 211 Risk committee, meetings 
A binary of 1 if a narrative on the frequency risk 
committee meetings is disclosed in the annual report, 
0 otherwise. 
35 Existence of sound internal control system. (ICS35) 3.1 pp 78 Internal control, controls 
A binary of 1 if a narrative on the structure, work and 
authority flows, people and management information 
system is in place, is disclosed in the annual reports, 
0 otherwise. 
36 Statement on the risk appetite of the company. (RISKAPP36) 3.1.2 pp 78 Risks, tolerance, appetite 
A binary of 1 if a narrative on either termination, 
transfer, acceptance (tolerance) or mitigation through 
a system of appropriate internal controls is disclosed, 
0 otherwise.  
37 
Statement on the risk assessment and adequacy of risk management 
and internal control systems. (RISKASSES37   
A binary of 1 if a narrative which demonstrate that 
the company has dealt 
comprehensively with the issues of risk management 
and internal control e.g. appropriate disclosure on 
matters such as risk tolerance and the risk 
management process in the annual report, 0 otherwise 
38 Statement on key risk areas. (KEYRISK38) 81 Key risk areas, risks, risk A binary of 1 if a narrative containing a list of risks 
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management faced by the company is disclosed in the annual 
report, 0 otherwise. 
39 Statement on key performance indicators. (STATEKPIS38) 80 
Key performance 
indicators, risk 
management, key risks 
A binary of 1 if  narrative which indicates that the 
firm has identified key risk areas and key 
performance indicators of 
the company and monitor these factors as part of a 
regular review of processes and procedures to ensure 
the effectiveness of its internal systems of control, 0 
otherwise. 
40 
Statement on existence of confidential reporting process (whistle 
blowing) covering fraud and other risks. (WHISBLOW40) 81 
Whistle, confidential 
reporting, hot line 
A binary of 1 if a narrative stating that there are 
established easily accessible “whistle-blowing”/hot 
line/confidential reporting channels, 0 otherwise. 
3. Accounting and Auditing (THEME3)    
41 Does the company have an internal audit function? (INTAUD41) 4.1 pp 128 Internal audit, audit  
A binary of 1 if a narrative stating the existence of an 
internal audit function, 0 otherwise. 
42 
Has the company reported the amount paid to external auditors? 
(AUDPAY42) 126 
Audit fee, external auditors, 
audit payment 
A binary of 1 if the amount paid to external auditors 
is disclosed in the financial statements (income 
statement), 0 otherwise. 
43 
Has the company reported on the description of non-audit services 
rendered by the external auditor? (NONAUDSERV43) 126 
Non-audit services, audit 
services 
A binary of 1 if a narrative is disclosed in the annual 
reports indicating the kind of services rendered by 
auditors over and above the normal audit services, 0 
otherwise. 
THEME4 Integrated Sustainability Reporting    
  Has the company reported on:    
44 Existence of a code of ethics? (CODEETHIC44) pp 101 Code, ethics, conduct 
A binary of 1 if a narrative which shows the existence 
of a clearly defined and documented code of ethics, 
stating the principles, norms, and standards that a 
firm promotes for the guidance and conduct of its 
activities, internal relations and interactions, with 
external stakeholders in accordance with established 
values, is disclosed in the annual report, 0 otherwise. 
45 
Whether it has developed and implemented standards and practices in 
the company based on code of ethics. (STATSCODE45) Pp 102 Standards, codes, ethics 
A binary of 1 if a narrative explaining what is 
acceptable, and not acceptable practice, or stating 
corporate ethical standards, stating how ethical 
infringements are identified, talks of promotion of 
ethical conduct, or how conflicts are resolved; is 
disclosed and 0, otherwise. 
46 Compliance with corporate social investment? (CSI46) pp 117 Social, investment 
A binary of 1 if a narrative explaining the type of 
community investment and amount of money spent of 
the project, or expenditure of a social nature is 
disclosed, 0 otherwise. 
47 Compliance with BEE partnership or in the process of establishing Pp115-117 BEE A binary of 1 if a narrative on BEE e.g. ownership of 
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partnerships. (BBBEE47) shares by previously disadvantaged groups, 
appointment to BoD of blacks, appointment to top 
management positions etc is disclosed, 0 otherwise. 




A binary of 1 if a narrative on employment practices 
of companies stating commitment to equal 
opportunity employment is disclosed in the annual 
report, 0 otherwise. 
49 
Compliance with human capital development/skills training? 
(CHCD49) Pp113-115 
Kills training, skills 
development 
A binary of 1, if a narrative stating expenditure on 
development of staff/staff training or a policy on 
skills development, 0 otherwise. 
50 Compliance with preferential procurement? (CPREFP50) Pp114 
Preferential, targeted, BEE 
procurement 
A binary of 1, if a narrative stating the organisations 
(owned by blacks) from which preferential  
procurement was undertaken plus amount of 
purchase, 0 otherwise. 
51 Compliance with HIV/AIDS? (HIVAIDS51) Pp109 HIV/AIDS 
A binary of 1, if a narrative stating the existence of an 
HIV/AIDS policy, assistance rendered to HIV/AIDS 
projects or participation of the company on 
HIV/AIDS national projects, 0 otherwise. 
52 Compliance with environmental management? (CEM52) Pp106 Environment management 
A binary of 1, if a narrative stating environmental 
management issues addressed or expenditure towards 
environmental management, 0 otherwise. 
53 Compliance with health and safety policies and practices? (CH&S53) Pp106 SHE, health, safety 
A binary of 1, if a narrative explaining the integration 
of business processes and safety, health, and 
environmental management is disclosed, 0 otherwise. 
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Appendix 3: Results of  Completed Checklist for Company 1 
Compliance Checklist       
Company Code: 1 2001  2008  2001 2008 
Compliance Items Voluntary Mandatory Voluntary Mandatory Page No. Page No. 
1 Board and Directors (THEME1)       
1.1 Board Requirements (SUBTHEME1.1)       
  Does the annual report contain:        
1 a charter setting out responsibilities of the board (CSRB1)? 0  0    
2 a statement of the purpose of the company as determined by the 
board? (SPC2) 1  1  
Pg1 Pg9 
3 a statement of the values of the company as determined by the board? 
(SVC3) 1  1  
Pg1 Pg10 
4 list of relevant stakeholders identified by the board? (LRS4) 0  0    
5 A narrative statement of how it has applied the principles set out in 
the King Code? (NSAKC5) (Man.) 0  0  
  
1.2 Board composition (SUBTHEME1.2)       
6 
Are the roles of CEO/MD and board chairman separated or a 
statement provided combining the roles. (ROLEDU6) (Man.)  1  1 
Pg3,4 Pg30,31 
7 Is the chairperson an independent non-executive director? (CINED7)    1   
8 
Is the capacity of each director categorised accordingly e.g. 
Executive, non-executive & independent non executive. (CAPDIR8) 
(Man.)  1  1 
Pg3,4,5 Pg30,31 
9 Does the company have an audit committee? (AUDC9) (Man.)  1  1 Pg28 Pg32,33 
10 
Is the audit committee chaired by an independent non executive 
director? (AUDINEDC10)    1 
 Pg32,33 
11 
Is membership of the audit committee disclosed in the annual report? 
(AUMBD11) 1  1  
Pg28 Pg32,33 
12 
Does the annual report contain information on the qualifications of  
directors? (DIRQUAL12) 1  1  
Pg2,3,4 Pg30,31 
13 
Does the annual report contain information on the experience of 
directors? (DIREXP13) 0  1  
 Pg30,31 
14 
Are audit committee members financially literate? (Qualifications) 
(AUFLIT14) 0  1  
 Pg32,33 
15 
Does the company have a remuneration committee? (REMCOM15) 
(Man.)  1  1 
Pg29 Pg34 
16 
Is the remuneration committee chaired by an independent non 
executive director? (REMCINED16)   1  
 Pg34 
17 
Does the remuneration committee consist entirely of independent 
non-executive directors? (REMINEDS16)   1  
 Pg34 
18 
Does the annual report contain details of director remuneration? 
(DIRREM18)  1  1 
Pg42 Pg46,47,8
4,85 
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19 
Does the company have an appointment/nomination committee? 
(NOMCOM19)  0  1 
 Pg34 
20 
Is the appointment committee chaired by an independent non 
executive director? (NOMCINED20)   1  
 Pg34 
21 
Does the annual report contain a statement/policy of how board 
appointments are made? (BAPP21) (Man.)  0  1 
 Pg34 
22 
Does the company have a corporate code of conduct on conflict of 
interest relating to directors and management? (CCCOND22) 0  0  
 Pg32 
23 
Does the board have a procedure for directors to take independent 
professional advice? (DIRPAD23) 0  0  
  
24 
Does a statement of how performance evaluation of the board, its 
committees and its directors included? (PERFEV24) 0  0  
  
25 
Is the board of directors demographically diverse (Blacks and 
whites)? (DIVERSE25) 1  1  
Pg2,3,4 Pg30,31 
26 Does the board of directors include women? (BWOMEN26) 1  1  Pg2,3,4 Pg30,31 
1.3 Board Meetings  (SUBTHEME1.3)       
27 
Does the board meet at least four times per year as per the Code? 
(BOARDMEET27) 0  0  
  
28 
Does the audit committee meet at least four times per year as per the 
Code? (AUDMEET28) 0  0  
  
29 
Does the remuneration committee meet at least four times per year as 
per the Code? (REMMEET29) 0  0  
  
30 
Does the appointment committee at least four times per year as per 
the Code? (APPMEET30) 0  0  
  
31 
Does the annual report contain list of individual attendance by 
directors. (DIRATTEND31) 0  0  
  
2. Risk Management (THEME2)       
32 Existence of risk management strategy. (RISKMAN32) 0  1   Pg32 
33 Does the company have a risk committee? (RISKCOM33) (Man.)  0  1  Pg33 
34 
Is the number of meetings of the risk committee disclosed in the 
annual report? (MEETRISK34) (Man.)  0  1 
 Pg33.34 
35 Existence of sound internal control system. (ICS35) 0  0    
36 Statement on the risk appetite of the company. (RISKAPP36) 0  0    
37 
Statement on the risk assessment and adequacy of risk management 
and internal control systems. (RISKASSES37 0  0  
  
38 Statement on key risk areas. (KEYRISK38) 0  0    
39 Statement on key performance indicators. (STATEKPIS38) 0  0    
40 
Statement on existence of confidential reporting process (whistle 
blowing) covering fraud and other risks. (WHISBLOW40) 0  0  
  
3. Accounting and Auditing (THEME3)       
 pg. 344 
 
41 Does the company have an internal audit function? (INTAUD41) 0  1   Pg35 
42 
Has the company reported the amount paid to external auditors? 
(AUDPAY42) 0  1  
 Pg77 
43 
Has the company reported on the description of non-audit services 
rendered by the external auditor? (NONAUDSERV43) 0  1  
 Pg77 
THEME4 Integrated Sustainability Reporting       
  Has the company reported on:       
44 Existence of a code of ethics? (CODEETHIC44) 0  0    
45 
Whether it has developed and implemented standards and practices in 
the company based on code of ethics. (STATSCODE45) 0  0  
  
46 Compliance with corporate social investment? (CSI46) 0  1   Pg27 
47 
Compliance with BEE partnership or in the process of establishing 
partnerships. (BBBEE47) 0  1  
 Pg9.33.40,
45 
48 Compliance with employment equity/transformation? (CEE48) 0  1   Pg38 
49 
Compliance with human capital development/skills training? 
(CHCD49) 0  1  
 Pg38 
50 Compliance with preferential procurement? (CPREFP50) 0  1   Pg9 
51 Compliance with HIV/AIDS? (HIVAIDS51) 0  1   Pg35 
52 Compliance with environmental management? (CEM52) 0  1   Pg25 
53 Compliance with health and safety policies and practices? (CH&S53) 0  1   Pg35 
Total Voluntary Compliance Score (VCS) 15  36    
 Mandatory Compliance Score (MCS)  5  8   
 Total Compliance Score (TCS)       
 Total Compliance Items in the Checklist 48  53    
 Total Compliance Index (TCI = TCS/48 or 53) 0.417  0.830    
 THEME1                 26/31                          11 0.423 25 0.806   
 THEME1                     9 2 0.222 8 0.889   
 THEME1                     3 3 1.000 3 1.000   
 THEME1                   10 4 0.400 8 0.800   
 VOLCINDEX            39  0.385  0.818   
 MANCINDEX             9  0.556  0.889   
 SUBTHEME1.1           5  0.400  0.400   
 SUBTHEME1.2       16/21  0.563  0.952   
 SUBTHEME1.3           5  0.000  0.600   
Note: Scores may not be assigned to coloured cells. 
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 February 2010 
 
Bradford University School of Management,  






Chief Executive, IoD 
144 Katherine Street, Grayston Ridge Office Park, 
 Block B, 1st Floor, Sandown, Sandton, 2196 
PO Box 908, Parklands 2121 
Email: iodsa@iodsa.co.za  
 
Dear  Respondent, 
 
Permission to conduct interview on Corporate Governance in South Africa  
I am Tebogo Magang, and I am currently pursuing my PhD studies at Bradford University 
School of Management. My thesis is on corporate governance in South Africa, particularly 
perceptions of corporations and key stakeholders on the South African King Code and its 
impact on corporations and stakeholders. Results of this study will not only enhance our 
understanding of corporate governance in the new South Africa, but will also help 
international investors appreciate the status quo of corporate governance in SA and to make 
informed decisions on whether to invest in JSE listed companies.   
 
You have knowledge and experience which would be of value to me and I therefore kindly 
wish to request for an appointment to telephonically interview you so as to get your 
perspective on the King Code (2002). The interview will generally cover the King Code 
itself, issues of compliance with the Code and corporate governance in general in South 
Africa. I envisage that the interviews will take about 20 to 30 minutes per session. 
 
I am aware of the need to treat my findings with utmost confidentiality. I can assure you that 
no source, individual or organisational, will be identified or comment attributed without the 
express permission of the originator. A copy of the summary of the findings of this project 
will be sent to each of the participants in the study, if requested. 
 
I hope you are able to assist me and should be grateful if you would return the attached 
proforma. My contact telephone number: Mobile +44 776 589 1624. My e-mail address is: 
t.i.Magang@Bradford.ac.uk or Magangti@hotmail.co.uk.  
 
If you require any further information please do not hesitate to get in touch with me or my 
supervisors: 
 
Professor Ros Haniffa 
Professor of Accounting & Head of Accounting & Finance Group  
Bradford University School of Management   
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Emm Lane, Bradford BD9 4JL 
E-mail: r.haniffa@Bradford.ac.uk 
Telephone (Personal): +44 (0) 1274 234403 
Telephone (Secretary): +44(0) 1274234344 
Fax (School):                +44(0) 1274 546866 or  
 
Dr. Musa Mangena                                                                              
Seniour Lecturer 
Bradford University School of Management   
Emm Lane, Bradford BD9 4JL 
E-mail: r.haniffa@Bradford.ac.uk 
Telephone (Personal): +44 (0) 1274 234340 
Telephone (Secretary): +44(0) 1274234344 
Fax (School):                +44(0) 1274 546866  
 
 
Yours sincerely,  
 
 
Tebogo I. Magang (Mr) 
 
For the Attention of T. Magang, Bradford University School of Management 
 
Dear Tebogo Magang, 
Permission to conduct interview on Corporate Governance in South Africa  
 




Please contact me to arrange a suitable date, time and venue. 
My contact number:……………………………………………. 
 
I do recommend you to speak with.................................................. 
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Appendix 5: Interview Guide 
Interview  Guide for King Code Commissioners 
 
1. King Code 
a) What was the motive for establishing the King Code? 
b) Is the Code suitable in the context of South Africa? 
c) What are the reasons for updating the Code (King Code I, King Code II & 
King Code III)? 
d) Has the objectives been achieved? Yes/No – Why? 
e) Why the Code emphasised on the five key issues (boards and directors, risk 
management, internal audit, integrated sustainability reporting and accounting and 
auditing)? 
f) Which aspects of King Code were successful/unsuccessful? Why? 
g) Impact of King Code on SA companies and its stakeholders. 
h) What is the role of the government/regulator in ensuring that the King Code 
achieves its goals in the short and longer term? 
i) What is the role of NGOs in ensuring that the King Code achieves its goals in the 
short and longer term? 
 
2. Compliance  
a) Perception on whether JSE listed corporations comply with the King Code 
Measurement of compliance with the King Code 
b) Importance for corporations to comply with the King Code; Why? 
c) Perception on which aspects of the Code have been/have not been complied with by 
corporations? 
d) What factors may influence compliance by corporations? 
e) In your opinion, why do companies comply/not comply to the Code? 
f) In your opinion, why companies comply on some aspects more than others? 
g) Steps to be undertaken by government/regulator to ensure compliance by 
corporations?  
h) King Code is just recommendations/best practice, should it be made mandatory? 
Why? 
i) How would compliance help society?  
j) Who benefits from compliance by JSE listed corporations? 
 
3. Corporate Governance 
a) Comments on the standard of corporate governance in JSE listed corporations since 
the inception of the King Code? 
b) Comments on the standard of corporate governance in South Africa in general?  
c) Standard of corporate governance in South Africa compared to other Southern 
African Development Community countries? 
d) What contributes to this standard of corporate governance?  
e) Areas  for improvement? 
f) One of the main objectives of the Department of Trade and Industry is to make South 
Africa a suitable destination for capital. In your opinion has the King Code (2002) 
contributed towards this objective? 
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Appendix 6: Template for Analysing of Interviews 
1. King Code 
 Importance of the King Code to SA 
1..1. Importance as a good Standard of CG 
1..2. Importance of King Code & people/management behaviour  
1..3. Conflict between good corporate governance standards & management 
behaviour 
 Promotion of CG Standards in SA 
1..1. Process of development of King Code and CG awareness in SA 
1..1.1. Media reporting 
1..1.2. Stakeholder involvement in Code Development 
1..2. How objective of improving CG standards has been achieved 
1..2.1. Stakeholder accounts on CG standards in SA (MK) 
1..2.2. Conflict between Civil Society organisations views & Other Stakeholders 
1..2.2.1. “Tenderpreneuring” 
1..2.2.2. Life Style Audits to Combat Corruption 
1..2.2.3. BEE and Failure to Empower Blacks 
 Suitability of King Code to South Africa 
1..1. Process of Compiling King Code & Suitability to SA 
1..2. Mimicking Codes from Developed Countries 
 King Code & prevention of CG Scandals in SA 
1..1. Legislation, Dishonesty and Corporate Governance 
 
2. Compliance  
 Compliance five key issues 
2..1. Issue most complied with 
2..2. Issue least complied with 
2..2.1. Conflict – “Silo” or “Green-wash” reporting on Integrated Sustainability 
Reporting 
2..3. Compliance, Environmental Issues & Skills Development 
2..4. Why compliance is high/low for some issues 
2..5. Compliance & Improvement of CG Standards 
 Compliance with Letter and not Spirit of the Code. 
2..1. Tokenism Blacks 
2..1.1. Tokenism widespread, not unique to SA 
2..2. Conflict between BEE and Compliance with King Code 
2..3. Board Representative & Compliance 
2..4. Compliance and Box-ticking  
2..4.1. How to improve Effectiveness of NEDs 
2..5. Compliance and Moral Issues 
2..6. King Code and Culture in Organisations 
 Compliance across industries 
 Compliance in terms of firm size 
 Beneficiaries of Compliance 
2..1. Importance of Compliance 
 Impact of King Code on Stakeholders 
2..1. King Code & Shareholder Activism 
2..2. Measuring Compliance 
2..3. Who decides on compliance 
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2..4. Role Played by JSE IN Compliance Issues 
 
3. Corporate Governance 
 Standard of CG in SA since King Inception 
3..1. CG Development in SA & Reasons for King Code 
3..2. Challenges to Good CG Practice in SA 
 Standard before & after review of King Code 
 General views of CG in SA 
 Areas for further improvement of King I, II and III 
3..1. Mandatory or Voluntary Code 
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Appendix 7: 2001 Independent Variables after Transformations 
Variable 
Mean Median Variance 
Std. 





PROPWHITES 0.0323 0.0298 0.0010 0.0373 0.0000 0.1200 1.0520 0.2150 0.2410 0.2300 0.8120 0.8270 
PROPDNEDS 0.1538 0.1523 0.0050 0.0690 0.0000 0.2800 0.0740 -0.3410 0.0970 0.2300 0.9750 0.8820 
SBD 1.3249 1.3424 0.0080 0.0891 1.1000 1.4500 -0.8650 0.0410 0.1220 0.0200 0.9120 0.8370 
PROPDNEDS 5.3539 5.3582 0.0000 0.0074 5.3400 5.3600 -1.1090 -0.4470 0.2600 0.2000 0.7130 0.8270 
STA 0.9828 0.9877 0.0000 0.0157 0.9400 1.0000 -1.0560 -0.0590 0.1690 0.2000 0.8370 0.8260 
LTDtoTE 0.2003 0.2197 0.0060 0.0789 0.0000 0.2800 -0.9650 -0.0240 0.1530 0.2000 0.8770 0.8270 
INSTSHARE 0.2035 0.2208 0.0010 0.0277 0.1500 0.2200 -1.1520 -0.3700 0.2680 0.2000 0.6880 0.8830 
DRCTSHARE 0.0623 0.0654 0.0010 0.0235 0.0000 0.1200 -0.5130 -0.0990 0.0820 0.2700 0.9710 0.7600 
ROA 0.0323 0.0298 0.0010 0.0373 0.0000 0.1200 1.0520 0.2150 0.2410 0.2000 0.8120 0.8520 
 
Appendix 8: 2001 Dependent Variables after Transformations 
Variable 
Mean Median Variance 
Std. 





TCI 0.1449 0.1537 0.0020 0.0471 0.0300 0.2400 -0.3420 -0.5680 0.1000 0.0020 0.9760 0.0180 
VCI 0.1613 0.1723 0.0030 0.0500 0.0300 0.2500 -0.4500 -0.4480 0.1070 0.0010 0.9690 0.7600 
MCI 0.1433 0.1248 0.0030 0.0514 0.0500 0.2800 0.4220 -0.1950 0.1770 0.0000 0.9440 0.8520 
THEME1 0.1398 0.1414 0.0030 0.0508 0.0300 0.2300 -0.5460 -0.3570 0.1010 0.0020 0.9510 0.7600 
THEME2 0.1860 0.1758 0.0040 0.0661 0.0000 0.3000 -0.0090 -0.7650 0.1610 0.0000 0.9280 0.8370 
THEME3 0.0686 0.0000 0.0130 0.1161 0.0000 0.3000 1.2890 -0.0970 0.4360 0.0000 0.5990 0.8270 
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Appendix 9:  2001 Independent Variables after Transformations 
Varibale 
Mean Median Variance 
Std. 





PROPWHITES 0.0323 0.0298 0.0010 0.0373 0.0000 0.1200 1.0520 0.2150 0.2410 0.2000 0.8120 0.8820 
PROPDNEDS 0.1538 0.1523 0.0050 0.0690 0.0000 0.2800 0.0740 -0.3410 0.0970 0.2030 0.9750 0.0130 
SBD 1.3249 1.3424 0.0080 0.0891 1.1000 1.4500 -0.8650 0.0410 0.1220 0.0900 0.9120 0.8270 
PROPDNEDS 5.3539 5.3582 0.0000 0.0074 5.3400 5.3600 -1.1090 -0.4470 0.2600 0.2000 0.7130 0.8820 
STA 0.9828 0.9877 0.0000 0.0157 0.9400 1.0000 -1.0560 -0.0590 0.1690 0.2000 0.8370 0.8370 
LTDtoTE 0.2003 0.2197 0.0060 0.0789 0.0000 0.2800 -0.9650 -0.0240 0.1530 0.2500 0.8770 0.8270 
INSTSHARE 0.2035 0.2208 0.0010 0.0277 0.1500 0.2200 -1.1520 -0.3700 0.2680 0.2000 0.6880 0.8260 
DRCTSHARE 0.0623 0.0654 0.0010 0.0235 0.0000 0.1200 -0.5130 -0.0990 0.0820 0.2700 0.9710 0.0060 
ROA 0.0323 0.0298 0.0010 0.0373 0.0000 0.1200 1.0520 0.2150 0.2410 0.2500 0.8120 0.8820 
 
Appendix 10: 2008 Dependent Variables after Transformations 
 
Mean Median Variance 
Std. 





TCI 0.0888 0.0748 0.0030 0.0591 0.0000 0.2400 0.5710 -0.7270 0.1380 0.2000 0.9340 0.8370 
VCI 0.0967 0.0737 0.0040 0.0637 0.0000 0.2500 0.5270 -0.8100 0.1560 0.2000 0.9360 0.8270 
MCI 0.0523 0.0457 0.0030 0.0504 0.0000 0.1600 0.2730 -1.2970 0.2770 0.2500 0.8180 0.8260 
THEME1 0.1032 0.0885 0.0040 0.0625 0.0000 0.2700 0.5690 -0.3320 0.1110 0.2100 0.9590 0.8370 
THEME2 0.0713 0.0457 0.0030 0.0569 0.0000 0.2200 0.3320 -0.7440 0.2030 0.2700 0.8860 0.8270 
THEME3 0.1103 0.0792 0.0090 0.0952 0.0000 0.3000 0.5110 -0.9620 0.1700 0.2500 0.9010 0.8260 
THEME4 0.0888 0.0748 0.0030 0.0591 0.0000 0.2400 0.5710 -0.7270 0.1380 0.2000 0.9340 0.8370 
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Appendix 11a: Normal Histogram Plot for TCI Model 2001  
 
 pg. 353 
 






























 pg. 354 
 
 
Appendix 11c: Normal Histogram Plot for MCI Model 2001 
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Appendix 11e: Normal Histogram Plot for THEME2 Model 2001 
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Appendix 11h: Normal Histogram Plot for TCI Model 2008 
 
 
Appendix 11i: Normal Histogram Plot for VCI Model 2008 
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Appendix 11k: Normal Histogram Plot for THEME1 Model 2008 
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Appendix 12a: A Scatter Plot and Normal probability-Probability Plot of Regression for 










Appendix 12b : A Scatter Plot and  Normal probability-Probability Plot of Regression for 










Appendix 12c : A Scatter Plot and  Normal probability-Probability Plot of Regression for 










Appendix 12d: A Scatter Plot and  Normal probability-Probability Plot of Regression for 
the THEME1 Model 2001 
 
  








Appendix 12e : A Scatter Plot and  Normal probability-Probability Plot of Regression for 
the THEME2 Model 2001 
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Appendix 12f: A Scatter Plot and  Normal probability-Probability Plot of Regression for 
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Appendix 13a: A Scatter Plot and Normal probability-Probability Plot of Regression for 
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Appendix 13b: A Scatter Plot and Normal probability-Probability Plot of Regression for 
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Appendix 13c : A Scatter Plot and Normal probability-Probability Plot of Regression for 
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Appendix 13d: A Scatter Plot and Normal probability-Probability Plot of Regression for 
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Appendix 13e : A Scatter Plot and Normal probability-Probability Plot of Regression for 
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Appendix 13f: A Scatter Plot and Normal probability-Probability Plot of Regression for 
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Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
Predicted Value .0875 .1998 .1449 .02534 136 
Std. Predicted Value -2.266 2.165 .000 1.000 136 
Standard Error of Predicted 
Value 
.009 .020 .013 .002 136 
Adjusted Predicted Value .0824 .2042 .1449 .02570 136 
Residual -.12000 .11776 .00000 .03966 136 
Std. Residual -2.877 2.823 .000 .951 136 
Stud. Residual -3.107 3.003 .000 1.006 136 
Deleted Residual -.13996 .13327 .00000 .04442 136 
Stud. Deleted Residual -3.224 3.108 .000 1.015 136 
Mahal. Distance 4.896 30.375 12.904 4.980 136 
Cook's Distance .000 .115 .009 .016 136 
Centered Leverage Value .036 .225 .096 .037 136 










Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
Predicted Value .0969 .2245 .1613 .02728 136 
Std. Predicted Value -2.362 2.316 .000 1.000 136 
Standard Error of Predicted 
Value 
.009 .021 .014 .002 136 
Adjusted Predicted Value .0953 .2284 .1614 .02763 136 
Residual -.13361 .11521 .00000 .04191 136 
Std. Residual -3.030 2.613 .000 .951 136 
Stud. Residual -3.273 2.780 .000 1.006 136 
Deleted Residual -.15584 .13039 -
.00001 
.04700 136 
Stud. Deleted Residual -3.413 2.860 .000 1.016 136 
Mahal. Distance 4.896 30.375 12.904 4.980 136 
Cook's Distance .000 .127 .009 .016 136 
Centered Leverage Value .036 .225 .096 .037 136 
















Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
Predicted Value .0969 .1812 .1433 .01798 136 
Std. Predicted Value -2.580 2.110 .000 1.000 136 
Standard Error of Predicted 
Value 
.011 .024 .016 .003 136 
Adjusted Predicted Value .0894 .1854 .1433 .01910 136 
Residual -.11486 .11334 .00000 .04813 136 
Std. Residual -2.269 2.239 .000 .951 136 
Stud. Residual -2.331 2.396 .000 1.005 136 
Deleted Residual -.12121 .12985 -.00001 .05389 136 
Stud. Deleted Residual -2.375 2.445 .001 1.012 136 
Mahal. Distance 4.896 30.375 12.904 4.980 136 
Cook's Distance .000 .075 .009 .012 136 
Centered Leverage Value .036 .225 .096 .037 136 









Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
Predicted Value .0833 .1894 .1398 .02279 136 
Std. Predicted Value -2.479 2.174 .000 1.000 136 
Standard Error of Predicted 
Value 
.010 .023 .015 .003 136 
Adjusted Predicted Value .0757 .1918 .1398 .02347 136 
Residual -.12500 .11726 .00000 .04544 136 
Std. Residual -2.615 2.453 .000 .951 136 
Stud. Residual -2.825 2.610 .000 1.004 136 
Deleted Residual -.14579 .13271 .00004 .05072 136 
Stud. Deleted Residual -2.910 2.675 -.001 1.013 136 
Mahal. Distance 4.896 30.375 12.904 4.980 136 
Cook's Distance .000 .095 .008 .015 136 
Centered Leverage Value .036 .225 .096 .037 136 



















Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
Predicted Value .1081 .2501 .1860 .02671 136 
Std. Predicted Value -2.917 2.400 .000 1.000 136 
Standard Error of Predicted 
Value 
.013 .031 .020 .004 136 
Adjusted Predicted Value .1051 .2529 .1860 .02772 136 
Residual -.16342 .11665 .00000 .06042 136 
Std. Residual -2.571 1.835 .000 .951 136 
Stud. Residual -2.708 1.976 .000 1.004 136 
Deleted Residual -.18132 .13522 -
.00002 
.06744 136 
Stud. Deleted Residual -2.782 2.000 .000 1.009 136 
Mahal. Distance 4.896 30.375 12.904 4.980 136 
Cook's Distance .000 .057 .008 .010 136 
Centered Leverage Value .036 .225 .096 .037 136 










Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
Predicted Value -.0511 .1620 .0686 .03934 136 
Std. Predicted Value -3.042 2.374 .000 1.000 136 
Standard Error of Predicted 
Value 
.024 .055 .036 .006 136 
Adjusted Predicted Value -.0595 .1613 .0683 .04161 136 
Residual -.14641 .28219 .00000 .10927 136 
Std. Residual -1.274 2.455 .000 .951 136 
Stud. Residual -1.337 2.704 .001 1.002 136 
Deleted Residual -.16130 .34239 .00027 .12142 136 
Stud. Deleted Residual -1.341 2.778 .005 1.009 136 
Mahal. Distance 4.896 30.375 12.904 4.980 136 
Cook's Distance .000 .111 .008 .014 136 
Centered Leverage Value .036 .225 .096 .037 136 
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Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
Predicted Value .1294 .2988 .2212 .03589 136 
Std. Predicted Value -2.556 2.163 .000 1.000 136 
Standard Error of Predicted 
Value 
.014 .032 .021 .004 136 
Adjusted Predicted Value .1259 .3010 .2213 .03639 136 
Residual -.15660 .13222 .00000 .06224 136 
Std. Residual -2.392 2.019 .000 .951 136 
Stud. Residual -2.542 2.148 -.001 1.004 136 
Deleted Residual -.17690 .14964 -
.00011 
.06944 136 
Stud. Deleted Residual -2.601 2.181 -.002 1.010 136 
Mahal. Distance 4.896 30.375 12.904 4.980 136 
Cook's Distance .000 .060 .008 .011 136 
Centered Leverage Value .036 .225 .096 .037 136 










Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
Predicted Value .0112 .1961 .0888 .04297 136 
Std. Predicted Value -1.807 2.498 .000 1.000 136 
Standard Error of Predicted 
Value 
.009 .019 .014 .002 136 
Adjusted Predicted Value .0104 .1927 .0887 .04336 136 
Residual -.09496 .11945 .00000 .04051 136 
Std. Residual -2.228 2.803 .000 .951 136 
Stud. Residual -2.332 3.020 .001 1.006 136 
Deleted Residual -.10404 .13871 .00010 .04541 136 
Stud. Deleted Residual -2.376 3.127 .002 1.015 136 
Mahal. Distance 5.267 26.396 12.904 4.030 136 
Cook's Distance .000 .105 .009 .014 136 
Centered Leverage Value .039 .196 .096 .030 136 








 pg. 377 
 














Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
Predicted Value .0100 .2121 .0967 .04609 136 
Std. Predicted Value -1.883 2.502 .000 1.000 136 
Standard Error of Predicted 
Value 
.010 .021 .015 .002 136 
Adjusted Predicted Value .0113 .2077 .0966 .04649 136 
Residual -.11133 .11316 .00000 .04394 136 
Std. Residual -2.409 2.448 .000 .951 136 
Stud. Residual -2.582 2.638 .001 1.006 136 
Deleted Residual -.12795 .13141 .00015 .04921 136 
Stud. Deleted Residual -2.645 2.706 .002 1.014 136 
Mahal. Distance 5.267 26.396 12.904 4.030 136 
Cook's Distance .000 .080 .009 .013 136 
Centered Leverage Value .039 .196 .096 .030 136 






Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
Predicted Value -.0140 .1180 .0523 .02770 136 
Std. Predicted Value -2.392 2.373 .000 1.000 136 
Standard Error of Predicted 
Value 
.010 .020 .014 .002 136 
Adjusted Predicted Value -.0163 .1303 .0524 .02841 136 
Residual -.11169 .14887 .00000 .04209 136 
Std. Residual -2.523 3.362 .000 .951 136 
Stud. Residual -2.725 3.623 -.001 1.005 136 
Deleted Residual -.13030 .17287 -.00014 .04707 136 
Stud. Deleted Residual -2.800 3.820 .000 1.015 136 
Mahal. Distance 5.267 26.396 12.904 4.030 136 
Cook's Distance .000 .151 .009 .016 136 
Centered Leverage Value .039 .196 .096 .030 136 
a. Dependent Variable: LOGMCI 
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Appendix 14k: Residuals Statistics Table for THEME1 Model 2008 
 
 












Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
Predicted Value .0252 .2088 .1032 .04345 136 
Std. Predicted Value -1.795 2.431 .000 1.000 136 
Standard Error of Predicted 
Value 
.010 .021 .015 .002 136 
Adjusted Predicted Value .0164 .2022 .1032 .04397 136 
Residual -.12070 .12068 .00000 .04494 136 
Std. Residual -2.553 2.553 .000 .951 136 
Stud. Residual -2.672 2.751 .000 1.005 136 
Deleted Residual -.13214 .14014 .00000 .05024 136 
Stud. Deleted Residual -2.742 2.829 .000 1.014 136 
Mahal. Distance 5.267 26.396 12.904 4.030 136 
Cook's Distance .000 .087 .008 .013 136 
Centered Leverage Value .039 .196 .096 .030 136 






Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
Predicted Value -.0007 .1324 .0713 .02998 136 
Std. Predicted Value -2.400 2.037 .000 1.000 136 
Standard Error of Predicted 
Value 
.011 .023 .016 .002 136 
Adjusted Predicted Value -.0209 .1468 .0713 .03097 136 
Residual -.09836 .13393 .00000 .04830 136 
Std. Residual -1.936 2.636 .000 .951 136 
Stud. Residual -2.079 2.842 .000 1.008 136 
Deleted Residual -.11341 .15565 .00001 .05436 136 
Stud. Deleted Residual -2.108 2.928 .001 1.015 136 
Mahal. Distance 5.267 26.396 12.904 4.030 136 
Cook's Distance .000 .094 .009 .014 136 
Centered Leverage Value .039 .196 .096 .030 136 
a. Dependent Variable: LOGTHEME2 
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Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
Predicted Value -.0047 .2851 .1103 .06404 136 
Std. Predicted Value -1.796 2.730 .000 1.000 136 
Standard Error of Predicted 
Value 
.016 .033 .024 .003 136 
Adjusted Predicted Value -.0054 .2827 .1099 .06458 136 
Residual -.18744 .20215 .00000 .07040 136 
Std. Residual -2.531 2.730 .000 .951 136 
Stud. Residual -2.714 2.853 .003 1.007 136 
Deleted Residual -.21542 .22078 .00047 .07898 136 
Stud. Deleted Residual -2.788 2.941 .005 1.016 136 
Mahal. Distance 5.267 26.396 12.904 4.030 136 
Cook's Distance .000 .079 .009 .015 136 
Centered Leverage Value .039 .196 .096 .030 136 
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Appendix 15: Comparison of Regression Results for the Years 2001 and 2008 
Model Regression Results 2001 2008 
TCI Adjusted R² 0.214 0.479 
 Standard Error 0.047 0.042 
 F Value 3.831 10.556 
 Sig. Value 0.000 0.000 
 Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.334 2.480 
    
VCI Adjusted R² 0.223 0.473 
 Standard Error 0.044 0.046 
 F Value 3.975 10.327 
 Sig. Value 0.000 0.000 
 Durbin-Watson 2.284 2.395 
    
MCI Adjusted R² 0.029 0.228 
 Standard Error 0.050 0.044 
 F Value 1.310 4.065 
 Sig. Value 0.216 0.000 
 Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.227 2.167 
    
Theme 1 Adjusted R² 0.116 0.428 
 Standard Error 0.047 0.047 
 F Value 2.361 8.776 
 Sig. Value 0.008 0.000 
 Durbin-Watson 2.427 2.445 
    
Theme 2 Adjusted R² 0.074 0.201 
 Standard Error 0.063 0.058 
 F Value 1.834 3.617 
 Sig. Value 0.045 0.000 
 Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.974 2.250 
    
Theme 3 Adjusted R² 0.020 Dependent 
Variable (Theme 3) 
is constant. 
 Standard Error 0.114 
 F Value 1.216 
 Sig. Value 0.270 
 Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.079 
    
Theme 4 Adjusted R² 0.170 0.395 
 Standard Error 0.065 0.074 
 F Value 3.121 7.766 
 Sig. Value 0.000 0.000 
 Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.978 2.147 
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1 .728a 0.529 0.479 0.04262 0.529 
a. Predictors: (Constant), ITYPE4, LISTSTATUS, LOGPROPWHITES, LOGLTDtoTE, 
LOGINSTSHARE, LOGROA, LOGPROPDNEDS, LOGSBD, ITYPE2, 
LOGDIRECTSHARE, LOGSTA, AUDTYPE, ITYPE1 
b. Dependent Variable: LOGTCI 
 






Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 0.249 13 0.019 10.556 .000a 
 Residual 0.222 122 0.002   
 Total 0.471 135    
a. Predictors: (Constant), ITYPE4, LISTSTATUS, LOGPROPWHITES, LOGLTDtoTE, 
LOGINSTSHARE, LOGROA, LOGPROPDNEDS, LOGSBD, ITYPE2, LOGDIRECTSHARE, 
LOGSTA, AUDTYPE, ITYPE1 
b. Dependent Variable: LOGTCI 
 






Coefficients   Collinearity Statistics 
Model  B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -9.716 2.089  -4.65 0   
 LOGPROPWHITES -0.235 0.06 -0.259 -3.893 0 0.87 1.15 
 LOGPROPDNEDS 0.104 0.089 0.082 1.168 0.245 0.773 1.293 
 LOGSBD 0.124 0.036 0.246 3.391 0.001 0.734 1.361 
 LOGSTA 1.951 0.41 0.34 4.756 0 0.756 1.322 
 LOGLTDtoTE -0.285 0.61 -0.031 -0.467 0.641 0.903 1.107 
 LOGINSTSHARE -0.046 0.05 -0.062 -0.93 0.354 0.864 1.158 
 LOGDIRECTSHARE -0.243 0.109 -0.154 -2.235 0.027 0.81 1.235 
 LOGROA -0.076 0.13 -0.039 -0.587 0.558 0.876 1.141 
 AUDTYPE 0.041 0.01 0.283 3.904 0 0.735 1.361 
 LISTSTATUS -0.026 0.01 -0.183 -2.624 0.01 0.795 1.258 
 ITYPE1 -0.012 0.011 -0.085 -1.035 0.303 0.566 1.767 
 ITYPE2 -0.002 0.011 -0.013 -0.164 0.87 0.63 1.588 
 ITYPE4 -0.003 0.011 -0.018 -0.237 0.813 0.639 1.566 





 pg. 382 
 






Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 .724a 0.524 0.473 0.04622 2.395 
a. Predictors: (Constant), ITYPE4, LISTSTATUS, LOGPROPWHITES, LOGLTDtoTE, LOGINSTSHARE, 
LOGROA, LOGPROPDNEDS, LOGSBD, ITYPE2, LOGDIRECTSHARE, LOGSTA, AUDTYPE, ITYPE1 
b. Dependent Variable: LOGVCI 
 
 







Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 0.287 13 0.022 10.327 .000a 
 Residual 0.261 122 0.002   
 Total 0.547 135    
a. Predictors: (Constant), ITYPE4, LISTSTATUS, LOGPROPWHITES, LOGLTDtoTE, LOGINSTSHARE, 
LOGROA, LOGPROPDNEDS, LOGSBD, ITYPE2, LOGDIRECTSHARE, LOGSTA, AUDTYPE, ITYPE1 
b. Dependent Variable: LOGVCI 
 








  Collinearity Statistics 
Model  B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 
-
10.749 2.266  -4.743 0   
 LOGPROPWHITES -0.261 0.066 -0.267 -3.988 0 0.87 1.15 
 LOGPROPDNEDS 0.074 0.097 0.054 0.764 0.446 0.773 1.293 
 LOGSBD 0.132 0.04 0.243 3.333 0.001 0.734 1.361 
 LOGSTA 2.124 0.445 0.343 4.772 0 0.756 1.322 
 LOGLTDtoTE -0.162 0.662 -0.016 -0.246 0.806 0.903 1.107 
 LOGINSTSHARE -0.041 0.054 -0.051 -0.764 0.446 0.864 1.158 
 LOGDIRECTSHARE -0.25 0.118 -0.147 -2.117 0.036 0.81 1.235 
 LOGROA -0.08 0.141 -0.038 -0.567 0.572 0.876 1.141 
 AUDTYPE 0.044 0.011 0.286 3.924 0 0.735 1.361 
 LISTSTATUS -0.026 0.011 -0.175 -2.491 0.014 0.795 1.258 
 ITYPE1 -0.011 0.012 -0.074 -0.891 0.375 0.566 1.767 
 ITYPE2 -0.004 0.012 -0.029 -0.367 0.714 0.63 1.588 
 ITYPE4 -0.002 0.012 -0.01 -0.127 0.899 0.639 1.566 
a. Dependent Variable: LOGVCI 
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Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 .550a 0.302 0.228 0.04427 2.167 
a. Predictors: (Constant), ITYPE4, LISTSTATUS, LOGPROPWHITES, LOGLTDtoTE, LOGINSTSHARE, 
LOGROA, LOGPROPDNEDS, LOGSBD, ITYPE2, LOGDIRECTSHARE, LOGSTA, AUDTYPE, ITYPE1 
b. Dependent Variable: LOMCI 
 
 







Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 0.104 13 0.008 4.065 .000a 
 Residual 0.239 122 0.002   
 Total 0.343 135    
a. Predictors: (Constant), ITYPE4, LISTSTATUS, LOGPROPWHITES, LOGLTDtoTE, LOGINSTSHARE, 
LOGROA, LOGPROPDNEDS, LOGSBD, ITYPE2, LOGDIRECTSHARE, LOGSTA, AUDTYPE, ITYPE1 
b. Dependent Variable: LOGMCI 
 








  Collinearity Statistics 
Model  B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -4.152 2.171  -1.913 0.058   
 LOGPROPWHITES -0.089 0.063 -0.115 -1.413 0.16 0.87 1.15 
 LOGPROPDNEDS 0.245 0.093 0.228 2.647 0.009 0.773 1.293 
 LOGSBD 0.076 0.038 0.176 1.998 0.048 0.734 1.361 
 LOGSTA 1.011 0.426 0.206 2.372 0.019 0.756 1.322 
 LOGLTDtoTE -0.88 0.634 -0.111 -1.389 0.167 0.903 1.107 
 LOGINSTSHARE -0.082 0.051 -0.129 -1.59 0.115 0.864 1.158 
 LOGDIRECTSHARE -0.184 0.113 -0.137 -1.627 0.106 0.81 1.235 
 LOGROA -0.048 0.135 -0.029 -0.354 0.724 0.876 1.141 
 AUDTYPE 0.018 0.011 0.144 1.634 0.105 0.735 1.361 
 LISTSTATUS -0.021 0.01 -0.178 -2.101 0.038 0.795 1.258 
 ITYPE1 -0.015 0.012 -0.127 -1.268 0.207 0.566 1.767 
 ITYPE2 0.01 0.011 0.082 0.859 0.392 0.63 1.588 
 ITYPE4 -0.009 0.011 -0.072 -0.757 0.45 0.639 1.566 
a. Dependent Variable: LOGMCI 
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Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 .695a 0.483 0.428 0.04727 2.445 
a. Predictors: (Constant), ITYPE4, LISTSTATUS, LOGPROPWHITES, LOGLTDtoTE, LOGINSTSHARE, 
LOGROA, LOGPROPDNEDS, LOGSBD, ITYPE2, LOGDIRECTSHARE, LOGSTA, AUDTYPE, ITYPE1 
b. Dependent Variable: LOGTHEME1 
 
 







Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 0.255 13 0.02 8.776 .000a 
 Residual 0.273 122 0.002   
 Total 0.528 135    
a. Predictors: (Constant), ITYPE4, LISTSTATUS, LOGPROPWHITES, LOGLTDtoTE, LOGINSTSHARE, 
LOGROA, LOGPROPDNEDS, LOGSBD, ITYPE2, LOGDIRECTSHARE, LOGSTA, AUDTYPE, ITYPE1 
b. Dependent Variable: LOGTHEME1 
 
Appendix 19c: Coefficient Table for THEME1 Model 2008 
Coefficients(a) 




  Collinearity Statistics 
Model  B 
Std. 
Error Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -10.038 2.317  -4.332 0   
 LOGPROPWHITES -0.276 0.067 -0.287 -4.112 0 0.87 1.15 
 LOGPROPDNEDS 0.108 0.099 0.081 1.092 0.277 0.773 1.293 
 LOGSBD 0.125 0.04 0.235 3.099 0.002 0.734 1.361 
 LOGSTA 2.005 0.455 0.33 4.406 0 0.756 1.322 
 LOGLTDtoTE -0.261 0.677 -0.026 -0.386 0.7 0.903 1.107 
 LOGINSTSHARE -0.048 0.055 -0.062 -0.883 0.379 0.864 1.158 
 LOGDIRECTSHARE -0.15 0.121 -0.09 -1.247 0.215 0.81 1.235 
 LOGROA -0.071 0.144 -0.034 -0.49 0.625 0.876 1.141 
 AUDTYPE 0.04 0.012 0.264 3.478 0.001 0.735 1.361 
 LISTSTATUS -0.017 0.011 -0.113 -1.548 0.124 0.795 1.258 
 ITYPE1 -0.008 0.013 -0.054 -0.622 0.535 0.566 1.767 
 ITYPE2 0.002 0.012 0.015 0.181 0.857 0.63 1.588 
 ITYPE4 -0.001 0.012 -0.004 -0.044 0.965 0.639 1.566 
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Appendix 20a: Model Summary for THEME2 Model 2008 
 
Model Summaryb  
  
Model 
Summary(b)    
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 




1 .527a 0.278 0.201 0.05081 2.25 
a. Predictors: (Constant), ITYPE4, LISTSTATUS, LOGPROPWHITES, LOGLTDtoTE, LOGINSTSHARE, 
LOGROA, LOGPROPDNEDS, LOGSBD, ITYPE2, LOGDIRECTSHARE, LOGSTA, AUDTYPE, ITYPE1 
b. Dependent Variable: LOGTHEME2 
 







Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 0.121 13 0.009 3.617 .000a 
 Residual 0.315 122 0.003   
 Total 0.436 135    
a. Predictors: (Constant), ITYPE4, LISTSTATUS, LOGPROPWHITES, LOGLTDtoTE, LOGINSTSHARE, 
LOGROA, LOGPROPDNEDS, LOGSBD, ITYPE2, LOGDIRECTSHARE, LOGSTA, AUDTYPE, ITYPE1 




Appendix 20c: Coefficient Table for THEME2 Model 2008 
Coefficients(a) 






  Collinearity 
Statistics 
Model  B 
Std. 
Error Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -7.267 2.491  -2.917 0.004   
 LOGPROPWHITES 0.01 0.072 0.012 0.144 0.885 0.87 1.15 
 LOGPROPDNEDS 0.186 0.106 0.153 1.748 0.083 0.773 1.293 
 LOGSBD 0.098 0.043 0.202 2.248 0.026 0.734 1.361 
 LOGSTA 1.568 0.489 0.283 3.205 0.002 0.756 1.322 
 LOGLTDtoTE -0.699 0.727 -0.078 -0.962 0.338 0.903 1.107 
 LOGINSTSHARE -0.032 0.059 -0.045 -0.539 0.591 0.864 1.158 
 LOGDIRECTSHARE -0.162 0.13 -0.106 -1.246 0.215 0.81 1.235 
 LOGROA -0.113 0.155 -0.06 -0.73 0.467 0.876 1.141 
 AUDTYPE 0.011 0.012 0.079 0.885 0.378 0.735 1.361 
 LISTSTATUS -0.015 0.012 -0.11 -1.276 0.204 0.795 1.258 
 ITYPE1 -0.023 0.014 -0.175 -1.716 0.089 0.566 1.767 
 ITYPE2 0.002 0.013 0.019 0.192 0.848 0.63 1.588 
 ITYPE4 -0.023 0.013 -0.17 -1.768 0.08 0.639 1.566 
a. Dependent Variable: LOGTHEME2 
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Appendix 21a: Model Summary for THEME4 Model 2008 
 
Model Summaryb  
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 .673a 0.453 0.395 0.07405 2.147 
a. Predictors: (Constant), ITYPE4, LISTSTATUS, LOGPROPWHITES, LOGLTDtoTE, LOGINSTSHARE, 
LOGROA, LOGPROPDNEDS, LOGSBD, ITYPE2, LOGDIRECTSHARE, LOGSTA, AUDTYPE, ITYPE1 
b. Dependent Variable: LOGTHEME4 
 
 







Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 0.554 13 0.043 7.766 .000a 
 Residual 0.669 122 0.005   
 Total 1.223 135    
a. Predictors: (Constant), ITYPE4, LISTSTATUS, LOGPROPWHITES, LOGLTDtoTE, LOGINSTSHARE, 
LOGROA, LOGPROPDNEDS, LOGSBD, ITYPE2, LOGDIRECTSHARE, LOGSTA, AUDTYPE, ITYPE1 
b. Dependent Variable: LOGTHEME4 
 
 
Appendix 21c: Coefficient Table for THEME4 Model 2008 
 
Coefficients(a) 




  Collinearity 
Statistics 
Model  B 
Std. 
Error Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -12.009 3.63  -3.308 0.001   
 LOGPROPWHITES -0.32 0.105 -0.219 -3.047 0.003 0.87 1.15 
 LOGPROPDNEDS 0.021 0.155 0.01 0.133 0.895 0.773 1.293 
 LOGSBD 0.146 0.063 0.18 2.299 0.023 0.734 1.361 
 LOGSTA 2.363 0.713 0.255 3.315 0.001 0.756 1.322 
 LOGLTDtoTE -0.046 1.06 -0.003 -0.043 0.966 0.903 1.107 
 LOGINSTSHARE -0.041 0.086 -0.034 -0.473 0.637 0.864 1.158 
 LOGDIRECTSHARE -0.584 0.189 -0.23 -3.089 0.002 0.81 1.235 
 LOGROA -0.071 0.226 -0.022 -0.313 0.754 0.876 1.141 
 AUDTYPE 0.073 0.018 0.314 4.018 0 0.735 1.361 
 LISTSTATUS -0.065 0.017 -0.289 -3.851 0 0.795 1.258 
 ITYPE1 -0.02 0.02 -0.089 -0.997 0.321 0.566 1.767 
 ITYPE2 -0.024 0.019 -0.109 -1.294 0.198 0.63 1.588 
 ITYPE4 0.004 0.019 0.019 0.224 0.823 0.639 1.566 
a. Dependent Variable: LOGTHEME4 
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Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 .538a 0.29 0.214 0.04171 2.334 
a. Predictors: (Constant), ITYPE4, LISTSTATUS, LOGPROPWHITES, LOGLTDtoTE, LOGINSTSHARE, 
LOGROA, LOGPROPDNEDS, LOGSBD, ITYPE2, LOGDIRECTSHARE, LOGSTA, AUDTYPE, ITYPE1 
b. Dependent Variable: LOGTCI 
 






Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 0.087 13 0.007 3.831 .000a 
 Residual 0.212 122 0.002   
 Total 0.299 135    
a. Predictors: (Constant), ITYPE4, LISTSTATUS, LOGPROPWHITES, LOGLTDtoTE, LOGINSTSHARE, 
LOGROA, LOGPROPDNEDS, LOGSBD, ITYPE2, LOGDIRECTSHARE, LOGSTA, AUDTYPE, ITYPE1 
b. Dependent Variable: LOGTCI 
 






Coefficients   Collinearity Statistics 
Model  B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -0.718 3.569  -0.201 0.841   
 
REFLOGPROPWHITE
S -0.034 0.107 -0.027 -0.313 0.755 0.808 1.237 
 REFLOGPROPDNEDS 0.041 0.058 0.061 0.719 0.473 0.814 1.229 
 REFLOGSBD 0.165 0.053 0.312 3.137 0.002 0.588 1.701 
 REFLOGSTA 0.018 0.676 0.003 0.026 0.979 0.516 1.939 
 REFLOGLTDtoTE 0.52 0.252 0.173 2.06 0.042 0.823 1.216 
 REFLOGINSTSHARE 0.021 0.051 0.035 0.404 0.687 0.79 1.265 
 REFLOGDRCTSHARE 0.038 0.144 0.022 0.26 0.795 0.806 1.241 
 REFLOGROA 0.333 0.177 0.166 1.883 0.062 0.749 1.335 
 AUDTYPE 0.019 0.009 0.173 2.041 0.043 0.808 1.237 
 LISTSTATUS 0.002 0.012 0.018 0.213 0.831 0.819 1.221 
 ITYPE1 0.001 0.01 0.005 0.055 0.956 0.655 1.526 
 ITYPE2 -0.017 0.011 -0.154 -1.577 0.117 0.611 1.637 
 ITYPE4 -0.01 0.01 -0.092 -0.981 0.329 0.665 1.505 





 pg. 388 
 
 






Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 .545a 0.298 0.223 0.04409 2.284 
a. Predictors: (Constant), ITYPE4, LISTSTATUS, LOGPROPWHITES, LOGLTDtoTE, LOGINSTSHARE, 
LOGROA, LOGPROPDNEDS, LOGSBD, ITYPE2, LOGDIRECTSHARE, LOGSTA, AUDTYPE, ITYPE1 
b. Dependent Variable: LOGVCI 
 
 







Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 0.1 13 0.008 3.975 .000a 
 Residual 0.237 122 0.002   
 Total 0.338 135    
a. Predictors: (Constant), ITYPE4, LISTSTATUS, LOGPROPWHITES, LOGLTDtoTE, LOGINSTSHARE, 
LOGROA, LOGPROPDNEDS, LOGSBD, ITYPE2, LOGDIRECTSHARE, LOGSTA, AUDTYPE, ITYPE1 
b. Dependent Variable: LOGVCI 
 
Appendix 23c: Coefficient Table for VCI Model 2001 
Coefficients(a) 




  Collinearity Statistics 
Model  B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -1.353 3.772  -0.359 0.721   
 REFLOGPROPWHITES -0.081 0.113 -0.06 -0.712 0.478 0.808 1.237 
 REFLOGPROPDNEDS 0.019 0.061 0.026 0.311 0.756 0.814 1.229 
 REFLOGSBD 0.17 0.056 0.302 3.054 0.003 0.588 1.701 
 REFLOGSTA 0.133 0.714 0.02 0.187 0.852 0.516 1.939 
 REFLOGLTDtoTE 0.542 0.267 0.17 2.033 0.044 0.823 1.216 
 REFLOGINSTSHARE 0.01 0.054 0.016 0.186 0.853 0.79 1.265 
 REFLOGDRCTSHARE 0.085 0.153 0.047 0.558 0.578 0.806 1.241 
 REFLOGROA 0.369 0.187 0.173 1.977 0.05 0.749 1.335 
 AUDTYPE 0.021 0.01 0.184 2.183 0.031 0.808 1.237 
 LISTSTATUS 0.003 0.012 0.018 0.212 0.832 0.819 1.221 
 ITYPE1 0.002 0.011 0.015 0.155 0.877 0.655 1.526 
 ITYPE2 -0.02 0.011 -0.17 -1.75 0.083 0.611 1.637 
 ITYPE4 -0.015 0.011 -0.124 -1.335 0.184 0.665 1.505 
a. Dependent Variable: LOGVCI 
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Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 .350a 0.123 0.029 0.05062 2.227 
a. Predictors: (Constant), ITYPE4, LISTSTATUS, LOGPROPWHITES, LOGLTDtoTE, LOGINSTSHARE, 
LOGROA, LOGPROPDNEDS, LOGSBD, ITYPE2, LOGDIRECTSHARE, LOGSTA, AUDTYPE, ITYPE1 
b. Dependent Variable: LOGMCI 
 
 







Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 0.044 13 0.003 1.31 .216a 
 Residual 0.313 122 0.003   
 Total 0.356 135    
a. Predictors: (Constant), ITYPE4, LISTSTATUS, LOGPROPWHITES, LOGLTDtoTE, LOGINSTSHARE, 
LOGROA, LOGPROPDNEDS, LOGSBD, ITYPE2, LOGDIRECTSHARE, LOGSTA, AUDTYPE, ITYPE1 
b. Dependent Variable: LOGMCI 
 
Appendix 24c: Coefficient Table for MCI Model 2001 
Coefficients(a) 




  Collinearity Statistics 
Model  B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 2.984 4.331  0.689 0.492   
 REFLOGPROPWHITES 0.186 0.13 0.135 1.427 0.156 0.808 1.237 
 REFLOGPROPDNEDS 0.143 0.07 0.192 2.046 0.043 0.814 1.229 
 REFLOGSBD 0.1 0.064 0.173 1.563 0.121 0.588 1.701 
 REFLOGSTA -0.632 0.82 -0.091 -0.771 0.442 0.516 1.939 
 REFLOGLTDtoTE 0.396 0.306 0.121 1.294 0.198 0.823 1.216 
 REFLOGINSTSHARE 0.066 0.062 0.101 1.055 0.293 0.79 1.265 
 REFLOGDRCTSHARE -0.146 0.175 -0.079 -0.832 0.407 0.806 1.241 
 REFLOGROA 0.139 0.215 0.064 0.65 0.517 0.749 1.335 
 AUDTYPE 0.003 0.011 0.023 0.247 0.806 0.808 1.237 
 LISTSTATUS 0.003 0.014 0.017 0.178 0.859 0.819 1.221 
 ITYPE1 -0.005 0.013 -0.046 -0.435 0.665 0.655 1.526 
 ITYPE2 -0.005 0.013 -0.041 -0.381 0.704 0.611 1.637 
 ITYPE4 0.01 0.013 0.079 0.756 0.451 0.665 1.505 
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Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 .448a 0.201 0.116 0.0478 2.247 
a. Predictors: (Constant), ITYPE4, LISTSTATUS, LOGPROPWHITES, LOGLTDtoTE, LOGINSTSHARE, 
LOGROA, LOGPROPDNEDS, LOGSBD, ITYPE2, LOGDIRECTSHARE, LOGSTA, AUDTYPE, ITYPE1 
b. Dependent Variable: LOGTHEME1 
 
 






Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 0.07 13 0.005 2.361 .008a 
 Residual 0.279 122 0.002   
 Total 0.349 135    
a. Predictors: (Constant), ITYPE4, LISTSTATUS, LOGPROPWHITES, LOGLTDtoTE, LOGINSTSHARE, 
LOGROA, LOGPROPDNEDS, LOGSBD, ITYPE2, LOGDIRECTSHARE, LOGSTA, AUDTYPE, ITYPE1 
b. Dependent Variable: LOGTHEME1 
 
Appendix 25c: Coefficient Table for THEME1 Model 2001 
Coefficients(a) 




  Collinearity Statistics 
Model  B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -0.439 4.089  -0.107 0.915   
 REFLOGPROPWHITES -0.055 0.123 -0.04 -0.448 0.655 0.808 1.237 
 REFLOGPROPDNEDS 0.1 0.066 0.135 1.508 0.134 0.814 1.229 
 REFLOGSBD 0.148 0.06 0.26 2.46 0.015 0.588 1.701 
 REFLOGSTA 0.058 0.774 0.008 0.075 0.941 0.516 1.939 
 REFLOGLTDtoTE 0.014 0.289 0.004 0.05 0.96 0.823 1.216 
 REFLOGINSTSHARE -0.007 0.059 -0.01 -0.112 0.911 0.79 1.265 
 REFLOGDRCTSHARE 0.108 0.165 0.059 0.651 0.517 0.806 1.241 
 REFLOGROA 0.152 0.203 0.07 0.751 0.454 0.749 1.335 
 AUDTYPE 0.019 0.01 0.165 1.835 0.069 0.808 1.237 
 LISTSTATUS 0.008 0.013 0.057 0.634 0.528 0.819 1.221 
 ITYPE1 0.014 0.012 0.116 1.161 0.248 0.655 1.526 
 ITYPE2 -0.001 0.012 -0.012 -0.114 0.909 0.611 1.637 
 ITYPE4 0.001 0.012 0.009 0.087 0.931 0.665 1.505 








 pg. 391 
 
Appendix 26a: Model Summary for THEME2 Model 2001 
Model Summaryb  
  
Model 
Summary(b)    
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 




1 .404a 0.163 0.074 0.06356 1.974 
a. Predictors: (Constant), ITYPE4, LISTSTATUS, LOGPROPWHITES, LOGLTDtoTE, LOGINSTSHARE, 
LOGROA, LOGPROPDNEDS, LOGSBD, ITYPE2, LOGDIRECTSHARE, LOGSTA, AUDTYPE, ITYPE1 
b. Dependent Variable: LOGTHEME2 
 







Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 0.096 13 0.007 1.834 .045a 
 Residual 0.493 122 0.004   
 Total 0.589 135    
a. Predictors: (Constant), ITYPE4, LISTSTATUS, LOGPROPWHITES, LOGLTDtoTE, LOGINSTSHARE, 
LOGROA, LOGPROPDNEDS, LOGSBD, ITYPE2, LOGDIRECTSHARE, LOGSTA, AUDTYPE, ITYPE1 
b. Dependent Variable: LOGTHEME2 
 
Appendix 26c: Coefficient Table for THEME2 Model 2001 
Coefficients(a) 






  Collinearity 
Statistics 
Model  B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 4.258 5.438  0.783 0.435   
 REFLOGPROPWHITES 0.027 0.163 0.015 0.164 0.87 0.808 1.237 
 REFLOGPROPDNEDS -0.082 0.088 -0.085 -0.928 0.355 0.814 1.229 
 REFLOGSBD 0.161 0.08 0.218 2.016 0.046 0.588 1.701 
 REFLOGSTA -1.038 1.029 -0.116 -1.008 0.315 0.516 1.939 
 REFLOGLTDtoTE 1.324 0.385 0.314 3.443 0.001 0.823 1.216 
 REFLOGINSTSHARE 0.08 0.078 0.096 1.026 0.307 0.79 1.265 
 REFLOGDRCTSHARE -0.173 0.22 -0.073 -0.786 0.433 0.806 1.241 
 REFLOGROA 0.513 0.269 0.182 1.902 0.059 0.749 1.335 
 AUDTYPE 0.004 0.014 0.03 0.323 0.747 0.808 1.237 
 LISTSTATUS -0.024 0.018 -0.124 -1.357 0.177 0.819 1.221 
 ITYPE1 -0.017 0.016 -0.11 -1.072 0.286 0.655 1.526 
 ITYPE2 -0.024 0.016 -0.157 -1.48 0.141 0.611 1.637 
 ITYPE4 -0.015 0.016 -0.095 -0.932 0.353 0.665 1.505 
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Appendix 27a: Model Summary for THEME3 Model 2001 
Model Summaryb  
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 .339a 0.115 0.02 0.11495 2.079 
a. Predictors: (Constant), ITYPE4, LISTSTATUS, LOGPROPWHITES, LOGLTDtoTE, LOGINSTSHARE, 
LOGROA, LOGPROPDNEDS, LOGSBD, ITYPE2, LOGDIRECTSHARE, LOGSTA, AUDTYPE, ITYPE1 
b. Dependent Variable: LOGTHEME3 
 
 






Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 0.209 13 0.016 1.216 .276a 
 Residual 1.612 122 0.013   
 Total 1.821 135    
a. Predictors: (Constant), ITYPE4, LISTSTATUS, LOGPROPWHITES, LOGLTDtoTE, LOGINSTSHARE, 
LOGROA, LOGPROPDNEDS, LOGSBD, ITYPE2, LOGDIRECTSHARE, LOGSTA, AUDTYPE, ITYPE1 
b. Dependent Variable: LOGTHEME3 
 
 
Appendix 27c: Coefficient Table for THEME3 Model 2001 
Coefficients(a) 




  Collinearity 
Statistics 
Model  B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 3.561 9.835  0.362 0.718   
 
REFLOGPROPWHIT
ES -0.114 0.295 -0.037 -0.386 0.7 0.808 1.237 
 
REFLOGPROPDNED
S 0.06 0.159 0.036 0.376 0.708 0.814 1.229 
 REFLOGSBD 0.199 0.145 0.153 1.376 0.171 0.588 1.701 
 REFLOGSTA -0.851 1.861 -0.054 -0.457 0.648 0.516 1.939 
 REFLOGLTDtoTE 0.773 0.695 0.104 1.111 0.269 0.823 1.216 
 REFLOGINSTSHARE 0.25 0.141 0.17 1.774 0.079 0.79 1.265 
 REFLOGDRCTSHARE -0.095 0.398 -0.023 -0.238 0.812 0.806 1.241 
 REFLOGROA -0.069 0.487 -0.014 -0.142 0.887 0.749 1.335 
 AUDTYPE 0.013 0.025 0.05 0.523 0.602 0.808 1.237 
 LISTSTATUS 0.017 0.032 0.051 0.544 0.588 0.819 1.221 
 ITYPE1 0.013 0.028 0.049 0.468 0.64 0.655 1.526 
 ITYPE2 -0.022 0.03 -0.081 -0.746 0.457 0.611 1.637 
 ITYPE4 -0.029 0.029 -0.107 -1.023 0.308 0.665 1.505 
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Appendix 28a: Model Summary for THEME4 Model 2001 
Model Summaryb  
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 .500a 0.25 0.17 0.06547 1.978 
a. Predictors: (Constant), ITYPE4, LISTSTATUS, LOGPROPWHITES, LOGLTDtoTE, LOGINSTSHARE, 
LOGROA, LOGPROPDNEDS, LOGSBD, ITYPE2, LOGDIRECTSHARE, LOGSTA, AUDTYPE, ITYPE1 
b. Dependent Variable: LOGTHEME3 
 
 






Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 0.174 13 0.013 3.121 .000a 
 Residual 0.523 122 0.004   
 Total 0.697 135    
a. Predictors: (Constant), ITYPE4, LISTSTATUS, LOGPROPWHITES, LOGLTDtoTE, LOGINSTSHARE, 
LOGROA, LOGPROPDNEDS, LOGSBD, ITYPE2, LOGDIRECTSHARE, LOGSTA, AUDTYPE, ITYPE1 




Appendix 28c: Coefficient Table for THEME4 Model 2001 
Coefficients(a) 






  Collinearity 
Statistics 
Model  B 
Std. 
Error Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -4.266 5.602  -0.762 0.448   
 
REFLOGPROPWHITE
S -0.024 0.168 -0.012 -0.141 0.888 0.808 1.237 
 REFLOGPROPDNEDS -0.014 0.091 -0.014 -0.158 0.875 0.814 1.229 
 REFLOGSBD 0.171 0.082 0.213 2.079 0.04 0.588 1.701 
 REFLOGSTA 0.625 1.06 0.064 0.589 0.557 0.516 1.939 
 REFLOGLTDtoTE 0.893 0.396 0.195 2.254 0.026 0.823 1.216 
 REFLOGINSTSHARE -0.025 0.08 -0.027 -0.312 0.756 0.79 1.265 
 REFLOGDRCTSHARE 0.088 0.226 0.034 0.387 0.7 0.806 1.241 
 REFLOGROA 0.594 0.278 0.194 2.141 0.034 0.749 1.335 
 AUDTYPE 0.031 0.014 0.187 2.148 0.034 0.808 1.237 
 LISTSTATUS 0.003 0.018 0.016 0.183 0.855 0.819 1.221 
 ITYPE1 -0.019 0.016 -0.113 -1.17 0.244 0.655 1.526 
 ITYPE2 -0.039 0.017 -0.229 -2.283 0.024 0.611 1.637 
 ITYPE4 -0.025 0.016 -0.145 -1.511 0.133 0.665 1.505 
a. Dependent Variable: LOGTHEME4 
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Appendix 29a: Collinearity Diagnostics for TCI 2001 
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Appendix 29b: Collinearity Diagnostics for VCI 2001 
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Appendix 29c: Collinearity Diagnostics for VCI 2001 
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Appendix 29d: Collinearity Diagnostics for THEME1 2001 
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Appendix 29e: Collinearity Diagnostics for THEME2 2001 
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Appendix 29f: Collinearity Diagnostics for THEME3 2001 
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Appendix 29g: Collinearity Diagnostics for THEME4  2001 
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Appendix 30f: Collinearity Diagnostics for THEME4 2008 
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Appendix 31: List of Code Names of Respondents 
Commissioners 
 
1. Respondent A 
2. Respondent B 
3. Respondent C 
Company Executives 
 
4. Respondent D 
5. Respondent E 
6. Respondent F 
7. Respondent G 
8. Respondent H 
9. Respondent I  
Labour Union Movement - COSATU 
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Appendix 32: Summary of Regression Results for Eleven Models   





TCI TCI VCI VCI MCI THEME1 THEME1 THEME2 THEME2 THEME4 THEME4 
H1 PROPWHITES - -ve -ve*** -ve -ve*** -ve* -ve - ve*** + ve + ve - ve - ve*** 
H2 PROPNEDS + +ve +ve +ve +ve +ve*** + ve* + ve - ve + ve** - ve + ve 
H3 SBD + +ve*** +ve*** +ve*** +ve*** +ve** + ve*** + ve*** + ve** + ve** + ve** + ve** 
H4 STA + +ve +ve*** +ve +ve*** +ve*** + ve + ve*** - ve + ve*** + ve + ve*** 
H5 LTDtoTE + +ve** +ve +ve** -ve -ve* + ve - ve + ve*** - ve + ve** - ve 
H6 INSTSHARE + +ve +ve** +ve -ve -ve* - ve - ve + ve - ve - ve - ve 
H7 DRCTSHARE - +ve +ve +ve -ve -ve* + ve - ve - ve - ve + ve - ve*** 
H8 ROA + +ve** +ve +ve** -ve -ve* + ve - ve + ve** - ve + ve** - ve*** 
H9 AUDTYPE + +ve** +ve*** +ve** +ve*** +ve* + ve** + ve*** + ve + ve + ve** + ve*** 
H10 LISTSTATUS + +ve +ve*** +ve -ve*** +ve** + ve - ve* - ve* - ve + ve - ve 
H13 ITYPE1 -/+ +ve +ve +ve -ve +ve + ve - ve - ve - ve** + ve - ve 
H13 ITYPE2 -/+ -ve -ve -ve** -ve -ve - ve + ve - ve* + ve - ve** - ve* 
H13 ITYPE4 -/+ -ve -ve -ve -ve +ve + ve - ve - ve - ve** - ve + ve 
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Appendix 32a: Sensitivity Analysis on PROPWHITES: OLS Regression Results for 2008 
  2008  2008  2008  










t-statistic Coefficient  
Value 
t-statistic Coefficient  
Value 
t-statistic 
(Constant)  -9.702 -4.422*** -10.038 -4.119*** -12.027 -3.222*** 
REFLOGPROPDNEDS + 0.098 1.328 0.097 1.249 0.022 0.284 
REFLOGSBD + 0.284 3.718*** 0.279 3.491*** 0.214 2.655*** 
REFLOGSTA + 0.329 4.393*** 0.319 4.059*** 0.248 3.129*** 
REFLOGLTDtoTE + -0.01 -0.142 -0.005 -0.065 0.013 0.184 
REFLOGINSTSHARE + -0.036 -0.512 -0.035 -0.475 -0.014 -0.19 
REFLOGDRCTSHARE - -0.152 -2.1** -0.087 -1.141 -0.227 -2.963*** 
REFLOGROA + -0.013 -0.191 -0.007 -0.099 -0.002 -0.031 
AUDTYPE + 0.278 3.643*** 0.26 3.25*** 0.311 3.867*** 
LISTSTATUS + -0.198 -2.713*** -0.129 -1.68** -0.301 -3.905*** 
ITYPE1 -/+ 0.088 1.029 0.085 0.945 -0.009 -0.102 
ITYPE3 -/+ 0.153 1.689** 0.121 1.279 0.142 1.49 
ITYPE4 -/+ 0.093 1.099 0.076 0.846 0.125 1.387 
REFLOGPROPWHITES - -0.109 -1.593* -0.139 -1.931** -0.11 -1.519 
        
Adjusted R²   0.426  0.368  0.361 
Standard Error   0.044  0.049  0.076 
F Value   8.722***  7.052***  6.855*** 
No. of Observations   136  136  136 
Where: ***,  **  and * denote p-value is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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Appendix 32b: Sensitivity Analysis on STA: OLS Regression Results for 2008 
Where: ***,  **  and * denote p-value is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
  2008  2008  2008  





t-statistic Coefficient  
Value 
t-statistic Coefficient  
Value 
t-statistic 
(Constant)  -0.004 -0.005 -0.086 -0.1 -0.298 -0.226 
LOGPROPWHITES + -0.232 -3.296*** -0.262 -3.554*** -0.199 -2.69*** 
REFLOGPROPDNEDS + 0.113 1.524* 0.112 1.447* 0.035 0.446 
REFLOGSBD + 0.259 3.356*** 0.251 3.113*** 0.192 2.369** 
REFLOGLTDtoTE + 0.002 0.031 0.008 0.107 0.024 0.33 
REFLOGINSTSHARE + -0.059 -0.82 -0.056 -0.75 -0.029 -0.388 
REFLOGDRCTSHARE - -0.158 -2.149** -0.096 -1.254 -0.235 -3.039*** 
REFLOGROA + 0.01 0.145 0.014 0.191 0.015 0.202 
AUDTYPE + 0.272 3.524*** 0.255 3.166*** 0.307 3.79*** 
LISTSTATUS + -0.147 -2.002 -0.076 -0.993 -0.26 -3.382*** 
ITYPE1 -/+ 0.097 1.116** 0.091 1.002 -0.004 -0.047 
ITYPE2 -/+ 0.109 1.175 0.075 0.771 0.108 1.106 
ITYPE4 -/+ 0.074 0.87 0.059 0.66 0.113 1.264 
STASMALLSSA  -0.2 -2.56** -0.179 -2.199** -0.136 -1.657* 
        
Adjusted R²   0.414  0.362  0.355 
Standard Error   0.045  0.049  0.076 
F Value   8.341***  6.904***  6.703*** 
No. of Observations   136  136  136 




Appendix 32c: Sensitivity Analysis on STA (LOWER & UPPER QURTILES): OLS Regression Results for 2008 
  2008  2008  2008  





t-statistic Coefficient  
Value 
t-statistic Coefficient  
Value 
t-statistic 
(Constant)  0.581 0.78 0.567 0.689 0.338 0.258 
REFLOGPROPWHITES - -0.228 -3.393*** -0.256 -3.66*** -0.198 -2.711*** 
REFLOGPROPDNEDS + 0.093 1.329 0.09 1.232 0.022 0.282 
REFLOGSBD + 0.205 2.778*** 0.194 2.515** 0.157 1.942** 
REFLOGLTDtoTE + -0.046 -0.692 -0.043 -0.626 -0.008 -0.108 
REFLOGINSTSHARE + -0.057 -0.858 -0.058 -0.829 -0.028 -0.378 
REFLOGDRCTSHARE + -0.158 -2.242** -0.093 -1.271 -0.239 -3.111*** 
REFLOGROA - -0.027 -0.412 -0.024 -0.346 -0.011 -0.157 
AUDTYPE + 0.27 3.621*** 0.252 3.234*** 0.311 3.818*** 
LISTSTATUS + -0.17 -2.428** -0.103 -1.403 -0.279 -3.646*** 
ITYPE1 + -0.102 -1.226 -0.069 -0.8 -0.098 -1.084 
ITYPE2 -/+ -0.004 -0.054 0.024 0.291 -0.104 -1.215 
ITYPE4 -/+ -0.012 -0.15 0.003 0.04 0.026 0.302 
UPPERQSTA + -0.282 -3.901*** -0.283 -3.742*** -0.202 -2.551** 
LOWERQSTA + 0.149 1.957** 0.145 1.831*** 0.08 0.97 
        
Adjusted R²   0.480  0.434  0.381 
Standard Error   0.042  0.047  0.074 
F Value   9.917***  8.384***  6.939*** 
No. of Observations   136  136  136 
Where: ***,  **  and * denote p-value is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
 pg. 412 
 
 
Appendix 32d: Sensitivity Analysis on PROPWHITES: OLS Regression Results for 2001 
  2001  2001  2001  










t-statistic Coefficient  
Value 
t-statistic Coefficient  
Value 
t-statistic 
(Constant)  -0.599 -0.167 -0.233 -0.057 -0.726 -0.726 
REFLOGPROPDNEDS + 0.057 0.675 0.131 1.449* -0.019 -0.22 
REFLOGSBD + 0.324 3.277*** 0.277 2.643*** 0.222 2.186** 
REFLOGSTA + -0.001 -0.011 0.003 0.024 0.06 0.548 
REFLOGLTDtoTE + 0.171 2.033** 0.001 0.012 0.193 2.233** 
REFLOGINSTSHARE + 0.034 0.398 -0.011 -0.119 -0.029 -0.33 
REFLOGDRCTSHARE - 0.017 0.206 0.052 0.577 0.031 0.352 
REFLOGROA + 0.17 1.949** 0.077 0.829 0.197 2.189** 
AUDTYPE + 0.169 1.997 0.16 1.776** 0.184 2.113** 
LISTSTATUS + 0.014 0.165 0.05 0.568 0.013 0.155 
ITYPE1 -/+ 0.161 1.639* 0.129 1.234 0.119 1.176 
ITYPE3 -/+ 0.164 1.577* 0.012 0.107 0.242 2.257** 
ITYPE4 -/+ 0.061 0.607 0.021 0.202 0.077 0.751 
REFLOGPROPWHITES - -0.038 -0.469 -0.053 -0.63 -0.04 -0.489 
        
Adjusted R²   0.215  0.117  0.171 
Standard Error   0.041  0.047  0.065 
F Value   3.844***  2.38***  3.143*** 
No. of Observations   136  136  136 
Where: ***,  **  and * denote p-value is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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Appendix 32e: Sensitivity Analysis on STA (Using Median as Separator): OLS Regression Results for 2001 
  2001  2001  2001  





t-statistic Coefficient  
Value 
t-statistic Coefficient  
Value 
t-statistic 
(Constant)  -0.601 -2.453** -0.137 -0.488 -0.891 -2.349** 
LOGPROPWHITES + -0.033 -0.386 -0.04 -0.439 -0.027 -0.311 
REFLOGPROPDNEDS + 0.053 0.626 0.137 1.531* -0.027 -0.319 
REFLOGSBD + 0.276 2.834*** 0.267 2.574** 0.153 1.546 
REFLOGLTDtoTE + 0.172 2.064** 0.005 0.058 0.197 2.326** 
REFLOGINSTSHARE + 0.033 0.401 -0.008 -0.092 -0.019 -0.224 
REFLOGDRCTSHARE - 0.034 0.399 0.057 0.626 0.059 0.683 
REFLOGROA + 0.162 1.846** 0.071 0.755 0.185 2.078** 
AUDTYPE + 0.15 1.736** 0.169 1.843** 0.143 1.634* 
LISTSTATUS + 0.012 0.148 0.059 0.664 0.011 0.13 
ITYPE1 -/+ 0.009 0.099 0.115 1.153 -0.106 -1.119 
ITYPE2 -/+ -0.149 -1.531 -0.013 -0.125 -0.221 -2.244** 
ITYPE4 -/+ -0.083 -0.893 0.006 0.065 -0.133 -1.413* 
STASMALLSSA  0.095 0.962 -0.011 -0.102 0.221 2.2** 
        
Adjusted R²   0.220  0.116  0.199 
Standard Error   0.041  0.047  0.064 
F Value   3.931***  2.361***  3.58*** 
No. of Observations   136  136  136 
Where: ***,  **  and * denote p-value is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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Appendix 32f: Sensitivity Analysis on STA (LOWER & UPPER QURTILES): OLS Regression Results for 2001 
  2001  2001  2001  





t-statistic Coefficient  
Value 
t-statistic Coefficient  
Value 
t-statistic 
(Constant)  -0.694 -2.771*** -0.181 -0.624 -1.08 -2.736*** 
REFLOGPROPWHITES - -0.063 -0.747 -0.068 -0.752 -0.049 -0.554 
REFLOGPROPDNEDS + 0.034 0.411 0.115 1.281 -0.034 -0.39 
REFLOGSBD + 0.281 2.809*** 0.232 2.164** 0.207 2.012** 
REFLOGLTDtoTE + 0.203 2.427** 0.026 0.292 0.229 2.649*** 
REFLOGINSTSHARE + 0.047 0.553 -0.003 -0.034 -0.002 -0.022 
REFLOGDRCTSHARE + 0.026 0.313 0.062 0.691 0.035 0.407 
REFLOGROA - 0.181 2.088** 0.081 0.874 0.209 2.332** 
AUDTYPE + 0.14 1.633* 0.138 1.497* 0.166 1.873** 
LISTSTATUS + 0.022 0.266 0.059 0.672 0.029 0.34 
ITYPE1 + -0.049 -0.517 0.075 0.734 -0.17 -1.724** 
ITYPE2 -/+ -0.209 -2.113** -0.052 -0.496 -0.287 -2.816*** 
ITYPE4 -/+ -0.148 -1.564 -0.033 -0.323 -0.21 -2.144** 
UPPERQSTA + 0.119 1.182 0.077 0.712 0.118 1.138 
LOWERQSTA + 0.201 2.136** 0.157 1.557* 0.196 2.019** 
        
Adjusted R²   0.242  0.128  0.193 
Standard Error   0.040  0.047  0.064 
F Value   4.076***  2.244***  3.307*** 
No. of Observations   136  136  136 
Where: ***,  **  and * denote p-value is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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